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Department of Comparative Literature

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Homeric epaineō: The Politics of Reception
and the Poetics of Consent

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Homeric *epaineô*: The Politics of Reception and the Poetics of Consent

A thesis presented

by

David Franklin Elmer

to

The Department of Comparative Literature

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the subject of
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Homeric *epaineô*: The Politics of Reception and the Poetics of Consent

Through close examination of the Homeric usage of *epaineô*, this thesis examines the representation of collective decision making in Homer, and the thematic importance the *Iliad* in particular attaches to a mode of decision making one can describe in terms of 'consensus.' Chapter 1 isolates the function of *epaineô* as part of a system of five formulaic expressions that together constitute a 'grammar of reception.' *Epaineô* emerges as a term for the most efficacious response an audience can give to a speaker. Chapter 2 explains this efficacy and relates Homeric *epaineô* to later usages of the verb by examining the social force of 'praise.' Chapter 3 begins to develop a reading of the *Iliad* in terms of consensus by exploring the many forces (and their phraseological markers) that interfere with *epainos*. Chapter 4 balances this analysis of social dysfunction by observing the three figures (Nestor, Odysseus, and Diomedes) who specialize in the practice of *ainos*, defined as 'socially constructive speech.' Chapter 5 brings together the results of previous chapters to produce a sustained reading of the *Iliad* that focuses on the drive toward re-establishing the social cohesion of *epainos*. *Epainos*—that is, the global support, or consensus, of the community—is not only central to the thematics of the *Iliad*; it is also presented by the *Iliad* itself as the fundamental force that creates and sustains Panhellenic epic tradition.

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Introduction

As its title implies, this work undertakes a reading of the *Iliad* that has a double inflection, as 'politics' and as 'poetics,' both of which, I shall argue, are implicit in the Homeric usage of the verb *epaineô*. The political aspects of this verb are relatively easily delineated, simply by anticipating some of the observations I will make in the first chapter of this thesis. Homeric *epaineô* is part of the vocabulary of political life; more specifically, it designates an aspect of the process whereby groups collectively make decisions. It refers to the support expressed by a political constituency for the policy proposals of its leaders, a support that, we will see, is necessary for any proposal to become policy. That is, *epaineô* designates a socially meaningful act of acceptance, and it is first of all in this sense that we can speak of a 'politics of reception,' a representation of the political process that focuses on the determining role of the community that receives 'law' (in the most general sense), rather than the elites who propose it.

The acceptance or approval marked by the term *epaineô* is of a special nature: for reasons that will become clear in the following pages, I will describe this specific form of acceptance as 'consensus,' giving to the term the full weight it bears in anthropological descriptions of decision-making processes. I will endeavor to show that the poem ascribes considerable value to this particular modality of political life, to the extent that the theme of *epainos*[1] becomes central to the construction of the work as a whole. The

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[1] For ease of style, I shall throughout this work use the nominal form *epainos* in reference to the action designated by Homeric *epaineô*. This is merely a stylistic device; the noun *epainos* does not occur in Homer. By adopting this periphrastic technique, I do not mean to suggest that the semantics of *epainos* and

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'poetics of consent' I offer here is, first and foremost, a description of the significance of this theme to the *Iliad* in particular and to Homeric tradition as a whole.

Thus *The Politics of Reception and the Poetics of Consent*, in the simple sense: a reading of the *Iliad* that addresses simultaneously two relatively distinct fields, the representation of political processes, on the one hand, and the poetic texture of the poem, on the other. But I hope that my discussion will lead to the gradual deepening and intertwining of both inflections, so that we may see the extent to which they are fundamentally interconnected. By virtue of its deep self-awareness and its tendency to represent political processes within the poem as in fact shaping the poem itself (I shall explore these features of Iliadic *epainos* in Chapter 5), the poem projects a notion of the reception—in the full literary sense of that word—of a poetic text as a fundamentally political process, a process requiring the definition and negotiation of an interested constituency; and it pictures the politics of consent as a decisive factor in determining the shape of poetic traditions.

This deepened sense of my title lies somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is implicit in many of the arguments I put forward, and especially in the reading of the *Iliad* I develop in Chapter 5. Moreover—so long as I am looking beyond the scope of this thesis—the intertwining of poetics and politics is implicit in certain later usages of the verb *epaineô*, for instance when Plato's Socrates speaks of his refusal to admit Agamemnon's dream to the official text of his ideal city: πολλὰ ἄρα Ὁμήρου ἐπαινοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐπαινεσόμεθα, τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπὴν ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ ᾿Αγαμέμνονι ("while, then, approving much of Homer, this [passage] we will not

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epaineô should be strictly equivalent at any given stage in the development of Greek; as Blanc 1995: 214 observes, derivatives often diverge from the sense of their root.

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approve, namely, the messenger sent in a dream by Zeus to Agamemnon," *Republic*

383a). Socrates' goal is to construct an authoritative, 'approved' text of Homer on the

basis of and in support of the agreed-upon values of the state: in the context of such a

project, reception is fundamentally political, and any poetics will be determined by

political concerns.

To draw a connecting line between two such temporally and contextually distinct

usages of *epaineô* is of course a perilous endeavor. Together with the simplex *aineô* and

the related nouns *epainos* and *ainos*, the verb shows a semantic diversity in attested

Greek that has confounded critics.[2] A quick review of the many examples gathered in the

verb's entry in LSJ reveals an overwhelming range of nuances. 'Praise' or, more

generally, 'approval' would seem, from the lexicon, to be the basic sense; but LSJ's

"praise, commend in any way" (s.v. I.2) is rather a catch-all than a proper definition. The

verb can indicate the public praise conferred by an honorary decree or inscription; the

poetic (and no less public) praise of an epinician ode; the acceptance of an obligation, as

of marriage; even the approval one expresses by way of giving thanks.[3] The list of

possible meanings could be considerably extended. Nevertheless, there are reasons to

suspect a line of connection, however tenuous or circuitous, uniting some or all of these

diverse usages, especially with respect to the interrelation of poetics and politics we will

observe in Homer. Of particular interest to me—although, again, it lies strictly beyond

the scope of this thesis—is the poetic usage that lies in the immediate background of

Socrates' comments in the *Republic*. The locution 'praise (the text of) Homer'—which

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[2] For a representative survey of the variety of interpretations given to *ainos*—which has received the bulk of the critical attention devoted to this lexical field—see Blanc 1995: 208-11.

[3] For this last, see Quincey 1966, who corrects LSJ s.v. III.

Plato employs as a way of talking about the process of reception—derives from the technical language of the rhapsodes, who used the phrase *epainein Homêron* to mean 'recite' or 'declaim publicly' (LSJ s.v. IV) the authoritative text of Homer.[4] I would argue that this usage also designates a process of reception that is fundamentally political, insofar as the authority of the Homeric text is constituted precisely by its performance in specified institutional settings (for instance, the Panathenaia at Athens).[5] The rhapsode's performance of material he has himself received in tradition is the act of reception that defines the text as transmitted to others. On the other hand, Isocrates, Aristotle, and the writer of the *Athênaiôn Politeia* attest to a rhetorical tradition of *epainos* for political institutions (reinforced by blame for competing institutions)[6]: here, as in Homer, *epainos* designates political 'approval,' and as in Plato, it participates in the definition of the ideal state; yet it is nevertheless in the most general sense a poetic action, the practice of verbal art, and it may well rely on a prior and specifically poetic tradition. In Chapter 2 I will survey a representative selection of the post-Homeric usages of *epaineô* and argue that we can trace connections in the domain of the social, that is, by understanding the social force of the actions denoted by the verb; by the same token, the connection between political acts and poetic acts is likewise to be located in the social sphere, which subsumes them both.

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[4] Cf. Pl. *Ion* 536d, 541e, and Lycurg. *Against Leokrates* 102; for a discussion of the meaning and phraseology of the rhapsodes' expression, see Nagy 2002: 11, 27-8.

[5] I refer the reader to the work of Nagy on the 'Panathenaic rule': Nagy 2002: 12 ff. and *passim*.

[6] Cf. e.g. Isoc. *Panath.* 118 (τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ὑπό τινων ψεγομένην ἀντὶ τῆς ὑπό πάντων ἐπαινουμένης: note that this *epainos* is explicitly universal); Arist. *Pol.* 1265b (διὸ καὶ τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπαινοῦσιν); *Ath. Pol.* 1.1 (οὐκ ἐπαινῶ). For the tradition of *epainos* for political forms, see Roscalla 1995.

Aware as I am of the multiplicity of distinct semantic values that have attached themselves to *epaineô* in the course of its long history, I assiduously refrain in the early part of this work from making any undue assumptions about its specific semantic content. My initial approach to understanding the value of this word in the system of Homeric diction is empirical and functional, that is, I interpret it on the basis of careful observation of its specific and unique function in Homeric descriptions of collective decision making. A few words need to be said about the conceptual apparatus I have brought to bear on this functional description.

Because the process of decision making in Homer involves the performance in speech of a proposal for action, followed by the rejection or acceptance (i.e. putting into action) of that proposal, I have found it useful to employ certain basic insights of the so-called theory of speech acts, especially as initially formulated by J. L. Austin. The theory has relevance for my project in two respects. Firstly and most obviously, it attempts to assess the ways in which speech has an effect on the world, the ways in which saying something 'does' something: political deliberation is a primary field for the operation of illocutionary and perlocutionary forces, since the final goal of political discourse is precisely to produce or manage action.[7] But secondly, and ultimately much more importantly, speech-act theory has a place in this study of political *reception* because it allows us to relate an utterance and its reception as two distinct but interdependent components of a single larger action. There is a tendency in some treatments of the theory to elide the fundamental importance of reception by focusing strictly on the 'illocutionary act' as intended by the performer of an utterance, and on the description of

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[7] For the distinction between 'illucutionary' and 'perlocutionary' actions and effects, see Austin 1975, Chs. 9 and 10. For my purposes, it is not important to distinguish the two.

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the linguistic features that distinguish one such 'illocution' from another (features that are naturally independent of reception).[8] Austin, however, made a firm distinction between 'performatives'—the utterance component of a speech act—and the speech act as a whole, so that, at the end of the lectures that inaugurated the study of speech acts, he could speak of "the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary acts in the total speech act," and assert that "the total speech act in the total speech situation is the *only actual* phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating."[9] This is a forceful assertion that necessitates a rigid and principled distinction between an 'act' in the narrow sense—i.e. the action one performs with the intention of achieving a certain goal—and the total 'act'—i.e. the fulfillment of that goal:

> Acts of all our three kinds [locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions] necessitate, since they are the performing of actions, allowance being made for the ills that all action is heir to. We must systematically be prepared to distinguish between 'the act of doing x,' i.e. achieving x, and 'the act of attempting to do x.'
> In the case of illocutions we must be ready to draw the necessary distinction, not noticed by ordinary language except in exceptional cases, between
> (a) the act of attempting or purporting (or affecting or professing or claiming or setting up or setting out) to perform a certain illocutionary act, and
> (b) the act of successfully achieving or consummating or bringing off such an act.
> This distinction is, or should be, a commonplace of the theory of our language about 'action' in general.[10]

Now, there are any number of 'infelicities' (again, Austin's term) that might vitiate a speaker's attempt to perform a given illocutionary act, that might render it 'unhappy';

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[8] See, for example, Searle 1976.

[9] Austin 1975: 148.

[10] Ibid. 105-6. Note Austin's use of the word 'action' to indicate the difference between the narrow and global senses.

but, in general, assuming a competent speaker who has correctly understood and deployed the appropriate illocutionary procedure in the appropriate setting, the difference between the 'happy' and 'unhappy' (or successful and unsuccessful) act will be a difference of reception, what Austin calls 'uptake.'[11] From the point of view of the present work, this is the most important aspect of the theory of speech acts, for it is precisely here, in the importance of reception to the efficacy of language, that we can locate the social dimension of speech: "Illocutionary acts are either felicitous or infelicitous, to use Austin's terms. . . . The notion of felicity is itself distinctly social. A felicitous act is one that 'takes,' one whose legitimacy is acknowledged by all the participants and all those affected, and whose performance changes, however slightly, the social connectedness among people."[12]

In the chapters that follow, I will use the term 'speech act' to refer to the *total* speech act—that is, the dyad of performative utterance and reception as a complex that exerts a social force—and not to illocutionary acts, i.e. actions, in the narrow sense. The reader should be advised that in doing so I am giving to the term a somewhat broader sense than it usually carries in discussions and applications of speech-act theory (where 'speech act' and 'illocutionary act' are often used interchangeably). In order to prevent in advance any possibility of confusion, I would also like to point out that, insofar as it applies to the *response* to a proposal—to the community's expression of approval for an utterance—*epaineô* belongs to the reception component of the speech act dyad. When I

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[11] Cf. e.g. Austin 1975: 139. Note that the failure of 'uptake' is as much a reception as its success. That is, there is no such thing as 'non-reception'; we must rather distinguish between 'happy' or successful reception and 'unhappy' or unsuccessful reception.

[12] Ohmann 1972: 129. Fish's critique (Fish 1980: 225) of Ohmann's notion of sociality misses the point as a result of understanding over-broadly what Ohmann means by 'social.'

speak of the 'expression of *epainos*,' or of the 'expression' of other kinds of approval or

disapproval, I do not mean to suggest that such manifestations of sentiment count as

'speech acts' in themselves. They are, rather, part of the process of reception, which, if

successful, will transform an utterance into a speech act (understood as a total

phenomenon).[13]

The second major component of my conceptual framework that requires some

preliminary explication involves the terms 'consensus' and 'consent,' which I use to

describe the specific political modality indicated in Homeric discourse by *epaineô*. I

emphasize that my use of these terms is more descriptive than analytical: the notion of

consensus provides a convenient tool for isolating the distinctive features of a particular

mode of political interaction; by invoking this notion, I do not mean necessarily to locate

the political forms represented in the Homeric poems in any general theory of political

systems or decision making. At the same time, neither do I adopt these terms as mere ad

hoc labels or empty concepts to be filled by a more or less arbitrary set of characteristics

culled from Homeric social life. On the contrary, with the words 'consensus' and

'consent' I take on as well the very specific meanings these terms carry in political

science—or rather, in political anthropology, where they have an empirical value that

differs from their normative value in political theory (e.g. in Rousseau's notion of the

'consent of the governed,' or in contemporary theories of democracy).[14] In their

empirical senses, these terms describe a manner of collective decision making that, for

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[13] The main difference between my use of the term 'speech act' and its classical usage is that, for me, a 'speech act' is always 'happy' or successful, i.e. by definition it results in action.

[14] For the necessity of distinguishing between descriptive and prescriptive perspectives (those of "political science" and "political philosophy," respectively) in assessing the concept of 'consensus,' see Graham 1984: 89-90.

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my purposes, is distinguished by two essential features.[15] Firstly, deliberations founded

on the principle of consensus strive for one hundred per cent participation in the decision-

making process. For consensus to be achieved, all voices must be heard, or at least, be

given the opportunity to be heard; in other words, no voice can be excluded. Secondly,

the consensus-based approach to decision making strives to ensure that all participating

individuals support the decision thus reached. When a decision results from the

consensus of the group, there are no winners and no losers. While the intensity of

preference for the option decided upon may vary widely among members of the group,

no one can claim that he or she has 'sacrificed' interests, or otherwise 'lost': in this sense,

consensus politics—as opposed, for example, to majoritarian politics—count as a

'positive-sum' rather than a 'zero-sum' game.

In considering the implementation of such a manner of decision making, one can

reflect on a number of social circumstances that make it possible (multiplicity of relations

among group members, comparability of interests, etc.). Similarly, the practice of

consensus politics has a number of identifiable consequences. If the drive to establish

consensus is particularly strong, the immediate consequence is that action (the

implementation of a decision) is not possible in the absence of consensus, i.e. the global

support of the group.[16] In particular instances, of course, political realities may fall far

short of the ideal of consensus, so that it can be more a matter of perception than of

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[15] The description that follows owes much to the presentation of the consensus model in Flaig 1993 and 1994, on which see below.

[16] Cf. Bailey 1965: 8-9 (in the context of the politics of Indian villages): "some of the apparent anxiety to damp down dispute . . . springs from the fact that everyone knows that if the decision is not the result of an agreed compromise, then it cannot be implemented. . . . conflicts will tend to be resolved by compromise if the majority know that the minority must be carried with them on pain of taking no action at all." 'Compromise,' however, is an unfortunate term, since it implies some sacrifice of interests. One of the often-reiterated themes in discussions of consensus is that there are no losers, no compromised interests.

fact—in other words, it can have an ideological dimension.[17] Nevertheless, it is an

ideology with a powerful ability to organize social behavior, and to which subscribers are

so deeply committed that they are willing to invest large amounts of energy and resources

in a mode of political life that is costly by any estimation.[18] Obviously, by a kind of

inverse economy of scale, this manner of decision making is easily practicable only by

relatively small, homogenous groups, and for this reason it appears to be especially

characteristic of (but by no means limited to) small-scale, traditional societies.[19] It should

be noted that the social and political modality I am describing is a *systemic* phenomenon.

For that reason, one cannot speak of the 'consent' (in the strong sense I am outlining

here) of an individual except insofar as the individual is understood as a representative of

the group, with which his or her interests are coordinated.[20] In the context of consensus,

an individual's preference has no meaning except in relation to group dynamics.[21]

The requirement of the global support of the group, which I singled out

above—and which, it is worth stressing, differs considerably from what the majoritarian

means when speaking of 'unanimity'—is *prima facie* reason to identify Homeric *epainos*

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[17] Cf. Huffer and So'o 2003: 286: "consensus is not always achieved through voluntary consent. . . .
Therefore, in practice, *âmana'ia*, *soâlaupule*, and *alofa* are not always applied across the board."

[18] For the costs of investment in a consensus system, see Bailey 1965: 1 and Flaig 1993: 141-2, Flaig 1994: 30.

[19] For a survey of three historical consensus-based decisions in three distinct societies, see Boehm 1996.
For a description of the consensus-based society of Samoa, mediated by the views of native informants, see
Huffer and So'o 2003, who give a good sketch of the actual process of making decisions by consensus on p.
295. The culture of consensus described by these authors has many important points of comparison with
Homeric dynamics.

[20] For the theoretical imperative to consider consensus according to a "social-systemic" model, see Scheff
1967: 33.

[21] This point can be readily understood by considering what an individual's 'consent' would mean if, for
instance, the individual 'consents' to an option other than that preferred by the group as a whole. If we
predicate 'consent' of an individual, the coherence of the concept of consensus breaks down.

with the political notion of consensus. As we will see, one of the principal features that distinguishes *epaineô* from a range of other possible ways of describing audience reaction is that, by definition, it designates a *universal* reaction. The pages to follow will sketch a number of other ways in which the social dynamics designated by this verb match up with what I have said about consensus as a specific mode of decision making. In the meantime, by way of justifying my provisional identification of *epainos* with consensus, I note that I am not the first to apply this political model to a reading of the Homeric poems. In the first of two recent articles demonstrating the extent to which ancient Greek culture was familiar with consensus as a mode of political action, Egon Flaig has argued that the scene of divine negotiation that opens *Iliad* Book 4 must be understood in terms of the 'consensus principle.'[22] Flaig's treatment is purely conceptual, but his use of the opening of Book 4 as his example warrants the specific lexical connection (*epainos* = consensus) I trace in the Homeric text. This episode, fraught with poetic consequences, plays an important role in the reading of the *Iliad* I develop in Chapter 5; moreover, as I endeavor to show there, the dynamic of consensus finds a virtually perfect expression in Hera's threat to Zeus, ἔρδ᾽· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι ("do as you like, but we other gods do not give *epainos*," 4.29).[23] Hera's words must be understood as a declaration that the proposal put forward will not generate consensus, and therefore will not meet with the 'happy' reception necessary to carry it into effect.

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[22] Flaig 1994; see also Flaig 1993 (on the society of fifth-century Sparta).

[23] Cf. Flaig's translation (Flaig 1994: 22n.34): "Tu es! Doch wir anderen Götter billigen es dir nicht alle!"

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Flaig rightly points out that the intense and deeply rooted *agônismos* of Greek culture naturally stood in the way of a positive preference for the consensual mode.[24] Nevertheless, Greeks of diverse times and places were well aware of the advantages possessed by decisions based on consensus. In fact, the fundamental antagonism of political life in the Greek *poleis* seems to have created something of a fascination with this particular, perhaps atypical mode of decision making; for Flaig, this fascination explains why consensus should be thematized in the *Iliad*, the most elementary document of Greek culture, which Flaig reads as a "politische Reflexion in atheoretischer Form."[25] Regrettably, Flaig confines his comments and his interpretation to the divine council that opens Book 4 of the *Iliad*. It is perhaps as a result of this narrow focus that he misses the way in which the language of the poem as a whole encodes the conceptual apparatus of the 'consensus principle.' (The close interdependence of traditional theme and traditional diction of course comes as no surprise to those accustomed to investigate Homeric poetry as a coherent and self-contained system.) As I indicated above, his article on *Iliad* 4 is conducted more or less entirely at the conceptual level, with no mapping of those concepts onto the phraseology of the poem. Although he succeeds in bringing the political strategies of Olympus to life by explaining their conceptual underpinnings, he leaves his reader at a loss when it comes to the Homeric text. This thesis is, in some respects, an attempt to make Flaig's insight into one relatively minor episode meaningful for the poem as a whole—indeed, on the long view, for the tradition of Homeric epic as a

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[24] Flaig 1994: 30-1. The bulk of Flaig's work is on Roman (and particularly senatorial) political culture, to which the principle of consensus is fundamental.

[25] Ibid.

whole. At the same time it attempts to decode the highly developed language of consensus Homeric poetry uses to explore this crucial thematic.

I should emphasize that although the chapters to follow focus primarily on the *Iliad*, my conclusions are, in general, applicable to the *Odyssey* as well, and in many cases to a variety of related texts and traditions—especially insofar as my arguments concern the language of consensus.

Chapter 1 offers a description of what Martin would call a "discourse grammar" of reception in the *Iliad*.[26] By investigating the variety of ways in which the poem can represent the response of an audience to a performative utterance, I demonstrate that Homeric epic ascribes a unique value to *epainos* as a singularly 'efficient' act of reception, the reception that transforms an utterance into a speech act. I elucidate the force of this response by reflecting on the way the syntax of *epaineô* expresses the social dynamics of a particular kind of pragmatic context, namely, performance in a group setting.

Chapter 2 is a limited (but sufficient for my purposes) sociology of praise, in which I sketch the social implications of *ainos* and *epainos* both in Homeric tradition and in later, more specialized developments of dynamics we can observe in a relatively less differentiated state in Homer. My point is that 'praise' is in fact a 'total' social phenomenon, i.e., an activity that has implications for society as a whole. Understanding this, we have a better sense for the point of convergence between 'praise' and the politics of consensus, or rather, for the point of divergence of the former from the latter.

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[26] Martin 1989: 14. Throughout this work I follow the methodological principle that Martin there puts forward (after Bolling): "Homeric discourse grammar should consist of three segments: a description for each poem, and a third comparing the two." I include in my discussion numerous indications of both convergences and divergences in the respective 'grammars' of both poems.

Chapter 3, on the rich Iliadic vocabulary of dissent, provides the essential toolkit for reading the *Iliad* in terms of *epainos*-as-consensus. The poem describes a grand struggle to rehabilitate consensus—but of course it devotes most of its attention to a detailed study of the social pathologies that prevent consensus. In this chapter I chart the phraseology Homeric poetry uses to describe those maladies.

In Chapter 4 I turn my attention to the treatment the *Iliad* prescribes for the pathology of dissent by identifying the master consensus-builders of the Achaean community, and examining the ways in which they interact in the poem.

Chapter 5, at last, integrates the insights gained from previous chapters into a sustained reading of the *Iliad*'s progress toward the strangely problematic *telos* of total social cohesion. I argue that *epainos*-as-consent is not only the poem's central focus and ultimate ideal, but is also presented within the poem itself as the force that confirms the definitive shape of Iliadic tradition.

My methodology is fairly conservative. It is the same methodology that has been fruitfully employed by Homerists for decades if not longer, namely, the careful observation of phraseology and phraseological patterns as a guide to understanding the thematic composition of the poem. This methodology involves certain assumptions, for instance: the principle alluded to above of the correspondence between diction and theme; the idea of the 'immanence' of traditional associations and connotative meanings in formulaic phraseology; the notion that repeated formulas or patterns of diction can index thematic connections between distinct parts of the poem—even distinct poems (or, better said, traditions) within the broader tradition of ancient Greek epic—*without* requiring a restrictive technique of allusion. These methodological assumptions, familiar

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in Homeric criticism since at least the mid-1970's, will generally not be made explicit in my discussion. If I can present any methodological insight with even a claim to freshness, it is the lesson I have acquired from my mild dismay at discovering that an extraordinarily high number of the verses I wished to cite in support of my arguments had in fact been rejected by ancient editors of the text—in most cases because they seemed somehow inconsistent with the general texture of the poem. As my analysis demonstrates, however, these apparent anomalies contribute to an admirably harmonious fabric. The lesson (hardly fresh, I admit), then, is the same one that Adam Parry adumbrated in his famous essay of 1956, when he observed that, in the mouth of Achilles, the Homeric language begins to break down.[27] That is to say, the story of Achilles describes a 'state of exception' that manifests itself in both the social structure of the Achaean community and the linguistic structure of the Homeric text; that story explores certain basic concepts by pushing them to their limits—by pushing them *beyond* the limits of Homeric norms. This, I suggest, is a consequence of the fundamental technique of signification in a traditional medium, an "immanent art" in which every utterance interacts with the pattern set by all previous utterances[28]: such a medium creates meaning through difference—i.e. it establishes significance, priamel-like, through contrast with set patterns—so that, paradoxically, the most central concerns will tend to be expressed in the most anomalous language. The methodological consequence of this lesson is: *caveat lector*. The ancient editors and commentators, for whom normative usage served as a principle guide, are not always to be trusted.

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[27] Parry 1956: 6-7.

[28] See Foley 1991.

Chapter 1

The Grammar of Homeric Reception

Our point of entry into the poetics of *epainos* must be an objective, empirical description of the discrete function of the verb *epaineô* within the system of Homeric diction. The 'economy' of that system is widely recognized; and though it does not necessarily obtain in so strong a form as initially envisioned by Milman Parry, it nevertheless warrants, as a serviceable working principle, the expectation that the formulaic phraseology of *epainos* will not reiterate the function of any other element within the system. Thus, by isolating the function of *epaineô* we can triangulate its semantics vis-à-vis the functions of contrasting expressions, *without* relying on any undue assumptions of meaning based on later patterns of usage.[1] Not that the lexica are altogether unreliable as a guide. In LSJ's gloss on Homeric usage—"approve, applaud, commend . . . c. *dat. person.*, agree with, side with" (s.v. I.1)—one finds some indication (especially in the locutions 'approve' and 'agree with') of the proper force of the verb as a designation for a particular mode of response to the utterance of a speaker. We can only understand this force, however, by placing *epaineô* in relation to a number of other words and expressions employed in comparable contexts by the language of the Homeric poems.

I begin by drawing attention to two facts, one noted by LSJ—namely, that *epaineô* is for the most part used absolutely in Homer—and another left implicit in their

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[1] For the argument that the meaning of Homeric formulas exceeds the mere lexical values of words, see Foley 1995: 12; cf. p. 25 for the usefulness of Parry's notion of economy in the analysis of formulaic phraseology (with specific reference to the first of the five formulas I discuss below). Parry's formulation of this principle ("thrift") can be found at Parry 1987: 276.

entry: on the only occasion that the verb takes a direct object, that object is specifically an utterance, a *muthos* (*Il.* 2.335).[2] I emphasize the latter because, on encountering glosses such as 'applaud' and 'commend,' the native English speaker is liable to think first of the approval one might express for an individual. In point of fact, however, *epaineô* is firmly rooted in the domain of speech. At the risk of extrapolating too much from a single instance (but the subsequent discussion will bear out this extrapolation), we might say that it is rooted specifically in the domain of *muthoi*. Martin has shown that *muthos* is in fact that Homeric term for what speech-act theorists identify as an 'illocutionary act.'[3] Nevertheless, simply on the basis of its distribution in the Homeric texts, we can assert that *epaineô* does not apply to the reception of *muthoi* or illocutionary acts in general—it does not occur in reference to the reaction to a simple command, for instance, or to boasts or insults.[4] The verb is restricted to contexts of collective decision making that are often marked as formal deliberations by words such as *agorê* or *boulê*. A formal assembly is not a necessary component of such scenes, however. All that is required is a deliberative process in which a speaker or speakers propose a specific course of action to a collective body, and in which the support of the group is required in order for the proposal to be put into action. The verb *epaineô* participates in a system of expressions by means of which

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[2] Henceforth all citations from Homer are from the *Iliad*, unless otherwise noted. In the chapters that follow I discuss every Iliadic instance of the verb *epaineô* in detail, but for the intrepid reader who wishes to arm him- or herself in advance, I list all the occurrences here: 2.335, 3.461, 4.29, 4.380, 7.344, 9.710, 16.443, 18.312, 21.290, 22.181, 23.539, 23.540. Instances in the *Odyssey*: 4.673, 7.226, 8.398, 12.294, 12.352, 13.47, 18.64, 18.66.

[3] Martin 1989: 12, who uses the term 'speech act' (in the narrow sense—see my Introduction) in favor of 'illocutionary act.'

[4] All identified as illocutionary acts by Martin 1989: 22.

the traditional diction of Homeric poetry can indicate the reaction of the group to such a proposal—in other words, the reception of the proposal.

The phraseology of Homeric reception

The conventions of the traditional medium do not require that a specific description of group reaction be given in every apposite instance of deliberation. The poetry's 'default' way of indicating that a proposal has satisfied the conditions necessary for it to be put into effect is simply to say that the audience addressed by the speaker "heard and obeyed," as in the case of Priam's proposal in the Trojan *agorê* of 7.345 ff.[5]:

νῦν μὲν δόρπον ἕλεσθε κατὰ πτόλιν ὡς τὸ πάρος περ,
καὶ φυλακῆς μνήσασθε καὶ ἐγρήγορθε ἕκαστος·
ἠῶθεν δ' Ἰδαῖος ἴτω κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας . . .

ὣς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο·
δόρπον ἔπειθ' εἵλοντο κατὰ στρατὸν ἐν τελέεσσιν·
ἠῶθεν δ' Ἰδαῖος ἔβη κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας·

<div align="right">7.370-72, 379-81</div>

"For now, take your suppers throughout the city as before,
and be mindful of the watch and keep vigil each of you;
But at dawn let Idaios go to the hollow ships . . ."

. . .

Thus he spoke, and they heard him and obeyed;
then they took their suppers in companies throughout the host;
and at dawn Idaios went to the hollow ships . . .

Obviously, the mere fact that a proposal results in action implies that it has met with a generally "happy" reception (to use the adjective which Austin applied to successful performatives).[6] The statement that the addressees "heard and obeyed" does not,

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[5] Other occurrences of the same formula in the *Iliad*: 9.79, 14.133, 14.378, 15.300, 23.54, 23.738. 2.442, ὣς ἔφατ'. οὐδ' ἀπίθησεν ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων, is a kind of variation on this formula: it is a deliberative context, certainly, but the decision is ultimately to be made by Agamemnon. This tension between the individual preference of an authoritative person and the will of the group plays an important part in the *Iliad*'s exploration of socio-political pathologies.

[6] Austin 1975: 14 and *passim*.

however, tell us very much about their disposition toward the speaker or his proposal; Homeric speakers can be 'obeyed' as much through fear as through approval.[7] In fact, when we subsequently come to examine more closely the Trojan assembly of Book 7, we will see that Priam's proposal is a compromise intended to bridge the gap between two irreconcilable counter-proposals, and that the apparent 'happiness' of his proposal actually conceals very deep-seated differences among the Trojans.[8]

As an alternative to this 'default' way of indicating the outcome of a deliberative proposal, the epic medium can also specify the reaction of the audience. It is important to note that descriptions of audience reaction actually take the place of a specific reference to the efficacy of a proposal — along the lines of 'they heard and obeyed.' This elision of an explicit statement of efficacy is possible because such descriptions are formulated in phraseology that exhibits the characteristic specificity and refinement of Homeric diction: since happy or unhappy proposals always meet with the same reactions, we can infer from descriptions of those reactions whether a given proposal will be put into effect, and specific notice of a proposal's efficacy becomes redundant.[9] Their ability to substitute for a specific statement of efficacy gives these descriptions of audience reaction a certain primary usefulness to Homeric poetry as a way of talking about *failed* proposals; Homer has no way of indicating an unhappy proposal directly in terms of (in)efficacy. In fact, we

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[7] Cf. 1.33, of Chryses' reaction to Agamemnon's command: ὣς ἔφατ'· ἔδεισεν δ' ὁ γέρων καὶ ἐπείθετο μύθῳ. I am not suggesting that the κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο formula ever indicates that a proposal was enacted through fear. My point is rather that this formula does not tell us anything about the disposition of the audience.

[8] See below, pp. 242-3.

[9] See Lowenstam 1981: 17 ff. for a good discussion of the "constraints" or "restrictions" of formulaic diction that allow us to infer from the deployment of a given formula the presence of themes, motifs, or contexts with which that formula is traditionally associated.

will find that the system of expressions describing audience reactions provides a remarkably subtle means of differentiating among responses which can be, in varying degrees, happy or unhappy. That differences are a matter of *degree*, and that the responses can, accordingly, be arranged on a scale, endows this system of expressions with a poetic utility in addition to its compositional one. In short, the existence of a system, and the intelligibility of any given response as an element in this system, has the effect of emphasizing, priamel-like, those responses that lie at the extreme ends of the scale of differences. The discussion that follows will, I hope, reveal the way in which the *Iliad* uses its (presumably inherited) taxonomy of responses to mark moments of social accord (or discord) that are thematically important.

There are five formulaic expressions for describing an audience's reaction, by which I mean not so much the affective disposition of the addressees—their pleasure or displeasure at a given proposition—but rather the concrete manifestation of their disposition.[10] Because of the consistent correlation of each of these expressions with the

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[10] To my knowledge, all but (arguably) three Iliadic instances of deliberative reception (2.142, 3.111, and 9.173) are described using some variation either on an expression belonging to this system or on the familiar κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο formula. The special circumstances motivating the exceptional phraseology of 9.173 are discussed more fully below. Agamemnon's proposal at 2.110-41 is likewise exceptional. In fact, he does not intend his proposal to be efficacious, and the response in question is explicitly identified as the result of insufficient knowledge about the context of this proposal: ὡς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε / πᾶσι μετὰ πληθύν, ὅσοι οὐ βουλῆς ἐπάκουσαν (2.142-3). See below, Ch. 5 pp. 207-8, for the implications of the fact that l. 142 is a variation on a formula customarily used to describe the reaction of an *individual*; I draw attention also to the fact that this response is explicitly limited to certain members of the group, i.e. it is not properly collective. 3.111 (οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν 'Αχαιοί τε Τρῶές τε) is a complex case. Note that this line represents the Greek response to Menelaos' reformulation of a proposal that has already been made by Hektor, and that has already been received with one of the terms of our system (3.95). In any case, this passage must be read in connection with 19.74-5, where we find a description of a group response to a public pronouncement of Achilles: ὡς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἐχάρησαν ἐϋκνήμιδες 'Αχαιοί / μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος. (See below, Ch. 5 p. 202 and 213 ff. for discussion of these lines, and of the fact that in Book 3 we are dealing with the rather unique problem of 'cross-cultural' reception.) This reaction does indeed occur in the most marked assembly in the poem (Achilles summons *all* the Achaeans, even those who remained by the ships during previous assemblies: 19.42-5); the emphasis is due to the fact that Achilles' pronouncement is a singularly important juridical act, the foreswearing of his *mênis*. Nevertheless, this pronouncement is not a proposal submitted to the group for approval, but concerns rather Achilles' personalized relationship with Agamemnon (I refrain

success or failure of the corresponding proposal, we can describe these expressions in terms of an ascending scale of 'efficiency.' I call an 'efficient' reaction one that effectively enacts the proposal to which it responds; reactions that have decision-making force and that result in the carrying out of a plan of action are efficient. These five expressions are as follows, with number 5 representing full efficiency (I cite representative whole-line formulas—for the time being without translation—underlining the words that define the "nucleus" of each expression,[11] and indicating variants in parentheses):

1. 3.95, 7.398, 8.28, 9.29, etc.
ὣς ἔφαθ'. οἳ δ' ἄρα <u>πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ</u>

2. 1.22, 1.376
ἔνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν <u>πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν</u> Ἀχαιοί

3. 7.403, 9.50
ὣς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἄρα <u>πάντες ἐπίαχον</u> υἷες Ἀχαιῶν
(cf. 2.333, 2.394)

4. 8.542, 18.310
ὣς Ἕκτωρ ἀγόρευ', <u>ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν</u>

5. 7.344, 9.710
ὣς ἔφαθ'. οἳ δ' ἄρα <u>πάντες ἐπήνησαν</u> βασιλῆες[12]
(cf. 3.461; 4.29, 16.443, 22.181; 2.335, 4.380, 18.312, 21.290, 23.539-40)

One immediately observes that numbers 1 and 5—the most definitively inefficient and the most definitively efficient response, respectively—are easily the most common

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from calling this relationship 'private' because it undoubtedly has implications for the community). The juridical nature of Achilles' illocution is the technical reason why it must be made in public. Note that all these apparent exceptions involve descriptions of an audience's *attitude* toward a pronouncement, not of their *expression* of that attitude.

[11] For the distinction between 'nucleus' and 'periphery' in Homeric formulaic diction, see Bakker and Fabbricotti 1991.

[12] This expression occurs in several variant forms. In at least one case, the metrical shape of the variant may be significant: see below.

reactions in Iliadic assemblies. In fact, numbers 2 through 4 are entirely absent from the

Odyssey, a circumstance which suggests that the traditional medium did not very often

find a use for these expressions; the needs of the poetry would seem for the most part to

have been met by a system that included only two terms, one for the inefficient and one

for the efficient response.[13] The middle terms on the scale serve an important purpose in

the *Iliad*, however, since the poem takes as its central concern themes that are

fundamentally sociological. Focused as it is on social problems affecting group

solidarity, the *Iliad* displays a sustained interest in exploring the various dynamics that

might affect the creation of a cohesive group will — of consensus — especially in the

context where the group will is most clearly expressed, viz. the assembly. Before we can

discuss in detail the *Iliad*'s treatment of consensus, we must examine each of the

elements in the Iliadic system and attempt to describe the nuances that assign each to a

specific place in that system.

Number 1 indicates a reaction which is, to be precise, the *lack* of any vocalized

reaction.[14] The group does not express any kind of approval, and although it is never

acknowledged as such by the speaker or narrator, this negative reaction would seem to be

understood as an expression of *disapproval*, of non-support or non-acceptance of a

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[13] That is, the binary system provides a basic framework whose stability across the two poems suggests that this framework was generally sufficient for the basic needs of the tradition as a whole. Just like the *Iliad*, which expands the basic system, the *Odyssey* develops additional nuance by employing an additional reception formula, exemplified by 16.406, ὣς ἔφατ' 'Αμφίνομος. τοῖσιν δ' ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος. The introduction of this third formula is as indicative of the *Odyssey*'s distinctive thematics as the *Iliad*'s three intermediary terms are of its particular thematic concerns. As we shall see in Ch. 3, this formula demarcates the Suitors as an anti-community parasitically inhabiting Ithacan society. The *Odyssey*'s addition to the basic system allows the poem to establish a social difference between groups, just as the *Iliad*'s additions allow it to explore the social dynamics that impinge upon the establishment of solidarity among the group as a whole.

[14] See Foley 1995 for an analysis of this formula and its function in Homeric phraseology.

proposal. (Homeric heroes do not indulge in boos or hisses.) In Homeric diction, the

expression οἳ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ is functionally the contrary of the

default expression for acceptance, οἳ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο; it is

the poetry's way of saying that the audience does *not* obey. In no case is a proposal that

meets with this response actually put into action.[15] By way of illustrating this rule, we

may consider the interesting case of a proposal that looks, at first, as though it might be

reformulated in acceptable terms after initially encountering silence. In this case, the

proposal takes the outward form of a command (but the fact that it is, in the event, subject

to negotiation makes this no less a deliberative context): at the beginning of Book 8, Zeus

assembles the divine *agorê* and enjoins the gods not to intervene in the battle. In

response to his *muthos*, the gods are at first silent (πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ,

8.28)—this, as I have said, should be a sign that Zeus' proposition is *not* put into effect.[16]

But after a pause (ὀψέ, l. 30), Athena replies that the gods *will* stand by a qualified

version of Zeus' order:

> ἀλλ' ἤτοι πολέμου μὲν ἀφεξόμεθ' ὡς σὺ κελεύεις·
> βουλὴν δ' Ἀργείοις ὑποθησόμεθ' ἥ τις ὀνήσει,
> ὡς μὴ πάντες ὄλωνται ὀδυσσαμένοιο τεοῖο.

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[15] Cf. Foley's description of the significance of the formula (broadened somewhat to account for several instances in which the formula is applied outside the assembly context, but nevertheless an adequate formulation of the essential inefficiency signaled by the phrase): "the radical, unexpected action [proposed by the speaker] never materializes without an immediate or an eventual qualification, that is, without a substantial attendant drawback that may be crippling to or dismissive of the proposal but at the very minimum constitutes a change of narrative direction from that suggested by the initial speaker" (Foley 1995: 14). In view of these semantics, the description of the Achaean response to the Trojan proposal for restitution (7.385 ff.) offered by Heiden 1991: 10 must be revised: "This proposal was not self-evidently unacceptable to the Achaians; initially they reacted with silence (σιωπῇ 7.398), and only after a long time . . . did Diomedes answer . . ." Heiden's interpretation obscures the fact that we have 1) a proposal offered by Idaios that is definitively rejected, and 2) a proposal by Diomedes that is ultimately accepted.

[16] Aristarchus athetized 8.28-40. According to the scholion A 8.28, the athetesis is due to the fact that the lines are drawn, in part, from other sections of the poem (this criticism seems to be directed mainly against 38-40). Perhaps Aristarchus was also troubled by the use of the ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ formula in a context where the proposal does not seem to be rejected outright.

> Surely we will hold back from the battle as you command;
> but we will suggest to the Argives salutary counsel,
> that not all perish as a result while you are in a rage.

To which Zeus responds by declaring that his initial command had not been made 'in earnest' (οὔ νύ τι θυμῷ / πρόφρονι μυθέομαι, ll. 39-40), and that, furthermore, he wishes to be 'in accord' with Athena (ἐθέλω δέ τοι ἤπιος εἶναι, l. 40).[17] Now, assuming that the 'all were silent' formula indicates the rejection of a proposal, several arguments could be made to account for the use of the formula even here, where Athena asserts that the gods will do as Zeus commands. In the first place, one could argue that Zeus' proposal is in fact rejected, being replaced by Athena's counter-proposal, which includes an interpretation of the original proposal with qualifications. A variation on this argument would be to say that Zeus, in claiming that he was not *prophrôn*, effectively withdraws his proposal, and agrees to Athena's counter-proposal instead. Both of these arguments are, I think, essentially valid, but perhaps unnecessary in light of a third, more meaningful one. The fact is that, despite Athena's claim that the gods will refrain from providing concrete assistance, divine participation in battle will continue to be a problem in later books[18]—and Zeus himself will later reverse his own position, actually instructing the gods to enter the battle (20.20 ff.).[19] In spite of what Athena says, Zeus' proposal is

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[17] I will discuss the significance of the word *êpios*—and justify my rendering of the term here—when I discuss the crucial passage at 22.167 ff., in which Zeus repeats these words to Athena (see below, Ch. 5 pp. 226 ff.). Comparison with that passage shows that, in terms of the structure of this type-scene, Athena's words must be understood as a rejection, not as qualified approval.

[18] See below, Ch. 3 pp. 254 ff., for the significance of the fact that it is *Poseidon* who contravenes Zeus' *boulê*. For the Homeric technique of delaying fulfillment of the norms of traditional phraseology, see Foley 1995: 16-7.

[19] Note especially the way that 20.24-5 (ἔρχεσθ᾽ ὄφρ᾽ ἂν ἵκησθε μετὰ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιούς. / ἀμφοτέροισι δ᾽ ἀρήγεθ᾽) responds to 8.10-11 (ὃν δ᾽ ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε θεῶν ἐθέλοντα νοήσω / ἐλθόντ᾽ ἢ Τρώεσσιν ἀρηγέμεν ἢ Δαναοῖσι).

not, in the event, put into practice. Rhetorical appearances notwithstanding, subsequent events confirm what our typology of reception already implies—what the traditional diction already tells us—that Zeus' words will not be efficacious. Zeus' pronouncement does not receive an efficient response, a reception sufficient to make his performative utterance a true speech act, that is, an utterance that has an effect on the world.[20]

I suggested above that each of the expressions we are considering has a "specific place" in an overall system. The position of each expression must be plotted not only with respect to efficiency, but also with respect to other factors that might limit its use. Some expressions, as we will see, are restricted to certain groups or to certain contexts. With this in mind, two aspects of the distribution of ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ deserve mention. In the first place, this expression occurs in contexts other than deliberative assemblies. It can be used, for instance, to indicate the reluctance among members of a group to accept a challenge issued on the battlefield.[21] In this context, the expression does not have the effect of voiding the proposition, as it does in scenes of deliberation; in other words, a challenge does not go unmet even if it meets initially with silence.[22]

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[20] A similar argument could be made about the occurrence of the σιωπῇ formula at 3.95: this response greets Hektor's proposal to settle the war by means of a duel between Menelaos and Alexander. Although the two armies act on Hektor's proposition by performing the oath ritual and staging the duel, the proposal thereby to end the war will of course fail. Reception by silence signals this ultimate failure in spite of the fact that Hektor's speech results in action. (We might say that the mode of reception indicates that this superficial action lacks social consequences.) It is furthermore significant that this non-efficient reaction is predicated of both Achaeans and Trojans: the scene as a whole represents the concerted action of diverse societies as an impossibility (see below, Ch. 5 pp. 215). Finally, the silence of the assembled group resonates with the motif of reluctance to accept a battlefield challenge, as e.g. at 7.92.

[21] E.g. 7.92. In the *Odyssey* this expression has an even wider range of applications: cf. 8.234 (the response to a challenge in an athletic *agôn*), and 11.333 and 13.1 (the response to Odysseus' narration). For the exceptional nature of these Odyssean instances, see Foley 1995: 21. (It is perhaps worth comparing these 'exceptions' to the atypical instance of *handanô* at *Od.* 13.16 discussed below, Ch. 3 pp. 142-4.)

[22] Even though it is offered in a *boulê* (10.195), Nestor's proposition that one of the Greeks should undertake a night mission should be seen as a challenge rather than a deliberative proposal (no course of

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Secondly, the 'silence' formula is not restricted to any particular social group; it is applied both to Achaeans and to Trojans, as well as to the poem's third political entity, the Olympian gods. In short, our number 1—the default means of indicating an inefficient response—is not a very distinctive expression. It does not describe a reaction that is in any way characteristic of a given social group, or indeed of a given functional context.

The situation is far different in the case of the second term of the system. Like the 'silence' formula, this expression likewise designates an inefficient response, but by contrast with the wide range of applicability of the former, this second expression shows a very restricted pattern of usage: it is used only of Achaeans, and only of Achaeans in assembly. In fact, it is used only in reference to the Achaean assembly of Book 1. In both its occurrences, the line refers to the response of the Achaean community—with the notable exception of Agamemnon—to Chryses' request for his daughter's release:

[παῖδα δ' ἐμοὶ λύσαιτε φίλην, τὰ δ' ἄποινα δέχεσθαι,
ἀζόμενοι Διὸς υἱὸν ἑκηβόλον Ἀπόλλωνα.]
ἔνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοὶ
αἰδεῖσθαί θ' ἱερῆα καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα·
ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἥνδανε θυμῷ . . .
                                        1.22-4 = 1.376.8

["Release to me my dear child, and receive a ransom,
having reverence for Zeus' son, far-shooting Apollo."]
Then all the other Achaeans expressed approval
for respecting the priest and receiving the splendid ransom;
but this did not please the *thumos* of Atreus' son Agamemnon . . .

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action to be taken by the group as a whole is at issue). In fact, the motif of *kleos* makes a thematic link between Nestor's speech and Hektor's challenge in Book 7 (cf. 10.212 with 7.91). For this reason, Nestor's proposal is not voided even though it is at first received with silence (10.218). The same could be said about the Trojans' response (10.313) to Hektor's proposal, the mirror image of Nestor's challenge. The contrast between the restricted (or "marked") use of a formulaic expression in one context and its unrestricted (or "unmarked") use in another is an important aspect of formulaic diction: cf. Lowenstam 1981: 21.

(The final three lines occur first in the diegesis, and are then repeated by Achilles when he narrates the events surrounding Chryseis / Briseis to his mother.[23]) Also by contrast with the first expression, the inefficiency of the second is not due to the lack of approval from the audience: *epeuphêmeô* clearly expresses a positive, supportive response.[24] The failure of this response to make Chryses' request efficacious is due rather to the fact that the course of action adopted by the assembly is ultimately determined not by the will of the group as a whole, but by the preference of Agamemnon. The will of the group is, in a word, fragmented, but the one entity that has splintered from the rest appears to carry more weight than all the others combined. Later pages will attempt an exposition of the conceptual apparatus that frames this pathological situation, and of the linguistic patterns that express it. For now, I note that ἐπευφήμησαν is, though not in the strict sense of the

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[23] To Martin's discovery of the fact that "in Achilles we hear the speech of Homer, the heroic narrator" (Martin 1989: 223; cf. Mackie 1996: 139, 155), I add the observation that here Achilles actually quotes the diegesis. His narration of preceding events is in fact marked as a quasi-epic by the allusive reference to the conventions of an invocation to the Muses with which it begins. Achilles' οἶσθα· τί ἤ τοι ταῦτα ἰδυίη πάντ' ἀγορεύω; (1.365) recalls the ἴστέ τε πάντα. / . . . οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν of the invocation which begins the Catalogue of Ships (2.485-6; cf. Hes. *Th.* 27-8). Achilles speaks as though he were a poet reflecting on the absurdity of performing his song for an audience of gods (to whom there is no need to transmit the mere *kleos* of events). In the *Iliad*, gods may summarize either future events which will later be related by the narrative (8.473 ff., 15.64 ff.) or past events (18.444 ff.—note that this is Thetis, who thus behaves like the Muse that Achilles implies she is by transmitting knowledge of past events), but among human speakers, only Achilles is allowed to double the narrative this way—and only he, of gods or humans, quotes the narrative directly. In the case of the *Odyssey*'s hero-narrator, the situation becomes considerably more complicated. Odysseus can narrate events that have already been narrated by another speaker (7.249 ff. ~ 5.131 ff.), and he can quote the preceding diegesis itself (7.268 = 5.279). (Note that in many cases of near quotation, the fact that Odysseus narrates in the first person requires minor changes.) But the pattern can also be reversed, so that the diegesis can actually paraphrase events whose primary narration has already been given by Odysseus (23.310 ff.). In the Odyssey, other human narrators (but only after death) also have the power to re-relate events that have been narrated by Odysseus (11.63-5 ~ 10.558-60) or by the diegesis (24.125 ff.).

[24] LSJ defines *epeuphêmeô* as "assent with a shout of applause." I find it an interesting, but unlikely, possibility that the word is in fact ambiguous as to whether or not the approval is vocalized. The simplex *euphêmeô* commonly means 'be silent,' and so it is usually interpreted in its only Homeric occurrence, *Il.* 9.171. (Here it could also mean, however, 'utter what is ritually correct.') This potential ambiguity is worth considering because of the fact that inefficiency is generally marked by silence. If *euphêmeô* evokes some tension between silence and vocalization, our awareness of this scene as a kind of malfunctioning consensus (a reading I develop below) is correspondingly enhanced. However, *euphêmia* is a standard term for acclamation in later Greek: Roueché 1984: 181, 193.

term, nevertheless *hapax* in essence, with a single set of lines merely repeating itself when the same event in 'real time' must be narrated again.[25] This use of singular phraseology is, I think, an effective stylistic means of expressing the singularity the poem attributes to the opening political crisis, a true 'state of exception.'[26]

The third expression listed above shows some restriction in its usage, but in other, equally significant ways, it appears to have a wide range of undifferentiated applicability. In the context of deliberative assemblies, *epiakhô* is limited to the Achaeans: neither the Trojans nor the gods express their approval this way. So, in the context of assemblies, *epiakhô* is distinctive of the Greeks—but the term is not itself limited to assemblies, so that it is not distinctive of this context in general. Outside the assembly, *epiakhô* can refer, for instance, to the 'acclaim' or simply 'cry' of a group on the battlefield, as we see at the end of Book 13 in lines which follow on Hektor's boast in response to Ajax:

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας ἡγήσατο· τοὶ δ' ἅμ' ἕποντο
ἠχῇ θεσπεσίῃ, ἐπὶ δ' ἴαχε λαὸς ὄπισθεν.
Ἀργεῖοι δ' ἑτέρωθεν ἐπίαχον, οὐδὲ λάθοντο
ἀλκῆς, ἀλλ' ἔμενον Τρώων ἐπιόντας ἀρίστους.
13.833-6

Having spoken thus he led the way; and they followed with him
with a prodigious shout, and the *laos* behind him <u>cried out</u>.
And the Argives <u>cried out</u> on the other side, nor did they forget
courage, but awaited the attack of the best of the Trojans.

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[25] It makes little sense to call ἐπευφήμησαν *dis* rather than *hapax legomenon*, for reasons inherent in the concept itself as applied to traditional poetry. The concept of the *hapax* is defined and sustained by reference to a fixed, textualized corpus. This concept must be radically modified in the context of the reperformance of traditional material: audiences of the *Iliad* would not have been aware of *hapax legomena* as words uttered only once, but as words strictly limited to a particular narrative episode, and uttered only when that episode was performed. In this sense, ἐπευφήμησαν is *hapax* as much as any such restricted word in the poem: it is uttered only when a particular event is narrated; the repetition of this word within the poem is exactly the same as the repetition of a 'true' *hapax* in subsequent performances of the poem.

[26] The tendency to develop a specialized vocabulary for the exceptional situation of Book 1 is observable also in the poem's title-word, *mênis*: the "application of *mênis* is restricted by the composition specifically to the anger that Achilles felt over the slighting of his *tîmê* at the very beginning of the action" (Nagy 1999: 73).

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Note that here the term applies equally well to the responses of both the Greeks and the Trojans; outside the assembly, *epiakhô* is not restricted to any particular social group. Within the assembly context, proposals that meet with this response are sometimes put into effect—but not always, as for instance at the beginning of Book 9 (9.50), a passage we will consider in close detail below (pp. 175 ff.). Significantly, even when proposals thus received do result in action, we always find some indication of another, more decisive response, which appears to carry the real decision-making force.[27] Consider, for example, the response to Odysseus' speech in Book 2—a very important moment, to which we will return more than once in subsequent pages:

ὣς ἔφατ᾽, Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ᾽ <u>ἴαχον</u>, ἀμφὶ δὲ νῆες
σμερδαλέον κονάβησαν ἀϋσάντων ὑπ᾽ Ἀχαιῶν,
μῦθον <u>ἐπαινήσαντες</u> Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο·
<div align="right">2.333-5</div>

> Thus he spoke, and the Argives <u>shouted</u> greatly, and round about the ships
> resounded terribly with the cries of the Achaeans,
> who <u>expressed *epainos*</u> for the *muthos* of godlike Odysseus.

In terms of the system I am describing, *epaineô* is far more decisive, and must be considered, here, as the real expression of an efficient response. It is significant in this regard that we have here the simplex *iakhô*, and not the compound *epiakhô*: only ἐπαινήσαντες carries the preverb *epi-*, which will be shown shortly to be a primary indicator of the political dynamics of consensus. These considerations should be applied also to the one instance where *iakhô* seems to indicate an efficient response, the group's reception of a speech made by Agamemnon soon after Odysseus:

ὣς ἔφατ᾽, <u>Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ᾽ ἴαχον</u> ὡς ὅτε κῦμα
ἀκτῇ ἐφ᾽ ὑψηλῇ . . .
<div align="right">2.394-5</div>

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[27] The most interesting example is 7.403, which will be discussed below, Ch. 3 pp. 138-9.

> Thus he spoke, and <u>the Argives shouted greatly</u>, like a wave
> against a high headland . . .

Although Agamemnon's speech, a rallying-cry for the troops to continue the war, does contain one new proposal (that the army should take a meal before beginning the fight), it is essentially just a confirmation of Odysseus' proposal to remain at Troy—a proposal which has already met with the decisive response indicated by *epaineô* (see below).[28] The close connection between these two speeches is signaled by the repetition of the formula Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ᾽ ἴαχον.[29] In short, we might say that while *(ep)iakhô can* be efficient, in the sense that proposals encountering this response can be efficacious, it is not *sufficiently* efficient; this response does not suffice, in itself, to complete the speech act.

In the funeral games of Book 23, *epiakhô* indicates collective applause (23.767)—it is thus a kind of group acclamation—but not collective decision.[30] (This is

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[28] Cf. Busolt 1963: 337: "Zu einer *Abstimmung* war es nicht gekommen. Von einer solchen ist überhaupt nirgends die Rede." Busolt understands the dynamics of Agamemnon's address correctly, but he infers from the king's tendency to assert his independence from the will of the group the general principle that the group did not need to be directly consulted. This is an overgeneralization from a situation marked by the *Iliad* as exceptional. In fact, the *Iliad* as a whole represents *epainos*, the formal consent of the group, as essential.

[29] The formula occurs in this metrical position only in these two passages. It also occurs twice at line-initial position (4.506 and 17.317). Note that Agamemnon makes his proposal explicitly subordinate to what has been said by previous speakers: he begins his speech with the words, ἦ μὰν αὖτ᾽ ἀγορῇ νικᾷς, γέρον, υἷας Ἀχαιῶν (2.370), with reference to Nestor's confirmation of Odysseus' proposal, which intervenes between the speeches of Odysseus and Agamemnon. In terms of the group dynamics of this scene, one might argue that Odysseus is the only one who directly addresses the group, and thus he is the only one who receives an efficient group response. The speeches of Nestor and Agamemnon are positioned as an exchange between a ruler and a counselor, which culminates in a command for the group—but not a properly deliberative proposal. Thus there is no need for Agamemnon to receive an efficient response; his speech belongs to a different register of discourse.

[30] Notice, however, that in this case we have ἴαχον δ᾽ ἐπί instead of the more normal ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἰαχ-, or the form customary in deliberative contexts, ἐπίαχον. The post-position of the preverb emphasizes its prepositional force, and correspondingly de-emphasizes its collective overtones (see below). One is almost inclined to see this as an instance of simplex *iakhô* construed with a prepositional phrase. For the range of meanings of *iakhô* and its non-restriction to properly political action, see Mackie 1996: 30n.47.

30

significant in light of Gernet's insight that the Homeric representation of the athletic *agôn* has important connections with the juridical context of the assembly.[31]) Finally, it is important to note that the simplex *iakhô* can designate inarticulate sound, such as the echoes resounding from the banks of a flooding river (21.10), so that the root concept of *epiakhô* does not appear to be anything proper to the social life of humans.[32] *Epiakhô*, in other words, does not designate a distinctively political action.

The fourth expression for audience response—in many ways the Trojan equivalent of *epiakhô*—is the most infrequent of the terms in the system, occurring but twice in the poem, both times with reference to the Trojans in assembly. I should emphasize, however, that it is used only of deliberations taking place on the battlefield; in the poem's single Trojan civic assembly we find no formulas describing audience reaction, which I submit is already suggestive of major political differences between Trojans and Achaeans.[33] As in the case of *epiakhô*, we find, in one of its two instances, that *epikeladeô* occurs alongside the more definitively efficient *epaineô* (18.310-12), so in this case, at least, the reaction designated by this verb appears to be 'insufficiently efficient.' But *epikeladeô* can also stand alone to indicate a definitive response (8.542). Perhaps the best way to describe the situation is to say that, while *epikeladeô* falls somewhat short of *definitive* efficiency, it nevertheless can suffice for Trojan purposes. It may even be the case that *epikeladeô* is the default way of indicating the group will of the Trojans; from this perspective, the correlation of the verb with *epaineô* at 18.312 marks a

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[31] Gernet 1948.

[32] Note that in the case of Agamemnon's speech in Book 2, discussed above, the emphasis is precisely on the *sound* of the response, which is compared to the inarticulate noise of a wave, rather than its social force.

[33] Cf. Mackie 1996: 23: "The formulas used to construct Homeric assembly scenes are strangely lacking from the *Iliad*'s accounts of Trojan assemblies."

very special, in fact unique, event among the Trojans. (The full reasoning behind this characterization must be drawn from subsequent pages.) Like *iakhô*, the simplex *keladeô* generally indicates inarticulate noise, as does the noun from which it derives, *kelados*.[34] Also like *iakhô* (or like *epiakhô*, depending on how we read 23.766; cf. n. 30, above), *keladeô* can indicate applause in the athletic *agôn*, but without any decision making force (23.869). Notice that here, outside the deliberative context, the verb can describe the actions of the Achaeans.

This brings us to the term I have placed at the highest end of the scale of efficiency, a term that also displays the highest level of restriction on its usage (apart perhaps from the exceptional *epeuphêmeô*). In the first place, *epaineô* is restricted exclusively to assembly contexts, so whatever kind of action the word denotes, it is something one can do only in assembly; it is a distinctively social or political action. Secondly, *epaineô* is used only of Achaeans and Olympians—with one exemplary exception, alluded to above. I defer until a more opportune moment discussion of this single, very significant instance of Trojan *epainos*. For now I can say that the significance and force of the application of *epaineô* to Trojans derives in large part from the general rule of its restriction to Greeks and gods. Since I will devote most of the following pages to elucidating the semantics of this word, there is no need for me to comment overmuch on its usage now, or to survey its various instances, since all of these will appear in later pages. But I would like to say that, although there is no doubt that *epaineô* indicates the highest degree of efficiency of any group response, we notice

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[34] E.g. 18.576 and 21.16, both of noise generated by a river. See Mackie 1996: 93, who notes both the "acoustic component" of *keladeô*, and the contrast between *epikeladeô* and *epaineô* as expressions of group approval in Trojan and Achaean contexts, respectively.

something very interesting when we examine its actual efficiency in practice: viz., that in several instances the decision ratified by *epainos* does not, in the event, come to fruition (notice I avoid the phrase 'is not enacted').[35] In fact, the very passage that defines the rule according to which *epainos* must result in action also represents an apparent exception (nor should we be surprised by this correlation between the formulation of a rule and its violation). After the chariot race of Book 23, Achilles proposes awarding second prize to the misfortunate Eumêlos; the assembled Achaeans consent to this proposal, but the decision is voided by the objection of Antilokhos:

ὣς ἔφαθ᾽. οἳ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπῄνεον ὡς ἐκέλευε.
καί νύ κέ οἱ πόρεν ἵππον. ἐπῄνησαν γὰρ Ἀχαιοί.
εἰ μὴ ἄρ᾽ Ἀντίλοχος μεγαθύμου Νέστορος υἱὸς
Πηλείδην Ἀχιλῆα δίκῃ ἠμείψατ᾽ ἀναστάς·
                              23.539-42

Thus he spoke, and they were all expressing *epainos* for his command.
And now he would have bestowed the horse, for the Achaeans had
    expressed *epainos*,
If Antilokhos son of great-hearted Nestor had not
risen and answered Peleus' son Achilles with a claim for justice.

As the text indicates (ἐπῄνησαν γὰρ Ἀχαιοί), the *epainos* of the Achaeans *should* be enough to turn Achilles' proposal into a speech act, and to result in the award of the prize as proposed, but this action is prevented by other circumstances. Nevertheless, *epaineô* designates a *definitively* efficient response according to the poem's own comment on its vocabulary. Nor is this failure of efficiency a true violation of the rule here formulated. The failure of *epainos* is, in fact, never due to some fault of reception (which is always implied to be efficient), but to some change in circumstances surrounding the decision:

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[35] In the *Odyssey*, however, which shows a simplified, more 'regular' system, *epainos* always results in action.

33

either divine powers intervene to produce new conditions voiding the decision,[36] or else the political circumstances expressed by the verb themselves change. (This is the case in Book 23 with the sudden raising of an objection by Antilokhos.)

Antilokhos' objection has further importance for our functional definition of *epaineô*. This passage not only formulates the rule that *epainos* is efficient; it also implies that it is *universal*, for it obtains only to the extent that everyone expresses approval. As soon as an objection is heard, *epainos* disappears—and along with it the collective support necessary to transform speech into action. *Epainos* cannot be sustained in the face of non-negotiable dissent—herein lies an important key to understanding *epainos* as consensus.

The two instances of *epaineô* that follow closely on each other in 23.539-40 show an interesting alternation in tense that deserves comment. When the action of the Achaeans is viewed as something definitive, something that should result in action, the verb appears in the aorist (ἐπῄνησαν). But when the action is first narrated—and remember, it is an action that ultimately will not reach the conclusion in which it should, by definition, result—we find an imperfect (ἐπῄνεον). The aorist, we might say, is the tense of the action in its ideal, normative context, the action as it should take place according to its definition. (At work here are the same linguistic tendencies that result in the 'gnomic aorist.') On the other hand, the imperfect has a special poetic effect motivated by the way the narrative unfolds, by the *mise en oeuvre* of the expression: the progressive force ("they were approving") creates a sense of tension and expectation, a

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[36] Thus in the case of the *epainos* of the Achaeans at 3.461 (discussion below, Ch. 5 pp. 216 ff.) and of the Mycenaeans at 4.380-1: οἱ δ' ἔθελον δόμεναι καὶ ἐπῄνεον ὡς ἐκέλευον· / ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς ἔτρεψε παραίσια σήματα φαίνων.

sense that is amplified by the suspense of the next line, until we read of Antilokhos'

intervention and realize that the approval will not be efficient. The imperfect, in a way, is

the tense of the action in its exceptional context, the context in which it violates our

expectations; the imperfect expresses the tension between expectation and reality. This

contrast in tenses is in fact consistent throughout the poem, and can be formulated as a

rule: whenever the action designated by *epaineô* will not result, ultimately, in

action—whenever it will remain in a sense incomplete—it is expressed in the imperfect;

whenever the response is, as it should be, efficient, it is expressed in the aorist.[37]

Now, because we are dealing with expression in verse, the alternation of

tenses—which I have shown to have poetic consequences, i.e. to be a meaningful,

'distinctive' feature—also has metrical consequences. There is a possibility—though I

would not venture to say that it is anything more than that—that these metrical

consequences can, in turn, shed some light on the 'distinctive features'[38] of other

elements in our system. Let us examine two comparable forms of the *epaineô*

expression, one of the normative type and one of the exceptional type:

> (1) ὣς ἔφατ', οἱ δ' ἄρα <u>πάντες ἐπήνησαν βασιλῆες</u>
> 7.344
>
> Thus he spoke, and <u>all the *basilêes* expressed *epainos*</u>
>
> (2) ὣς ἔφατ', οἱ δ' ἄρα <u>πάντες ἐπήνεον ὡς ἐκέλευε</u>
> 23.539
>
> Thus he spoke, and <u>they were all expressing *epainos* for his command</u>

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[37] Imperfect *epainos*: 3.461, 4.380. There are also three instances of the future tense (similarly 'imperfect,' in the sense that *epainos* will not be granted: 4.29 = 16.443 = 22.181).

[38] I adopt the term from phonology, where a 'distinctive feature' is an attribute (e.g. voicing, aspiration) that assigns a phoneme to a particular place in a structural system. For the argument that the 'features' model can be extended to include as well semantic units—like the elements of our system—see Chomsky 1965: 213-4n.15.

It is immediately apparent that both forms fill the same metrical slot in the verse: from

the beginning of the third foot to the end of the line (beginning somewhat arbitrarily at

πάντες), or, if one considers only the distinctive words, from the penthemimeral caesura

to line-end. Both forms fill this slot equally well—but they are not metrically equivalent.

Moreover, if we compare these two forms, one efficient (1) and the other inefficient (2),

to the other terms in our system of expressions for reception—more specifically, to those

two terms which are peculiar to the Achaeans—we find that this same metrical difference

also distinguishes these other expressions with respect to each other:

(1) ὣς ἔφατ᾽. οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνησαν βασιλῆες

— ◡ ◡ — — — ◡ ◡ — ~

(1a) ἔνθ᾽ ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί

(2) ὣς ἔφατ᾽. οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνεον ὣς ἐκέλευε

— ◡ ◡ — ◡ ◡ — ◡ ◡ — ~

(2a) ὣς ἔφατ᾽. οἱ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπίαχον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν

The metrical parallel that unites each pair is reinforced by the grammatical parallel

between the aorists in the first two examples and the imperfects in the second two. This

set of parallelisms matches up an inefficient expression (ἐπήνεον) with one that is

likewise inefficient (or at least not fully efficient; notice that πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο

σιωπῇ follows the same dactylic pattern), and an efficient expression with one that, in a

way, *should* be efficient. From this perspective, *epeuphêmeô* does not so much function

as a special, 'marked' version of the properly inefficient response, as my placement of it

in second position on the scale of efficiency implied; it indicates rather a special case of

the efficient response. In other words, the verb supplies the poet with a way of signifying

not inefficiency, but *dysfunctional* efficiency. *Epeuphêmeô* is a doublet for *epaineô* in its

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normative form, but transposed into dissonance rather than harmony. Would an ancient audience have perceived these metrical patterns and so inferred this doubling relation? Probably not. But a poet assembling his verses, keenly aware of the metrical shape of his words, might very well have felt the rhythmical sameness, even if half-consciously, and so have sensed some connection between these variant expressions.[39]

This survey of the expressions by means of which the *Iliad* can refer to the reception of performative utterances leads, I think, to two important general observations. The first is that the system of these expressions makes a clear distinction between reception as practiced by the Achaeans and as practiced by others (that is, the Trojans). The poem has a very well-developed vocabulary for describing the distinctive political activity of the assembled Greeks: fully three terms out of five, representing three distinct degrees of efficiency, characterize the Greek army in particular. The second observation is that, even as this system tends to emphasize those responses at the extreme ends of the scale (the full efficiency of *epaineô* stands out in high relief by being opposed to two inefficient responses), it contributes particular emphasis to those moments which represent exceptions to the system, of which there are two: the dysfunctional Achaean consensus designated by *epeuphêmeô* in Book 1, and the exceptional Trojan consensus marked, as would be usual among the Achaeans, by *epaineô* in Book 18.

The syntax of *epainos*

As I noted above, the *Odyssey* shows a much more simplified typology of response, relying mainly on a basic opposition between an inefficient reception (silence)

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[39] Notice that I do not make any claims about intentionality; I speak rather of the poet as a reader of his inherited medium.

and an efficient one (*epaineô*). The *Iliad* expands this basic system by introducing three

additional terms on the efficient side of the opposition. Since, however, these additional

terms are all less than definitively efficient, they function as foils for *epaineô*.

Nevertheless, the four verbs standing in opposition to the negative response of silence

(*epeuphêmeô, epiakhô, epikeladeô, epaineô*) all share certain common features. For

instance, they all express the positive reaction of all or part of a group. More

importantly, they are all compounds incorporating the preverb *epi-*. This is a lexical and

syntactic feature that deserves some consideration, since it has the potential to tell us

some basic information about the kind of response with which we are dealing.

Two of the four verbs do not occur outside the context of the assembly, which

suggests that that context might provide some insight into the force of the preverb *epi-*.

In fact, there is a wealth of later evidence (mostly belonging to the second century of our

era or later, but with a few important earlier testimonia) indicating that verbal

constructions in *epi-* characteristically described the group response of deliberative

assemblies that voted by acclamation or other non-balloting procedures (analogously to

Homeric *epeuphêmeô* and *epaineô*), as well as the non-deliberative acclamations of an

assembled group without juridical power (like Homeric *epiakhô* and *epikeladeô*).[40] This

manner of expression is widespread enough in space and time to suggest that the

phraseology has very deep roots. In a second-century inscription from Thera, for

instance, we find one of the Homeric terms used, as in Homer, absolutely, and with a

certain juridical force: ἐπε[υ]φη[μ]ήσαντ[ος] Ι [τα]ῖς ἐ[π]α[γ]γελίαι[ς] τοῦ παντὸ[ς]

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[40] For a survey of the evidence, see Roueché 1984 and Colin 1965: 109-52. By 'non-deliberative
acclamation' I mean any collective vocal expression of sentiment that does not carry decision-making
force, e.g. honorific acclamations such as αὔξι ὁ δεῖνα, 'long live so-and-so!' (cf. Roueché 1984 195: "one
of the most standard acclamatory formulae").

Θ[ηραίων δήμου] ("the entire *dêmos* of Thera expressed their approval for the proposal").[41] In this case, there is no indication whether the *dêmos* used intelligible words to respond to the proclamation, or if they expressed their approval with a mere shout, as Thucydides says of the Lacedaimonians.[42] In Homer, where likewise there is never any indication of an actual verbalization (as opposed to vocalization) of approval, one is inclined to think of a wordless acclamation. But an ancient Greek with experience in public life might not have been so quick to make this assumption: votes were frequently conducted by means of some standard expression such as ἔδοξεν (cf. the use of *placet* in Roman legislative bodies), uttered in response to a prompt formulated by a magistrate (δοκεῖ:, *si hoc omnibus placet*, etc.).[43] In the Roman period, assemblies could produce fairly complex collective utterances, especially when some institutionalized framework provided a pattern,[44] and documentary records apply the same phraseology of response to these elaborate replies.[45] Moreover—and this perhaps tells us more about the meaning of the preverb than anything else—the same *epi-* phraseology could be applied even to those collective replies that were not vocalized at all. An Athenian decree from

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[41] IG XII.iii 326.27-8 (AD 149). Note the emphasis on the involvement of the entire community.

[42] 1.87: κρίνουσι βοῆ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ. See Flaig 1993.

[43] E.g. SEG 12.226 (AD 319); cf. Roueché 1984: 182. Roman law applies this basic structure to the constitution of all forms of *leges*, those of private contract (the *sponsio* formula *spondesne? spondeo*) and public law (the *rogatio* was also executed by question and answer: *ita uos rogo, Quirites . . . uti rogas*; cf. *RE* ser. 2 v. 1, p. 999, s.v. *rogatio*, with Aulus Gellius 5.19.9).

[44] Roueché 1984: 183 suggests that the facility of Romanized groups with elaborate collective cheers derives in part from their experience in the circus and amphitheater.

[45] Cf. *OGIS* 595.31 ff. (= IG XIV 830, AD 174): Φιλοκλῆς Διο[δ]ώρου εἶπεν· . . . ἐπ[ε]φώνησαν· "καλῶς εἶπεν Φιλοκλῆς. δίκαια ἀξιῶσι οἱ ἐν Ποτιόλοις. ἀεὶ | οὕτως ἐγείνετο. καὶ νῦν οὕτως γεινέσθω. τοῦτο τῆ πόλει συμφέρει. φυλαχθή|τω ἡ συνήθεια." Of course, there is no need to imagine that the entire assembly pronounced all of this in unison. I merely point out that *epiphôneô* can be used of articulate utterances. Cf., as early as AD 19, Germanicus' reference to the titles with which he was often acclaimed by Egyptian crowds: τὰς δὲ ἐπιφθόνου[ς] ἐμοὶ καὶ ἰσοθέους ἐκφωνήσεις (Hunt and Edgar, *Select Papyri* II.211.35-6).

AD 229/30 or 230/31 describes a vote taken by show of hands, and even transcribes the words of the officiating magistrate:

[ὁ πρόεδρος· "ὅτῳ δοκεῖ κύ]ι̣[ρια εῖναι τὰ ἀνεγνω]σμένα *v* ἀράτω τὴν χεῖρα·" *v* πάντες ἐπῆραν· *v* "καὶ ὅτῳ [μὴ δοκεῖ *v* ἀράτω τὴν χεῖρα." *v* οὐδεὶς ἐπῆρεν.]

SEG 21.506.30-1[46]

The presider [said]: "Whoever thinks that what has been read should become law, let him raise his hand." All raised [their hands]. "And whoever does not think so, let him raise his hand." No one raised [his hand].

Here, the prefixed form *epairô (tên kheira)* expresses the response of the group to the magistrate's prompt. Significantly, the wording applied to the response corresponds precisely to the words used by the official—a relationship that the stonecutter has emphasized through the 'typographical' device of using spaces to articulate the crucial moments of the voting procedure (the equivalent of boldface in *scriptio continua*). Except, of course, for the addition of *epi-*: the preverb marks the difference between action (the reading of the motion and the request for approval) and reaction (the efficacious response).

Epi-, then, characterizes a response. Moreover, in both deliberative and more generally acclamatory contexts, it appears to characterize a more or less universal response (cf. πάντες ἐπῆραν, above). This is a point emphasized by Roueché: "The many accounts of acclamations which we have regularly stress the unison—*mia phônê* . . . —and unanimity—*mia psychê*—with which everyone—*pantes, pas o laos*, or . . . the whole city—utters an acclamation."[47] The stress on unanimity observed by Roueché

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[46] *v(acat)* indicates a blank space on the stone. For *epi-* as an indication of the non-verbal action of the assembly, cf. ἐπιγνόντες in IG V.i 1432 (Messene, ca. 103, according to Rhodes and Lewis 1997).

[47] Roueché 1984: 187.

typifies decision-making processes that operate according to the political principle of consensus, to the extent that this mode of political action that hinges on the ideal of universal approval (or at least universal acceptance): "Das Konsensprinzip zielt idealiter darauf, Einmütigkeit unter den Entscheidungsteilnehmern herzustellen."[48] The epigraphical representations of legislative decisions surveyed in the preceding paragraph thus betray a consensus-oriented way of thinking about political decisions. The same could be said for the Homeric variations on the efficient response, which emphasize universal or near-universal participation (πάντες ἐπίαχον / ἐπευφήμησαν / ἐπήνησαν)—and above all for Homeric *epaineô*, which, as we shall see, is in contrast to the variations *definitively* universal.

As we have seen, one of our Homeric terms (*epeuphêmeô*) is directly attested in the epigraphical record as a technical term for deliberative reception—but *epaineô* is not. Nevertheless, the nominal form *ainos* does occur in inscriptions as a designation for 'decree' or 'decision,' and on one occasion *aineô* indicates the official 'approval' of the state.[49] Since "le nom de la décision prise par une assemblée est souvent en relation avec la formule verbale dite de résolution" (e.g. δόγμα : ἔδοξε),[50] we might hypothesize that *(ep)aineô* was actually applied to the decision-making process more frequently than the

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[48] Flaig 1994: 15, who continues: "es gehorcht also der Einmütigkeitsregel, dies sogar dann, wenn realiter die Einmütigkeit häufigkeit nicht in eindeutig symbolisierter Form erfolgt und kaum gleiche Intensität bei allen Entscheidungsteilnehmern aufweist . . . Einmütigkeit kann auch einen Kompromiß anzeigen." That is to say, 'unanimity' in this context does not mean 'of one mind.' Flaig's article contains useful comments on the contrast between the principles of consensus and majority rule; at 14n4 he points out that the *reality* of majority rule is not necessarily at odds with the *ideal* of consensus. I suspect that cross-culturally the principle of majority shows a close correlation with specific 'digital' technologies of assessment (balloting, tabulation, etc.).

[49] See below, p. 75.

[50] Blanc 1995: 218-19.

extant inscriptions indicate, or that the sparse epigraphical attestations represent vestiges

of an older mode of reference preserved also by the Homeric text. In support of the

former hypothesis, we can cite Hesychius' gloss ἐπαίνους· τὰς κρίσεις, καὶ τὰς

συμβουλίας, καὶ τὰς ἀρχ(αιρ)εσίας ("judgments; coucil sessions; elections"), and the

entry in the *Etymologicum Magnum*, s.v. *ainesis*: αἶνος, γνώμη, παροιμία,

παράδειγμα, ἔπαινος· καὶ ἡ χειροτονία καὶ ψήφισμα ("*ainos*, maxim, proverb,

exemplum, praise; also voting by hand and balloting"). Even without this hypothesis or

its proof, however, the literary and epigraphical evidence provides ample indication that

the Homeric phraseology of reception represents a way of speaking about deliberative

assemblies that is well-attested in our era, and must certainly go back to a very early

stage of Greek political organization.

Having considered the syntax of *epaineô* and its variants as an expression of a

pattern common to the specific setting of the assembly, we would do well to consider as

well its connection to broader phraseological patterns whose applicability extends beyond

any specific institutional context. We have seen, in the case of assembly records, that the

preverb *epi-* appears to connote both response and the collectivity of that response. In an

assembly, of course, a response is virtually always collective. Homeric diction provides

an interesting confirmation of this principle, for while the simplex form *aineô* can be

used with either a singular (24.30) or a plural subject (8.9, 23.552), *epaineô* is *always*

used of a group.[51] However, Homeric usage also indicates that this pattern is by no

means limited to the context of the assembly. The collective force of *epaineô* in fact

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[51] 21.290, where Zeus is the singular subject of *epaineô*, is the one apparent exception to this rule.
Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate below (Ch. 5), the exception is only apparent, since Zeus must be
understood to represent the community of the gods.

conforms to a much more general phraseological tendency. Observe, for instance, the

following formulaic system, in which the preverb *epi-* is tied to collective activity:

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίουσ', ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες
(19.301, etc.)

Thus she spoke, lamenting, and the women cried out in response

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίων, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γέροντες
(19.338)

Thus he spoke, lamenting, and the elders cried out in response

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίων, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο πολῖται
(22.429)

Thus he spoke, lamenting, and the *politai* cried out in response

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίουσ', ἐπὶ δ' ἔστενε δῆμος ἀπείρων
(24.776)

Thus she spoke, lamenting, and the boundless *dêmos* cried out in response

In the case of ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο, one is inclined to attribute a specific adverbial force to

epi- as an expression of a call-and-response pattern: the wailing of the mourners is *in*

response to the lament of a soloist; *epi-* marks the action as a *reaction*.[52] The collective

associations of the formula derive, we might say, from its pragmatic context. Since, in

the group-oriented society of the Homeric world, reactions (especially reactions to

performance!) are typically the reactions of a group, the call-and-response pattern

virtually implies collective action. On the other hand, we find numerous examples of *epi-*

compounds that seem, conversely, to stress precisely the collectivity of an action, and

leave the adverbial force of the preverb implied. For instance (to take the example of a

verb we have already considered),

ὃ δ' ἔβραχε χάλκεος Ἄρης
ὅσσόν τ' ἐννεάχιλοι ἐπίαχον ἢ δεκάχιλοι
ἀνέρες ἐν πολέμῳ ἔριδα ξυνάγοντες Ἄρηος

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[52] Cf. Monro 1891: 179 (§197).

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(5.860)

Brazen Ares roared
as loudly as nine or ten thousand men cry out,
men bearing down on each other the *eris* of Ares in war.

where ἐπίαχον may imply some battlefield speech or action to which the soldiers of the simile respond,[53] but seems primarily to focus our attention on the image of a coordinated group. One could easily extend a list of examples in which the consistent association of *epi-* with the response of a group has been generalized to denote simply group action.[54] As a general observation—but not a hard-and-fast rule—we can say that, when the adverbial or prepositional force of the preverb *epi-* fades into the background, the verb will tend to express the activity of a group.[55]

In the case of one strictly-circumscribed semantic field, however, this tendency does indeed become a rule; the hardening of the rule in this particular instance will be of signal importance to us when we come to consider the associations of the verb *epaineô* with 'metapoetic' reflections on the nature of poetic tradition. At issue is a set of complementary and morphologically equivalent expressions constituting a crucial component of Homeric poetry's vocabulary of self-reference. We find in the Homeric lexicon three verbs that index the poetic function of the group as embodiment and

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[53] Cf. e.g. *Il.* 13.822.

[54] Cf. *Il.* 4.63 (*ephepomai*), 7.45 (*ephandanô*) , 8.158 (*epikheuô*), etc.

[55] A good example is provided by the verb *epigignôskô*. Where the force of the preverb is stressed, the verb can express an action easily predicated of an individual, as at *Od.* 24 αἴ κέ μ' ἐπιγνώη "if he *still* recognizes me" (this use of *epi-* seems tied to the temporal duration expressed by the preposition + accusative [Chantraine 1942-1953: 2.111]). However, when the force of the preverb is not explicitly foregrounded, it tends to express the reactive structure typical of group response; cf. *Od.* 18.30 ζώσαι νῦν. ἵνα πάντες ἐπιγνώωσι καὶ οἶδε. This example is a very interesting one for my purposes, since the group response belongs to the framework of the *agôn* (here the quasi-*agôn* of Odysseus' bout with Iros). Of course, the force (explicit or implicit) of *epi-* differs in these two cases. Another way of stating matters is to say that reactive *epi-* tends more often to be left implicit or taken for granted.

transmitter of poetic memory, all of which are compounds in *epi-*. The most

unambiguous of these (though not necessarily the most straightforward) is used by

Telemakhos as he explains to Penelope the fundamental role of the audience (that is, of

reception) in shaping any given performance:

τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον <u>ἐπικλείουσ'</u> ἄνθρωποι,
ἥ τις ἀκουόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται.
(1.351-2)

For men <u>approve</u>[56] better that song
that most lately meets their ears.

Epikleiô unambiguously designates the poetic function of the audience, a reception

characterized as a dynamic action. This Homeric *hapax*,[57] however, appears less than

fully straightforward to the extent that it participates in the *Odyssey*'s extended reflection

on and problematization of poetic memory. As Ford has suggested, something is slightly

off when the spokesman for a traditional culture declares the *newest* song (that is, the

least traditional) to be the most preeminent.[58] The *Odyssey*'s most sustained poetic

reflections concern the relation of memory (and forgetfulness) to epic *kleos*; here, one

who has precisely *no memory* of Odysseus explains the appeal of the 'newest song' to

Penelope, who is afflicted with a *penthos alaston* (1.342).[59] Given the consistent

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[56] "Approve" hardly suffices to capture the full force of *epikleiô*, which, like the rhapsodes' *epainô*, implies both reception and performance.

[57] *Epikleiô* resurfaces only as a Homeric echo in Aratus, Apollonius of Rhodes, and Oppian.

[58] Ford 1992: 109. I note that as the *Iliad* develops a special lexicon to describe the political 'state of exception' which opens the poem, so too the *Odyssey* appears to be deploying a special vocabulary to describe the exceptional *poetic* circumstances of its opening book.

[59] *Alaston* < *lanthanomai*: Nagy 1974: 256. For the poetic implications of *penthos alaston*, see Nagy 1999: 95 ff.

deployment of the roots *mnê-* and *lêth-* as markers of the poetic function,[60] we might well consider Telemakhos' use of the unique *epikleiô* to be symptomatic of his disconnect from poetic memory of his father. That is, we might see this *hapax* as necessitated by avoidance: although we might expect a direct reference to the operation of poetry to employ the key concept of memory, Telemakhos—who misunderstands the 'proper' operation of poetry, or, rather, who has grown up in a 'dysfunctional' poetic environment due to the unavailability of his father's *kleos*—cannot make use of this concept.[61]

This impression is confirmed when we consider the existence of a perfectly complementary pair of expressions designating the complementary activities of remembering and forgetting, which together constitute the total operation of poetic memory. I take first the term that is more obviously (though no less explicitly) related to poetic tradition: *epilêthomai*. After the Achaeans build their wall, Poseidon expresses to Zeus his anxiety that the *kleos* of this latest foundation will obliterate the epic fame of an earlier foundation in which he has a personal stake[62]:

τοῦ δ᾽ ἦτοι κλέος ἔσται ὅσον τ᾽ ἐπικίδναται ἠώς·
τοῦ δ᾽ <u>ἐπιλήσονται</u> τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων

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[60] See Nagy 1990: 58-60. Note especially the formulation on p. 57, which could be taken as an exceptionally concise statement of the poetic crisis of *Odyssey* 1: "The latest performance is by necessity a crisis point for the traditions of myth . . ."

[61] For reasons which will become clear in the course of my discussion, we might also have expected Telemakhos to have used a form of *epaineô*, but this term is likewise unavailable for the same reason, namely, that the poetic life of Ithaca is consistently portrayed as dysfunctional.

[62] The *kleos* of a foundation must evoke the specific conventions of *ktisis* poetry, which, as Nagy has argued (Nagy 1999: 139-41) has a fundamentally local orientation, as opposed to Panhellenic *epos*. Poseidon expresses particular outrage over the fact that the Achaeans have not consulted the gods (447): I suggest this theme is a reference to a standard feature of *ktisis* poetry, viz. a consultation with the Delphic oracle (ibid. 139n). When he intervenes to save Aeneas in Book 20, Poseidon becomes a sort of spokesman for the independent vitality of alternative (local) poetic traditions (see below, Ch. 5 p. 207), so that he is an appropriate mouthpiece for tensions related to the relative prestige of local traditions. Note that Poseidon is here *not* worried that the Achaean *ktisis* will threaten the *kleos* of Panhellenic tradition; he is concerned rather with the obliteration of *another ktisis*, the *ktisis* of Troy. Local traditions are in competition with each other, not with Panhellenic tradition, which always wins out.

ἥρῳ Λαομέδοντι πολίσσαμεν ἀθλήσαντε.
(7.451-3)

Surely it will have a *kleos* that extends as far as the light of the sun;
but men <u>will forget</u> that wall which I and Phoebus Apollo
labored to build for the hero Laomedon.

Epilêthomai here refers to the collective operation of poetic memory; characteristically,

and analogously to *epaineô*, it takes a plural subject. On the other hand, we find the

inverse of this collective forgetting expressed by the verb *epimimnêskomai*. Peisistratos

relates how stories of the Trojan war are related in a group setting in his father's house:

Ἀτρεΐδη, περὶ μέν σε βροτῶν πεπνυμένον εἶναι
Νέστωρ φάσχ᾽ ὁ γέρων, ὅτ᾽ <u>ἐπιμνησαίμεθα</u> σεῖο
οἷσιν ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν, καὶ ἀλλήλους ἐρέοιμεν . . .
(4.190-2)

Son of Atreus, old Nestor was always saying that you are
especially sensible [*pepnumenos*] among men whenever we <u>made
recollection</u> of you
in his halls, and inquired of each other . . .

In the context of the *Odyssey*'s consistent use of such scenes of after-dinner conversation

as a figure for and means of reflection on poetic performance, the poetic force of

epimimnêskomai is clearly felt, even if it is not as overt as in the case of *epilêthomai*. The

complementarity of these two terms can be directly observed in a signal rhapsodic usage

of *epilêthomai*.[63] The context is the rhapsodic 'shifting' from one topic to another at the

end of the first Homeric Hymn (to Dionysus)[64]:

οἱ δέ σ᾽ ἀοιδοὶ
ᾄδομεν ἀρχόμενοι λήγοντές τ᾽, οὐδέ πῃ ἔστι
σεῖ᾽ <u>ἐπιληθόμενῳ</u> ἱερῆς <u>μεμνῆσθαι</u> ἀοιδῆς.

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[63] Cf. the same complementarity—but on the part of the *audience*, not, as in the *Hymn*, of the rhapsode—at Hes. *Theog.* 102-103.

[64] In rhapsodic poetics, 'shifting' (*metabasis*: Nagy 2002: 82n.37 and Ford 1992: 43) to a new topic is conventionally designated as 'remembering' (cf. Nagy 2002: 31); leaving behind the old topic is, by implication, 'forgetting.' But the conceit of the hymns, which place the entire poetic performance under the auspices of a particular god, is that the presiding god is never 'forgotten,' since the poet begins and ends with him / her.

47

(*HH* 1.17-9)

We bards sing you
both beginning and leaving off [from song], nor is it ever possible
for one <u>forgetful of</u> you to <u>recall</u> the sacred song.

Insofar as *epilêthomai* and *epimimnêskomai* designate respectively the negative and positive aspects of a total phenomenon—the preservation and transmission of *kleos* in poetic memory[65]—we might expect that, in a 'normal' poetic environment, Telemakhos would use some form of the latter; instead he uses the morphological double *epikleiô*, doubtless because the memory of Odysseus is precisely what is at stake.[66]

In addition to their 'marked' poetic usage, *epilêthomai* and *epimimnêskomai* have as well an ordinary 'unmarked' usage, according to which they designate simple (non-poetic) forgetting and remembering. When used in this simple sense, these verbs can indeed take a singular subject. But when marked as indexes of poetic memory, they occur as a rule in the plural.[67] Thus, when we confine ourselves to the semantic sphere delineated by the poetic function, we observe a coherent set of terms that follow the same morphological pattern, according to which the preverb *epi-* is correlated with the response of the group. What may at first appear to be isolated exceptions to this rule turn out instead, on closer examination, to be instances where an individual is presented as an exemplary representative of the group response. This is above all true of the Homeric

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[65] Cf. Simondon 1982: 128 (with reference to Hes. *Theog.* 54-5): "La divinité Mémoire est, en quelque sorte, maîtresse d'oubli, d'un certain oubli."

[66] In Ford's terms (Ford 1992: 100 ff.), the *Odyssey* is concerned with the origin of poetic memory. The story of Odysseus is a 'work in progress,' and thus is not yet available for preservation in memory.

[67] Singular *epilêthô/omai* (explicitly or potentially 'poetic' usages in boldface): *Il.* **22.387**; *Od.* 1.57, **4.221**, 4.455, 5.324, 20.85. Plural *epilêthô/omai*: *Il.* **7.452**. Singular *epimimnêskomai*: *Od.* **1.31**, **4.189**. Plural *epimimnêskomai*: *Il.* 17.103; *Od.* **4.191**. I note that *epilêthô/omai* has a generally less restricted pattern of usage. In the active, for instance, it has causal force; thus at *Od.* 4.221 (potentially 'poetic'), Helen's *pharmakon* is κακῶν ἐπίληθον ἀπάντων. See below for other potentially 'poetic' usages of singular forms.

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Hymn's ἐπιληθόμενῳ—if indeed Allen's emendation for the ἐπιλαθόμενοι of the

codex[68] is correct. The context is precisely the behavior of *aoidoi* considered as a group.

Moreover, the rhapsode himself is always implicitly a representative of the community,

and must be understood as such, even when he is considered as a solo performer. At *Od.*

4.189, Peisistratos is said to be reminded (ἐπιμνησθείς) of his brother—the context and

the themes evoked in conjunction with Antilokhos make some poetic overtone

likely[69]—but his response (and his memory is precisely a response to the speech of

Menelaos) is explicitly coordinated with those of the others. Moreover, two lines later he

himself pluralizes the experience of *epimimnêskomai*. Zeus is similarly described as

ἐπιμνησθείς of an implicitly poetic theme (Orestes' avenging of Agamemnon's murder)

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[68] Suspect of course for the Doric *â*; although I cannot supply an exact parallel, I believe Greek would tolerate a predicate adjective in the nominative if we understand the subject of the infinitive as the ἀοιδοί of l. 17 (cf. Smyth §1973). Alternatively, following Allen's syntax but avoiding hiatus, we might correct to ἐπιληθομένοις.

[69] The entire episode, of course, abounds in poetic resonances, especially Helen's *pharmakon*, which, like Hesiod's Muses (*Th.* 55), induces forgetfulness of cares (κακῶν ἐπίληθον ἁπάντων, 4.221). Peisistratos' memory focuses on the most epic of themes related to Antilokhos, namely his death at the hands of Memnon (a central event in the cyclic *Aithiopis*). I note the formal resemblance between the verbalization of this theme (ἀμύμονος 'Αντιλόχοιο / τόν ῥ' 'Ηοῦς ἔκτεινε φαεινῆς ἀγλαὸς υἱός, 4.187-88) and the typical opening of an epic song, with line-final statement of the hero's name (cf. *Il.* 1.1) followed by an expanding relative clause. (Walsh [forthcoming]: 72n31 notes that "naming conventions can be highly formal" in Homeric style.) The Peisistratean paradigm of remembering a *philos* who has fallen in battle suggests that there may be some poetic resonance in the usage of *epilêthomai* (in the singular) at *Il.* 22.387, where Achilles declares that he will "never forget" Patroklos. For neoanalyst critics, Achilles' hesitation marks a moment where the tradition of the *Aithiopis* threatens to hijack the plot of the *Iliad* (Seaford 1994: 157; we can see from this correspondence between *Il.* 22 and *Od.* 4 via the *Aithiopis* tradition that the *Aithiopis* functions generally as a foil for Homeric tradition as an object of poetic memory). Alternatively, we might see in this passage a tension between the traditional plots of the Trojan cycle as a whole (where the death of Hektor leads inevitably to the fall of Troy—so Achilles momentarily contemplates *immediately* taking the city [22.381-4]) and of the *Iliad* in particular (where the death of Patroklos leads to the reintegration of Achilles, whose story does not compass the fall of Troy). Needless to say, if this instance of *epilêthomai does* count as 'poetic,' it involves an exceptionally dense moment of signification; in such a context, singular *epilêthomai* should not be felt to disrupt the pluralizing tendency I have described.

at the beginning of the *Odyssey* (1.31)[70]; in this case, I direct the reader to what will be said below concerning the collectivity personified by Zeus (Ch. 5, p. 257).[71]

As I noted above, the plural usage of verbs in *epi-* seems above all to derive from the pragmatic context of these verbs, which, on the basis of morpho-syntax alone, should denote simply some reaction experienced in response to an action or speech. In terms of Chantraine's *Grammaire homerique*, "ἐπί souligne le sentiment qui provient de tel ou tel événement."[72] The marked tendency toward pluralization in the case of words linked to the semantic field of poetic performance is due to the fact that, in the Homeric world, one rarely engages in poetic activity except in a group setting.[73] In such a context, the poet defines the pole of 'action' — that is, of performance — and the audience (as a rule, a group) of 'reaction' — or reception. The diction of Homeric poetry both distinguishes between the poles of performance and reception and relates them as complementary components of a total framework. Note the correlation of *epikleiô* (the receptive activity of the audience) with *kleiô* (the performative activity of the bard) in the passage that provides the sole Homeric attestation of the former:

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[70] Formally (as well as thematically), these lines are an exact parallel for Peisistratos' recollection. Note ll. 29-30, ἀμύμονος Αἰγίσθοιο, / τόν ῥ' Ἀγαμεμνονίδης τηλεκλυτὸς ἔκταν' Ὀρέστης, and cf. the previous note on the possible resonances of this formal pattern.

[71] Zeus, in a way, represents the totality of the ideal audience. Thus, the archetypal poetic performance of the Muses has as its audience not the community of Olympians but the mind of Zeus: Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα, ταὶ Διὶ πατρὶ / ὑμνεῦσαι τέρπουσι μέγαν νόον ἔντος Ὀλύμπου (Hes. *Th.* 36-7).

[72] Chantraine 1942-1953: 2.106 (§151). The 'event' in question can be either an action (*Il.* 23.840: ἧκε δὲ δινήσας· γέλασαν δ' ἐπὶ πάντες Ἀχαιοί) or, often, a utterance (*Od.* 15.437: ὣς ἔφαθ'. οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπόμνυον ὣς ἐκέλευεν).

[73] One possible exception being the 'private' performance of rhapsodic poetry by Achilles and Patroklos in *Iliad* 9 (186 ff.). However, this performance setting is abnormal, even pathological, and is connected to the marked asociality of Achilles/Patroklos (cf. Sinos 1980: 60, who brilliantly connects this scene to Achilles' sociopathic fantasy that all the Achaeans should perish but he and Patroklos). The peculiar way in which poetic performance here delineates the personal, definitely anti-social bond between Achilles and Patroklos may help to explain the instance of singular *epilêthomai* noted above (n. 69).

Φήμιε, πολλὰ γὰρ ἄλλα βροτῶν θελκτήρια οἶδας
ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, τά τε <u>κλείουσιν</u> ἀοιδοί·
τῶν ἕν γέ σφιν ἄειδε παρήμενος . . .

.   .   .
τούτῳ δ' οὐ νέμεσις Δαναῶν κακὸν οἶτον ἀείδειν·
τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον <u>ἐπικλείουσ'</u> ἄνθρωποι,
ἥ τις ἀϊόντεσσι νεωτάτη ἀμφιπέληται.

<div align="right">1.337-39, 350-52</div>

Phêmios, you know many other charms for mortals,
the works of men and gods that bards <u>celebrate</u>;
sing one of these for them as you sit in their company . . .

.   .   .
But this man is not to be blamed for singing the dire fate of the Danaans;
for men <u>approve</u> better that song
that most lately meets their ears.

Whatever the precise meanings of *kleiô* and *epikleiô*,[74] it is clear that they name

coordinated components of a total activity, which is the transmission of *kleos*. The

reception of the poetic act is designated by an *epi-* compound of the verb whose simplex

form designates the act itself. To return to the word that constitutes our primary object of

interest, *epaineô*: if this word participates in a morpho-semantic system analogous to that

of *epikleiô*, we may hypothesize that it designates an act of reception which is the

complement of an act that could be indicated by the term *aineô* or a related word. (I

explore this hypothesis in Chapter 2, pp. 63-4.)

In Homer *epaineô* is, as a rule, always used of a group.[75] Outside of the system of

Homeric phraseology (where its semantics are likewise less rigid), *epaineô* loses some of

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[74] I find the conventional glosses, based on the notion of 'praise,' to be inadequate and overly restrictive. Note the use of *kleiô* to denote the (singular) activity of the bard at Hes. *Th.* 32: ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα.

[75] For the apparent exception of Zeus' *epainos*, which must nevertheless be understood as an expression of group will, see below, Ch. 5 p. 257.

its *explicitly* collective character, although it retains this character in at least one important cognate context, Alcaeus fr. 348 LP[76]:

> τὸν κακοπατρίδαν
> Φίττακον πόλιος τὰς ἀχόλω καὶ βαρυδαίμονος
> ἐστάσαντο τύραννον, μέγ' ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες

> Base-born
> Pittakos they have established as tyrant of a city without anger
> and beset by evil fortune, <u>approving him greatly, all together</u>.

I note that in this case, *epaineô* is not only used in the plural, but is also part of an explicitly social, even civic, context. The action designated by the verb is tied to a process of community building or definition (although this process may not be a positive one from the speaker's point of view). In archaic contexts where *epaineô* is not grammatically plural, we nevertheless find some interesting patterns of distribution that suggest that the verb continues to connote a pluralized point of view, one that is to be identified with the group rather than an individual speaker. At Alcman 1.43, *epaineô* designates the potential activity of the chorus (which is, however, not permitted by the chorus-leader). In the *Theognidea*, *epaineô* is always used in general statements, taking as its subject either an indefinite (and generalizing) *tis* or a generic addressee.[77] As the designation of a generalizable phenomenon, *epaineô* is twice explicitly opposed to the singular action of the poet / speaker, designated by *aineô*:

> οἶνε, τὰ μέν σ' <u>αἰνῶ</u>, τὰ δὲ μέμφομαι· οὐδέ σε πάμπαν
> οὔτέ ποτ' ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι.

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[76] As an indication of the extent to which Alcaeus' Aeolic diction is cognate with that of Homer, I note the fact that ἀόλλεες here occurs at colon-boundary, as it does in Homer, where this Aeolicism always occurs before the bucolic diaeresis, which tends to be the most syntactically marked colon-boundary of the hexameter line. (NOTE also the tendency for "syntactic closure" at this point in the line: Nagy 1990: 462-3n.121. Cf. Nagy 1974: 61-7 for the importance of the 'Adonic' as an independent formulaic unit.) Cf. Walsh (forthcoming): 63: "it has been shown that phrases at the end of the line are related to those at the main caesura."

[77] *Epaineô* occurs twice in the *Theognidea* aside from the two passages quoted below (93, 797).

ἐσθλὸν καὶ κακόν ἐσσι. τίς ἄν σέ γε μωμήσαιτο,
τίς δ' ἄν <u>ἐπαινήσαι</u> μέτρον ἔχων σοφίης;
(Theog. 873-6)[78]

Wine, I <u>approve</u> you in some regards, in others I reprove; and never am I able
    either to hate you or to love you altogether.
Noble are you, and base. Who, holding a measure of wisdom,
    could reproach you, who <u>approve</u>?

μήποτ' <u>ἐπαινήσῃς</u>, πρὶν ἄν εἰδῇς ἄνδρα σαφηνέως,
ὀργὴν καὶ ῥυθμὸν καὶ τρόπον ὅστις ἄν ῇ.
. . .
ἔφθην <u>αἰνήσας</u> πρὶν σοῦ κατὰ πάντα δαῆναι
ἤθεα· νῦν δ' ἤδη νηῦς ἅθ' ἑκὰς διέχω.
(Theog. 963-70)

Never praise a man before you know him clearly, what sort he is
    in temper, character, and custom.
.   .   .
I rushed to praise you before knowing thoroughly all your
    habits; but now I keep a ship's safe distance.[79]

This pattern bears an obvious resemblance to the opposition of *kleiô* and *epikleiô* I

observed in the *Odyssey* above. At Semonides 7.29, *epaineô* indicates the approval of a

generic *xeinos*; again we are dealing with a general formulation and an action which is

implicitly imputed to a plurality of potential actors. Among the lyric poets, Simonides

542.27-29 (πάντας δ' ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω, / ἑκὼν ὅστις ἔρδῃ / μηδὲν αἰσχρόν)

appears to be the most individualizing usage of a related form. But here we must take

account of the tendency in lyric poetry for the poet's persona to express the ideals of the

community or tradition as a whole.[80] It is worthwhile comparing the position of *epaineô*

in a priamel formulated by Timocreon:

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[78] Note the correlation of *epaineô* and *mômeomai* as designations for praise and blame poetry, respectively, as at Alcman 1.43-4; see further Ch. 2.

[79] Note the way Theognis expresses the bond created by *ainos* (or rather the reverse of that bond) in terms of a very concrete "ethical distance": cf. Ch. 3, n. 14.

[80] Cf. Lear 2005.

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ἀλλ' εἰ τύ γε Παυσανίαν ἢ καὶ τύ γε Ξάνθιππον αἰνεῖς,
ἢ τύ γε Λευτυχίδαν, ἐγὼ δ' Ἀριστείδαν ἐπαινέω ...
(PMG 727.1-2)

But while you may <u>praise</u> Pausanias, or you again Xanthippos,
or you Leutukhidas, *I* <u>praise</u> Aristeidas . . .

The poet's definitive act of praise—which, by a kind of Kantian reasoning, is meant to be

normative for the community as a whole—is contrasted with a plurality of possible

individual acts of praise at odds with the norm expressed by the poet.

Timocreon brings us into the 5th century. Lest the connotations of collective

action or approval should appear to be too weak at this point to be meaningful or apparent

to a classical audience, who might therefore be at risk of missing in contemporary

performances the specific force I am attributing to *epaineô*, I would like to discuss briefly

one very important use of the verb in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*. This is, in fact, a crucially

important example, since, of all the non-Homeric instances of the verb, this one appears

closest to Homeric usage. At ll. 1346 ff., immediately after Agamemnon has received the

coup de grâce,[81] we find a "bold artifice," one which is "unique" in extant tragedy,

namely, "the splitting of the voice of the Chorus . . . into the voices of its individual

members."[82] This device is a uniquely appropriate representation of the disintegration of

the body politic: the climactic murder of the king results immediately in the staged

breakdown of the community. Thrown into confused turmoil by Clytemnestra's *coup*,

the chorus struggles to find some common response (κοινωσώμεθ', 1347) in a context

which is explicitly bouleutic (βουλεύματ', ibid.). The climactic moment of crisis is thus

presented as the struggle of a temporarily fragmented assembly to reach some kind of

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[81] The double blow delivered to Agamemnon suggests the paradigm of sacrifice: cf. Lowenstam 1981: 165.

[82] Fraenkel 1950: 634.

political consensus. This Aeschylean assembly scene closes with a statement of *epainos*

for the proposal that the chorus should take action by seeking more precise knowledge of

what has transpired (an appropriate course of action for the chorus!); like the majority of

modern editors,[83] but for reasons based on the preceding analysis of the morpho-

semantics of *epaineô*, I believe these lines are spoken by the chorus-leader, who

expresses the collective decision of the group:

> ταύτην ἐπαινεῖν πάντοθεν πληθύνομαι,
> τρανῶς Ἀτρείδην εἰδέναι κυροῦνθ' ὅπως.
> (1370-1)
>
> From every part I am prevailed upon to approve this [proposal],
> to ascertain clearly how the son of Atreus fares.

Note the emphasis on the totality or collectivity of this decision (πάντοθεν). As in the

case of Zeus on Olympus (see below, Ch. 5), the chorus-leader's point of view, expressed

by the first-person πληθύνομαι, is presented as an expression of the collective will. And

this expression of *epainos* is decisive, rendering the proposal efficient in terms of the

action of the play: with the chorus-leader's declaration the assembly is closed, the chorus

having apparently found a measure of reintegration, and the action continues with the

appearance of Clytemnestra, whose entry permits the chorus to act on their decision to

σάφ' εἰδέναι. Thus here, as in Homer, *epaineô* expresses the efficacious resolution to

deliberation accomplished by group approval for a proposal.[84]

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[83] Ibid.

[84] I alert the reader that, in Homer, the division that *epainos* resolves is often expressed by the word *dikha* or its derivatives (see below, Ch. 3 pp. 146 ff.). In connection, therefore, with the Homeric poetics of consensus, I note the formulation of the proposal which here leads to consensus: σάφ' εἰδότας χρὴ τῶνδε μυθεῖσθαι πέρι· / τὸ γὰρ τοπάζειν τοῦ σάφ' εἰδέναι δίχα (1368-9).

Chapter 2

The Sociology of Praise

I noted in my Introduction the semantic diversity that has in general confounded or complicated attempts to understand the lexical field of *ainos* and *epainos* as a more or less cohesive whole. Scholars have generally focused their attention on *ainos* (due to its use in a variety of poetically dense contexts, this word seems to have the most literary appeal), and have offered a range of competing, even contradictory accounts of the development of its meaning.[1] Some find a more or less qualified notion of 'speech' primary, and the word's laudatory connotations a secondary development.[2] Others reverse this course of development, and make 'praise' the primary meaning.[3] Largely because it is, morphologically, a derivative of *aineô*, *epaineô* has received far less scrutiny. In assessing the range of values this word can have in later Greek, one is left to rely almost entirely on the lexica, which generally subsume the bulk of classical usages under the rubric of some form of 'praise' or 'commendation.' Scholars who feel the need to account for some specific nuance in the semantics of *epaineô* instinctively have recourse to the notion of 'praise.' For instance, in accounting for the use of *aineô* and *epaineô* in conversational speech as a way of expressing thanks in the context of a polite refusal, Quincey writes: "Both expressions would be perfectly explicable in terms of

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[1] For a survey of different accounts of the semantics of *ainos*, see Blanc 1995: 209-11.

[2] Crusius, in *RE*, s.v. *Ainos* 10, pp. 1029-30; Richardson 1993: 240.

[3] Jaeger, as cited by Blanc 1995: 210; Pucci 1977: 76: "In particular, αἶνος designates a discourse that aims at praising and honoring someone or something or at being ingratiating toward a person."

social convention; the refusal function would have stemmed from αἰνεῖν / ἐπαινεῖν = 'praise,' and constitute one more convenient euphemism dedicated to the cause of politeness."[4]

It should be clear, however, even from the few examples of *epaineô* I have cited thus far that this word's meaning in Homer differs significantly from the simple notion of 'praise.' A laudatory or commendatory connotation is perhaps conceivable in certain of the Homeric instances (e.g. μῦθον ἐπαινήσαντες, 2.335), but it is very difficult to sense this connotation when the verb is used absolutely (as it almost always is, by contrast with post-Homeric usage).[5] Even when that connotation is possible, it is certainly secondary, since the primary meaning of the verb is simply the acceptance of, or better, *consensus for* a particular proposal by virtue of which the proposal is enacted. Some of this is captured in LSJ's gloss on the Homeric usage ("approve, applaud, commend"), but this gloss does not reflect that one feature that distinguishes Homeric *epaineô* from other words for the demonstration of approval, namely, the fact that *epainos* in Homer is an *efficient* demonstration of approval. As Gernet astutely observed in a pathfinding essay on the proto-legal dimensions of the *Iliad*, "le mot *epainein* . . . précise souvent chez Homère une idée d'efficacité quasi juridique."[6] (I would modify this formulation only by changing "souvent" to 'toujours.') It is this efficacity—what I have been calling efficiency—that determines the term's specific value and usage; any adequate description of its semantics must therefore account for the predominant notion of efficiency.

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[4] Quincey 1966: 145.

[5] See below, Ch. 5 p. 199, and cf. LSJ s.v. I.1.

[6] Gernet 1948: 186. Cf. Gernet 1948-1949: 111-2: "Une certaine participation sociale y apparaît, pour une série d'actes, comme un fondement de validité. . . . cf. l'emploi du mot ἐπαινεῖν qui équivaut à ratifier dans *Il.*, XXIII, 534 sq."

Nevertheless, it must be noted that, even in Homer, the notion of 'praise' is not totally absent from the semantic field we are considering. Secondary at best in the case of the compound *epaineô*, this notion takes on a greater prominence in the semantics of the simplex *aineô*.[7] Thus, in objecting to Achilles' proposal, only a dozen lines after the play with the tenses of *epaineô* noted previously, Antilokhos enjoins Achilles to award Eumêlos a different prize, ἵνα σ' αἰνήσωσιν Ἀχαιοί (23.552). I would hesitate to say that 'praise' is the *mot juste* for this expression; it seems somewhat reductive in ways I will suggest shortly. But certainly something approaching (or exceeding) our notion of praise must be far more in evidence on this occasion than in any instance of *epaineô*. Similar is the case of the *Iliad*'s single reference to the Judgment of Paris,

ὃς νείκεσσε θεὰς ὅτε οἱ μέσσαυλον ἵκοντο,
τὴν δ' ᾔνησ' ἥ οἱ πόρε μαχλοσύνην ἀλεγεινήν.
24.29-30[8]

who made *neikos* for the goddesses when they came to his dwelling,
but approved the one who bestowed on him the bitter gratification of lust.

One can clearly sense here the operation of something akin to praise, in the sense of affirmation of merit, even while the word 'praise' would seem an even more inadequate translation for Paris' action than for the recognition Antilokhos projects for Achilles. In

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[7] Although *aineô* itself can denote the notion of 'efficient consent' I am ascribing to the compound: cf. 8.9 (see below, Ch. 3 p. 108, for a discussion of this passage). There are several factors, I think, which explain why we find the simplex rather than the compound here. First is the fact that this is a command directed toward the future; using the imperative of *epaineô* would imply, rather hastily, an efficacy that this command in fact does not have. Second is the fact that Zeus' command concerns action on behalf of Greeks or Trojans, an issue that divides the community of gods; the communal implications of *epaineô* are therefore contextually inappropriate.

[8] For the controversy ancient and modern surrounding these lines, which were athetized in antiquity, see Richardson 1993 ad 24.23-30. The athetesis covered ll. 23-30, but the objections seem to focus on the two lines quoted here. Richardson summarizes the modern scholarship, including Reinhardt's arguments against the hypothesis of interpolation, and concludes, "it is probably fair to say that the passage as a whole should be regarded as part of the original poem, despite some doubts over 29-30" (278). In the context of another essay, I hope to show that these lines on the Judgment are in fact crucial to the poem's thematics, and encode important information not only about the poems' conception of social cohesion (especially in the juridical sphere), but also about the pathology that prevents the Trojans from achieving that cohesion.

particular, we must be aware of the fact(s) that the Judgment is decidedly a juridical

context, and that Paris' judgment is a proper speech act, a kind of 'praise' that, coupled

with a particularly fateful 'uptake,' has an important effect on reality. Nevertheless, these

two instances of *aineô* seem, if not directly comparable to, at least continuous with later,

more strictly laudatory usages of the word (e.g. Her. 5.102: Εὐαλκίδην . . . ὑπὸ

Σιμωνίδου τοῦ Κηίου πολλὰ αἰνεθέντα, "Eualkidês . . . much praised by Simonides of

Keos").

Bearing in mind that *aineô* and *epaineô* have positive connections to what we

think of as 'praise' both within the system of Homeric phraseology and historically, in

subsequent patterns of usage, we are compelled to confront the question of whether it is

possible to connect the social act designated in Homer by *epaineô* with other

manifestations of the same or related words. Is there a cohesive semantic field

encompassing all these usages? What core meaning or conceptual framework underlies

the process of semantic development and specialization? The argument offered here is

that, insofar as all the various applications of *(ep)aineô* are fundamentally social

acts—acts that create and sustain social relations—the unity of these applications will be

discovered in the social sphere. By socializing our understanding of praise, we can

construct a common field in which to examine the points of contact between the act of

praising and the speech acts we have begun investigating in Homer. To examine *epainos*

as a (socially) efficient response, to speak of Paris's *ainos* for Aphrodite as a speech act,

is to demand a *sociology of praise*.

This sociology has been undertaken for the classical Indo-European societies on

two occasions by Georges Dumézil: first in a book-length study (*Servius et la Fortune*,

1943) and later in a definitive reformulation, compressed into a chapter of *Idées romaines*

(1969). These studies provide an exhaustive description of the social function of praise

in ancient Indic, Roman, and Celtic societies, and reveal praise to be, at its most

fundamental level, a mode of efficacious speech. In *Servius et la Fortune*, Dumézil's

consistent gloss for the word which principally interests him, IE **kens-*, is "la louange

qualifiante"; in this formulation, "qualifiante" expresses both the power of praise to

endow its object with certain qualities—its quasi-magical ability to alter or enhance its

object—and the constraining force of praise, which produces obligations for the honorand

in the future.[9] In other words, "la louange qualifiante" has efficacy in both concrete and

social reality. In fact, Dumézil's later essay rephrases the gloss as "la louange efficace."[10]

In general, the *Idées romaines* chapter rearticulates the notion of 'praise' in terms that lay

greater emphasis on its nature as speech act, as an activity constitutive of reality.

Speaking of the object of praise—in particular, the past merits of Servius and the future

merits of Prthu, merits which themselves have social effects—Dumézil writes, "les

mérites sont efficaces parce que publiquement déclarés, célébrés."[11] If we substitute "les

mots" for "les mérites" in this formulation, we obtain a nearly perfect statement of the

efficiency of *epainos*: Odysseus' *muthos*, for example, is 'praised,' and therefore

efficacious.[12] The 1969 essay moreover specifies precisely what social function this

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[9] Cf. e.g. Dumézil 1943: 56: "autant et plus que noblesse, louange oblige. Il est probable même que, à époque plus ancienne, la louange avait une office non seulement rhétorique et moral mais un effet proprement magique . . ."; 67-70; the paraphrase on p. 86: "avec valeur de louange efficace et contraignante"; etc.

[10] Dumézil 1969: 122.

[11] Ibid. 118.

[12] Dumézil 1943: 84 notes that the Sanskrit reflex of **kens-* occasionally takes as its object not a personal entity but "un mot signifiant 'formule.'"

mode of efficacy serves. For the power of praise (or rather, of such 'qualifying' speech

generally, since IE *kens- originally designated praise *and* blame, the latter being equally

efficacious) is not exercised arbitrarily, but in the service of overall social cohesion, of

order in the social (and real) world: "la racine [*kens-] . . . implique aussi que cette

décleration sera, moralement au moins, suivie d'effet, mettra ou remettra à sa place dans

l'ordre du monde ou dans l'ordre social la chose affirmée ou l'être jugé."[13]

Praise, as a species of efficacious speech, maintains society—in a way, founds

society—by establishing social relations, by 'putting things in their places' respective to

each other. (The same, incidentally, is true of blame, which also serves the "positive

social function" of establishing the order of things—provided, of course, that it is applied

correctly, a condition that applies as well to praise.[14]) This social mechanism may be a

cultural universal, or it may not. It hardly matters, since a fundamentally *socialized*

understanding of praise is part and parcel of the Greeks' Indo-European inheritance. It is

our task to attempt to reconstruct this socialized understanding when we examine the

semantics of *epaineô*. In fact, the Dumézilian analysis of the social meaning of IE *kens-*

may be understood to be *necessary* to an adequate account of the semantics of *(ep)aineô*,

simply on the basis of internal developments in the Greek language. García-Ramón has

recently set forth a wealth of evidence, based on careful analysis and comparison of

Mycenaean proper names with classical onomastic patterns, that "(ἐπ)αινεῖν est le

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[13] Dumézil 1969: 103. For *kens-* as praise *and* blame, see Dumézil 1943: 76-8, 230, and *passim*. For the importance of blame in IE culture, see Ward 1973, esp. pp. 139-40 on its magical efficacy.

[14] Nagy 1999: 262 (§12n4), 287 (§10n6), etc.; Nagy's book contains a detailed working through of the implications for archaic Greek poetry and society of Dumézil's model of praise and blame as complementary aspects of a single social function. For the requirement that blame be applied to an *appropriate* object, see Ward 1973: 133. For the socially constructive function of blame poetry in the context of a non-Indo-European consensus-based society, see Colson 1974: 56.

continuant de *kéns-e- en grec alphabétique par un processus de renouvellement lexical."[15]

It is here, then, in the notion of an utterance that defines and even creates a community, that I propose to discover the root concept from which all specific applications of *(ep)aineô* evolved. The basic meaning of *ainos* and related forms should be understood, I suggest, as 'socially constructive speech,' as speech that creates or sustains social relations, above all by establishing the relative positions of members of the group. This basic meaning allows us to understand, first of all, why Homeric *(ep)ainos* is so firmly grounded in the domain of speech acts, for an *ainos* in this sense is a speech act *par excellence*; secondly, it suggests the way in which *(ep)ainos* might easily come to mean 'praise,' since 'to praise' someone—especially in the forms that praise took in the ancient world—is above all to identify that person's relative position (of eminence) vis-à-vis his or her peers.

One might remark at this point that, while *aineô* might well match the notion of 'socially constructive speech,' *epaineô* in Homer is in fact not an utterance at all. The approval designated by the verb is never formalized as a statement; at best, the verb expresses a kind of acclamation. Homeric *epainos* is a response, a reception, but of a basic, primal kind that seems not to require, or even to preclude, verbalization.[16] The reactive nature of *epainos*, which gives it the appearance of a mere reflex, is to a certain extent determined by the syntax of this word as a compound.[17] That syntax, however,

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[15] García-Ramón 1992: 249.

[16] But cf. Ch. 1 p. 39 on the articulate acclamations of historical assemblies.

[17] See above, Ch. 1 pp. 40 and 43.

also presupposes a primary utterance—an *ainos* to the *epainos*, to state things 'backward'—which is why, after all, *epaineô* is strictly restricted to the arena of utterances, the *agorê* or assembly. The verbalization of an utterance is a key component of the concept of *epainos*, but not of any utterance whatsoever: specifically, a Dumézilian utterance that creates, orders, and sustains society—an utterance that is, in other words, socially constructive.

In fact, I am prepared to formulate as a working hypothesis for our Homeric grammar of *epainos* the following principle: *epainos* is not so much an utterance in itself but the response of the group to an utterance, i.e. an *ainos*. The relationship between these two terms, viz. between the verbs *aineô* and *epaineô*, should be understood according to the pattern set by the other pair of Homeric verbs (noted in Chapter 1, p. 51) exhibiting the simplex / *epi-* alternation: *kleiô* and *epikleiô*. I cite again the two directly relevant lines from the *Odyssey*:

ἔργ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε, τά τε <u>κλείουσιν</u> ἀοιδοί·

τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μᾶλλον <u>ἐπικλείουσ'</u> ἄνθρωποι . . .
<div align="right">1.338, 351</div>

Here, *kleiô*, predicated of the bard, plainly means 'make a *kleos*' (that is, a song, an *aoidê*), just as *aineô* means 'make an *ainos*.' But the compound *epikleiô* manifestly does not mean 'make a *kleos* for' (as, similarly, LSJ's "commend, praise" might lead us to think that *epaineô* means 'make an *ainos* for'). Rather, *epikleiô* designates the response to a *kleos* that has already been sung, i.e. the reception of the song; "*epi-* marks the action as a *reaction*."[18] Likewise, Homeric *epaineô* designates specifically the response to

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[18] Above, Ch. 1 p. 43. Of course, in the context of Phêmios' activity as bard, reception can also be performance. *Od.* 1.351-2 could be understood in reference either to Phêmios' reception of the 'newest song,' or to that of his audience—the wording is ambiguous. (On the whole, I prefer the latter interpretation.)

something that has already been verbalized, something that, I suggest, can always be understood as an *ainos*. This suggestion must remain a working hypothesis because the Homeric poems never allow us to confirm it empirically. Never, that is, do we find *epainos* for an utterance that is explicitly identified as an *ainos*. (Although all utterances ratified by *epainos*, and especially Odysseus' *muthos* in Book 2, certainly match the definition of *ainos* as 'socially constructive speech.') But this circumstance is not so damning to the hypothesis as one might think. The word *ainos* occurs only twice in the *Iliad*, both times in the context of the funeral games of Book 23 (23.652 and 795). And there, as we shall see when we consider the episode in detail in Ch. 5 (pp. 232 ff.), it is precisely the use of the words *ainos* and *aineô* that creates the expectation, necessary to the poetic efficacy of the scene, of a future *epainos* (one that is nevertheless deferred indefinitely). That is to say, *ainos* and *aineô*, as deployed in Book 23, presuppose the response of *epainos* in exactly the manner predicted by my hypothesis. We can find further indirect confirmation in Odysseus' traditional epithet *poluainos*. This man 'of many *ainoi*' is one of the *Iliad*'s great specialists in socially constructive speech (see Ch. 4); and it is precisely he who succeeds in achieving *epainos* when the Achaeans need it most (see below, esp. pp. 208-9, on the crisis following the *diapeira* of Book 2). *Ainos* and *epainos* are related, then, as action and response; together, these two constitute the total speech act.

To return to the sociology of *epainos*: the social cohesion engendered by praise is a notion that can be traced in many, if not most, later instances of *(ep)aineô*, and it predominates in the epinician poetics of Greece's canonical praise poet, Pindar. In

Pindar, praise serves an essential social function: as Leslie Kurke has forcefully

demonstrated, the rhetoric of epinician organizes itself around the negotiation of anxieties

surrounding the re-integration of the victor into his community.[19] The task of epinician is

to (re)establish the social bonds of a harmonious community. Both the form and the

content of epinician contribute to the achievement of this goal: in the context of the

kômos' choral performance, epinician song unites the voices of community members and

instantiates their belonging to a group; at the same time, the themes of that song actively

reinforce the various obligations subtending society ("la louange qualifiante"). In light of

the social dynamics of epinician praise, it is important to note that Pindar himself uses

epaineô in the same sense we have observed in Homer. Thus, after Pelias has verbalized

the precise circumstances under which Jason may obtain the throne of Iolkos, Pindar

indicates the ratification of this compact with the words σύνθεσιν ταύταν ἐπαινήσαντες

("having approved this compact," *P.* 4.168).[20] This act of reception not only establishes a

bond between the two men, signaled by the plural form of the participle; it also results, as

in Homer, in action, viz. the assembly of the Argonauts and the departure of the

expedition. (Note too that the *sunthesis* is fundamentally political: it concerns the future

of the government of Iolkos, and thus the future shape of the community.) Moreover,

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[19] Kurke 1991: *passim*; cf. pp. 6-7, "everything in epinikion aimed at the defusion and resolution of these same tensions [between *oikos* and *polis*], for its goal was the successful integration of the athlete into a harmonious community"; see also Kurke 1998: 141 and Crotty 1982: 121 for the epinician ode as an "act of inclusion." See Nagy 1990: 153 for a slightly different perspective on "the social function of the *ainos*": Nagy places the *ainos* of praise poetry in the context of the consolidation of power and prestige by tyrants. The phenomena I am discussing are somewhat more broadly conceived; I understand epinician *ainos* as a specialization of a more general 'social function' (as does Nagy, but without further exploration: cf. Nagy 1990: 149n.20).

[20] I note that this instance of *epainos* is one half of a compositional ring enclosing the catalogue of Argonauts, which concludes with the words λέξατο πάντας ἐπαινήσαις Ἰάσων (189). The correlation of *epainos* with the marshaling of a *stratos* (cf. l. 191) and an epic-style catalogue is very interesting in light of the function of *epainos* in *Iliad* 2.

even in its more usual laudatory sense, *epaineô* in Pindar frequently bonds with

statements of social cohesion and order. The first strophe of *Olympian* 13 is

representative:

> τρισολυμπιονίκαν
> ἐπαινέων οἶκον ἥμερον ἀστοῖς,
> ξένοισι δὲ θεράποντα, γνώσομαι
> τὰν ὀλβίαν Κόρινθον, Ἰσθμίου
> πρόθυρον Ποτειδᾶνος, ἀγλαόκουρον·
> ἐν τᾷ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασι-
>   γνήτα τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές,
> Δίκα καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰ-
>   ρήνα, τάμι' ἀνδράσι πλούτου,
> χρύσεαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος·
>
> *O.* 13.1-8

In <u>praising</u> a house with three Olympic victories,
one that is gentle to <u>townsmen</u>
and for <u>xenoi</u> an assiduous host, I will make evident
prosperous Corinth, portal
of Isthmian Poseidon and city of glorious children.
For there dwells <u>Eunomia</u> with her sister <u>Dikê</u>,
    firm foundation for <u>cities</u>,
and <u>Eirênê, steward</u> of wealth for men,
    who was raised with them—
the golden daughters of <u>wise-counseling Themis</u>.[21]

I note that Pindar's 'praise' of the "house with three Olympic victories" begins by

plotting out that house's social relations with others both within the political community

(ἀστοῖς) and beyond it (ξένοισι), that is, by providing a global map of those relations.

Furthermore, by means of praise, the poet will *gignôskein*—not so much "come to know"

(Race) or even 'recognize,' but 'acknowledge publicly,' 'put in evidence,' or 'judge' in a

juridical sense[22]—the prosperity that Corinth enjoys precisely because of her well-

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[21] I adapt this and subsequent translations of Pindar from William H. Race's Loeb edition (Harvard UP, 1997).

[22] Cf. LSJ s.v. II. Gernet 1948: 186 notes the juridical force *gignôskô* can have in Homer, which he ties to the later usage of *gnômê* as legal judgment. In his prayer to Thetis, Achilles asks for just such legal recognition from Agamemnon (γνῷ . . . / ἣν ἄτην, 1.411-12). And eventually Agamemnon provides such recognition when he acknowledges, in the *agorê*, his own *atê* (19.78 ff.); note the stress Agamemnon

ordered socio-political apparatus.[23] It is perhaps overstating the case to say (as I think

Dumézil would) that Pindar's praise in a sense produces or augments that prosperity ("la

louange efficace"), but I propose that praise and social order are here represented as

reciprocally interdependent (order elicits praise, which in turn improves order).[24]

Even in the case of the more common and less specialized word *aineô*, we can

detect a similar pattern of meanings and associations. Like *epaineô* as applied to Jason

and Pelias, *aineô* can indicate the acceptance of a social bond: thus Korônis, in

consenting to an illicit love affair, ἄλλον αἴνησεν γάμον κρύβδαν πατρός ("accepted

another marriage, without the knowledge of her father," *P.* 3.13).[25] And though the

association is less frequent than in the case of *epaineô* (this may be a statistical anomaly

resulting from the relative infrequency of the compound form), we can nevertheless

observe a similar correlation with order and the cohesiveness of social structures.

Olympian 9, for instance, instructs us to praise (αἰνήσαις), in addition to the victor (who

is appropriately named Epharmostos), his city Opous, ἂν Θέμις θυγάτηρ τέ οἱ

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lays on the juridical nature of this moment: αὐτὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι / σύνθεσθ᾽ Ἀργεῖοι, μῦθόν τ᾽ εὖ γνῶτε
ἕκαστος (19.83-4). With regard to the long controversy regarding Agamemnon's apparent violation of
custom in not 'standing up' to deliver his public acknowledgement (οὐδ᾽ ἐν μέσσοισιν ἀναστάς, 19.77;
for an outline of the controversy, see Edwards 1991 ad 19.76-84), I note that, in Book 1, *anhistêmi* is
directly related to the quarrel theme; forms of the word mark crucial moments of division (e.g. 1.305, 387-
8). So Agamemnon's avoidance of this action may be a gesture of reconciliation—an avoidance of a
gesture which previously punctuated the quarrel. Cf. the *Iliad* proem's summary of the Quarrel:
διαστήτην ἐρίσαντε, 1.6.

[23] The phrase τάμι᾽ ἀνδράσι πλούτου makes explicit the properly social dimension of political qualities.

[24] Another prominent example of the correlation of *epainos* and social order is *N.* 11. The first triad of this
ode begins with a hymn to Hestia, ἅ τε πρυτανεῖα λέλογχας, which emphasizes the connection between
proper ritual reverance of the goddess and good government (l. 5). The second triad begins with the words
ἐν λόγοις δ᾽ ἀστῶν ἀγαθοῖσιν ἐπαινεῖσθαι χρεών (l. 17).

[25] Pindar's use of *aineô* rather than *epaineô* is indicative of the latter's connotation of group action and
sentiment (see below); he wishes to stress that Korônis contracts this relationship independently, apart from
the group to which she belongs, her family (πατρός). For the use of *(ep)aineô* in the context of a marriage
contract, cf. Eur. *Or.* 1658, 1672.

σώτειρα λέλογχεν / μεγαλόδοξος Εὐνομία ("which Themis and her glorious daughter,

saving Eunomia, have as their allotment," 15-16). Fragment 215a (Snell)—an interesting

reference to the local variation of customs—makes not the city itself but her institutions

the object of praise: ἄλλα δ' ἄλλοισιν νόμιμα, σφετέραν / δ' αἰνεῖ δίκαν ἀνδρῶν

ἕκαστος ("there are different customs in different places, and each man praises his own

dikê," 2-3).[26] And the first Nemean ode concludes with the words σεμνὸν αἰνήσειν

νόμον ("will praise his hallowed nomos," 72), a statement of the apotheosized Herakles'

affirmation of what appears to be the cosmic order, but which undoubtedly implies order

among men.[27]

I conclude this compressed survey of *(ep)aineô* in Pindar with the lines that close

Pythian 10:

> ἀδελφεοῖσί τ' ἐπαινήσομεν ἐσλοῖς, ὅτι
> ὑψοῦ φέροντι νόμον Θεσσαλῶν
> αὔξοντες· ἐν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι κεῖται
> πατρώιαι κεδναὶ πολίων κυβερνάσιες.
>
> *P.* 10.69-72

We shall praise as well his noble brothers
because they uphold and exalt the state
of the Thessalians; with good men rests
the governance of cities as a cherished inheritance.

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[26] Here again, as in the reference to Korônis' 'marriage,' where some *particularized* sentiment is described, by contrast with the implied possibility of global agreement, Pindar uses the simplex *aineô* rather than *epaineô*. *Dikê* here means not 'judgment' or 'justice' but 'custom, usage' (LSJ s.v. I), but I stress that it is nevertheless an *institutional* concept.

[27] In fact, this *ainos* implies, or rather creates, poetic order in this ode: the final phrase makes a ring with the first words of the song, ἄμπνευμα σεμνὸν 'Αλφεοῦ / . . . σέθεν ἁδυεπής / ὕμνος ὁρμᾶται θέμεν / αἶνον ἀελλοπόδων μέγαν ἵππων (1-6). Note that the final word *nomos* falls, indexically (to adopt a term from Pierce's semiotics), outside the ring: this is a technique for creating emphasis. I note also that the opening of the poem is an explicit statement of a principle of order (σέθεν).

These final lines, lauding the brothers[28] of Thôrax, the commissioner of the ode, represent

a tertiary dispensation of glory, for they follow praise of Thôrax (hence the τέ), who is

himself honored only after the actual victor, Hippokleas. Here too we see a connection

between *epainos* and societal order: the object of praise, or rather the reason for *epainos*,

is precisely the brother's ability to augment the vitality of the state. But this is not, in

fact, what makes these lines so interesting. The fascination of this passage lies rather in

the fact that its style and syntax, as well as its function in the ode as a whole, distinctly

echo the legislative commendations that appear in the epigraphic record either by

themselves, as independent decrees, or as component parts—often secondary, 'tag'

amendments or additions (something like Washington's 'pork barrels')—of larger

decrees. The resemblance is actually quite striking, and, I suggest, too systemic to be due

to mere coincidence. For the syntax, we can compare an exceptionally well-preserved

Athenian decree from the end of the fifth century (405/4)[29]:

> ἔδοξεν τῆι βολῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι· . . . γνώμη Κλεσόφο | καὶ
> συμπρυτάνεων· ἐπαινέσαι τοῖς πρέσβεσι τοῖς Σαμίοις τοῖς τε
> προτέροι|ς ἥκοσι καὶ τοῖς νῦν καὶ τῆι βολῆι καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ
> τοῖς ἄλλοις | Σαμίοις ὅτι ἐσὶν ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ πρόθυμοι ποιεῖν ὅ τι
> δύνανται ἀγαθόν. | καὶ τὰ πεπραγμένα αὐτοῖς ὅτι δοκῶσιν ὀρθῶς
> ποιῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Σαμίοις·
>
> IG I³.i 127.5-11

> The *boulê* and the *dêmos* approved: . . . the proposal of Klesophos and the
> *sumprutaneis*, commendation for the Samian ambassadors, both those who
> came previously and the present ones, and for the *boulê* and the generals

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[28] Eurupulos and Thrasudaios: cf. Hdt. 9.58.

[29] The scholia date Pindar's ode to 498, which leaves nearly a half-century until the earliest example cited
by Henry 1983 (p. 1: 451/0), but the epigraphical record for the 5th c. is extremely sparse. Nevertheless,
regardless of when these formulas began appearing on stone, I believe Pindar reproduces the common
political language of his time: see Elmer 2005: 2-3 for the argument that it is unnecessary to establish the
chronological priority of epigraphical texts over their literary echoes. The argument is even stronger in this
case, since the epigraphical formulas undoubtedly reflect the oral proceedings of the *boulê*, themselves
conducted in inherited, traditional language. The formulas we observe in Athenian decrees are widespread
in the rest of Greece beginning in the Hellenistic period; doubtless they were widespread in practice even
before, but not disclosed by the scanty epigraphical remains outside Athens.

and the other Samians, because they are *andres agathoi* and willing to do whatever good thing they are able; and commendation for their deeds, because they have manifestly acted in the interest of the Athenians and the Samians.

Pindar's construction with a dative (rather than accusative) object corresponds well with the early epigraphical practice, as we see it represented here.[30] And again following standard legislative practice, the ὅτι clause in both Pindar and the Athenian decree comes after the statement of commendation.[31] Thematically, too, Pindar's text is a good match for the pattern of official *honores* (in both written and oral forms): the brothers are commended for their civic service, as the Samians in the inscription.[32] Moreover, as I mentioned, such commendations are often tacked onto other pieces of legislation, and appear as addenda in the decrees. For instance, an early fourth century grant of *proxenia* for Arkhônidês continues with the additional stipulation (according to a motion brought

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[30] Henry 1983: 1: "The evidence of the fifth century is too scanty to support a thesis that ἐπαινέσαι + dative is the earlier construction, but nevertheless one can say that ἐπαινέσαι + dative does not extend beyond the fifth century." Pindar's dative is in fact Wilamowitz's emendation, but for sound metrical reasons. Note that the inscription shifts from a dative (of the persons) to an accusative (of their actions, τὰ πεπραγμένα). We might hypothesize that the syntax is inflected according to an animate / inanimate distinction. We find a similar distinction between accusative and dative constructions in the *Iliad* (2.335 [acc.] and 18.312 [dat.]); see below, Ch. 5 p. 199, for the possible significance of this syntactical variation in the Homeric text.

[31] Ibid.: "With ὅτι the clause always *follows* at the end of the formulation." In later practice, ἐπειδή is the standard conjunction for the justificatory clause; the ὅτι is thus typical of 5th-c. style in the same way as the dative.

[32] Note too Pindar's αὔξοντες. This verb has deep and long-lasting connections to the language of public praise. E.g. IG II-III² 1297.2-6 (honors conferred by a religious fraternity, 237/6), in a section of the inscription which appears to preserve the language of the honorand's praises as uttered in the meeting of the guild: ἐπειδὴ Σώφρων . . . βουλόμενος αὔξειν τὸ κοινὸν ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων. See Roueché 1984: 195 for the persistence of the verb in honorific language. Note that the verb can apply either to the meritorious actions of the honorand, i.e. the past services for which he is praised, or to the *effect* that praise has on him; e.g. Pl. *Ly.* 206a, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαινῇ καὶ αὔξῃ. This reciprocal pattern is precisely that of Dumézil's "louange qualifiante." Cf. Dumézil 1943: 67, à propos of praise's power to produce magical growth in the miniscule Indra, on "cette curieuse notion de 'croissance magique' qui a été sûrement très importante, à en juger . . . par les usages mystiques et figurés de la racine *aug*- chez divers peoples indo-européens . . ." That is not to say, of course, that the use of *auxô* in Pindar or in the inscriptions is mystical or magical, but that it might be traditional, and inherited from Indo-European praise poetry. Note, finally, the way that Pouludamas refers to the approval that Hektor seeks in the *agorê*, an approval that might in other contexts be denoted by *epaineô*: σὸν δὲ κράτος αἰὲν ἀέξειν (12.214).

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by a certain Phrasmôn, who appears to be a second speaker other than the one who moved for the granting of honors to Arkhônidês[33]) that similar privileges be extended to his brother Dêmôn:

. . . Φράσμω[ν εἶπεν· τὰ μ]ὲν [ἄλ]ι[λα] καθάπερ τῆι βο[λῆι.
ἐπαιν]έσ[αι δ]ι[ὲ κα]ὶ Δήμων[α] τὸν ἀδ[ελφὸν τ]ὸν 'Α[ρχω]ι[νίδ]ο . . .
IG I³ 228.19-22

. . . Phrasmôn proposed: in addition to what had been approved by the *boulê*, to commend as well Dêmôn the brother of Arkhônidas.

One of the more striking features of *Pythian* 10 is the way it concludes—somewhat lamely, one might think—with 'tacked on' praise for the rulers of Larissa.[34] The ode thus reproduces a common rhetorical structure[35] of a particular mode of civic discourse. When we recognize that this is the discourse of civic praise, we understand that this 'footnote' is in fact eminently appropriate for men who are being commended for their political service; the style itself carries a certain official dignity. This rhetorical parallel is, I think, the strongest argument for 'intertextuality' in the ode: the legislative process of 'pork barreling' such honors provides a perfect pragmatic paradigm, with which aristocratic, politically active Greeks would have been familiar, for the encomiastic 'rider.'

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[33] The name of the first speaker is lost, but judging by the standard form undoubtedly appeared in the lacuna. Since Phrasmôn's name is specifically stated in connection with the addendum to the decree, I take it that he is not to be identified with the bringer of the first motion.

[34] Of course, this is not truly a lame ending: the final position of Thôrax and the brothers is prescribed by ring composition with ll. 4-6: ἀλλά με Πυθώ τε καὶ τὸ Πελινναῖον ἀπύει / 'Αλεύα τε παῖδες. ' Ιπποκλέα θέλοντες / ἀγαγεῖν ἐπικωμίαν ἀνδρῶν κλυτὰν ὄπα. Nevertheless, their brief mention at the end of the ode does seem less than vigorous. But in fact their 'ancillary' position gains meaning if we read it as a rhetorical signal of the discourse of civic honor.

[35] See Henry 1983: 4-5 for the syntax of such laudatory addenda, which typically introduce the new honorand with the phrase ἐπαινέσαι δὲ καί (as above).

A further point of comparision leads us to consideration of whose voice the

ἐπαινέσαι of the decrees represents. I leave aside the troubled question of the 'choral

"I"' in Pindar,[36] and confine my attention merely to the observation of a shift from

singular to plural in the final lines of the ode. The first-person plural verb of praise

(ἐπαινήσομεν) follows almost immediately on an individualized first-person singular:

πέποιθα ξενίᾳ προσανέι Θώρακος ("I trust in the favorable hospitality of Thôrax,"

64).[37] (The sudden transition from singular to plural is ameliorated somewhat by the

interposition of an impersonal gnomic statement: πειρῶντι δὲ καὶ χρυσὸς ἐν βασάνῳ

πρέπει / καὶ νόος ὀρθός ["gold shines forth for the one testing it on the touchstone, as

does an upright mind," 67-8].) The shift from an individualized statement of the merits

of a *laudandus* to a collective statement of *epainos* corresponds remarkably well to the

structure of the decrees, a structure that, more importantly, represents the oral practice of

the assembly. The voting of honors required, first, an individual speaker who would

move for honors after describing the various laudable acts or qualities of the honorand[38];

when the vote was conducted by acclamation or a show of hands, the assembly would

then be asked, usually by an official other than the speaker, whether they approved; and

the assembly would respond. This basic structure is expressed in the early inscriptions,

such as the ones quoted above, by the formulas ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ (indicating that the

measure had been approved by the council), with which the inscription customarily

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[36] See, e.g., Lefkowitz 1991 and D'Alessio 1994, esp. 121n.13.

[37] There is a lexical as well as conceptual connection underlying this transition: ancient lexicographers felt the etymological connection between *prosênês* and *aineô* (Blanc 1985: 261). Thôrax' hospitality produces the *ainos* recognized and 'ratified' by the ode.

[38] Cf. IG II-III² 1297 (honors voted by a *thiasos*, 237/6): the initial ἐπειδή clause appears to preserve the wording of the merits Sôphrôn as pronounced in the assembly of the group.

begins, and ὁ δεῖνα εἶπε (indicating the speaker who introduced the measure)[39]; much

later texts, all from the Roman period, describe the proceedings in great detail, even

quoting in direct speech the words of the speakers and the questions of the magistrates.[40]

Now, in the examples I have cited and in the inscriptions generally, ἐπαινέσαι depends

grammatically on the initial ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ (vel sim.)—that is, it specifies the decision

of the council as a whole, and not merely the proposal of the speaker. In other words,

these statements of *epainos* represent collective statements and collective voices, a

feature of this legislative mode of discourse that Pindar faithfully reproduces with his

ἐπαινήσομεν.

It would be reductive to consider the collective nature of *epainos* in the decrees a

mere surface feature of the grammar of those texts, or a simple consequence of the fact

that any decision enacted by the council or assembly is, by definition, collective. Rather,

the facts, first, that *epainos* is something to be decided upon by the *boulê*, and second,

that civic commendation takes *epainos* as its name reveal the social aspects of this form

of praise. Civic *epainos*, as an act of a legislative body, expresses *communal* approval,

and constitutes formal recognition of an individual or group's positive relation to the

Athenian community. The decrees customarily characterize merits precisely in relation

to the community of Athens, as in IG I³ 62.13-14 (428/7): ἐπαινέσαι . . . ὅ[τι ἄνδρες

ἀγαθο]ὶ[ἲ ἐ]σι[ν] καὶ νῦν καὶ ἐν τῶι πρόσθεν [χρόνω]ι περὶ ᾿Α[θη]ν[αίος

("commendation . . . because they are now and have been in the past *andres agathoi* with

respect to the Athenians"). The decrees thus serve to define the honorand's place with

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[39] In IG I³ 127, we find γνώμη τοῦ δεῖνος; this seems to be because the motion is attributed to several speakers, i.e. the *eipon* formula may be customarily applied only to individual speakers.

[40] For a survey of these later inscriptions and references to secondary literature, see Rhodes and Lewis 1997: 562 and Roueché 1984.

respect to the community. It is significant in this regard that only foreigners are honored

by such decrees in the fifth century; not until the fourth century do Athenians begin

receiving commendation in this way.[41] *Epainos* in this context 'puts things in their

places' just as Dumézilian praise is supposed to do. Inscriptions conveying *epainos* on

foreigners have the important social effect of charting the position of an individual or

group that did not necessarily appear before on the Athenian social map. Moreover, the

legislative enactment of social relations is often concretized by reciprocity rituals (*xenia*)

designed precisely to establish and maintain those relations.[42]

I have examined two of the most prominent usages of *epaineô* in later Greek and

attempted to show that these usages show traces—I am arguing for nothing more than

that—of their derivation from an inherited root concept of 'socially active' or 'socially

constructive' speech—speech that creates, activates, or maintains social structures. In the

examples I have considered, we can observe the development of this root concept in two

directions, one poetic (but also social: Pindar) and one legal (honorific decrees). In other

words, we are dealing with a process of *differentiation* of specific components of a

broader semantic field, and of *specialization* of specific words as designations for those

components.[43] In this case, *(ep)ainos* seems to specialize in at least two of the

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[41] Henry 1983: 12n.2.

[42] E.g. IG II-III² 111.55-6: καὶ καλέσαι αὐτὸς ἐπὶ [ξ]έ[νια εἰς τ]ὸ πρυτανεῖον ἐς αὔριον. Praise thus gives rise to what sociologists term 'potlatch,' i.e. the reciprocal exchange of services as a way of defining social relations. Cf. Dumézil 1943: 56: "La louange, service officiel et nécessaire, n'est pas gratuite. Elle amorce une sorte de contrat, non explicite mais contraignant, d'un type que les sociologues connaissent bien et que, d'un mot pris à une langue de Colombie Britannique, ils nomment *potlatch*."

[43] Nagy 1999: 288 hypothesizes "a time when the concept of a blame poet was not yet distinct from that of a praise poet." Both praise and blame are specialized forms of 'constructive' speech; both establish the relations of which society is composed. Cf. Nagy 1999: 239, which implies a broader semantic range for *ainos* before the word became specialized as a term of self-reference for praise poetry, and Nagy 1990: 149n.20.

differentiated subcomponents. Rhapsodic *epainos*, for instance, is another example of the term's development of specifically poetic overtones. On the other hand, in some parts of Greece the simplex *ainos/eô* developed in the same legal direction as *epaineô* in the context of the Athenian honorific decrees. Thus, in Epidauros in the third century (IG IV^2 71.4) and in Delphi in the second (SIG 672.15-6), we find the expression *kata (ton) ainon* used of the terms of a decree passed by a legislative assembly; the wording μήτε κατὰ ψάφισμα μήτε κατ' αἶνον of the Delphic text suggests that *ainos* may apply specifically to decrees voted on by acclamation rather than ballot.[44] And from Elatea in Phokis we have a fourth-century manumission tablet that refers to the approval of the juridical act by the popular assembly: [ὁ δᾶμ]ος αἰνεῖ ("the *dêmos* ratifies").[45] Homeric diction appears to represent a stage of relatively less specialization and differentiation of the language and the social concepts it expresses. *Epaineô*, as we have seen, has a "quasi juridique" force, but, as we will discover in Chapter 5, it also has important poetic resonances; it includes, in one and the same context, at least two of the distinct fields to which it will later belong in different contexts. In Homer, we observe a state in which a single function—the authoritative speech act—encompasses several aspects that will later be differentiated as discrete functions (juridical speech, poetic speech, and doubtless religious speech as well).[46] The key to understanding that undifferentiated function—and

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[44] Blanc 1995: 217-18. Cf. esp. 217: "αἶνος devait souvent revenir dans la langue administrative de la ligue achéene." For a different view on the contrast between *psêphisma* and *ainos*, see Dittenberger's comment on his text in SIG: "ψάφισμα populi, αἶνον senatus decretum esse probabile est." For Blanc (215), *ainos* in the sense of 'decree' seems to be peculiar to Doric Greek.

[45] IG IX 119.7-8; cf. Blanc 1995: 218.

[46] For the convergence (or rather, primordial unity) of legal and poetic speech, the classic essay is Jacob Grimm's "Von der Poesie im Recht" (originally published in the *Zeitschrift für geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft* 2 [1815], pp. 25-99), where we read, "Dasz recht und poesie miteinander aus einem bette aufgestanden waren, hält nicht schwer zu glauben" (Grimm 1991: 152). My inclusion of religious

to appreciating the social framework of later specializations—is to understand *(ep)ainos* as socially constructive speech.

The interpretation I have developed from a sociological perspective can to a certain extent be confirmed by etymological analysis; etymology, after all, is the science of comparing different usages of the same word. The etymology of *ainos* and related terms has always been notoriously uncertain, for both semantic and phonological reasons. Among the many proposals that have been offered, notable are those of Puhvel, who compares Hittite *enant-* 'tamed' and suggests a possible root **ain-* 'be agreeable,'[47] and Bader, who, following Bailey, derives *ainos* from a root **h₂ei-*, as seen also in Avestan *aêθra-* 'instruction,' Sanskrit *adhîta-* 'instructed,' and Tokharian B. *ai-k-* 'savoir'; the basic meaning for her is thus 'instruct.'[48] However, a more recent contribution by Alain Blanc, which surveys and criticizes these and other suggestions, has made some progress toward resolving the issue.[49] By establishing a connection between the *ainos* family of words and the adjective *apênês*,[50] Blanc is able to decide definitively in favor of a Greek root *an-* (as opposed to *ain-*; reconstructions have always been hamstrung by an inability to say decisively whether *ainos* should be analyzed as *ain-o-* or *an-yo-*[51]). This connection enables him not only to dispense with Puhvel and Bader, but further to make

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speech as an aspect of the undifferentiated function is not based solely on theory or inference, but on the facts of the Homeric text: the *muthos* with which Odysseus generates *epainos* features the recollection of a bird-omen and the reperformance of Kalkhas' prophetic utterance (2.300-30).

[47] Puhvel 1984-: 2.271.

[48] Bader 1989: 159, with an explicit critique of Puhvel; cf. Bailey 1958: 536. This is the etymology apparently favored by Sihler 1995: 561 (**h₂i-*, but with no discussion of semantics).

[49] Blanc 1995.

[50] On the connection, see also Blanc 1985.

[51] Ibid. 194.

use of Frisk's 1877 proposal that *apênês* should be connected to Common Germanic *ann/*unnan ("accorder, permettre"); on the basis of the Germanic evidence, Blanc reconstructs an Indo-European root *h_2en-, meaning 'to consent.'[52] The verb *ainomai*, attested in the negative *anainomai*, is Blanc's principal object of interest, as it is the only verbal form built directly on the root (*ainos* appears to be a deverbative; *(ep)aineô* lies at a third degree of interest for Blanc, as a denominative built on *ainos*). But on the basis of this reconstructed root, Blanc is able to account for all the diverse uses of *ainos* depending on whether the deverbative is construed as a true *nom d'action*, or as a designation for the result of action: "Les divers sens de αἶνος peuvent donc se laisser ramener à un sens premier 'acceptation, approbation' / 'ce que l'on accepte, ce que l'on approuve.'"[53] I find Blanc's conclusions about the form and meaning of the Indo-European root compelling, and fully in harmony with my own interpretation of the force of *(ep)ainos* in Greek: consensus or acceptance provide the foundation for any socially meaningful bond. In the case of the varied meanings of Greek *ainos*, however, the sociological perspective allows us to go one step further and ascribe a common social force to words which appear, from the linguistic point of view, to be diathetically distinct, i.e. to express either the active or passive force of the verbal notion. Whether it designates 'approval' or 'that which is approved' (always of something verbalized,

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[52] Blanc offers as a possible third term of comparison (pp. 222-23) Hit. *hanna-* 'judge'; Puhvel 1984-: 2.271 (cf. v. 1 84) finds such a connection "improbable," but without explanation. I should emphasize that I arrived at my notion of consensus before I had investigated the etymologies of the words involved, and solely in consideration of the Greek evidence: I take Blanc's independent conclusion as a striking confirmation of the fact that that evidence is interpretable in itself, despite the semantic diversity that Blanc laments on p. 208.

[53] Blanc 1995: 222.

spoken), *ainos* indicates speech that is socially constructive, that activates or energizes a community.

In principle, Blanc's *h_2en-* 'consentir' need not have a fully social force: it may be confined to the relation between individuals, and so fall short of sociology's ideal of the 'total phenomenon.'[54] I see no reason necessarily to retroject this force into the protolanguage.[55] But, as I have attempted to show with selected examples, this social force accounts well for the root's range of applications in Greek. So far as *ainos* is concerned, in at least one case I believe the sociological perspective actually reveals more of the word's depth of meaning than Blanc's strictly linguistic approach. In Sophocles' *Philoktêtês*, Neoptolemos proposes to the ailing hero that he rejoin the comrades from whom he is presently alienated:

> . . . ἀλλ' ὅμως σε βούλομαι
> θεοῖς τε πιστεύσαντα τοῖς τ' ἐμοῖς λόγοις
> φίλου μετ' ἀνδρὸς τοῦδε τῆσδ' ἐκπλεῖν χθονός.
> 1373-5
>
> . . . but nevertheless I would have you
> put your trust in the gods and in my words
> and sail from this land with me your friend.[56]

To which Philoktêtês replies with an exclamation whose intense emotion is marked by a *figura etymologica*: ὦ δεινὸν αἶνον αἰνέσας. τί φής ποτε: ("oh you who have affirmed a terrible *ainos*, what are you saying?," 1380). Against Verdenius' view that *ainos* here

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[54] For the "'total' social phenomena," see Mauss 1990: 3, and *passim*.

[55] But note one of the Germanic examples cited by Blanc 1995 (223): old Icelandic *unna laga* "'accorder à quelqu'un [le benefice de] la loi.'" This case approaches a total phenomenon, insofar as it involves the incorporation of the individual into the global system of society's laws.

[56] Translation adapted from Hugh Lloyd-Jones' Loeb edition (Harvard UP, 1994).

indicates an "allusive tale" of which Philoktêtês does not yet comprehend the meaning,[57] Blanc sensibly counters that Philoktêtês in fact understands quite well what has, anyway, been stated clearly by Neoptolemos. He does not ask, "what do you mean?" but "how can you say that?" Blanc proposes instead an interpretation in line with his notion of *ainos* as acceptance or approval, and translates: "'Que dis-tu là! Tu approves [le projet d'Ulysse] d'une si révoltante approbation!'"[58] On this reading, αἶνον refers to Neoptolemos' approval for Odysseus' proposal, rather than the proposal itself. This is acceptable sense—Philoktêtês is understandably dismayed that one he considers noble should advocate a plan that is hateful to him—but one would rather see such an emotionally charged outburst refer to the situation as a whole, including the proposal. Such a reading is possible with an understanding of the poetics of *ainos* as socially constructive speech. We must first of all keep in mind that the mission to Philoktêtês—at least in Neoptolemos' hands—is a mission to reincorporate an absent but vitally important hero into the social body of the Greek army. That is, it is analogous to the Embassy to Achilles in *Iliad* 9, and doubtless inherits the same traditional themes.[59] In Philoktêtês exclamation we find additionally the same inherited diction as an expression of those themes: here I direct the reader to my comments on Achilles' rejection of *ainos* (signaled by the word *anainomai*) in the next chapter (pp. 180-1). In Book 9, the (implied) *ainos* offered to Achilles—to which he responds with indignation that exceeds

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[57] Verdenius 1962. This one-paragraph note has exercised an extraordinarily strong influence on subsequent interpretations of the word *ainos*.

[58] Ibid. 221.

[59] Perysinakis 1994-1995: 381: "The most obvious analogy between *Philoctetes* and the *Iliad* is that the whole play constitutes an embassy like the ninth Book. But the most striking similarity is Philoctetes' position in relation to Achilles' position during the μῆνις." Cf. Beye 1970: 63-5.

Philoktêtês' — is the settlement offered by Agamemnon, i.e. a socially constructive

utterance that would establish the definitive cohesion of the Achaean host. Similarly

here, the *ainos* to which Philoktêtês objects is the general idea, advocated most recently

by Neoptolemos, of a reintegration that repulses him. The compressed emotion of δεινὸν

αἶνον αἰνέσας expresses not Philoktêtês' shock at Neoptolemos' perceived

betrayal — indeed, only a hundred lines earlier, Philoktêtês claimed to expect such

behavior from him (1268-9) — but rather the traditional reluctance to return of the

'withdrawn hero,' whom profound emotional barriers prevent from rejoining the group.

The difference between this interpretation and Blanc's is that, for the latter, the word

ainos is not significant in itself, serving only as an indifferent designation for

Neoptolemos' endorsement; on my view, this word has deep resonances as the traditional

expression for the very theme (social cohesion) that defines Philoktêtês' heroic identity.

It is therefore a suitable object for Sophocles' etymological word-play.

This *periêgêsis* of the world of *(ep)ainos* makes one final stop on its return to the

Homeric text. In recent literature, one of the most discussed applications of *ainos* is its

use as a designation for what we would call 'fable,' for example in Archilochus (frr. 174

and 185 West), but above all at Hesiod *Works and Days* 202: νῦν δ' αἶνον βασιλεῦσ'

ἐρέω, φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς ("but now I will tell an *ainos* for the *basilêes*, who also

have understanding"). For Nagy, the fact that Hesiod addresses his *ainos* of the hawk

and the nightingale specifically to the *basilêes* "who also have understanding"[60] makes

this passage exemplary of the "ideology of exclusiveness" that characterizes the *ainos*

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[60] This is my rendering, which differs from Nagy's "aware as they are." I understand the *kai* to mean "in addition [to myself]."

mode.[61] This ideology accounts for the semantic development that produces, as a derivative of *ainos*, *ainigma* 'riddle.'[62] The same understanding of the semantics of *ainos* can be found in Bader.[63] These writers emphasize the edifying, 'instructive' nature of this mode of discourse, and also the fact that it is opaque or obscure. But we can place their observations in a more directly social light[64] by altering slightly our perspective on the notion of "exclusivity." If exclusivity is, from one point of view, the marking of differences, it is, from another, the determination of what is the same: this is the dialectic of homogeneity and heterogeneity as described by Georges Bataille.[65] In establishing a distinction between insiders and outsiders, the enigmatic *ainos* also defines a community.[66] It even creates a community, and thus functions as socially constructive speech par excellence. Now, in its ability to create and / or define a community, *ainos*—again, following Nagy, as an opaque mode of speech that has, in addition to its surface meaning, a deeper significance available to insiders only—has a unique potential to serve as a tool for establishing and / or testing social cohesion. This potential is only implicit in Hesiod. For Nagy, the phrase φρονέουσι καὶ αὐτοῖς indicates that the

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[61] Nagy 1999: 239. See also Nagy 1990: 148 ff.

[62] Nagy 1999: 240.

[63] Bader 1989: 159n138: "dans tous ses emplois, αἶνος est comme l'une de ces 'instructions' menées dans l'Inde par énigmes . . ."

[64] To be sure, social concerns are at work in the texts of both writers. I am only intensifying the illumination that is already there. My perspective differs somewhat, as the general from the specific, from the "social function of the *ainos*" described at Nagy 1990: 153 ff.

[65] See e.g. Bataille 1985: 147. It is no coincidence that Bataille is here discussing sovereignty and royal power, while Hesiod addresses his *ainos* to the *basilêes*.

[66] Cf. Nagy 1999: 241 on the relation between *ainos* and *philotês*, "the ties that bind the *philoi hetairoi*."

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basilêes must be "aware" in order to understand the poet's message.[67] But the text is in fact quite clear that the kings, like the poet (καί), do understand; there is never any question of their misunderstanding. Addressed solely to the kings, Hesiod's *ainos* can confirm a community, but it cannot test it or create it, since the boundaries of the community are taken for granted. (Of course, in the larger context of the *Works and Days*, the *ainos* can test whether Persês—or the audience of the poem—belongs to this privileged group.)

The social power of *ainos* is thus put on display in Hesiod's poem, but not put into action. That requires a more expansive setting and a more directly narrative context, both of which we find in the *Iliad*—and specifically in the *diapeira*, Agamemnon's 'testing' of the troops in Book 2, a scene which I suggest dramatizes the social power of *ainos* as a means of testing, and ultimately establishing, social cohesion.[68] I stress the fact that Hesiod defines the community of 'cognoscenti' as the *basilêes*. By implication, one who does not understand is not a *basileus*, and one who is not a *basileus* will not understand. The *diapeira* of Book 2 hinges on this same distribution of knowledge. Agamemnon first discloses his intention in a closed session of the *boulê gerontôn* (2.53), that is, of the *basilêes* (cf. 2.86), thus ensuring in advance that this privileged group will understand the true meaning of the utterance he will shortly pronounce before the army as a whole. In fact, he anticipates in advance that *only* this group will understand, and he counts on their help in enforcing the true meaning of his utterance by "restraining [the

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[67] Ibid. 239: "the *code* of this *ainos* has a *message* for kings—but only if they are 'aware.'"

[68] Cf. the remarks in a fine essay by Bruce Heiden, who argues "that the community that created and heard the *Iliad* recognized a type of speech that tested its audience, and that the speech of Agamemnon could serve as an example of such a speech" (Heiden 1991: 5). Heiden does not invoke the mode of *ainos*, but Nagy's description of that mode meshes well with Heiden's principle that "speakers may deliberately construct utterances that suggest contradictory interpretations" (2).

army] with words" (ἐρητύειν ἐπέεσσιν, 2.75); it is unclear whether this restraint should involve the actual sharing of Agamemnon's intention with the rank and file (the subsequent development of the scene suggests otherwise). Thereafter the scene shows a very marked articulation in terms of a distinction between *basilêes* and *laoi*, beginning with the close of the *boulê* and the convocation of the general assembly:

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας βουλῆς ἐξῆρχε νέεσθαι.
οἳ δ᾽ ἐπανέστησαν πείθοντό τε ποιμένι λαῶν
<u>σκηπτοῦχοι βασιλῆες</u>· ἐπεσσεύοντο δὲ <u>λαοί</u>.
                         2.84-6[69]

Having spoken thus, he led the way from the *boulê*,
and the scepter-bearing kings stood up and obeyed
the shepherd of the people; and the *laoi* hastened to [the *agorê*].

This distinction continues to structure the scene in subsequent lines.[70] That this distinction marks precisely a difference in the way that Agamemnon's utterance is understood emerges from the description of the audience's response:

ὣς φάτο. τοῖσι δὲ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε
πᾶσι μετὰ πληθὺν ὅσοι οὐ βουλῆς ἐπάκουσαν·
                         2.142-3[71]

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[69] The epithet *skêptoukhos* is very marked; its only other Iliadic occurrences are 1.279 and 14.93. This epithet is applied to the *basilêes* only when they are considered as representatives of a class or an abstract social function. Thus this line articulates the class structure of Homeric society.

[70] 2.98, 143; note also that, in preventing the flight of the army, Odysseus has a distinct manner of address for *basilêes* on the one hand (188 ff.) and men of the *dêmos* on the other (198 ff.). The distinction is not, however, carried through all the way to the end of the scene. (Nor is it typical of Homeric assemblies in general.) Once Odysseus delivers his speech exhorting the army to maintain its integrity, all signs of this distinction disappear (until Agamemnon again convenes the *gerontes*, but this is in fact the opening motif of the next movement, the mustering and Catalogue of the host). I take this as an indication that we are dealing here with two phases or modes of *ainos*, which can be, as I said, "a tool for establishing and / or testing social cohesion." In the first phase, presided over by Agamemnon, *ainos* tests cohesion; in the second, under Odysseus, *ainos* establishes cohesion. Since the poem emphasizes the reconstituted unity of the army, it accordingly deemphasizes the distinction between *basilêes* and *plêthus*.

[71] 2.142 is a modification of a formula used to describe the response of an *individual* (cf. Ch. 1 n. 10). See below, pp. 207-8 for comments on the significance of this fact. According to the scholion A 2.143a, this line was athetized because it states what is obvious. My argument is that this line is significant precisely because it establishes that the *plêthus* is characterized by its ignorance, as opposed to the understanding of the *basilêes*.

Thus he spoke, and he stirred the *thumos* in the chests
of all, throughout the *plêthus*, so many as did not hear the *boulê*.

The poem emphasizes that the surface meaning of the speech affects only the *plêthus*,

those who were not privy to the council session.[72] Implicitly the *basilêes*, by virtue of

their understanding of the hidden meaning, the ulterior purpose, of Agamemnon's speech,

do not experience the sudden impulse to set sail.

By limiting this response to the *plêthus*, line 143 implies that the *basilêes* as a

whole are immune from this effect, i.e. that they understand Agamemnon's

intention—just as Hesiod's *basilêes* understand, as a whole, the meaning of his *ainos*.

There is no specific indication that any of the *basilêes* take to their ships—nor, for that

matter, that they do not. That is, until line 188 ff., when Odysseus begins his efforts to

restore order. He must enjoin both men of the *dêmos and basilêes* to return to the

assembly, so evidently the latter are not exempt from the general panic. Moreover, he

addresses the *basilêes* with words that seem to stand in even greater contradiction to the

difference in knowledge implied by 142-3. Odysseus explains to his peers:

> οὐ γάρ πω σάφα οἶσθ' οἷος νόος 'Ατρεΐωνος·
> νῦν μὲν πειρᾶται, τάχα δ' ἴψεται υἷας 'Αχαιῶν.
> ἐν βουλῇ δ' οὐ πάντες ἀκούσαμεν οἷον ἔειπε.
> 2.192-4

For you do not yet know clearly the mind of the son of Atreus;
now he is testing, but soon he will chastise the sons of the Achaeans;
we did not all hear how he spoke in the *boulê*.

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[72] μετὰ πληθὺν specificies πᾶσι and limits its extension to the *plêthus*; the *basilêes* are thus excluded from
the number of those whose *thumos* was stirred. Note that μετὰ πληθὺν is *not* partitive, i.e. we should not
translate "all those among the *plêthus* who...," which would imply that there were some among the *plêthus*
who *did* hear what was said in council. We should translate rather "all throughout the *plêthus*," i.e.
emphasizing the extension of πᾶσι. Cf. Chantraine 1942-1953: 2.117, "Les sens de μετὰ suivi de
l'accusatif s'expliquent généralement par la valeur d'extension," with the translation of 2.142 on p. 118,
"chez tous, à travers la foule."

Do we have here a contradiction of the Hesiodic principle that the *basilêes*, by definition, are those who understand? I note first of all that these lines posed a substantial critical problem in antiquity.[73] Among the more interesting traces of the controversy are the indications in the scholia that line 192 bore the *antisigma* (scholion AT 192a) and 203-5 the *stigmê* (scholion A 203a); these were the signs used by Aristarchus to indicate a transposition.[74] Thus lines 192-4 ought to be replaced, according to the scholiast, with the following lines addressed by Odysseus *to the men of the* dêmos:

οὐ μέν πως πάντες βασιλεύσομεν ἐνθάδ' Ἀχαιοί·
οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἶς κοίρανος ἔστω,
εἶς βασιλεύς, ᾧ δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω.
2.203-5[75]

It is not possible that all we Achaeans will here be *basilêes*—
too many leaders are not a good thing—let there be one chief,
one *basileus*, on whom the son of wily Kronos has bestowed supremacy.

The reasoning, according to the scholiast, is that these lines are "fitting for kings, but not for men of the *dêmos*" (AT 192a). Such a transposition would immediately resolve the contradiction with the Hesiodic principle, for ignorance of the true meaning of the utterance would be imputed to the *dêmos*, while the *basilêes* would merely be reminded not to take any initiative on their own. There would be no suggestion that they somehow misconstrued the significance of Agamemnon's speech. The scholia also record a second, less invasive solution (transmitted by Eustathius as well): maintaining the received order of the lines, some critics understood Odysseus to be asking a rhetorical

[73] All three, along with the three following lines, are omitted by Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.58. Ll. 193-7 suffered athetesis because they did not seem to serve Odysseus' purpose.

[74] See Pfeiffer 1968: 218.

[75] L. 206, which belongs with 203-5 and could not stand if these three lines alone were transposed, is not attested in all manuscripts and is ignored by the scholia.

question rather than making a statement: "Did we not all hear what was said in the *boulê*? [So how can you be leaving?]"[76] Again, the result of the critical intervention is to avoid the implication that understanding should be restricted only to a few of the *basilêes*.

We sense a positive reluctance among ancient readers to avoid violating the principle of the Hesiodic *ainos*, viz. the clarity of meaning to the *basilêes* and its obscurity to others. But I think neither of the expediencies recommended by the ancient commentaries is necessary to show that the Homeric text expresses precisely the same hierarchy of 'interpretive communities' (I adopt the term from Stanley Fish).[77] For even if Odysseus' words to his fellow princes are statements rather than questions, nevertheless he leaves the possibility of knowledge open to them, and even encourages them to seek knowledge: the *basilêes* are those who have access to understanding, even if circumstance momentarily excludes them from it. We can look forward to a time when the apparent irregularity of 'ignorant' *basilêes* will be corrected. On the other hand, the supposedly transposed lines addressed to the man of the *dêmos permanently* exclude him from the rank of *basileus* and its attendant knowledge. That is to say that the received text suggests a violation of the Hesiodic ideology in order to show us Odysseus reestablishing the firm boundary line distinguishing *basileus* from rank-and-file as knowing from ignorant. This, I think, is poetically appropriate to the context: the purpose of the *diapeira* as a whole (though not necessarily Agamemnon's intention) is to provoke chaos so that Odysseus may impose order. Since the *Iliad* correlates social cohesion with

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[76] Scholion bT 2.194b; Eustathius 200. Eustathius, however, is quite comfortable with the notion that only some of the *basilêes* participated in the *boulê*, and in fact finds such an interpretation καλλίων.

[77] Fish 1980, esp. pp. 14-15, where the notion of 'agreement'—coextensive with and, significantly, limited to a given 'interpretive community'—bears a strong resemblance to my notion of consensus. Note especially his description of the relationship between the individual and the group, which coincides with my own emphasis, in the Introduction, on the "systemic" nature of consensus.

the successful operation of *(ep)ainos* as socially constructive speech, an important part of

establishing global order in this poem is to establish the proper dynamics of *ainos*.[78]

In support of my argument that Homeric social dynamics correspond precisely to

the ideology implicit in Hesiod's line—or, to put the matter another way, that Hesiod's

ainos for the *basilêes* is not motivated solely by the dramatic context of the poem (the

dispute with Persês), but expresses an inherited theme common to certain hexameter

traditions—I note an interesting feature of the *Iliad*'s formulaic language insofar as it

concerns the central theme of *epainos*. The verb *epaineô* occurs roughly a dozen times in

the *Iliad*, making it a fairly common expression. Despite its relative frequency, however,

there are only two consistent (i.e. repeating) formulas employing the verb.[79] One of

these, as important as it will be in later chapters, is irrelevant to this discussion of human

society, since it concerns *epainos* among the gods.[80] The other is the formula that

expresses the reception of a successful performative among the Achaeans on two out of

three occasions: ὣς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνησαν βασιλῆες (7.344 = 9.710).

This expression makes *epainos*—which we may provisionally understand as a response

to an *ainos*—a matter for the *basilêes*. From the fact that this is the only consistent

pattern for human *epainos* I infer that it was also relatively more common, if not the

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[78] I explore the centrality of *(ep)ainos* to Book 2 in subsequent chapters. Martin 1989: 23 notes that the text identifies Odysseus' speech to the *basilêes* as *epea*, as opposed to the *muthos* he addresses to men of the *dêmos*. Martin interprets this distinction in terms of power relations: Odysseus imposes authoritative speech on social inferiors, but does not presume such authority with his social equals.

[79] This is exactly what we should expect to observe in the case of a centrally important theme, for it shows that the lexeme expressing that theme is important enough to suffer adjustment in order to fit precisely into its context. According to the nucleus-periphery model of Bakker and Fabbricotti 1991, the greatest degree of formulaic fixity is shown not by the nucleus, or semantically significant element, but by the periphery, or inessential element.

[80] 4.29 = 16.443 = 22.181.

standard, way to express the enactment of a decision by consensus in the broader

tradition from which our *Iliad* derives. That is to say, I infer that the *epainos* of the

community as a whole was an exception, and that, according to the general convention,

ainoi were transacted among *basilêes*. This inference places perhaps more weight on a

single repetition than we may justifiably expect it to bear—but it may be buttressed by

one of the few other attestations in early Greek poetry of *ainos* in the Hesiodic sense of

'fable.' In Archilochus fr. 185 W, the speaker addresses his *ainos* to one Kêrukidês. The

name, I suggest, should be read, as other proper names in Archilochus, as a *redende*

Name, in which case this "son of Kêrux" would represent precisely the same social organ

as the *basilêes* of Hesiod or Homer. In Homeric society, the *kêrukes* work in close

partnership with the *basilêes*: in Book 2, for instance, *kêrukes* perform the very task that

Agamemnon had entrusted to the *basilêes*, viz. 'restraining' the soldiers (ἐρήτυον, 2.97;

cf. 2.75).[81] The figure of the *kêrux* was probably as direct a reference as Archilochus

could make to the "ideology of exclusivity" expressed in hexameter traditions by the

basilêes: reference to royal power would doubtless have seemed too lofty in his iambs, or

otherwise inappropriate in the context of the early *polis*. In any case, he identifies his

addressee as part of the social structure that traditionally expressed the understanding of a

'coded' poetic discourse, and therefore predicts, as Hesiod, that his *ainos* will be

understood.

Whether as 'praise' or 'fable,' the *ainos* is a mode of speech capable of (not to say

designed for) establishing and testing social cohesion. The conventional opacity of the

'fable' variety can be interpreted as an expression of an "ideology of exclusivity" that

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[81] Note, too, that Odysseus is accompanied by the *kêrux* Eurubatês when he enjoins the men to reseat
themselves (2.184), and by Athena in the guise of a *kêrux* when he delivers the speech that will reestablish
solidarity (2.280).

confines understanding to a select group of insiders. But this exclusivity is a structural phenomenon. The exclusion of outsiders does not limit the group—that is, the cohesive unit—to those within the magic circle; rather, the opposition insider : outsider structures society as a whole. The crisis of understanding in *Iliad* 2 does not establish community by expanding the group of those who 'know,' but reaffirms the distinction that aligns every member of the group with one or the other term of this basic opposition. And this crisis of understanding—this testing of the test of *ainos*—is a crucial component of the movement leading to the ultimate statement of the Achaean social structure, the Catalogue of Ships. Moreover, one could say that the "ideology of exclusivity" is as central to historical Greek societies as it is to the society of the Homeric imagination. For, if *Iliad* 2, with its sustained articulation of a contrast between the insiders of the *boulê* and the outsiders of the assembly as a whole, expresses this ideology in dramatic form, so too does the bipartite structure of *boulê* and *ekklêsia*, which characterized the political life of many Greek states, express it on an institutional level.

Chapter 3

Consensus and its Discontents

We owe to Dale Sinos the insight that the figure of Achilles embodies the Indo-European military ideology of the *Männerbund*: the epic of the withdrawn hero and the tragedy of his *therapôn*, who dies because, like the lord he serves, he chooses isolation over solidarity, hinge on the normative value of "the protection of the social, and thereby strategic, cohesion provided by your comrades in arms, your ἑταῖροι or φίλοι."[1] I draw attention to Sinos' use of the phrase 'social cohesion,' a phrase that has focused my discussion thus far. In formulating this ideology—as, for instance, in Ajax's speech in the Embassy (9.630 ff.)—the *Iliad* uses the term *philotês* to designate the reciprocal bond between comrades-in-arms. Achilles' anger at the dishonor he has suffered, which motivates his withdrawal from the war, represents the antitype or negation of this bond. The *Iliad* actually articulates the opposition itself between the positive and negative expressions of this bond, as when the Trojans believe they see Achilles reentering the battle:

> πᾶσιν ὀρίνθη θυμός, ἐκίνηθεν δὲ φάλαγγες
> ἐλπόμενοι παρὰ ναῦφι ποδώκεα Πηλεΐωνα
> μηνιθμὸν μὲν ἀπορρῖψαι, φιλότητα δ᾽ ἐλέσθαι·
> 16.280-82[2]

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[1] Sinos 1980: 34, who also points out that Patroklos separates himself from Achilles when he goes to fight just as Achilles separates himself from the Achaeans during the period of his *mênis*. In this sense, Achilles is a model for Patroklos. Conversely, however, Patroklos provides a model for Achilles in fighting on behalf of the common good (Sinos 1980: 55-7).

[2] For the opposition of *mênis* and *philotês*, see Muellner 1996, Ch. 5. Note that the reestablishment of *philotês* among the Achaeans coincides with the physical disintegration (in rout) of the Trojans. This disintegration becomes explicit in the phrase πᾶσιν ὀρίνθη θυμός: see below, Ch. 5 pp. 207-8, for comments on how the traditional syntagm *thum- orin-* signals the 'atomization' of a group.

> The *thumos* of all was stirred, and the ranks gave way,
> surmising that the swift-footed son of Peleus had cast aside
> his <u>wrath</u> at the ships, and accepted *philotês*.

Achilles' wrath is the complete opposite of the *philotês* that binds the cohesive *Männerbund*. Nevertheless, while Achilles may in a certain sense stand for strife,[3] his function in the epic is to (re)establish solidarity: "Achilles is the binding force of the Achaean cause *by nature* since only he can bring success."[4]

Achilles embodies the principle of sociality.[5] By absenting himself, he dissolves the social adhesive that maintains the bonds of the Achaean community in the hostile environment of Troy. In the context of the *Iliad*, the specific and ultimate sign of the reestablishment of community is the return of Achilles to the battlefield, that is, the reunification of the *Männerbund*. As the poem of Achilles' absence and return, the *Iliad* focuses all its attention on this reintegration. There is, however, another sign of social solidarity which is more general than, but not unrelated to, the ultimate sign of Achilles'

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[3] Agamemnon's αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε (1.177) is a tendentious interpretation of Achilles' identity (the same that Zeus gives of Arês' identity at 5.890-1): *polemoi* and *makhai* are indeed 'dear' to him as the representative of the *Männerbund*, but this role requires social solidarity within the group as much as strife (directed, of course, toward the enemy).

[4] Sinos 1980: 34; cf. 76: "His [Achilles', in contrast to Patroklos'] *ethos* is not individual, but social." Cf. Muellner 1996: 154: "[Achilles'] choice of *kleos* is also a choice of *philotês*." Achilles' '*ethos*' is defined by his function in the epic, not by his own intentions: as Sinos points out (76), Achilles is motivated throughout by his relationship to Patroklos. It is important to note that Achilles does not cause the quarrel with Agamemnon, i.e. he doesn't in himself embody strife. Cf. Wilson 2002: 49. For Bader 1980: 74, Achilles withdraws in response to Agamemnon's violation of the social contract of potlatch, a contract Agamemnon ought to uphold as sovereign. (For more on potlatch in the Indo-European context, see Bader 1978; for potlatch in Homer, Calder 1984: 34, who restates the findings of Mauss 1921: 390-1.) When Nestor enjoins Achilles not to quarrel with the king (1.277), he acknowledges that this behavior is regrettable, but the blame does not therefore rest with Achilles; rather, the situation *as a whole* is dysfunctional. See more below, p. 163.

[5] Several scholars have drawn attention to Achilles' role in preventing the dissolution of the host in the *Cypria* (εἶτα ἀπονοστεῖν ὡρμημένους τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς Ἀχιλλεὺς κατέχει, p. 105 1. 9-10 Allen), a role played by Odysseus in *Iliad* 2: cf. Ebert 1969. Odysseus, as we shall see in the next chapter, is a true specialist in the social cohesion of *ainos*.

absence or presence, namely *(ep)ainos*, socially constructive speech as both utterance and response. *(Ep)ainos* is "more general" in two respects: first, in institutional terms, since this mode of cohesion is not restricted to the military ideology of the *Männerbund* (as the classical examples discussed in previous chapters suggest); and second, in terms of the thematics of the *Iliad*, since *epainos* can apply even during the period of Achilles' absence.[6] (Conversely, as we shall see in Chapter 5, *epainos* is paradoxically deferred even after Achilles rejoins the *Männerbund*.)

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the theme of *epainos* in the *Iliad* is not restricted by the outlines of Achilles' story, neither is it, strictly speaking, independent of that story. Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon transpires almost entirely in words, and so it is preeminently a matter of *ainos*, of speech in relation to social reality. We might say that the ultimate *epainos* of the poem would be the public recognition (i.e. reception) of an *ainos* expressing (creating) a working bond between Achilles and Agamemnon. We witness the dissolution of that bond (and, by implication, the total social bond of the Achaean community) in the quarrel of Book 1. This quarrel represents—quite explicitly, as we shall see—the disruption of *(ep)ainos*. As such, it contains within itself nearly all the factors that may contribute to the failure of consensus, and the features characteristic of such failure. In the pages that follow, I will single out the most important of these features as designated by Homeric diction, noting others incidentally. My goal is not to provide a commentary on Book 1, but rather to use Book 1 as a framework for a discussion of the dynamics of (the failure of) consensus in general.

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[6] We can put this 'thematic' generality another way: *epainos* was an inherited sign of social cohesion common to many hexameter traditions (Hesiodic, cyclic, etc.). Since this theme is not limited to Achilles' story, it cannot be dependent on the absence / presence of Achilles. The 'general' relevance of *epainos* to all hexameter traditions is structurally the same as its general relevance to all segments of the *Iliad*.

This first book provides a suitable framework precisely because it articulates in microcosm the general outlines of the poem as a whole. Book 1 describes the origin and resolution of the *mênis* of Apollo; the course of Apollo's wrath sketches out a basic paradigm that will also define, in its most basic features, the course of Achilles'.[7] The parallelism of these two *mênies* is implicit in the proem to the standard text of the *Iliad*, which begins, of course, with the *mênis* of Achilles, but which motivates that *mênis* by explaining that Apollo, on account of his *kholos* (χολωθείς, 1.9), caused *eris* between Achilles and Agamemnon. An alternative opening, however, recorded in antiquity by Aristoxenos and transmitted with our scholia, makes the anger of Achilles and Apollo literally (grammatically) equivalent:

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι 'Ολύπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι,
ὅππως δὴ μῆνίς τε χόλος θ' ἔλε Πηλείωνα
Λητοῦς τ' ἀγλαὸν υἱόν· ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆϊ χολωθείς . . .[8]

Tell me now, Muses holding Olympian dwellings,
how *mênis* and *kholos* seized Peleus' son
and the bright son of Leto; for he was angry with the king . . .

The anger of each follows a similar path. In each case, *mênis* results in a *loigos* for the Achaeans, and only the angered person (or his substitute) is capable of 'warding off the *loigos*.'[9] Apollo's *mênis* and the attendant *loigos* are resolved by the return of the

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[7] Reinhardt 1961: 44; cf. Rabel 1988, who argues that Achilles' 'tragedy' deviates from the ultimately successful paradigm of Book 1 because it conflates the *mênis* of Apollo and the curse of Khrusês. It is sometimes difficult to say whether particular discrepancies between the microcosm and the 'monumental theme' should be understood as true deviations or as omissions due to the pronounced compression of the former. Consider, for instance, the fact that the compressed summaries of Zeus' *noêma* that Thetis related to Achilles evidently did not include the important detail of Patroklos' death (17.410-11; but cf. 18.9-11).

[8] For the reference, see Allen 1931 ad 1 ff.

[9] ἀπὸ λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι, 1.67; cf. 1.341, 1.456, 16.32, 16.80, etc., and see Wilson 2002: 65. Wilson's book describes the composition of Book 1 in particular and of the *Iliad* as a whole in terms of a 'compensation theme' that is realized on different scales. For "the contextual fixation of the *loigòn amûn-* phraseology with the *mênis* theme," see Muellner 1996: 144, with reference; Slatkin 1991: 87.

abducted girl (Khrusêis) and substantial supplementary gifts (the hecatomb sent to

Khrusês); Agamemnon makes the same offer to Achilles in Book 9, and the offer is

finally accepted (or at least not refused) in Book 19.[10]

The account of Apollos' *mênis* in Book 1 thus offers a kind of road map for the

poem as a whole; whatever information it offers about the proper functioning of

consensus will potentially be useful for interpreting other parts of the poem. Moreover,

Book 1 and the *Iliad* as a whole are related not just paradigmatically, but causally as well.

The crisis over Khrusêis cascades into the conflict with Achilles. The link between these

two interrelated disputes — the abduction of Brisêis — is symptomatic of the social malady

that afflicts Achaean society. Agamemnon feels compelled to take another's prize

because he has lost his. But as Achilles himself points out, such an act of immediate and

unilateral redistribution would be an act of extreme short-sightedness. Achilles advocates

instead that Agamemnon make use of the structures of exchange and reciprocity that

constitute the Achaean social order, and understand the surrender of Khrusêis not as a

true loss, but as an investment in the social structure:

> ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν τήνδε θεῷ πρόες· αὐτὰρ Ἀχαιοὶ
> τριπλῇ τετραπλῇ τ' ἀποτείσομεν, αἴ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς
> δῷσι πόλιν Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαλαπάξαι.
> <div align="right">1.127-29</div>

> Now, however, release this girl to the god; the Achaeans, on the other
>   hand,
> will compensate you three- and fourfold, if ever Zeus
> grants that we sack the well-walled city of Troy.

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[10] Note that as Odysseus leads the embassy to Khrusês, so he leads the Embassy in Book 9, and negotiates the settlement in 19. Note, too, that a feast marks the true end of the quarrel with Khrusês and the *loigos* of the plague (1.468); in Book 19, Odysseus similarly advocates a *dais* (179), but cannot accomplish his purpose because of Achilles' refusal to participate (see below, Ch. 5 pp. 202 ff.). The importance of the *dais* as resolution of the crisis and restoration of order (above all, the order of the distributive system) in Book 1 is the key to understanding Odysseus' obsession with food both in Book 19 and in general (cf. the *gastêr* motif in the *Odyssey*).

Achilles understands—as Agamemnon does not—the basic principle that, cross-culturally, can be observed to enable consensus-based problem solving: the principle of 'delayed return,' which ensures that anyone who momentarily sacrifices his own interests in consenting to a decision will receive suitable compensation, or will have his interests protected, in future decisions.[11] This principle requires that consenting individuals understand their losses and gains, first, as fundamentally comparable, and second, as part of a continuum with both a past and a future—not as isolated, *sui generis* interests.[12] In a society based on reciprocity, the disavowal of these principles amounts to the disavowal of the basic mechanisms of social life. Agamemnon thus takes a position that is deeply at odds with the society he claims to represent,[13] while Achilles, in upholding the basic structures of consensus, reveals his fundamentally social ethos, his nature as "the binding force of the Achaean cause." Indeed, he himself yields to the same reasoning of 'delayed return' when it is proposed to him by Athena (1.213)—although in this case the social energy of the system is channeled into negative rather than positive reciprocity.[14] These

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[11] See Flaig 1993: 141, 1994: 16 and 25 for "das Prinzip der vertagten Gegenleistung," and cf. Graham 1984: 105 on delayed return as the "mystique" of democracy.

[12] Both Agamemnon and Achilles attempt to protect their interests by denying the first of these requirements, that of comparability: Agamemnon claims the Khrusêis is dearer to him than his own (irreplaceable) wife Klutaimnêstrê, and Achilles allocates the same unique status to Brisêis (9.341-2); cf Wilson 2002: 50.

[13] Note too the implications of αἴ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς / δῷσι πόλιν Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαλαπάξαι (1.128-9): for Agamemnon to reject the proposal of Achilles is, in a way, to deny that the Greeks will ever take Troy. It is no wonder that Agamemnon has difficulty maintaining morale!

[14] For the notion of 'negative reciprocity' in the *Iliad* see Wilson 2002: 13 and 186n.1; in general, Gouldner 1960: 172 and Sahlins 1972: 191, 195-6, and *passim*. On p. 191, Sahlins makes the important observation that the difference between positive and negative forms of reciprocities can be mapped in terms of "social distance": thus Achilles' indulgence in negative reciprocity expresses precisely his denial of *philotês*, of 'nearness' to Agamemnon. For the notion of "ethical distance" as expressed by archaic Greek poetry, see Miller 1981: 141.

two moments of ideological positioning—Agamemnon's rejection of the mechanisms of

consensus, which requires him to appropriate a substitute *geras*, and Achilles' acceptance

of them, which commits him to a terrible 'restraint' (ἴσχεο, 1.214, but I mean to suggest

also Achilles' holding back from battle)—together link Book 1 with the 'monumental

theme' of Achilles' quarrel.[15] That is to say, the articulation of the poem as a whole with

the microcosm of Book 1 hinges on the acceptance or rejection of a consensus-based

system.

Consensus, as signaled by the successful operation of *(ep)ainos*, is the central

problem of the microcosm and of the poem as a whole. In observing the way that

epeuphêmeô—used of the Achaeans' reaction to the proposal of Khrusês in Book

1—expresses a dysfunctional version of what would normally be designated by *epaineô*,

we have already seen the failure of consensus in the microcosm. That fact that Achilles

has committed himself to the reciprocal structures underlying consensus does not mean

that *(ep)ainos* will be any more successful in his story, for he commits himself to a

system that Agamemnon, in his eyes, has foresworn, and therefore withdraws his stake

entirely from what he sees as a malfunctioning society. Achilles' commitment—which

goes hand in hand with his status as the embodiment of sociality—rather means that true

consensus and a stable social system have no chance so long as he remains withdrawn.

Cruel refusals: ἀπηνής

But can we say that the withdrawal of Achilles really is a matter of the failure of

(ep)ainos? In the narrative of the conflict surrounding Khrusêis, the actual diction of the

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[15] I take the term 'monumental theme' from Wilson 2002.

poem indicates the absence of *epainos* by the artifice of an ad hoc formula that doubles

for *epaineô* while drawing attention to its difference. For the competent audience or

reader, πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν ᾿Αχαιοί signals that *epainos has not* been achieved; the

cause of Apollo's *mênis* is marked as a failure of consensus. Can we find similar lexical

or phraseological gestures toward the problem of *epainos* at the source of Achilles'

mênis? A cursory survey of the text is liable to disappoint. The verb *epaineô* is

conspicuous by its absence in Book 1. In fact, the poem as a whole avoids this key term

in any context relating to the monumental theme of Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon.

Although the verb occurs roughly a dozen times in the *Iliad*, it only appears in connection

with Achilles in the funeral games, when the Achaeans approve his decision to award

second place to Eumêlos. Even this, however, does not amount to a positive instance of

epainos, since Antilokhos compels Achilles to modify his proposal. Curiously, the poem

makes no comment on how the Achaeans receive Achilles' ultimate distribution of

prizes—we assume they approve. Thus, whether we are dealing with the disruption of

consensus in the quarrel with Agamemnon or in the funeral games (which replay the

basic tensions of that quarrel[16]), the poem never states directly the reestablishment of

epainos in relation to Achilles. This pattern of avoidance is, I think, of a piece with the

large-scale deferral that characterizes Achilles' story as told by the *Iliad*. Just as the

climactic events of Achilles' life are implied by the poem but projected beyond its limits,

so too the definitive restoration of social cohesion is implied but never directly

represented within the *Iliad*. (I explore this idea in greater detail in Chapter 5.)

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[16] Macleod 1982: 29-31, Seaford 1994: 160-1.

In the story of Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon, *(ep)ainos* is named only by its

negation. I will comment in the next chapter on the clearest instance of negative

reference, the emphatic use of *anainomai* in Book 9's abortive attempt to reestablish the

social cohesion of *ainos*.[17] Here I will confine myself to the language of Book 1, where

this verb expressing the refusal of *ainos* does not occur. However, we do find one very

important instance of the semantically and morphologically parallel adjective *apênês*.

Traditionally translated 'hard, cruel,' this adjective in fact derives from the same root as

ainos, **ainomai*, etc., as Blanc has convincingly demonstrated.[18] Moreover, on the

synchronic level of Homeric diction, *apênês* occupies precisely the same contexts as

anainomai.[19] It functions as an adjectival equivalent of the verb; its radical sense is,

therefore, not 'cruel' but 'opposed to *ainos*.' And this is exactly how Achilles

characterizes the disposition of Agamemnon at the moment when the heralds arrive to

execute the decision that has provoked the quarrel:

> ἀλλ' ἄγε διογενὲς Πατρόκλεες ἔξαγε κούρην
> καί σφῶϊν δὸς ἄγειν· τὼ δ' αὐτὼ μάρτυροι ἔστων
> πρός τε θεῶν μακάρων πρός τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων
> καὶ πρὸς τοῦ βασιλῆος ἀπηνέος εἴ ποτε δ' αὖτε
> χρειὼ ἐμεῖο γένηται ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι
> τοῖς ἄλλοις· ἦ γὰρ ὅ γ' ὀλοιῇσι φρεσὶ θύει,
> οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω,
> ὅππως οἱ παρὰ νηυσὶ σόοι μαχέοιντο Ἀχαιοί.
> 1.337-44

Go, noble Patroklos, bring out the girl
and give her to them to take away; but let these two be witnesses
before the blessed gods and mortal men,

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[17] Pp. 180 ff.

[18] Blanc 1985; cf. Blanc 1995: 193. The evidence of *apênês* is crucial to establishing the etymology of *ainos*, since it allows us to analyze the deverbative as **an-yo-* rather than **ain-o-*.

[19] Blanc 1985.262-3 and Blanc 1995: 193: "On remarque par ailleurs qu'ἀπηνής peut apparaître dans les mêmes contextes que le verbe ἀναίνομαι . . . . L'équivalence ἀπηνής εἶναι = ἀναίνεσθαι donne la clé de l'étymologie d'ἀπηνής: c'est un adjectif sigmatique déverbatif dérivé d'un verbe *ἀπ-αίνομαι, doublet de ἀν-αίνομαι."

and before the _apênês_ king, if ever again
there be need of me to ward off unseemly destruction
from the others: for he is seething with his destructive _phrenes_,
nor does he know at all how to think forwards and backwards,
so that the Achaeans might fight safely for him by the ships.

It is worth emphasizing that this is the actual, juridically efficacious moment of Achilles'

withdrawal. The great oath he had sworn in the assembly (1.233 ff.) constituted a kind of

contract whose fulfillment was contingent on Agamemnon's course of action. As

Agamemnon has now acted on his threat, Achilles' oath comes into effect, and he

demands legal recognition of that fact by calling the _kêrukes_ to witness. In other words,

this is the moment when the rift that had been manifested verbally in the earlier assembly

scene becomes social reality; and at this moment Achilles identifies Agamemnon, the

source of that verbal and social rift, as _apênês_, as one opposed to socially constructive

speech.

The language of Achilles' formal withdrawal makes a direct connection between

the failure of _ainos_ and the thematic core of the withdrawn hero motif, the _loigos_ that

afflicts the people in the hero's absence. The language of the poem as a whole

consistently maintains this connection by correlating cognates of _ainos_ with the formula

expressing the _loigos_ theme ([ἀεικέα] λοιγὸν ἀμυν-). Thus in Book 16 Patroklos

identifies Achilles' continued refusal to reenter the battle as the result of his own

opposition to _ainos_:

> . . . τί σευ ἄλλος ὀνήσεται ὀψίγονός περ
> αἴ κε μὴ Ἀργείοισιν ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμύνῃς;
> νηλεές, οὐκ ἄρα σοί γε πατὴρ ἦν ἱππότα Πηλεύς,
> οὐδὲ Θέτις μήτηρ· γλαυκὴ δέ σε τίκτε θάλασσα
> πέτραι τ' ἠλίβατοι, ὅτι τοι νόος ἐστὶν ἀπηνής.
> 16.31-5

What benefit will anyone else, even of a later generation, derive from you
if you do not ward off unseemly destruction from the Argives?

> Pitiless man, Peleus could not have been your father,
> nor Thetis your mother: the grey sea bore you
> and the steep cliffs, so *apênês* is your *noos*.

Summarizing the events of the poem for Hephaistos, Thetis similarly characterizes her

son's persistent withdrawal as a negation of *ainos*: ἔνθ' αὐτὸς μὲν ἔπειτ' <u>ἠναίνετο</u>

<u>λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι</u> ("whereon he <u>refused</u> [denied *ainos*] <u>to ward off destruction</u>," 18.450). In

this way, the poem's formulaic diction encodes the fundamental connection between

Achilles' integration into the community and consensus: if Achilles fails to fulfill his

traditional function of warding off *loigos*, it is because of the failure of *ainos*. Note that,

at least in the case of Achilles and Agamemnon, the opposition to *ainos* is reciprocal.[20]

At different stages in their dispute, both Agamemnon and Achilles merit the designation

apênês.[21]

Although the poem will later reveal him to harbor his own opposition to the social

cohesion of *ainos*, when he pronounces his formal withdrawal to the *kêrukes* Achilles

nevertheless reveals the fundamental sociality of his character, for he formulates with

surprising clarity the precise respect in which Agamemnon's action disables the

mechanisms of consensus. Agamemnon refuses to calculate his losses and gains in the

context of a temporal continuum extending into the past and future (οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι

ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω)—that is, he rejects the most basic principle of the 'delayed

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[20] As is the *mênis* of Achilles and Agamemnon: Nagy 1999: 73 (§8n2).

[21] But, significantly, the poem characterizes Achilles as opposed to *ainos* only *after* the Embassy. In Book 1, when Athena promised that he would receive threefold compensation in the future (1.213), Achilles had apparently agreed to abide by the principle of 'delayed return.' The return predicted by Athena is offered to Achilles in Book 9, and according to the paradigm of Khrusês, Achilles ought to accept (cf. Rabel 1988 and Wilson 2002: 69; Wilson's book, however, explores the reasons why Achilles cannot accept Agamemnon's offer). Having refused this offer, Achilles can, therefore, be accused of obstructing *ainos*. Note also Wilson's comment on Achilles' oath: "His words constitute a precis that controls the plot of the *Iliad* up to Book 9" (62). As we have seen, the oath is formulated in terms of the enabling principles of consensus, but it applies *only up to Book 9*.

return,' which alone transforms political decision-making from a zero-sum game (one with a winner and a loser) to a positive-sum game (one where every player wins).[22] Although the connection between 'delayed return' and the positive-sum calculus of political consensus remains only implicit in the *Iliad*, the poem nevertheless has such a remarkably sophisticated understanding of the contrast between zero- and positive-sum enterprises that it represents its essential problematic precisely in terms of that contrast. In the funeral games, which replay the central conflict over the distribution of 'prizes,' Achilles is able, by means of his personal surplus of goods, to correct the economic problem (the lack of distributable prizes) that afflicted Achaean society in Book 1. He thus transforms a zero-sum game into a positive-sum game *on the synchronic level* by offering a prize for everyone. The mechanism of 'delayed return,' advocated by Achilles in Book 1, would accomplish the same transformation *diachronically* (without the need for a surplus of goods).

This is not the place to undertake an exhaustive description of the many complex ways in which the funeral games repeat and resolve the conflicts of the poem as a whole. I would like simply to point out that the implicit connection between the positive-sum structure of the games and the conceptual apparatus propounded by Achilles in Book 1 is reinforced by the use of common phraseology. Achilles accuses Agamemnon of being *apênês* because he rejects the possibility of a positive-sum system in favor of one that is zero-sum: Agamemnon must have his *geras* at Achilles' expense. Book 23 likewise

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[22] Flaig 1993: 142 and 1994: 30: "Der Gewinn des Konsensprinzips und das entscheidende Charakteristikum eines von ihm strukturierten politischen Feldes besteht darin, daß alle Teilnehmer ein Positivsummen-Spiel spielen, d. h. es gibt keine Verlierer bei den einzelnen Entscheidungen. *Durch vertagte Gegenleistungen* gewinnen alle—und keiner verliert" (my emphasis). Ethnographic descriptions of consensus-based societies reveal that virtually no conflict or decision is treated as an isolated moment in time, but is situated with respect to past and future: cf. Colson 1974: 44 (past) and 53 (future).

correlates the rejection of *ainos* signaled by the adjective *apênês* with a commitment to a

socially destructive zero-sum system. When a dispute (*neikos*—this programmatic term

makes an immediate connection with the poem's archetypal *neikos*, the quarrel of

Achilles and Agamemnon) breaks out between Oilean Ajax and Idomeneus, two

spectators at the chariot race, Idomeneus not only charges his co-disputant with being

opposed to *ainos* (we should remember that this charge may reciprocally be laid against

him as well); he also suggests that the only way they can settle their dispute is by

recourse to a zero-sum procedure:

> Αἶαν <u>νεῖκος</u> ἄριστε κακοφραδὲς ἄλλά τε πάντα
> δεύεαι Ἀργείων, ὅτι τοι νόος ἐστὶν <u>ἀπηνής</u>.
> <u>δεῦρό νυν ἢ τρίποδος περιδώμεθον ἠὲ λέβητος</u>.
> <u>ἵστορα δ' Ἀτρεΐδην Ἀγαμέμνονα θείομεν ἄμφω</u>,
> ὁππότεραι πρόσθ' ἵπποι. ἵνα <u>γνώῃς</u> ἀποτίνων.
> 23.483-7

Ajax, best in <u>*neikos*</u> and perverse of disposition, in many regards
you are found wanting among the Argives, [but especially] because your
   noos is <u>*apênês*</u>.
<u>Come, let us wager a tripod or a cauldron,</u>
and let us both settle on <u>Atreus' son Agamemnon as arbiter</u>
as to which horses are in the lead, so that in paying the penalty you may
   <u>acknowledge</u> [that I am right].

The juridical wager—and note that the discourse of *ainos* consistently involves juridical

modes of demonstration and decision[23]—is a zero-sum game *par excellence*, for the loser

of the wager pays the penalty to the benefit of the winner. Considering Agamemnon's

own preference for the zero-sum system, likewise signaled by *apênês*, it is altogether

fitting that he should preside over this wager. But since Book 23 stages Achilles'

transfiguration of zero-sum structures into socially cohesive, positive-sum ones, he

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[23] Both the reference to a *(h)istôr* and the use of *gignôskô* signal the juridical mode. For the juridical force of *gignôskô*, see Gernet 1948: 186. Gernet's article provides a wonderfully rich exploration of the many 'proto-legal' aspects of Book 23.

cannot allow the wager to take place. Instead he intervenes to put an end to the *eris*

(23.490), and insists that the *agôn* itself will provide a juridical framework with equal

benefits for both:

> ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς ἐν ἀγῶνι καθήμενοι εἰσοράασθε
> ἵππους· οἳ δὲ τάχ' αὐτοὶ ἐπειγόμενοι περὶ νίκης
> ἐνθάδ' ἐλεύσονται· τότε δὲ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστος
> ἵππους Ἀργείων, οἳ δεύτεροι οἵ τε πάροιθεν.
> 23.495-8

> Seated in the *agôn*, devote your attention
> to the horses—they themselves will soon arrive here
> in pursuit of victory. Then <u>each of you will acknowledge</u>
> which of the Argive horses are second and which are first.

Hekastos indicates that each can be the beneficiary of a juridical demonstration without

recourse to a calculus of loss and gain.

The *agôn* convened by Achilles institutes a positive-sum system on the

synchronic level. During the episode of the chariot race, this system provides a workable

means of conflict resolution not only between Ajax and Idomeneus, but also, and more

importantly, between two of the contestants, Antilokhos and Menelaos. Contrary to

Achilles' desire to award the second-prize horse to Eumêlos, who 'ought' to have won,

Antilokhos demands the prize for himself in recognition of his second-place finish. But

because Antilokhos had bested the superior horses of Menelaos by means of a stratagem,

Menelaos contends that the second prize rightfully belongs to *him*.[24] Both, therefore,

demonstrate an all-or-nothing attitude ('I will accept no substitute for the prize I have

merited; anything else I count as a loss') that threatens to reconfigure Achilles' positive-

sum system of universal largess as a zero-sum balance of credits and debits. In fact, this

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[24] We observe here a contrast between innate virtue and demonstrated achievement, or what Wilson 2002:
36 etc. terms 'fixed' and 'fluid' ideologies of value. This contrast is essential to the thematics of the *Iliad*
(where it differs slightly from the *Odyssey*'s contrast between innate and apparent virtue, for instance in the
presentation of Odysseus as beggar).

zero-sum mentality inheres in the intense antagonism of Greek culture generally, which is why Achilles must make some rather remarkable innovations over the standard and expected pattern of distribution.[25] Nevertheless, from the standpoint of the *Iliad*'s model of consensus, Menelaos and Antilokhos are reciprocally liable to the charge of being *apênês*. If the episode of the quarrel between Ajax and Idomeneus had the effect of identifying this opposition to *ainos* with a commitment to zero-sum mechanisms, the conflict over the second prize allows the disputants, conversely, to redeem themselves from the charge of being *apênês* by embracing positive-sum distribution. Of course, there remains, strictly speaking, only one horse, and now that it has been invested with so much value by the contestants, the game as designed by Achilles no longer suffices to ensure a net positive result. So Antilokhos and Menelaos have recourse to a curious legal fiction. In response to Menelaos' claim, Antilokhos acknowledges his elder's superior social position and virtue (σὺ δὲ πρότερος καὶ ἀρείων ["you have higher position and greater valor"], 23.588) and hands over the mare—while insisting that he gives freely, as a gift, what he has won as a prize: ἵππον δέ τοι αὐτός / δώσω. τὴν ἀρόμην ("I myself will give you the mare that I won," 23.591-2). Menelaos does not contradict this claim to

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[25] Two aspects of Achilles' behavior must be considered idiosyncratic from the standpoint of the paradigmatic *agônothetês*, and motivated solely by the *Iliad*'s advanced thinking about distributive problems. The first is his ability to supplement the set prizes with additional objects taken from his private store (23.558 ff.). The second is his awarding of a *common* prize (ξυνήϊα, 23.809) to the contestants in armed combat. (I intend to explore the specific significance of this exceptional joint award in a separate paper.) Because of Achilles' innovations, I believe some modification must be made to the assertion of Wilson 2002: 37 that in Book 23 "a *zero-sum* fluid model" (my emphasis) is "imagined as functioning independently of constraint."

ownership. Rather, he follows the younger man's lead and returns the horse *as a gift*, i.e. asserting his own right as owner[26]:

τῷ τοι λισσομένῳ ἐπιπείσομαι, ἠδὲ καὶ ἵππον
δώσω ἐμήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἵνα γνώωσι καὶ οἵδε
ὡς ἐμὸς οὕ ποτε θυμὸς ὑπερφίαλος καὶ ἀπηνής.
23.609-11

Thus I will be persuaded by your plea, and I will grant you the mare—
though she is mine—so that those here may bear witness
that never is my *thumos* overbearing or *apênês*.

With these words—an explicit disavowal of *apêneia*, viz. a kind of litotic endorsement of *ainos*—Menelaos abandons his potential quarrel with Antilokhos and affirms instead their social bond. Moreover, he redefines the horse as his before giving it away; the double gift has the net effect of establishing *both* Menelaos *and* Antilokhos as owners of the horse. It is as if each has gained the prize, and each has voluntarily incurred a loss—or rather, neither has lost, since Antilokhos gains the horse while Menelaos acknowledges past benefits.[27] That is, he engages a corollary of the 'delayed return' principle by contextualizing his present loss in terms of a temporal continuum. The end result is an exemplary instance of conflict resolution (consensus building) through positive-sum calculation of interests. By means of the legal fiction of joint ownership, Menelaos and Antilokhos have succeeded in recuperating the social benefits of Achilles' distributive system.[28] Significantly, Menelaos' final affirmation of *ainos* demands legal recognition with the same formula (ἵνα γνώωσι καὶ οἵδε) Achilles used in Book 1 to

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[26] These two claims of ownership need not be contradictory: at the moment that he returns the horse, Menelaos *is* its proper owner. (Cf. Gernet 1948 on the value of the *mainmise* by which ownership is transferred at 23.597.)

[27] 23.607-8: ἀλλὰ σὺ γὰρ δὴ πόλλ' ἔπαθες καὶ πόλλ' ἐμόγησας. / σός τε πατήρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀδελφεός, εἵνεκ' ἐμεῖο.

[28] This legal fiction is analogous to the joint ownership of Sarpêdôn's armor, the τεύχεα . . . ξυνήϊα of 23.809 (see n. 25 above).

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mark publicly his rift with Agamemnon (1.302; the formula occurs only on these two occasions).

Taking our cue from the language of Achilles' withdrawal in Book 1, we have now examined four out of six total occurrences of the adjective *apênês* in the *Iliad*. The last two instances constitute a pair that illustrates the reciprocal quality of *apêneia*. Moreover, in this case the reciprocal opposition to *ainos* involves two divine figures who embody, in their relation to each other, division among the gods as Achilles and Agamemnon do among humans, namely, Zeus and Poseidon. As we shall see, the poem represents Poseidon's will as a threatening alternative to the Will of Zeus, which controls the plot of the *Iliad*.[29] The failure of *ainos* between these two figures therefore jeopardizes not only consensus-based decision making among the gods but, more importantly, the divine consensus that ensures that the poem's 'fated' events happen as they should, i.e. according to tradition.

The poem spends a considerable amount of time developing the antagonism between Zeus and Poseidon before the climactic conflict in which each merits the descriptor *apênês*. Already in Book 1, when Achilles establishes the basis for Zeus' obligation to Thetis, Poseidon is singled out as part of a trilateral bloc of opposition[30]:

> . . . ἔφησθα κελαινεφέϊ Κρονίωνι
> οἴη ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι,
> ὁππότε μιν ξυνδῆσαι 'Ολύμπιοι ἤθελον ἄλλοι
> "Ηρη τ' ἠδὲ Ποσειδάων καὶ Παλλὰς 'Αθήνη·
> 1.397-400[31]

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[29] Cf. below, pp. 110-1. A similar argument can be made for the Will of Poseidon in the *Odyssey*.

[30] Cf. Reinhardt 1961: 70.

[31] Note ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι: Achilles makes Thetis as essential to Zeus as Achilles himself is to Agamemnon (and the other Greeks).

. . . you claimed single-handedly, alone among the gods,
to have warded off destruction from the cloud-shrouded son of Kronos,
when the other Olympians wished to bind him,
Hera and Poseidon and Pallas Athena.

This passage has programmatic importance for the *Iliad* as a whole, for it names precisely those parties whose support Zeus will have to secure in order to establish a lasting consensus. (This process of consensus building is the topic of Chapter 5.) Poseidon first appears as a potentially active member of the opposition in Book 8, when Hera suggests that their faction might actually establish itself as a dominant majority, thus marginalizing and effectively subverting the Will of Zeus[32]:

. . . σù δέ σφισι βούλεο νίκην.
εἴ περ γάρ κ᾽ ἐθέλοιμεν, ὅσοι Δαναοῖσιν ἀρωγοί,
Τρῶας ἀπώσασθαι καὶ ἐρυκέμεν εὐρύοπα Ζῆν,
αὐτοῦ κ᾽ ἔνθ᾽ ἀκάχοιτο καθήμενος οἷος ἐν Ἴδῃ.
8.204-7

. . . Come, contrive for them [the Greeks] victory.
For if we, so many as are Danaan allies, should wish
to repulse the Trojans and restrain Zeus heard from afar,
then he would sit there, alone on Ida, nursing his grief.

Hera proposes a *coup d'état* that, by isolating the current head of state, would forestall the cohesion of *ainos*[33]: as eager as she is to construct a base of political support, her proposal breaks entirely from consensus politics. And it puts to the test the apparent consensus that had been imposed by Zeus at the beginning of the book, when he called for the *epainos* of the other gods for his moratorium on divine assistance to mortal combatants:

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[32] I use the majority model in more than a metaphorical sense (although a comparison with contemporary American politics is not out of place): as Flaig 1993 has argued, majority politics, a zero-sum game, are definitively non-consensual. Note the tension between the Will of Zeus and the Will of Poseidon: Hera advocates that Poseidon construct his own *boulê* (βούλεο) to replace that of Zeus.

[33] The physical isolation of Zeus envisioned by Hera has the same value as the motif of division (as expressed by *dikha, diandikha*, etc.) discussed below, pp. 146 ff.

μήτέ τις οὖν θήλεια θεὸς τό γε μήτέ τις ἄρσην
πειράτω διακέρσαι ἐμὸν ἔπος, ἀλλ' ἅμα <u>πάντες</u>
<u>αἰνεῖτ'</u>, ὄφρα τάχιστα τελευτήσω τάδε ἔργα.
ὃν δ' ἂν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε θεῶν ἐθέλοντα νοήσω
ἐλθόντ' ἢ Τρώεσσιν ἀρηγέμεν ἢ Δαναοῖσι
πληγεὶς οὐ κατὰ κόσμον ἐλεύσεται Οὔλυμπον δέ·
                                                            8.7-12

Therefore let no goddess nor yet any god
attempt to subvert my saying, but <u>all of you</u>
give *ainos*, so that these matters may come to fulfillment as soon as
     possible.
Whomever I perceive forming an intention apart from the gods
and going to aid either Trojans or Danaans
will return to Olympus beaten and contrary to *kosmos*.

Now, although Zeus' command superficially strives to create unity and cohesion among
the gods (he forbids anyone to act ἀπάνευθε θεῶν), it imposes only an apparent
consensus. (As I pointed out in Chapter 1, Zeus' command does not meet with an
efficient reception.) There is nothing inherently wrong with the form of this command,
i.e. with the fact that is formulated as a command and not as a proposal. Zeus' αἰνεῖτ'
could, in certain circumstances, be expected to produce the properly efficient response
ἐπαινοῦμεν, just as the Athenian *proedros*' imperative ἀράτω τὴν χεῖρα produces the
corresponding act of ratification, πάντες ἐπῆραν.[34] The fault consists rather in the fact
that Zeus puts the outward form of consensus at the service of a power structure that is
essentially non-consensual. He predicates the *epainos* of the gods on the fact that he is
himself θεῶν κάρτιστος ἀπάντων ("supreme among all the gods," 8.17), powerful
enough to impose his will even without the consent of the others.[35] (This assertion of

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[34] See Ch. 2 above.

[35] Flaig 1994: 19-20 sees this apparent contradiction between two sociological systems as the expression of
a theological inconsistency—Zeus is presented sometimes as supreme deity, and sometimes as a member of
a pantheon. This analysis makes the situation in Book 8 seem almost accidental, the result of unresolved
(and unconscious) tensions in Greek society. I prefer to find a structural motivation within the thematics of
the poem for Zeus' problematic gesture toward consensus.

autarkeia is, as we shall see in Chapter 5, at odds with those passages in which the negotiation of divine conflict is connected to the plot of the poem.)

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the inherent contradiction of Zeus' top-down consensus, Poseidon declines to undertake the action suggested by Hera and the *ainos*, faulty as it is, is temporarily allowed to stand. At least, no one could accuse Poseidon of being *apênês*, even if his acquiescence is not based on consent but on acceptance of Zeus' self-sufficiency:

"Ηρη ἀπτοεπὲς ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες.
οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγ' ἐθέλοιμι Διὶ Κρονίωνι μάχεσθαι
ἡμέας τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐστιν.
8.209-11

Hera, audacious of speech, what *muthos* have you uttered?
I would not wish for us other gods to fight
with Zeus son of Kronos, since indeed he is far superior.

Poseidon's reluctant acceptance of the situation does not, however, persist indefinitely.

In fact, it does not persist beyond the first half of the poem; at the beginning of Book 13,

Poseidon feels compelled to aid the Acheans in violation of Zeus' command, first by

nemesis for Zeus because of the general suffering of the Greeks (13.16), and then by

kholos over the death of his son Amphimakhos (13.206-7).[36] From this point on,

Poseidon is openly opposed to *ainos*, and his determination to continue his involvement

in the war will eventually earn the label *apênês* (15.202). I note that, just like Achilles,

Poseidon receives this designation only in the second half of the poem, i.e. only after

Achilles has rejected the Embassy.[37] Among both gods and humans, a provisional,

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[36] I offer this provisional distinction between *kholos* and *nemesis* (a term which is not addressed by the exhaustive description of the former by Walsh [forthcoming]): while *kholos* is anger over personal damage—in the context of the battlefield, the death of a member of one's own *oikos*—*nemesis* is anger over damage done to a third party with whom one does not share ties of real or fictive kinship.

[37] See above, n. 21.

though faulty, *ainos* is allowed to stand through Book 9. The parallelism extends across

several features common to the divine and human spheres. Firstly, just as Zeus' quasi-

ainos contradicts its own superficial intention with its contradictory vision of power

relations, according to which Zeus has such supremacy that he does not need to establish

a true consensus, so too does Agamemnon exploit his offer of compensation (the very

'delayed return' that, according to the model advocated by Athena and accepted by

Achilles, was supposed to restore order to a consensus-based system) to establish his own

indisputable superiority vis-à-vis Achilles.[38] Secondly, the (re)entry of the *apênês*

individual onto the field of battle—in Poseidon's case, this event counts as a breach of

consensus, while in Achilles' it has at least nothing to do with the social cohesion of

ainos[39]—is in both instances motivated by *kholos* over the death of a (real or fictive)

kinsman.[40]

Poseidon's involvement in the battle steadily escalates over the course of Books

13 and 14. Toward the end of Book 13, by means of what Morrison terms a "reversal

passage"[41] the poem signals that Poseidon's intervention comes very close to giving the

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[38] To Zeus' ὅσον εἰμὶ θεῶν κάρτιστος ἁπάντων (8.17), cf. Agamemnon's δμηθήτω . . . / καί μοι ὑποστήτω, ὅσσον βασιλεύτερός εἰμι / ἠδ' ὅσσον γενεῆ προγενέστερος εὔχομαι εἶναι (9.160-1). On the force of these lines, and the reasons why they make it impossible for Achilles to accept the offer, see Nagy 1999: 52 and Wilson 2002: 80-1. Agamemnon's claim to be not merely 'more royal' but also older makes his relationship to Achilles analogous to that which Zeus claims vis-à-vis Poseidon in particular (καὶ γενεῆ πρότερος, 15.182).

[39] Even when reentering the battle and warding off *loigos* from his comrades, Achilles is "still contained by the universe of Patroklos/Achilles" (Sinos 1980: 76).

[40] The most emphatic statement of Achilles' *kholos* comes just before he joins battle, at the moment he receives the arms from Thetis: αὐτὰρ 'Αχιλλεὺς / ὡς εἶδ', ὡς μιν μᾶλλον ἔδυ χόλος (19.15-6).

[41] Morrison 1992. These reversal passages are the principle way the poem signals the possibility of alternatives to the epic tradition, to which the *Iliad* refers by means of the trope of the 'Will of Zeus' (Nagy 1999: 81, 98, 134, etc.).

Greeks the victory, and thus subverting the Will of Zeus (which dictates Greek losses

until the return of Achilles):

> . . . τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ κῦδος 'Αχαιῶν
> ἔπλετο· τοῖος γὰρ γαιήοχος ἐννοσίγαιος
> ὄτρυν' 'Αργείους, πρὸς δὲ σθένει αὐτὸς ἄμυνεν·
> 13.676-8

> . . . And soon would the Achaeans have had
> the *kudos*, so much was earth's fickle foundation
> stirring the Argives, and moreover aiding them with his own strength.

By the end of Book 14, after Hera has aided the cause in the *Dios apatê*, Poseidon has in

fact turned the tide of the battle (ἐπεί ῥ' ἔκλινε μάχην κλυτὸς ἐννοσίγαιος ["when the

renowned earth-shaker turned the tide of battle"], 14.510), so that events are now

transpiring according to *his* will, instead of that of Zeus. When Zeus awakes and

witnesses Poseidon's involvement (15.8), he takes immediate action to reassert his

authority, namely, by enlisting Hera as his agent in communicating his unvarying

intention that the Trojans carry the day. Confronted by the threat of force, Hera

complies; Zeus suggests that if she, as representative of the opposition, were *willingly* to

support him—i.e. if they two could establish a consensus—Poseidon could no longer

maintain his independent *boulê*:

> εἰ μὲν δὴ σύ γ' ἔπειτα βοῶπις πότνια "Ηρη
> ἶσον ἐμοὶ φρονέουσα μετ' ἀθανάτοισι καθίζοις,
> τῶ κε Ποσειδάων γε, καὶ εἰ μάλα βούλεται ἄλλη,
> αἶψα μεταστρέψειε νόον μετὰ σὸν καὶ ἐμὸν κῆρ.
> 15.49-52

> Indeed, wide-eyed mistress Hera,
> if you would sit among the gods sharing my intention,
> then would Poseidon himself, even if he should wish otherwise,
> quickly turn about his *noos* according to our desire.

For the time being, however, he seems to acknowledge that no consensus is possible, for

he asserts that he will not 'cease from *kholos*' nor allow any god to aid the Greeks until

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Achilles receives his due *timê* (15.72-3). (This reference to *kholos* is inexplicable—with whom is Zeus angry, and on account of what personal damage?—except as a marker of the impossibility of consensus; I explore this aspect of *kholos* in the next section.[42])

When Hera carries this non-negotiable message to Olympus, she is appropriately greeted by Themis, personification of order as it is 'laid down.'[43] Her words confirm what Zeus' anger implies, that his position precludes *ainos* at least until Achilles has reentered the battle:

μή με θεὰ Θέμι ταῦτα διείρεο· οἶσθα καὶ αὐτὴ
οἶος κείνου θυμὸς ὑπερφίαλος καὶ <u>ἀπηνής</u>.
15.93-4

Do not ask me this, goddess Themis; you know yourself
how overbearing and *apênês* is his *thumos*.

Zeus qualifies as *apênês* to the extent that he refuses to negotiate; his promise to Thetis (cf. 15.75 ff.) cannot be modified by any consideration of context past or future, or of the comparable commitments of others. When his position—which, again, can be carried through only to the extent that Zeus can be considered superior among the gods—is at last communicated by Iris to Poseidon, the latter abandons his previous acquiescence and contests the supposed preeminence that permits Zeus to act unilaterally: he is *homotimos* with Zeus (15.186), he claims, and therefore cannot or should not be compelled to assent. That is to say, Poseidon exposes the contradiction at the base of Zeus' pretension to *ainos*

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[42] Zeus describes his own antagonism with the gods in terms of the same force that divides Achilles from the Greeks: compare 15.72 (τὸ πρὶν δ' οὔτ' ἄρ' ἐγὼ παύω χόλον οὔτε τιν' ἄλλον) with 19.67 (νῦν δ' ἤτοι μὲν ἐγὼ παύω χόλον. οὐδέ τί με χρή), where Achilles renounces his quarrel with Agamemnon.

[43] *Themis* < IE **dheH₁-*. Although *themis* is customarily taken to mean 'custom' as opposed to 'statute,' etymology suggests rather that it should be understood as what has been 'established' as opposed, for example, to *nomos* (< **nem-*), what is 'received,' or 'custom' in the proper sense. I note that while, as a rule, *nomos* is never ascribed to any particular time or place exclusively, *themis* often has a specific point of origin, viz. Zeus, as at Hes. *Sc.* 22 ὁ οἱ Διόθεν θέμις ἦεν. It matters not that this origin transcends human institutions; *themis* is still 'established,' the statute law of Zeus. Note *Od.* 16.403, εἰ μέν κ' αἰνήσωσι Διὸς μεγάλοιο θέμιστες: the *themistes* of Zeus actually produce *ainos*.

in Book 8. Iris recognizes the danger of a complete breakdown of cohesion, and cautions

Poseidon not to worsen the divide that has opened up between the brothers:

οὕτω γὰρ δή τοι γαιήοχε κυανοχαῖτα
τόνδε φέρω Διὶ μῦθον ἀπηνέα τε κρατερόν τε,
ἦ τι μεταστρέψεις; στρεπταὶ μέν τε φρένες ἐσθλῶν.
15.201-3

Then, dark-robed keeper of the earth,
should I really report this *muthos*, so <u>*apênês*</u> and stern,
or will you <u>relent</u> in some regard? The hallmark of a noble character is
flexibility.

Poseidon should not, on her view, abandon entirely the possibility of *ainos*; her use of the

word *metastrephô* recalls Zeus' earlier vision of a cooperative relationship. Poseidon

praises Iris for exercising the messenger's virtue in prudently mediating a potentially

inflammatory exchange[44] and agrees to accede, in this case, to Zeus' demand. Moreover,

as he acts to avoid the charge of being *apênês*, he simultaneously reasserts (or demands

the reestablishment of) the consensus-based system and redefines the value of *kholos* as a

defense or sanction against the violation of consensus, rather than an obstruction to it:

ἀλλ' ἤτοι νῦν μέν κε νεμεσσηθεὶς ὑποείξω·
ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω, καὶ ἀπειλήσω τό γε θυμῷ·
αἴ κεν ἄνευ ἐμέθεν καὶ Ἀθηναίης ἀγελείης
Ἥρης Ἑρμείω τε καὶ Ἡφαίστοιο ἄνακτος
Ἰλίου αἰπεινῆς πεφιδήσεται, οὐδ' ἐθελήσει
ἐκπέρσαι, δοῦναι δὲ μέγα κράτος Ἀργείοισιν,
ἴστω τοῦθ' ὅτι νῶϊν <u>ἀνήκεστος χόλος</u> ἔσται.
15.211-17

For the time being, then, I will yield—though provoked.

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[44] 15.207, ἐσθλὸν καὶ τὸ τέτυκται, ὅτ' ἄγγελος αἴσιμα εἰδῇ. The consensus culture of Polynesia
identifies precisely the same virtue in the institutionalized role of the messenger. Cf. Huffer and So'o 2003:
301n.1 (quoting Tuwere): "in Fiji, an important role of the *matanivanua* (heralds) is to 'digest' dissent: '. . .
They press down (*bika*) and hide within their own hearts the angry words of the chiefs about the people,
and they hide also in their hearts the angry words of the people about the chiefs; and for this reason they are
called the "Stomach of Evil" (*kete ni ka ca*) for their first responsibility is to preserve the land from
weakness of destruction through dissention . . .' Remarkably, this culture, whose method of decision
making shows many points of similarity with Homeric *epainos*, conceives of anger in terms of precisely the
same 'digestive' metaphor that Walsh (forthcoming): 205 ff. has identified in the Homeric portrayal of
kholos.

But I will tell you this, and it is a threat I make sincerely:
if, in spite of myself and Athena bringer of booty,
in spite of Hera and Hermes and lord Hephaistos,
he spares lofty Ilion and does not wish
to destroy it and to grant the Argives ultimate supremacy,
let him know this: we shall have a *kholos* that is beyond cure.

This is a moment of true consensus building. Poseidon assents, but only on condition that his present capitulation be contextualized so that its value extends into the future. And its future value is precisely that of ensuring consensus, insofar as it constrains Zeus against acting unilaterally. The consequence of another counter-consensual move on Zeus' part will be that very force that motivated Poseidon to abandon a provisional *ainos* in Book 13, and that Zeus cites as the continuing reason for the failure of *ainos*: *kholos*. But this future *kholos*, unlike its present manifestation, will be incurable, a definitive and eternal disintegration of divine society.

Anger and dissent: χόλος

Examination of *apênês* has yielded several important results. First, it has revealed that the *Iliad* itself identifies the central crisis of the poem, the rift between Agamemnon and Achilles, as a problem of *ainos*. Secondly, it has allowed us to trace at least two moments in the poem that recapitulate this problem, the funeral games of Book 23 and, importantly, Poseidon's infraction of the Will of Zeus in Books 13 to 15. Finally, our brief investigation of the latter context has suggested the significance of *kholos* as a counter-consensual force, one that either motivates the violation of an agreement (as

when Poseidon enters the battle) or arises from a breach of consensus (as the *anêkestos kholos* Poseidon imagines in the future).[45]

Of course, *kholos* is one of the principle themes of the poem of Achilles' *mênis*.[46] Our *Iliad* cites the *kholos* of Apollo as the direct cause for the *eris* between the two Achaean princes (1.9), and, as I pointed out above, an alternative proem transmitted by Aristoxenos puts *kholos* on virtually equal footing with *mênis* as the topic of the poem (ἔσπετε . . . / ὅππως δὴ μῆνίς τε χόλος θ' ἕλε . . .). So it is not surprising that *kholos* should be deeply embedded in the thematics of Achilles' quarrel. In fact, as suggested by Aristoxenos' variant opening, *kholos* appears to have been the traditional cause for the absence of the protagonist in tales or epics of the 'withdrawn hero' type. Thus, when Hektor finds Paris in the seclusion of his bedchamber rather than on the battlefield, he immediately assumes his brother to be indulging his *kholos*: δαιμόνι', οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδ' ἔνθεο θυμῷ ("sir, not well have you settled this *kholos* in your *thumos*," 6.326).[47] His remark does not answer any display of angry behavior, but rather represents the reasoning of one familiar with the conventions of epic tradition: since this hero is withdrawn, he must be afflicted by *kholos*.[48] So far as Achilles is concerned, the account of the dispute in Book 1, and indeed the language of the poem as a whole, makes

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[45] Blanc 1985.262 notes the connection between *kholos* and the refusal of *ainos* in the *Iliad*: "Chaque fois, c'est la colère qui fait que le personnage est ἀπηνής ou ἀναίνεται."

[46] Walsh (forthcoming) has now provided an exhaustive description of the thematics and metrics of *kholos* (and *kotos*, another of the key terms for anger in the *Iliad*).

[47] Cf. Willcock 1956-1957: 24, Alden 2000: 263n.201. The *Iliad*'s internal paradigm for the epic tale of the 'withdrawn hero' is the tale of Meleager narrated by Phoenix in Book 9; Meleager withdraws from battle ὅτε δὴ . . . ἔδυ χόλος (9.553).

[48] Walsh (forthcoming): 197 ff., who points out the irony of the passage: Paris cuts a poor figure as a withdrawn hero. And Paris himself is quick to distance himself from that heroic model (6.335 ff.).

a direct connection between *kholos* and his withdrawal. His great oath on the *skêptron* is

introduced by the portentous formula οὔ πω λῆγε χόλοιο ("not yet did he cease from

kholos," 1.224; the temporal force of this 'not yet' extends across the next 18 books of

the poem, until Achilles' *kholos* for Agamemnon is replaced by that for Hektor).[49] Nestor

beseeches Achilles with words that link the theme of *kholos* to that of the defense of the

Achaeans, i.e. that identify the central preoccupations of the 'withdrawn hero' pattern:

> λίσσομ' Ἀχιλλῆϊ μεθέμεν χόλον. ὃς μέγα πᾶσιν
> ἕρκος Ἀχαιοῖσιν πέλεται πολέμοιο κακοῖο.
> 1.283-4
>
> I beseech Achilles, who is the great bulwark against
> war's destruction for all the Achaeans, to let go his *kholos*.

And subsequent appeals to Achilles to return to the field will be made in terms of his

'ceasing from *kholos*.'[50]

One therefore does not need recourse to the discourse of consensus to explain

why *kholos* should be thematized in any context relating to Achilles' dispute, or to any

dispute mirroring that of Achilles. Anger in general and *kholos* in particular may be

features of the 'withdrawn hero' motif independent of the problematic of *ainos* (to the

extent that this motif *is* independent of *ainos*). But the consensus-based agreement

constructed by Poseidon, of which *kholos* is an integral component as the quasi-legal

sanction against violations of consensus, suggests a rather more substantive connection

between *kholos* and the dynamics of *(ep)ainos*. This connection does not, I suppose,

surprise, since anger of any kind has an understandable tendency to obstruct cooperative

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[49] Note that, as all other words referring to the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles (*mênis, apênês*; cf. above, n. 20), *kholos* too is reciprocal. In Achilles' account of the quarrel, Agamemnon falls victim first to *kholos* (1.387).

[50] 9.157, 261, 299: μεταλήξαντι χόλοιο.

endeavors.[51] The connection is nevertheless worth exploring, since it reveals the extent to

which the hero's anger is not simply a matter of his affective relation to a single

individual (in Achilles' case, Agamemnon), but a fundamentally social phenomenon.[52]

We can usefully begin with an example that does not belong to the epic paradigm

of the 'withdrawn hero' — in which, in other words, the correlation of *kholos* and *epainos*

must be due to some motivation other than their mutual association with this particular

narrative pattern — but that nevertheless deploys language cognate with that of the *Iliad*.

The example is one we considered in Chapter 1 in the context of the collective

associations of *epaineô*, Alcaeus' lines on the political solution in Mytilene that, by

establishing Pittakos as 'tyrant,' brought relative peace after many tumultuous years[53]:

> τὸν κακοπατρίδαν
> Φίττακον πόλιος τὰς <u>ἀχόλω</u> καὶ βαρυδαίμονος
> ἐστάσαντο τύραννον, μέγ' <u>ἐπαίνεντες</u> ἀόλλεες
> Fr. 348 LP[54]

> Base-born
> Pittakos they have established as tyrant of a city <u>without anger</u>
> and beset by evil fortune, <u>approving him</u> greatly, all together.

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[51] All the more so when that anger is based on the perception of personal loss, as I submit is the case for Homeric *kholos* (see above, n. 36). By definition, true consensus, which yields a positive sum of interests, does not admit the perception of loss.

[52] Benveniste 1969: 1.340 has cautioned us against blinding ourselves to the social significance of virtually every 'affective' phenomenon in Homer: "il faut se rappeler que, chez Homère, tout le vocabulaire des termes moraux est fortement imprégné de valeurs non individuelles, mais relationnelles. Ce que nous prenons pour une terminologie psychologique, affective, morale, indique, en réalité, les relations de l'individu avec les membres de son groupe . . ." Cf. Malamoud 2001: 432 (originally published in 1971): "Interpersonal relations (hence also feelings) are already social relations."

[53] Cf. Diod. 9.11: τὴν πατρίδα τριῶν τῶν μεγίστων συφορῶν ἀπέλυσε, τυραννίδος, στάσεως, πολέμου.

[54] One can observe both lexical and metrical indications of the connection between Alcaeus' lines and the language of Homer. The position of ἀόλλεες shows Alcaeus' inherited phraseology to be cognate with that of the Homeric poems (see above, Ch. 1 n. 76). Alcaeus also shares with Homer the rare term *akholos*.

Pittakos, of course, did not establish a true tyranny, but was elected *aisumnêtês*, an office

which he later resigned.[55] The label *turannos* is rather the product of Alcaeus' vitriolic

rhetoric, the mainspring of which is the artful juxtaposition of tyranny (that is, the

disenfranchisement it implies) with the phraseology of universal political participation

(ἐπαίνεντες ἀόλλεες).[56] The designation of Pittakos as of ignoble birth, hence unfit for

such a position, strengthens the effect of oxymoron. The lines express the speaker's

shock at what would seem an unimaginable situation—and only the description of the

city as 'without *kholos*' and 'oppressed by a *daimôn*' explains how such a *coniunctio*

oppositorum is possible. The explanatory force of *barudaimôn* is clear enough: only

under baleful supernatural influence could the city have approved of such a leader.

Akholos seems similarly intended as a justification for an unlikely situation. Does this

term indicate anything more substantial than simply the citizens' lack of any particular

reason to oppose Pittakos? Another of Alcaeus' poems, which similarly associates the

negation of *kholos* and the involvement of the divine in the context of the ascendancy of

Pittakos, offers an instructive comparison:

ἐκ δὲ χόλω τῶδε λαθοίμεθ . . [·
χαλάσσομεν δὲ τὰς θυμοβόρω λύας·
ἐμφύλω τε μάχας, τάν τις Ὀλυμπίων
ἔνωρσε, δᾶμον μὲν εἰς αὐάταν ἄγων
Φιττάκωι δὲ δίδοις κῦδος ἐπήρ[ατ]ον.
<div align="right">Fr. 70.9-13 LP</div>

> May we forget this *kholos*;
> and let us relax from the heart-eating strife
> and civil warring, which one of the Olympians has aroused
> among us, leading the *dêmos* into *atê*

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[55] Cf. *RE* s.v. Pittakos pp. 1868-70.

[56] Fr. 348 is transmitted to us by Arist. *Pol.* 1285a. Aristotle may in fact derive from this very text his definition of the office of *aisumnêtês* as ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν αἱρετὴ τυραννίς, where αἱρετή corresponds to ἐπαίνεντες. Aristotle's definition should therefore be viewed with some suspicion.

while giving longed-for *kudos* to Pittakos.[57]

These lines, discussed by Loraux in the context of the poetics of amnesty (but without

reference to fr. 348), connect *kholos* to the violence of civil strife—violence in which

Pittakos is participant and principle beneficiary. The injunctions to forget *kholos*—to be

akholos—and to abandon *emphulos makhê* comprise the conditions necessary to enjoy

peace under the regime of Pittakos. (The speaker appears skeptical about this possibility

in line 8.) The logic of the poem seems to be that *kholos* would lead to a continuation of

emphulos makhê; that is, that the anger of *kholos*, presumably over some personal loss

(whether of property, privilege, or personal connection), would inspire an act of

retribution that would perpetuate the conflict. At any rate, this is the potentially divisive

effect attributed to *kholos* by the rare word *mnâsikholeô*, attested only in a third-century

Arcadian peace settlement, where it functions as a synonym for the more familiar

mnêsikakeô, often used in the context of legislated amnesties in the sense of 'pursue

retribution / compensation for past wrongs':

> . . . μηδένα μηδενὶ μνα[σ]ιχολῆσαι τῶν πρότερον γεγο[νό]των
> ἀμφιλλόγων πὸς ἀλλά[λ]ος. μηδὲ δικάσασθαι μηδένα μηδὲν εἴ τι
> μίασμα γέγονε π[ρότερ[ο]ν ἢ Κλεώνυμος τὰν πρωρὰν ἐξάγαγε τὰν
> Ἀριστ[ο]λάω | καὶ τὸς πειρατὰς ἐξέβαλε·[58]
>
> SEG 25.447.4-8

> . . . let no one <u>be mindful of *kholos*</u> against anyone else in connection with
> the disputes that arose between them in former times, nor let anyone
> pursue a claim against another in connection with any *miasma* that
> occurred before Kleônumos expelled the ship of Aristolaos and cast out
> the pirates.

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[57] I adapt my translation from Loraux 2002: 157, who has an illuminating discussion of the fragment.

[58] Text in Te Riele 1967: 212; the document has an eye toward both internal tensions and foreign affairs: "il y a eu des difficultés internes dans la cité, en rapport avec des événements extérieurs" (222). For *mnâsikholeô* < *mnâsikholos*, see Te Riele 1968: 343; cf. also Loraux 2002: 159.

In Alipheira as in Mytilene, *kholos* threatens the internal cohesion of a society insofar as

it motivates action in response to past injury. (The same, incidentally, could be said of

the *kholos* of Poseidon, who is motivated by the injury he has suffered to disrupt the

cohesion of the gods.) After several successive tyrannies and years of *stasis*, we can

imagine that many of Alcaeus' fellow citizens may have had reason to pursue prosecution

or revenge. Only a denial or willful forgetting of *kholos* could produce anything

resembling a consensus in a population with so many reasons for feeling *ressentiment*.[59]

This denial of *kholos* might be far from positive[60]—especially from the perspective of one

such as Alcaeus, who apparently suffered exile under Pittakos—and thus of a kind with a

negative term such as *barudaimôn*. But for our purposes it suffices to draw from Alcaeus'

poetry two observations. First and most fundamentally, *kholos* constitutes a premier

obstacle to the political solution of *epainos*. Secondly, as we see in Fr. 70, *kholos* is

conceived as an antisocial force defined by opposition to the social bonds it

counteracts—for this reason it renders the cohesion of *epainos* impossible. In Homer, of

course, *kholos* can designate the anger that perpetuates conflict between proper enemies,[61]

but in a civic discourse (such as that of Alcaeus and, to a certain extent, of the Arcadian

inscription) it enjoys a special tie to *emphulos makhê*.

The inscription of Alipheira, of course, envisions a civil strife that will be

conducted not with weapons but in the courts. In the world of the Homeric poems,

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[59] I use the French term *ressentiment* because, in the philosophical tradition deriving from Nietzsche, this term designates a specifically social force: cf. Scheler 1994: 33. Note the way Mazon translates Zeus' declaration of his opposition to consensus at 15.72 (τὸ πρὶν δ' οὔτ' ἄρ' ἐγὼ παύω χόλον): "Jusque-là, je garde mon ressentiment . . ."

[60] Cf. Loraux 2002: 157.

[61] Cf. the formula τοῦ δὲ . . . ἀποκταμένοιο χολώθη (4.495, 16.660), which indicates a warrior's reason for pursuing a new target.

however, these two forms of *kholos* are not so very far apart, as we see in the funeral

games' miniaturized presentation of the global struggle to reestablish *epainos*. Here, too,

kholos is the force that motivates an individual to disrupt an emerging consensus. I

review lines I have had occasion to cite before, but now with special attention to the

language expressing Anitlokhos' grievance:

ὡς ἔφαθ', οἳ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνεον ὡς ἐκέλευε.
καί νύ κέ οἱ πόρεν ἵππον, ἐπήνησαν γὰρ Ἀχαιοί,
εἰ μὴ ἄρ' Ἀντίλοχος μεγαθύμου Νέστορος υἱὸς
Πηλεΐδην Ἀχιλῆα δίκῃ ἠμείψατ' ἀναστάς·
ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ μάλα τοι κεχολώσομαι αἴ κε τελέσσῃς
τοῦτο ἔπος· μέλλεις γὰρ ἀφαιρήσεσθαι ἄεθλον . . .
23.539-44

Thus he spoke, and they were all expressing *epainos* for his command.
And now he would have bestowed the horse, for the Achaeans had
    expressed *epainos*,
If Antilokhos son of great-hearted Nestor had not
risen and answered Peleus' son Achilles with <u>a claim for justice</u>:
"Oh Achilles, <u>I will feel great *kholos*</u> toward you if you bring to pass
this saying: for you are about to take away the prize . . .

Antilokhos experiences *kholos* at what he perceives as a personal injury (the loss of the

prize) caused by Achilles. His response, which confounds the *epainos* of the group, takes

the form of a legal action (δίκῃ ἠμείψατ'), but also potentially involves actual armed

conflict, as the end of his speech makes clear (πειρηθήτω / ἀνδρῶν ὅς κ' ἐθέλῃσιν

ἐμοὶ χείρεσσι μάχεσθαι ["let the man who wishes to engage in combat with me make

trial"], 23.553-4).[62] Moreover, *kholos* continues to work as a disruptive force throughout

the scene, thus corresponding to the reciprocal and self-perpetuating *ressentiment* that

seems to have characterized the alternations of Mytilenean power politics. Once

Antilokhos' anger has been assuaged, a permanent solution is again deferred by the

kholos of his opponent:

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[62] See Gernet 1948: 187.

τοῖσι δὲ καὶ Μενέλαος ἀνίστατο θυμὸν ἀχεύων
'Αντιλόχῳ ἄμοτον <u>κεχολωμένος</u>·

23.566-7

And then Menelaos stood up among them, with grief in his *thumos*,
feeling a vehement *kholos* for Antilokhos.

Menelaos' anger likewise seeks a legal outlet (δικάσσατε, 23.574, and δικάσω, 23.579),

but this time with ultimate recourse to an oath rather than the more radical means of

combat (23.581 ff.). The cyclical outbreak of anger ultimately reaches a satisfying

conclusion through a conciliatory exercise of memory—not amnesty's forgetting of past

injuries, but the remembering of past services (23.607), that is, the recuperation of the

temporal framework of consensus—accompanied by a ritual gesture of reconciliation (the

reciprocal exchange of the horse).[63]

In the microcosm of the funeral games, *kholos* is thus tied to the testing of an

emergent, but ultimately unstable, *epainos*; its abatement coincides with the (implied)

reestablishment of consensus. Leaving aside the macrocosm of the poem's human

events, in which the *kholos / mênis* of Achilles predominates from beginning to end, we

can observe the same dynamic in the poem's Olympian superstructure, where *kholos*

similarly punctuates the negotiation of a very important divine consensus. This divine

consensus will be the focus of Chapter 5, but I do wish to highlight in advance several

crucial moments, beginning with the one that first raises the problem of divine *epainos*.

At the beginning of Book 4, Zeus proposes allowing the human combatants to find a

peaceful solution to their dispute. But the very mention of *philotês*, of a possible social

resolution to the conflict, provokes the anger of Athena and Hera, the two principle

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[63] The double exchange functions as one of those 'rituals of reconciliation' that Flaig remarks as
characteristic of small-scale consensus-based societies: "Sie halten die Gruppenstruktur nach der Beilegung
eines Konfliktes aufrecht, indem sie verhindern sollen, daß Verstimmungen bestehen bleiben, die
tendenziell die Solidarität der gesamten Gemeinschaft untergraben" (Flaig 1994: 26n47, with references).

figures of opposition. Their joint response is a definitive refusal even to consider the

possibility, combining both a version of the non-efficient silent reception—which

indicates in itself the rejection of Zeus' proposal—and a very vocal expression of the

reasons making *epainos* impossible:

ὣς ἔφαθ', αἳ δ' ἐπέμυξαν Ἀθηναίη τε καὶ Ἥρη·
πλησίαι αἵ γ' ἥσθην, κακὰ δὲ Τρώεσσι μεδέσθην.
ἤτοι Ἀθηναίη ἀκέων ἦν οὐδέ τι εἶπε
σκυζομένη Διὶ πατρί, χόλος δέ μιν ἄγριος ἥρει·
Ἥρη δ' οὐκ ἔχαδε στῆθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηύδα·
αἰνότατε Κρονίδη ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες·
πῶς ἐθέλεις ἅλιον θεῖναι πόνον ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον,
ἱδρῶ θ' ὃν ἵδρωσα μόγῳ, καμέτην δέ μοι ἵπποι
λαὸν ἀγειρούσῃ, Πριάμῳ κακὰ τοῖό τε παισίν.
ἔρδ'· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.
4.20-9[64]

Thus he spoke, and Athena and Hera muttered in response;
they sat near at hand, plotting evil for the Trojans.
Athena was silent and did not say anything,
indignant with Zeus her father, and a <u>savage [*agrios*] *kholos*</u> took hold of
       her.
But Hera's heart could not contain her *kholos*, and she spoke out:
"Dread son of Kronos, what a *muthos* you have uttered!
How can you wish to render vain and unfulfilled my labor,
the sweat of my toil and the weariness my horses endured while I was
assembling the *laos* to be a curse for Priam and his children?
Do as you like, but we other gods will not all <u>express *epainos*</u> for you."

Superficially, Hera attributes her anger to the injury she will sustain from Zeus if he

renders her labor vain; but of course the *kholos* of both goddesses is ultimately due to the

injury each sustained from Paris as a result of his judgment in favor of Aphrodite. This

injury, which is suppressed here and elsewhere in accordance with the tendency observed

by Reinhardt,[65] motivates the goddess' opposition to the Trojan success dictated by the

Will of Zeus during the *Iliad*, and their commitment to the ultimate outcome of the war in

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[64] Note the chiastic pun in ll. 23-4: χόλος . . . ἥρει· / Ἥρη . . . χόλον.

[65] Reinhardt 1960: 16-36 ("Das Parisurteil," originally published in 1938).

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the larger framework of the epic cycle. Here, that injury is the source of a *kholos* that

vitiates any attempt at achieving *epainos* for a socialized solution to the Trojan War. If

Antilokhos' anger, cited by him as the motivation for a speech that (according to the

narrator) disrupts consensus, implied the principle that *kholos* itself makes consensus

impossible, that principle receives here a virtually concrete expression: Hera's verbal

outburst is the external manifestation of a *kholos* that cannot be contained (οὐκ ἔχαδε

στῆθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηύδα), and the outburst explicitly identifies itself as a denial

of *epainos*.

By emphasizing that Zeus opens the possibility of resolving the war by means of

the social bond of *philotês* (ἦ φιλότητα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι βαλῶμεν ["should we

inspire *philotês* among them?," 4.16)—recall that the same word designates the social

bond uniting members of the *Männerbund*—I mean to draw attention to the specific

attitude of Hera's silent partner, Athena, who is afflicted not by a simple *kholos*, but one

that is *agrios* (4.23). The use of this adjective is by no means incidental, nor merely

intensifying—rather, it signals that the possibility of socialization is opposed by a

fundamentally asocial phenomenon. This opposition has programmatic force for the *Iliad*

as a whole; thus Ajax in the Embassy formulates Achilles' withdrawal precisely in terms

of a conflict between *philotês* and the asociality signified by *agrios*[66]:

αὐτὰρ 'Αχιλλεὺς
ἄγριον ἐν στήθεσσι θέτο μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν
σχέτλιος, οὐδὲ μετατρέπεται φιλότητος ἑταίρων
9.628-30

But Achilles
has made savage [*agrios*] the great-hearted *thumos* in his chest
cruelly, nor does he pay any consideration to the *philotês* of his comrades.

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[66] Cf. Sinos 1980: 40.

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Ajax's *agrios thumos* is simply another way of naming the anger of Achilles, so that we

can understand these words as an alternative formulation of the very same contrast

between social cohesion and its negation by *mênis* I noted at the start of this chapter:

μηνιθμὸν μὲν ἀπορρῖψαι, φιλότητα δ' ἑλέσθαι (16.282). In other words, Ajax makes

explicit the social significance of Achilles' wrath. Agamemnon demonstrates a similarly

social understanding of the quarrel when he describes his own part in the upheaval of the

structures of exchange that integrated Achilles into the community:

> ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι,
> ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς,
> οἵ τέ μοι εἰν ἀγορῇ φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄγριον ἄτην,
> ἤματι τῷ ὅτ' Ἀχιλλῆος γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπηύρων.
> 19.86-9

> I am not at fault,
> but rather Zeus and Moira and the Erinus who walks in darkness,
> who instilled in my mind a <u>savage [*agrios*]</u> *atê* in the assembly,
> on that day when I took away the prize of Achilles.

Agamemnon's *atê* is *agrios* to the extent that it disrupts those basic social relations that

ensure the proper functioning of the community.[67] *Agrios* designates what is

fundamentally asocial, opposed to the basic principles of community, and, in fact,

capable of dissolving the bonds of society.[68] From this perspective, then, we can

understand the full social implications of what may seem at first to be a merely affective

disposition, the *kholos* of the hero. We can also understand the affinity of *kholos* in

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[67] Our understanding of the social force of *agrios* in this context benefits from Bader's interpretation of the distribution of prizes as a system of potlatch: see above, n. 4.

[68] When Achilles' *kholos* is transferred from Agamemnon to Hektor, so too is its asociality, which then threatens to dissolve not just the structures of social life within the community but the very basic structures of inter-societal relations, viz. the rule of burial. See Seaford 1994: 177 on "the 'Panhellenic *nomos* (law or custom)' *par excellence*, the *nomos* that captured war-dead must be returned for death ritual . . ." Thus Apollo says of Achilles' pitiless treatment of Hektor's corpse: ᾧ οὔτ' ἄρ φρένες εἰσὶν ἐναίσιμοι οὔτε νόημα / γναμπτὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι, λέων δ' ὣς <u>ἄγρια</u> οἶδεν (24.40-1).

Alcaeus' civic poetry for *emphulos makhê*, the ultimate expression of the dissolution of civic bonds.

The outbreak of Hera's *kholos* in Book 4 opens a brief period of negotiation over the fate of Troy. This is one of the few moments where we can observe the actual calculation of interests with an eye to consensus: in return for his present concession to Hera's demand, Zeus receives assurances of her future compliance.[69] But, as Flaig notes, the negotiated settlement is far from perfect: "Doch die Götter erreichen diesen Konsens nicht auf 'idealem' Wege, und daher ist er zunächst auch kein vollendeter."[70] The inadequacy of this consensus stems in part from the nature of the comparison underlying the deal. Zeus balances Hera's present *kholos* against one he envisions for himself in the future (4.36 and 42). That is, this peculiar version of a positive-sum transaction—the sum is certainly not zero, though one hesitates whether to describe it as positive or negative—calculates not comparable benefits but comparable *kholoi*. Any consensus based on what has emerged as a definitively counter-consensual force must be seen as flawed.

Though superficially resolved through a negative inflection of the politics of consensus, the divine conflict of Book 4 thus leaves as its residue a certain "affektive Dissonanz."[71] The scene on Olympus will in fact be repeated twice more throughout the poem, as it searches for a lasting resolution of this dissonance. We will have the opportunity to explore fully the process by which this sequence of repetitions

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[69] Cf. Flaig 1994: 20: "Es geht hier um den Entscheidungsprozeß in der einzigen Götterversammlung, in der Zeus ausdrüklich die anderen Götter als Entscheidungsteilnehmer anspricht."

[70] Ibid. 25. Flaig focuses on Zeus' attitude toward the agreement, which we shall have occasion to consider in Chapter 5.

[71] Ibid. 26; cf. Flaig 1993: 153.

reestablishes divine consensus in Chapter 5; for the time being, I foreshadow that

discussion by noting that the ultimate sign of consensus will be Zeus' reconciliation with

Athena, who displays in Book 4 the most expressly antisocial form of *kholos*. The

crucial moment comes in Book 22, and is marked by Zeus' declaration of a desire to be

'in accord' with his daughter:

> θάρσει Τριτογένεια φίλον τέκος· οὔ νύ τι θυμῷ
> πρόφρονι μυθέομαι, ἐθέλω δέ τοι ἤπιος εἶναι·
> 22.183-4

> Have courage, Tritogeneia, my dear child: I have not now
> uttered this in earnest, and I wish to be in accord with you.

Now, the pattern for this reconciliation is set already at the beginning of Book 8: after

Athena has responded—somewhat ambivalently, as we have seen—to his command that

πάντες / αἰνεῖτ᾽, Zeus replies to his daughter with the very same words he will use in 22

(8.39-40).[72] In this case, however, the conciliatory gesture represents not a true resolution,

but a prelude to renewed conflict: as I argued above, Book 8 describes the imposition and

testing of a faulty *ainos* based, similarly to the situation in Book 4, on a flawed construal

of the mechanisms of consensus. It is as if, before the process of reestablishing

consensus can begin, the poem must expose the residuum of dissonance left over from

Book 4: things must get worse before they can get better. The project of Book 8 is, in

short, to unearth fully the "affektive Dissonanz" that results from the misuse of *ainos* in

order to begin repairing the infrastructure of the community. (The process of repair

commences with the Embassy of Book 9.)

The demolition, so to speak, of the faulty superstructure is punctuated by the very

formulas that index the process of social reconstruction in the poem as a whole. As the

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[72] See above, Ch. 1 p. 24.

book opens with Zeus' forceful declaration of his own unrivaled superiority, on which he

predicates his paradoxical demand for *epainos*, so it ends, after Hera and Athena have

been turned back from their course of intervention by threats of violence.[73] While the

incipit, however, features a pseudo-reconciliation with Athena, the reaction to the later

statement of Zeus' power politics returns us to the situation of Book 4:

ἤτοι 'Αθηναίη ἀκέων ἦν οὐδέ τι εἶπε
σκυζομένη Διὶ πατρί, χόλος δέ μιν ἄγριος ἥρει·
"Ηρη δ' οὐκ ἔχαδε στῆθος χόλον, ἀλλὰ προσηύδα·

8.459-61

Athena was silent and did not say anything,
indignant with Zeus her father, and a savage [*agrios*] *kholos* took hold of
   her.
But Hera's heart could not contain her *kholos*, and she spoke out:

One cannot speak of a regression, since no real progress toward consensus has yet been

made. Nevertheless, Book 8 plays in reverse the motifs that chart that progress in the

larger movement of the poem. Between the bookends of these motifs we witness the

deconstruction of the old, flawed edifice (to clear the ground for the new).[74] We have

seen how, early in the book, Hera invites Poseidon to undermine Zeus' position of

preeminence, an invitation that he declines, preferring to remain invested for the time

being in a system ignorant of consensus, insofar as it does not take account of context or

the interests of others. Only shortly thereafter, however, Hera prevails on Athena to take

action against the status quo that Poseidon had opted to preserve; while the latter was

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[73] 8.451: οὐκ ἄν με τρέψειαν, ὅσοι θεοί εἰσ' ἐν 'Ολύμπῳ.

[74] One should note the way the poem correlates the breakdown of superficial order among the gods with the progressive dissolution of the integrity of the Greek army. The first sign of serious trouble among the Achaeans is the peril of Nestor in ll. 80 ff., and Odysseus' failure to cooperate with Diomedes in his rescue. These three figures are primary indices and agents of the cohesion of the host (see the next chapter). Thus it is highly significant that, as the rout continues, Agamemnon must plead with the army to hold together while standing at the point around which the camp's political and spatial order is oriented: the ship of Odysseus, ἥ ῥ' ἐν μεσσάτῳ ἔσκε (8.223). For the significance of this localization 'at the middlemost point,' see Detienne 1996: 91 ff.

content to reaffirm Zeus' supremacy (ἣ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐστιν, 8.211), Athena justifies

her decision to resist precisely by asserting that present circumstances must be viewed in

a larger context (οὐδέ τι τῶν μέμνηται, ὅ οἱ μάλα πολλάκις υἱὸν / τειρόμενον

σώεσκον ["he has no recollection of the fact that often I saved his son in his distress"],

8.362-3)—that is, by promoting consensus-based reasoning in place of zero-sum

authoritarianism. Her complaint makes explicit why Zeus' *ainos* is no *ainos* at all—and

why *kholos* is the only possible response when one is asked to consent to such an

antisocial utterance.

Beyond the pleasure principle?: ἁνδάνω

Kholos—the disaffection of an alienated individual (and I note that *kholos* is

always predicated of specific individuals, never of groups)—thus emerges as both cause

and symptom of the disruption of consensus. But it is not only the negative emotion of

ressentiment that can disturb the proper functioning of the group. So too can the intense

preference—in Homeric diction, the 'pleasure' signaled by the verb *handanô*—of

individuals for one option over another. This is suggested already by the dysfunctional

consensus of Book 1:

> ἔνθ' ἄλλοι μὲν πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοὶ
> αἰδεῖσθαί θ' ἱερῆα καὶ ἀγλαὰ δέχθαι ἄποινα·
> ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἥνδανε θυμῷ . . .
> <div align="right">1.22-4 = 1.376-8</div>

> Then all the other Achaeans expressed approval
> for respecting the priest and receiving the splendid ransom;
> but this did not <u>please</u> the *thumos* of Atreus' son Agamemnon . . .

The text formulates Agamemnon's preference negatively, but that does not mean that the

force of a certain affective appeal is not operative. The implication is that Agamemnon

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prefers a different option, that of denying Khrusês' request; the negation of the verb

signifies simply that his preference is not that of the group. This singular, particularized

preference fragments the group,[75] so that the reaction expressed by ἐπευφήμησαν does

not encompass all the members of Khrusês' audience—as it should, according to the

performative dynamics of the preverb *epi-*. In fact, the limited applicability of

epeuphêmeô in this context is the principle semantic feature that distinguishes this word

from *epaineô*, which is not just collective but universal.[76]

Agamemnon's preference has decision-making force—in effect, it legislates a

course of action. The description of such a legislative act in terms of the 'pleasure' of

handanô finds numerous parallels in the later legal language of the Greek city-states, just

as Homeric terms for group response correspond to later descriptions of assembly

procedure (as we saw in Chapter 1).[77] While the ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ of Athenian decrees

conceptualizes decision-making in terms of 'acceptability' (*dokeô* < *dek-*), inscriptions of

other Greek states speak precisely in terms of what is 'pleasing.'[78] I suggest that we can

observe in *Iliad* 1 the earliest traceable stages in the development, i.e. specialization, of

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[75] See above, Ch. 1 p. 27.

[76] Thus at 23.539 ff., the Achaeans ἐπήνεον only so long as no one objects: the action of *epaineô* is by definition universal.

[77] It might be possible to think of the situation in Book 1 as a kind of conflict between two conceptual forms of deliberation, one characterized by the consent of all and another by the preference of individuals. I do not intend to pursue this line of thinking here, but I note that such a conflict might also be visible in the contrast between decisions made by the *gerousia* and by the *ekklêsia* in Sparta: see Flaig 1993, and cf. below pp. 143-4 on the way Homeric *epihandanô* expresses a tension between a select group of decision-makers and the larger society affected by their decisions.

[78] Cf. Chantraine 1968-1980 s.v. *dokaô*: "dans un emploi politique ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ (= dans d'autres dialects ἔαδε)." For epigraphical attestations of *handanô* in this legislative sense, see Busolt 1963: 455n3, and IG IX² 718.38 (τὰ ϝεϝαδεϙότα; early 5th c.).

what would later become a way of speaking about specifically politico-legal procedures.[79]

In the extant decrees, however, we observe few, if any, traces of an inherited sense that

the affective preference of this legislative pleasure might somehow be in tension with the

homogeneity of other modes of collective approval.[80] At the relatively undifferentiated

level of Homeric diction, on the other hand, this tension is overt, so that Agamemnon's

preference is in direct conflict with the otherwise homogenous sentiment of the group.

Confining ourselves just to forces or tendencies observable in the diction itself,

we could describe this tension in terms of syntax, viz. the differing syntaxes of individual

versus collective approval. The syntax of *handanô* requires the specification, in the

dative, of the person or persons to whom the subject of the verb 'appeals'; *handanô* is

never used absolutely in Homer. I say "person or persons"—not "person or

group"—because, significantly, even when it refers to the preferences of what could be

conceptualized as a group, the verb never takes as its indirect object a collective noun,

but governs rather a pronoun designating a plurality of individuals.[81] By contrast, the

phraseology of approval based on compounds in *epi-* by its very nature expresses a group

dynamic. As we have seen, the syntax and semantics of the *epi-* verbs is based on a

pragmatic context that contrasts the reaction of a group with the performance of an

individual. As a result, the subject of such a verb is by definition a group that derives a

cohesive identity from that context. From this perspective, the respective syntaxes of

pleasure and consent are fundamentally opposed, for the individualizing tendency of the

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[79] Cf. above, Ch. 2, pp. 74-5 on "differentiation" and "specialization" in the context of *(ep)ainos*.

[80] I note, however, that in IG IX² 718, τὰ ϝεϝαδεϙότα are mentioned in the context of the possibility that someone might *violate* (διαφθείρει, l. 38) the statutes.

[81] E.g. *Il.* 18.510 (σφίσιν); *Od.* 13.16 (τοῖσιν); *Od.* 24.465 (σφίν).

former fragments what the latter views as an indivisible whole.[82] In Book 1, the

juxtaposition of *epeuphêmeô* and *handanô* represents a collision of two radically different

viewpoints on the decision-making process. It is this collision that makes the situation

dysfunctional.

The individualized preference signaled by *handanô* does not merely *tend* to run

counter to the properly collective mentality of consensus; when we observe the way the

term operates in Homeric language, we see that it is, in fact, *definitively* counter-

consensual. *Handanô* always designates an approval that is either singular and in

contrast to the preference of the group, or divided, viz. divisive—a preference that marks

a division within the group. Thus when Ajax, fighting from the prows, takes up his

position of unique prominence during the battle at the ships, the poem emphasizes the

extent to which his course of action diverges from the general disposition of the army:

> οὐδ' ἄρ' ἔτ' Αἴαντι μεγαλήτορι ἥνδανε θυμῷ
> ἑστάμεν ἔνθά περ ἄλλοι ἀφέστασαν υἷες Ἀχαιῶν·
> 15.674-5

Then it did not please the *thumos* of great-hearted Ajax
to stand at a distance with the other sons of the Achaeans.

In the *Odyssey*, Eumaios similarly displays a preference that distinguishes him from the

commonplace:

> ὣς ὁ μὲν ἔνθ' Ὀδυσεὺς κοιμήσατο, τοὶ δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν
> ἄνδρες κοιμήσαντο νεηνίαι. οὐδὲ συβώτῃ
> ἥνδανεν αὐτόθι κοῖτος, ὑῶν ἄπο κοιμηθῆναι,
> ἀλλ' ὅ γ' ἄρ' ἔξω ἰὼν ὁπλίζετο· χαῖρε δ' Ὀδυσσεύς . . .

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[82] One is obviously tempted to contrast the 'subjective' perspective that would appear to be implicit in the notion of pleasure with the 'objective' perspective of descriptions of group procedures. Nevertheless, due to the uncertain relation between language and notions of subjectivity (does the former simply express or rather produce the latter?) I prefer to avoid the problem and to concentrate instead on observable facts of grammar.

14.523-6[83]

> So Odysseus lay down there, and beside him
> lay the young men. It did not please the swineherd, however,
> to make his bed in the same place, apart from the pigs,
> but going out he lay in the open air; and Odysseus was glad . . .

Perhaps the most striking realization of *handanô* as an indicator of divided preference is

the famous visualization of a besieging army on the Shield of Achilles:

> τὴν δ' ἑτέρην πόλιν ἀμφὶ δύω στρατοὶ ἧατο λαῶν
> τεύχεσι λαμπόμενοι· δίχα δέ σφισιν ἥνδανε βουλή . . .
>
> 18.509-10

> About the other city sat two hosts of *laoi*
> shining in their arms; and the *boulê* that pleased them was divided . . .

The text does not imagine two proper armies as two distinct, individually cohesive units,

but rather, in accordance with the widespread artistic convention of the second

millenium, a single army shown, as it were, in cross-section as it surrounds the city.[84]

With the facility of a wonderfully fecund tradition of poetic imagination, this visual

convention is then interpreted in terms of the affective disposition of the besieging host,

which is divided in two precisely to the extent that it is unable to reach a consensus.[85]

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[83] Cf. also *Od.* 2.113-4, μητέρα σὴν ἀπόπεμψον, ἄνωχθι δέ μιν γαμέεσθαι / τῷ ὅτεῳ τε πατὴρ κέλεται καὶ ἀνδάνει αὐτῇ, where Penelope's preference is singled out as something distinct from that of her father. We see in all these examples that the individualizing tendency of *handanô* can apply as much to the subject of the verb as to the indirect object (the 'subject' who experiences pleasure). This is most obvious in the case of *Od.* 16.397-8, μάλιστα δέ Πηνελοπείῃ / ἥνδανε μύθοισι, which uses Penelope's preference as a way of indicating the relative excellence of Amphinomos.

[84] Cf. Edwards 1991 ad 18.509. The notion that we see here two distinct armies has perhaps been encouraged by the ambiguity of σφίσιν, which could at first glance mean 'them' in the sense of 'the two armies.' But as I have pointed out, the plural pronoun is regular, indeed required, in the case of a group entity. Moreover, if we consider that *handanô* never governs a collective noun, it seems unlikely that σφίσιν actually could mean 'the two armies,' since in that case a group would be treated as a unit.

[85] If my hypothesis is correct, and the tradition has interpreted a characteristic figure of second millennium visual art by constructing a political narrative about division and decision-making—a narrative much like that of the *Iliad*—then we have at our disposal an important key to understanding the overall thematics of division and unity in the *Iliad* itself. The poem corresponds to what we observe on the Shield in that it investigates the pathology of division in the besieging army. But notice that, if we pursue the analogy with the iconographic representation, the besieged city, which would be represented as a discernible unit at the center of the depiction, *should not be* characterized by division in the same way as the attackers. The *Iliad*

A similar marker of division prepares for the final resolution of the poem by

establishing a dissonance in the divine community at the start of Book 24[86]:

ὣς ὃ μὲν Ἕκτορα δῖον ἀείκιζεν μενεαίνων·
τὸν δ' ἐλεαίρεσκον μάκαρες θεοὶ εἰσορόωντες.
κλέψαι δ' ὀτρύνεσκον ἐΰσκοπον Ἀργειφόντην.
ἔνθ' ἄλλοις μὲν πᾶσιν ἑήνδανεν, οὐδέ ποθ' Ἥρῃ
οὐδὲ Ποσειδάων' οὐδὲ γλαυκώπιδι κούρῃ . . .
<div align="right">24.22-6</div>

Thus in his fury did he befoul glorious Hektor.
But the blessed gods pitied him [Hektor] as they looked on,
and were calling for the sharp-seeing slayer of Argos to steal the corpse.
And so it pleased all the the others, but not Hera
nor Poseidon nor the grey-eyed maiden . . .

The failure of consensus implicit in this instance of divided preference becomes explicit

with the *kholos* Hera expresses some 30 lines later in response to Apollo's claim that the

gods should 'save' the corpse of Hektor (χολωσαμένη, 24.55). Now, lines 25 ff. suffered

Aristarchus' athetesis, and a principle objection (or at least the first of several reasons

cited by the scholia) seems to have arisen from the phraseology of dissent, that is, from

the feeling that "it is absurd to speak of all the gods agreeing, and then exclude three of

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appears in this regard to diverge from the Shield in that it thematizes division and heterogeneity among the Trojans. Herein, however, lies the key: for the poem represents Hektor's downfall, and by extension the downfall of Troy itself, as a moment of uncharacteristic, and thus climactic, consensus. (This is the argument of Chapter 5.) The fate of Troy is sealed at the moment that the Trojans become unified—at the moment, that is, that they converge with the paradigm of the besieged city as represented on the Shield.

This line of argument has one further consequence worth noting. The fate of Troy can be deferred so long as the actors in the story *do not* play the roles assigned to them by the traditional paradigm. From this we can infer that what is characteristic of the Trojans—namely, their heterogeneity—within the *Iliad* is uncharacteristic or atypical within the larger outlines of tradition. The *Iliad*'s rule is the tradition's exception. I see this as an effect of the *Iliad*'s monumental scale and (from our point of view) self-sufficiency: in the process of expanding to colossal proportions a minor episode of the larger Troy tradition, the poem assigns climactic value to the traditional outcome by establishing as its internal norm non-traditional motifs. Through most of its action, the *Iliad* describes a true 'state of exception.'

[86] This dissonance responds, to a certain extent, to the dissonance which opens Book 1: Davies 1981: 58. We observe a general compositional tendency in the Homeric epics to construct the first and last segments of each poem as units consisting of the same general movement from discord to resolution that characterizes each poem as a whole. Moreover, in Book 24 the dissonance in the divine community is paralleled by the symbolic dissolution of the human community with which the book begins: λῦτο δ' ἀγών, λαοὶ δὲ θοὰς ἐπὶ νῆας ἕκαστοι / ἐσκίδναντ' ἰέναι (24.1-2). Both of these markers of dissolution prepare the way for an ultimate resolution.

the most powerful deities."[87] But this phraseology becomes easily comprehensible when

we understand that *handanô* absolutely does not denote agreement, but rather a

preference that precludes agreement.[88] Modern objections to these lines have focused on

the fact that Poseidon's insertion between Hera and Athena seems out of place, especially

since the text goes on to explain the persistence of divine anger with reference to the

Judgment of Paris (24.28-30).[89] But in terms of the poem's problematic of consensus,

these three figures are necessarily associated. It is not just that Poseidon has been "firmly

registered in our minds within the company of gods who cherish undying hatreds because

of past offences"[90]; his will represents the principle challenge in the poem to the Will of

Zeus, and for this reason he is a key member of what I have characterized as the

'opposition party' whose cooperation is necessary in order to secure consensus. An

understanding of the *Iliadic* dynamics of consensus, and of the corresponding

phraseology, thus helps to resolve an ancient crux.

We find an interesting moment in the negotiation of conflicting divine interests at

the beginning of Book 7, a moment that is equally indicative of the distinctive semantics

of *handanô*. The book opens with the deaths of several Argive heroes, distressed by

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[87] Richardson 1993 ad 24.23-30, who also outlines the reasons for applying Aristarchus' athetesis only to 25-30, and not to 23-30, as the scholia might seem to suggest.

[88] The scholion paraphrased by Richardson in fact focuses less on the apparent contradiction of the notion of 'agreement' (the perception of such a contradiction seems peculiar to the modern commentator) than on the absurdity of speaking of all the gods, and then excepting three of the most important: γέλοιον γὰρ τὸ οὐδέ ποθ᾽ Ἥρῃ . . . · τίνες μὲν γὰρ ἔτι ἐλείποντο τῶν τριῶν ⟨τῶν⟩ σεμνοτάτων μετὰ τὸν Δία {τῶν} μὴ συνευδοκούντων: (sch. A 24.25-30). But as we have seen in previous examples (particularly those of Agamemnon and Ajax), *handanô* typically serves (especially when negated) to highlight the preference of important individuals; so it is, in fact, quite normal for this instance to single out the three members of the opposition party, who, from the standpoint of consensus, are certainly the most important representatives of a potentially divisive opinion.

[89] See Hampe 1954: 85 and Davies 1981: 57.

[90] Davies 1981: 59.

which Athena descends from Olympus, presumably to bring aid to the Greeks. She is

intercepted at the oak tree (a Trojan landmark) by Apollo, who, in contrast, Τρώεσσι δὲ

βούλετο νίκην ("was contriving victory for the Trojans," 7.21). There follows a brief

exchange in which the two gods agree that, although each has different interests at heart,

it would be better for both to put an end to the day's fighting, and they resolve on a duel

between Hektor and an Achaean champion as the means to do so. (At 7.274 ff. the duel

is declared a draw, so that neither god has, in the event, sustained a loss; by the same

token, of course, neither has gained, so that the outcome is, in effect, zero-sum.) Their

agreement is concluded and communicated to the human actors with the following words:

ὣς ἔφατ', οὐδ' ἀπίθησε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη.
τῶν δ' Ἕλενος, Πριάμοιο φίλος παῖς, σύνθετο θυμῷ
βουλήν. ἥ ῥα θεοῖσιν ἐφήνδανε μητιόωσι·
7.43-5

Thus he spoke, and the grey-eyed goddess Athena was persuaded.
And Helenos, Priam's dear child, perceived in his *thumos*
their *boulê*, the one which pleased the gods in their counsels.

This use of *handanô* in reference to a moment of an agreement—but an agreement which

is at least as divisive as it is solidary, and by no means involves the kind of homogeneity

characteristic of group interests—deserves some comment. In the first place, I note that

this agreement between Athena and Apollo is a strictly separate peace, a temporary

détente they arrive at while acting independently from the community of gods. (Athena

leaves Olympus and meets Apollo in the no-man's-land of the Trojan plain.) Thus

handanô maintains its essentially divisive force. Nevertheless, there is a certain

collectivization, or rather, coordination of interests here, signaled by *epi-*—the same

preverb that generally marks group action throughout the poem. At least, it is the same

morpheme, but with an important semantic difference. Here and elsewhere, *epihandanô*

(in the present tense, the verb does not undergo elision / assimilation in Homer) manifestly does not participate in the pragmatic context of audience-performer interaction that determines the use of *epi-* in the case of the properly 'group' words we have discussed. Rather than indicating a reaction, this *epi-* has a conjunctive force.[91] It is, we might say, coordinating but not collective, so that *epihandanô* indicates something that appeals *both* to Apollo *and* to Athena. In short, the verb indicates two separate preferences that are momentarily in accord—but nevertheless still separate, so that 'agreement,' to say nothing of 'consensus,' is perhaps too strong a term. This is simply a coincidence of interests.

If divine conflict to a certain extent mirrors the political disposition of the poem's Greek protagonists (thus the "antinomy" or "antithesis" of human and divine strife mentioned by Davies[92]—we shall have further opportunity to explore the interaction of human and divine consensus building in Chapter 5), then it is no coincidence that this curious coordination of preferences occurs at the beginning of Book 7, as the poem moves toward its first internal climax, the attempt to reestablish a connection with Achilles in Book 9. (We have already seen how Book 8 prepares for this climax.) Towards the end of this book, the Trojan herald Idaios arrives in the Greek camp to communicate Alexander's settlement offer. As in Book 1, Agamemnon and the Achaeans are confronted by a foreign visitor who offers compensation for a woman.[93]

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[91] Monro 1891: 179 glosses this force thus: "*in addition, besides*, esp. of an addition made to *correspond with* or *complete* something else" (italics original).

[92] Davies 1981: 58, with references.

[93] In terms of the system of *apoina / poinê* elaborated by Wilson 2002, we can understand the two visitations as related but different (Khrusês offers *apoina*, Idaios / Alexander *poinê*). Wilson's book demonstrates that much depends on whether a given action is presented as one or the other kind of transaction.

Recall how, there, *handanô* signaled Agamemnon's singular opposition to what might

otherwise have been the consensus of the Greeks. In Book 7, the collective will is

expressed by Diomedes, who receives (inefficient) approval for his declaration that the

Greeks will accept no compensation, but will sack the city. This time Agamemnon finds

himself in agreement:

> ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἳ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπίαχον υἷες Ἀχαιῶν
> μῦθον ἀγασσάμενοι Διομήδεος ἱπποδάμοιο·
> καὶ τότ᾽ ἄρ᾽ Ἰδαῖον προσέφη κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων·
> Ἰδαῖ᾽ ἤτοι μῦθον Ἀχαιῶν αὐτὸς ἀκούεις
> ὥς τοι ὑποκρίνονται· ἐμοὶ δ᾽ <u>ἐπιανδάνει</u> οὕτως . . .
>
> 7.403-7

> Thus he spoke, and all the sons of the Achaeans shouted in response,
> wondering at the *muthos* of Diomedes tamer of horses.
> And then lord Agamemnon addressed Idaios:
> "Idaios, surely you yourself hear the *muthos* of the Achaeans,
> what answer they give; and thus <u>it pleases</u> me as well . . ."

To what extent, however, has Agamemnon's understanding of the political process

changed? Clearly, he still views his own response, and not that of the group, as the

definitive, efficient act of reception. (This is, in fact, the only way to explain this

instance of *epiakhô* in reference to the reception of a proposition that is actually put into

effect[94]—the phraseology of the diegesis 'focalizes' Agamemnon's point of view on the

decision making process.) *Handanô* highlights his will as something distinct from, and

potentially in conflict with, that of the group. At the same time, however, Agamemnon

makes an effort to coordinate his will with that of the group, an effort evidenced by his

use of the prefixed form of the verb—or perhaps he simply takes the opportunity to

underline that coordination on the occasion of a more or less accidental coincidence of

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[94] Cf. above, Ch. 1, pp. 29-30, and note the passage from Book 2 cited there: ἐπαινήσαντες at 2.335 is
functionally equivalent to Agamemnon's ἐπιανδάνει as the indicator of the truly efficient response.

interests. Regardless, the appearance of the preverb *epi-* signals that some progress has been made over the situation of Book 1. Objectively, at least, leader and group are in sync. This step down the path toward homogeneity prepares the way for Book 9's concentrated effort to reconstitute the Achaean community. But just as Agamemnon's offer of reconciliation will, as a result of its inherent flaw (i.e. its insistence on the subordination of Achilles even as it attempts to reincorporate him into the group), preclude the reestablishment of social cohesion, so too is his emphasis on his solidarity with the army in a sense contradictory, for his very language betrays the fact that he sees his own will as a heterogeneous—and superior—force.

The prefixed *epihandanô* thus expresses a curious fusion of heterogeneity and the coordinated preference of a plurality. It occurs only on these two occasions in the *Iliad*, and both times it foregrounds the internal division of the group. The verb is considerably more frequent in the *Odyssey*, however, where it is used a total of seven times. Moreover, in the latter poem (in every one of its instances) the verb belongs to a reception formula—and an efficient one at that—that is unknown to the *Iliad*. The formula has, it seems, no place in the Iliadic poetics of (group) reception. Can the semantic features suggested by the *Iliad*'s usage of *epihandanô* explain the place of this formula in the Odyssean system? I note first of all that on six out of seven occasions the verb refers to the reception by the Suitors of a proposal made by one of their own.[95] In fact, in several instances it is precisely their coordinated preference for such a proposal that defines the suitors as a group (albeit a dysfunctional one). Antinoos' declaration to

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[95] 16.406, 18.50, 18.290, 20.247, 21.143, 21.269. All but one of these instances (21.269) are discussed below.

Penelope, which meets with the *epihandanô* response, can actually be taken as a kind of

definition of the Suitors from the standpoint of social function:

κούρη Ἰκαρίοιο, περίφρων Πηνελόπεια,
δῶρα μὲν ὅς κ᾽ ἐθέλῃσιν Ἀχαιῶν ἐνθάδ᾽ ἐνεῖκαι,
δέξασθ᾽· οὐ γὰρ καλὸν ἀνήνασθαι δόσιν ἐστίν·
ἡμεῖς δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἐπὶ ἔργα πάρος γ᾽ ἴμεν οὔτε πῃ ἄλλῃ,
πρίν γέ σε τῷ γήμασθαι Ἀχαιῶν, ὅς τις ἄριστος.
ὣς ἔφατ᾽ Ἀντίνοος, <u>τοῖσιν δ᾽ ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος</u>.
<div align="right">18.285-90</div>

"Daughter of Ikarios, prudent Penelope,
accept the gifts of whomever of the Achaeans wishes to bring them;
for it is not well to refuse [negation of *ainos*][96] a gift.
But we will not return to our business, or go anywhere else,
before you marry that one of the Achaeans who is best."
Thus spoke Antinoos, and the *muthos* <u>pleased them</u>.

During the archery contest, the Suitors similarly approve the most concrete expression of

their identity as a group, namely the drinking order at their symposia, which also

determines the order in which they will make trial of Odysseus' bow:

τοῖσιν δ᾽ Ἀντίνοος μετέφη, Εὐπείθεος υἱός·
ὄρνυσθ᾽ ἑξείης ἐπιδέξια[97] πάντες ἑταῖροι,
ἀρξάμενοι τοῦ χώρου, ὅθεν τέ περ οἰνοχοεύει.
ὣς ἔφατ᾽ Ἀντίνοος, <u>τοῖσιν δ᾽ ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος</u>.
<div align="right">21.140-3[98]</div>

Antinoos, Eupeithês' son, addressed them:
"Rise, all you my comrades, in order from left to right,
beginning from the place where the wine is poured."
Thus spoke Antinoos, and the *muthos* <u>pleased them</u>.

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[96] It is, of course, ironic that Antinoos here poses as an advocate of *ainos*, since his own social practice is decidedly not based on consensus.

[97] For *epidexios* as an indicator of the drinking order at symposia, see Athenaeus *Deipn.* 463e-f.

[98] In the *Iliad*, the most concrete expression of the group identity of the Achaeans, aside from their mustering in the Catalogue, is their assembly at the funeral games of Book 23. I therefore find it significant that the *epihandanô* response ratifies Antinoos' proposal to set prizes for the boxing match between Iros and the disguised Odysseus (18.50)—this, too, is a moment that defines the Suitors as a group. See below for the implications of the opposition of *epihandanô* and *epaineô* in this passage.

Moreover, in two instances where the 'pleasure' of the Suitors brings into effect some

proposal (both of which concern the murder plot against Telemakhos), the text

emphasizes that the Suitors conduct their deliberations in isolation from the normally

constituted channels of public discourse — i.e. it emphasizes their segregation from

society proper. This is most obvious in the case of their *agorê* in Book 16, which is

introduced with the lines:

> αὐτοὶ δ' εἰς ἀγορὴν κίον ἀθρόοι, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλον
> εἴων οὔτε νέων μεταΐζειν οὔτε γερόντων.
> 16.360-1[99]

> They themselves assembled in the *agorê*, but they did not allow
> any other of the young men nor of the elders to sit among them.

Epihandanô thus marks the Suitors as a group, but one characterized by a bounded

separateness that verges on being antisocial. The boundary marked out by the

phraseology of reception is particularly visible in the episode of the beggars' *athlos*, the

boxing match between Odysseus and Iros. (The *athlos* is a crucial site for the definition

of group identity — see above, n. 98.) When Antinoos sets the prize for the match, the

Suitors respond with their customary coordination of preference (ὣς ἔφατ' Ἀντίνοος,

τοῖσιν δ' ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος, 18.50). But when Telemakhos, one outside their group,

modifies the terms of the contest, the modality of their response suddenly changes:

> ξεῖν', εἴ σ' ὀτρύνει κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ
> τοῦτον ἀλέξασθαι, τῶν δ' ἄλλων μή τιν' Ἀχαιῶν
> δείδιθ', ἐπεὶ πλεόνεσσι μαχήσεται ὅς κέ σε θείνῃ.
> ξεινοδόκος μὲν ἐγών, ἐπὶ δ' αἰνεῖτον βασιλῆες,
> Εὐρύμαχός τε καὶ Ἀντίνοος, πεπνυμένω ἄμφω.
> ὣς ἔφαθ'. οἱ δ' ἄρα <u>πάντες ἐπήνεον</u>.[100] . . .

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[99] The reception of Amphinomos' proposal (to table the murder until the gods can be consulted) is described at 16.406 (τοῖσιν δ' ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος). The other instance of this response in an 'irregular' assembly is 20.247 (again, Amphinomos has spoken against the murder).

[100] Note the tense of *epaineô*. According to the rule formulated in Ch. 1, pp. 34-5, this is the tense of 'exception,' and signals to the audience that this *ainos will not* remain in effect. In fact, the suitors continue their violence against Odysseus just shortly thereafter (18.394, 20.299-30).

"*Xenos*, if your heart and your valorous *thumos* stirs you
to beat off this man, have no fear of any other of the Achaeans,
since the one who strikes you will have more to fight with.
I am the host; but let the *basilêes* give *ainos*,
Eurumakhos and Antinoos, both of them sensible [*pepnumenos*]."
Thus he spoke, and they all expressed *ainos* in response. . . .

With this intrusion of a figure of sociality (note the emphasis on the institution of *xenia*) into the otherwise asocial world of the Suitors' feasting, it is as though the scope of discourse suddenly broadens to cross the narrow boundaries of the Suitors' isolating interests. At this point, *epainos* replaces the mere coordination of preference.

In all these cases, the *epihandanô* response expresses the same fusion of heterogeneity and group action tied to the verb in the *Iliad*. Through its prominent, almost exclusive association with the Suitors, the formula has strong connotations of social dysfunction, a fact that deepens our understanding of the social dynamics of *Iliad* 1 and 7. Alas for the exception: in the one instance where the formula does not apply to the Suitors, it actually refers to the reaction of their very antitype and the *Odyssey*'s ideal society, the Phaeacians. The end of Book 12 marks the end of Odysseus' narrative entertainment of his island hosts; Book 13 opens with a speech in which Alkinoos sets forth the hospitality he will receive in turn. I quote this speech act (the performative and its reception) in full:

ὦ 'Οδυσεῦ, ἐπεὶ ἵκευ ἐμὸν ποτὶ χαλκοβατὲς δῶ,
ὑψερεφές, τῷ σ' οὔ τι πάλιν πλαγχθέντα γ' ὀΐω
ἂψ ἀπονοστήσειν, εἰ καὶ μάλα πολλὰ πέπονθας.
ὑμέων δ' ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ ἐφιέμενος τάδε εἴρω,
ὅσσοι ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γερούσιον αἴθοπα οἶνον
αἰεὶ πίνετ' ἐμοῖσιν, ἀκουάζεσθε δ' ἀοιδοῦ·
εἵματα μὲν δὴ ξείνῳ ἐϋξέστῃ ἐνὶ χηλῷ
κεῖται καὶ χρυσὸς πολυδαίδαλος ἄλλα τε πάντα
δῶρ', ὅσα Φαιήκων βουληφόροι ἐνθάδ' ἔνεικαν·

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ἀλλ' ἄγε οἱ δῶμεν τρίποδα μέγαν ἠδὲ λέβητα
ἀνδρακάς, ἡμεῖς δ' αὖτε ἀγειρόμενοι κατὰ δῆμον
τεισόμεθ'· ἀργαλέον γὰρ ἕνα προικὸς χαρίσασθαι.
ὣς ἔφατ' Ἀλκίνοος, τοῖσιν δ' ἐπιήνδανε μῦθος.
                                                    13.4-16

"Oh Odysseus, since you have arrived at my brazen and high-roofed
threshold, I do not expect that you will be driven back from your goal,
but will make your return, even if you have suffered very greatly.
But to each man of you I enjoin the following,
insofar as you are ever drinking the honorific sparkling wine
in my halls, and [here] you listen to the bard:
garments are already laid up for the *xenos* in the well-tooled chest,
and intricately worked gold and all the other gifts,
so many as the Phaeacian chieftains have brought hither;
but come, let us give him, man for man, a great tripod and cauldron—
we will recoup the expense by collecting throughout the *dêmos*.
For it is difficult for a single man to give freely."
Thus spoke Alkinoos, and the *muthos* pleased them.

Must this example cause us to reevaluate the semantics of *epihandanô*, or can we find a

way to account for it either in terms of our system or as a true exception? Is there, for

instance, some suggestion that Alkinoos is behaving tyrannically, that is, without regard

for consensus among his subjects? I suspect there is more than one way to explain this

use of *epihandanô* in accord with the principles I have outlined.[101] But it is worth

considering the social relations invoked by Alkinoos' speech. In the first place, he

repeatedly emphasizes that he is addressing the members of the gathering *as individuals*

(ἀνδρὶ ἑκάστῳ, ἀνδρακάς). Moreover, he stresses his own, unique position at the center

of a system of ritualized redistribution (ὅσσοι ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γερούσιον αἴθοπα οἶνον /

αἰεὶ πίνετ' ἐμοῖσιν). This distributive system is a 'total' social system (in the Maussian

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[101] I have a strong feeling that the reception formula has been selected under the influence of the reception formula that opens the book, which does not, in context, refer to deliberative reception but is nevertheless adopted from the deliberative system: ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ (13.1). Since this response is definitively inefficient (see Ch. 1), it might have seemed strange to predicate of the same group the definitively efficient response of *epaineô* some dozen lines later. That is to say, the bond between the 'silence' formula and the *epainos* formula as components of the same system might have been so strongly felt that their use in close proximity would have created the undesirable impression that the audience somehow approved of Alkinoos more than Odysseus.

sense) that ultimately includes all the members of the society, that is, it incorporates even

the *dêmos*, even though they do not participate in the present moment of exchange.[102] It

is important to note that the economic system outlined by Alkinoos—the recuperation of

expenses by the *basilêes* from the *dêmos* at a later point in time—serves at once to

demarcate a boundary that bisects society as a whole and to integrate both segments of

society into a global structure. This, we might say, is the ideal homeostasis of the fused

heterogeneity and solidarity implicit in *epihandanô*. On Skheriê we see a positive

manifestation of a tension that is valued negatively in the cases of the Suitors and of

Agamemnon. Of course, we should attend to the similarities between Alkinoos and

Agamemnon at least as much as to the differences. Like Agamemnon, Alkinoos shows

here an awareness of his position of preeminence: he sees himself not as an equal partner

in exchange, but as the ultimate control on distribution.[103] This should alert us to the fact

that the point of view represented by Agamemnon is not dysfunctional *in itself*. There is

nothing inherently wrong with Agamemnon's politics; from a certain point of view

familiar to the Greeks, his politics could even be understood as the ideal. What makes his

point of view dysfunctional is its collision, in the *Iliad*, with a competing

conceptualization of the political process in terms of consensus.

By way of anchoring, at its close, this discussion of the semantics of *handanô* in

the specific thematics of the *Iliad*, I note that the modality of decision making evinced by

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[102] Alkinoos describes the present moment of exchange as, in effect, a potlatch. Note that the larger context includes also *athloi*—in fact, the whole of Odysseus' stay on Skheriê could be understood as an archetype for a Panhellenic festival including both athletic and poetic *agônes* (cf. Ford 1992: 114-20). We should compare the character of the event as both potlatch and *agôn* with Bader's interpretation of *Iliad* 23 as potlatch. (See above, n. 4.)

[103] His whole method of balancing income and expense in fact parallels that outlined at *Il.* 1.182 ff. by Agamemnon, who intends to recoup his 'gift' to the god by taking the prize of a subordinate.

Agamemnon in Book 1 appears also to be typical of his counterpart as commander of the

Trojan forces, Hektor. We will examine in greater detail the social dynamics of Trojan

politics in Chapter 5. The task is not difficult, since there are relatively few instances of

collective decision making among the Trojans (a fact which has significance in itself for

understanding the programmatic differences between Trojans and Greeks). But in the

context of the individualizing perspective of *handanô*—a perspective that gives the verb

its counter-consensual force—it is worth noting that on two occasions Hektor decides,

individually, in favor of a proposal that determines the actions of the army as a whole.[104]

In both cases, the decision concerns the approval of strategic advise offered by

Pouludamas, with whom Hektor enjoys an uneasy relationship, despite the fact that the

poem marks him as the Trojans' principle specialist in *boulai*.[105] At 12.80 and again at

13.748, Pouludamas makes a proposal (to storm the Achaean fortifications on foot, and to

retreat and regroup, respectively) the ratification of which is described in terms of

Hektor's individual preference: ὡς φάτο Πουλυδάμας. ἅδε δ' Ἕκτορι μῦθος

ἀπήμων.[106] Hektor's distinctly hierarchical and individualized approach to decision

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[104] On Hektor's authoritarianism, see Mackie 1996: 26.

[105] Cf. 18.250, ὁ γὰρ οἷος ὅρα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω. That is, Pouludamas has the contextualizing perspective Agamemnon lacks.

[106] In the first instance, it is clear that Pouludamas addresses the Trojan army as a group; he begins his speech Ἕκτορ τ' ἠδ' ἄλλοι Τρώων ἀγοὶ ἠδ' ἐπικούρων (12.61). In the second, he addresses Hektor alone (indeed, the army at this point is in disarray). We can perhaps sense here a progressive decay of group dynamics analogous to the progressive improvement indicated by Agamemnon's shift from *handanô* to *epihandanô*. In light of the demarcation between *basilêes* and *dêmos* that characterizes, and perhaps determines, the use of *(epi)handanô* at *Od.* 13.16 (see above), Pouludamas' description of the general antagonism Hektor feels toward him may deserve some attention: ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδὲ ἔοικε / δῆμον ἐόντα παρὲξ ἀγορευέμεν (12.212-3). However, it would be very surprising if Pouludamas should actually belong to the *dêmos* (cf. Hainsworth 1993 ad loc.; but see Ebert 1969: 163n.3, who suggests that Pouludamas is perhaps a Thersites figure). I find the reading of Allen 1906: 5, δῆμον' 'one who knows' (< *daêmôn*), to be the most attractive interpretation of these lines.

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making is the pattern that gives significance to his final public interaction with

Pouludamas in Book 18—the single and climactic instance of Trojan *epainos*.

Dichotomies of discord: (δι)(αν)δίχα

The miniature version of the *Nostoi* that Nestor relates to Telemakhos in *Odyssey*

3 (ll. 130 ff., which follow a one-line paraphrase of the *Iliou Persis*) is a masterfully

concise précis of the *Iliad*'s entire repertoire of themes relating to the failure of

consensus. The narrative begins, as the *Iliad*, with mention of the *mênis* that causes all

the subsequent difficulties.[107] This disruptive *mênis* is later identified as a *kholos* that

must be assuaged (3.145).[108] The divine *kholos* expresses itself on the human plane in

terms of the divisive preference signified by *handanô*, which exhibits in this passage both

its singular and collective modes. Thus the proposal that first divides Menelaos from his

brother—Menelaos proposes embarking immediately, but οὐδ' Ἀγαμέμνονι πάμπαν

ἑήνδανε ("that did not at all please Agamemnon," 3.143)—ultimately results in the

bisection of the army as a whole, which departs from the assembly without deciding on

any collective course of action:

> ὣς τὼ μὲν χαλεποῖσιν ἀμειβομένω ἐπέεσσιν
> ἔστασαν· οἱ δ' ἀνόρουσαν ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
> ἠχῇ θεσπεσίῃ. <u>δίχα δέ σφισιν ἥνδανε βουλή</u>.
> <div align="right">3.148-50</div>

> So they rose, exchanging harsh words;
> and the well-greaved Achaeans arose

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[107] 3.135: μήνιος ἐξ ὀλοῆς γλαυκώπιδος ὀβριμοπάτρης. Cf. ὀλοῆς with the οὐλομένην of *Il.* 1.2.

[108] Other signposts of the failure of consensus, some of which will be touched on in later stages of the discussion, are ἔριν (3.136), οὐ κατὰ κόσμον (3.138), and νήπιος (3.146). Note that Odysseus first opts against Agamemnon's position, but he later rejoins the king (3.162 ff.); this is in conformity with his role as social integrator, especially with respect to the royal function (see Ch. 4 and the discussion of *Il.* 2 in Ch. 5).

with a tremendous noise, and the *boulê* that pleased them was divided.

This formula describing the lack of consensus among Agamemnon's soldiers is of course

the same formula that describes the divided preference of the besieging army shown on

Achilles' Shield:

> τὴν δ᾽ ἑτέρην πόλιν ἀμφὶ δύω στρατοὶ ἥατο λαῶν
> τεύχεσι λαμπόμενοι· δίχα δέ σφισιν ἥνδανε βουλή.
> ἠὲ διαπραθέειν ἢ ἄνδιχα πάντα δάσασθαι . . .
>
> <div align="right">18.509-11</div>
>
> About the other city sat two hosts of *laoi*
> shining in their arms; and the *boulê* that pleased them was divided,
> either to sack the city or to divide it all in two parts . . .

The scene expresses in concrete form the basic notion of division; the centrality of this

theme is stressed by the repetition of the adverb *dikha* 'in two parts.' The almost iconic

deployment of the word in this passage, and its general association with social and

psychological division as 'inefficient' states, that is, states that prevent action, prompts

me to dedicate some space to observations on its usage, especially since those

observations are relevant to the text I have taken as the framework for this chapter, *Iliad*

Book 1.

I have argued that Book 1 functions as a microcosm of the poem as a whole

insofar as it describes the origin and resolution of a *mênis* that threatens to undermine the

foundations of Achaean society. We will see in Chapter 5 that a key feature of the

poem's poetics of social cohesion is its technique of staging the dissolution of the group

and then marking its reconstitution through the phraseology of consensus. Now, this

feature seems at first glance to be absent from Book 1, or at least backgrounded. The

emphasis is on the transferal of disruptive forces from Apollo to Achilles, and thus their

continuation, not elimination. Is there a discernible moment of crisis and resolution that

we could compare, for instance, to the breakdown of order following Agamemnon's

diapeira? If we calibrate our analysis to the microcosmic scale of the episode, we can

detect such a moment not on the level of group dynamics, but on that of the

internalization of those same dynamics within the individual. (Since Russo and Simon,

Classicists have recognized that Homeric psychology mirrors social interactions.[109]) The

key is to recognize that the ambivalence signified by *dikha* applies equally to individual

and collective will. There is, in fact, more than a simple analogy at work here. Recall

that in *Odyssey* 3 the divisive individual preference of Agamemnon carries over into the

divided preference of the group as a whole: group and individual psychologies do not

merely reflect each other, they *express* each other.

In Book 1, Agamemnon's declaration of his fateful intention to take Briseis from

Achilles produces just such a divided reaction in the hero. If he were making a proposal

to the army, we can imagine that such a counter-consensual utterance would divide the

group just like the quarrel between Agamemnon and Menelaos in *Odyssey* 3. Instead, it

divides the mind of Achilles:

> ὣς φάτο· Πηλεΐωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ', ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ
> στήθεσσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν,
> ἢ ὅ γε φάσγανον ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ
> τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, ὁ δ' Ἀτρεΐδην ἐναρίζοι,
> ἦε χόλον παύσειεν ἐρητύσειέ τε θυμόν.
>
> 1.188-92

Thus he spoke; and the son of Peleus had *akhos*, and the heart
in his shaggy breast pondered <u>two possibilities</u>,
either, having drawn his sharp sword from his thigh
to push the others aside and take the life of Agamemnon,

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[109] Russo and Simon 1968. What is less often recalled about the pathfinding work of these authors is that they link the socialized dynamics of Homeric psychology to "the psychology of the Homeric performance" (492-3; cf. Havelock 1963: 164n.33). We find a striking expression of this link in Hesiod's *Theogony* (ll. 36-7), where Zeus' *noos* substitutes for the community of gods as the audience for the Muses' performance (see above, Ch. 1 n. 62; cf. below, Ch. 5 pp. 229 and 257, on Zeus' ability to 'represent' the group).

or else to put an end to his *kholos* and check his *thumos*.

This is a crisis of internal cohesion. Strangely, if the poem is to continue, it cannot be resolved, at least not in favor of either of the two immediately apparent alternatives. Achilles considers either killing Agamemnon—that is, permanently dissolving the Achaean social order, thus foreclosing the drama of consensus—or else putting aside his *kholos*, which would mean renouncing the social tensions that provide the poem with its basic thematic material. The unique nature of Achilles' dilemma, which requires the introduction of a *tertium quid* in order to move forward, derives from the fact that this crisis must be both resolved on the level of the microcosm and continued into the macrocosm as the mainspring for the action of the poem as a whole. (I find it poetically appropriate that a poem about the constitution of consensus begins with the posing of an insoluble dilemma.) The third option is supplied by none other than Athena, whose involvement in the scene as a kind of integrator of divided halves (insofar as she provides Achilles with a way out of his quandary) has considerable significance—but we must wait until Chapter 5 to expose this significance fully. Suffice it to say (proleptically) that Book 1 does provide a moment of dissolution and reintegration comparable to what we see in the poem as a whole, but on the smaller scale of Achilles as representative of the community.[110]

Of course, the formula διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν is an entirely conventional way of describing the uncertainty of any hero as he faces a choice between two possible courses

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[110] Note the immediate effect of Agamemnon's words: Πηλεΐωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ' (1.188). Palmer 1963: 79 (cf. Sinos 1980: 9) has shown that Achilles' name means "*akhos* for the *laos*." That is, Achilles' internal reaction represents the projection of group dynamics onto Achilles in terms of both 'division' and (in l. 188) 'sorrow.'

of action.[111] It might therefore seem like overreading to understand such a typical motif

as, in essence, an encapsulation of the basic choice facing the plot as a whole. And yet,

we find that the *Odyssey* employs the same device to formulate the central issue defining

its plot. As the *Iliad* projects onto its protagonist a choice between the definitive

rejection of social cohesion or its definitive acceptance (at the cost of sacrificing

legitimate personal grievances), so the *Odyssey* attributes to one of its protagonists,

Penelope, a choice between the two possibilities that give the poem its dramatic tension,

namely, the rejection of the hope of Odysseus' return (i.e. marriage with one of the

Suitors), on the one hand, and a commitment to remaining in her son's household in the

absence of her husband, on the other. In fact, the *Odyssey* emphasizes the centrality of

Penelope's choice by formulating it twice, first in the mouth of Telemakhos (16.73-7)

and later in the slightly more expansive words of Penelope herself:

> ὡς καὶ ἐμοὶ <u>δίχα</u> θυμὸς ὀρώρεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,
> ἠὲ μένω παρὰ παιδὶ καὶ ἔμπεδα πάντα φυλάσσω,
> κτῆσιν ἐμήν, δμῳάς τε καὶ ὑψερεφὲς μέγα δῶμα,
> εὐνήν τ' αἰδομένη πόσιος δήμοιό τε φῆμιν,
> ἢ ἤδη ἅμ' ἕπωμαι, Ἀχαιῶν ὅς τις ἄριστος
> μνᾶται ἐνὶ μεγάροισι, πορὼν ἀπερείσια ἕδνα.
>
> 19.524-9

So has my heart inclined <u>in two directions</u>, now one way, now the other,
either to remain by my child and make sure that everything remains
    steadfast,
my possessions, the servants and the great high-roofed house,
respecting the bed of my husband and the report of the *dêmos*,
or else to cast my lot with the best of the Achaeans
who pay court in these halls, the one who gives boundless bridal gifts.

In the event neither of the possibilities envisioned by Penelope (who does not actually

imagine that her husband might return) actually comes to pass: the poem provides a way

out of the dilemma by finding a third option that reconciles the irreducible antithesis of

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[111] Cf. *Il.* 8.167, 13.455, and *Od.* 22.333.

the protagonist's choice. The technique of representing dramatically such a choice appears to be fundamental to the self-definition of epic songs in the Homeric medium.[112]

When Athena intervenes to resolve Achilles' dilemma, she does so by instructing him to 'leave off from *eris*' (λῆγ' ἔριδος, 1.210) and conduct his quarrel in words alone. Achilles obliges, and so presumably abandons *eris*—but not *kholos*: καὶ οὔ πω λῆγε χόλοιο (1.224). That is to say, the state of division signified by *dikha* is coextensive with the condition of *eris*, of active conflict. And in fact, in the thematics of the *Iliad*, *dikha* shows a direct connection with *eris* that is far more substantive than the mere fact that the διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν formula is always used (except in Book 1) of a warrior on the battlefield. This connection becomes evident in the context of the divine *eris* that first breaks out when Zeus at last lifts his moratorium on Olympian aid and the gods range themselves against each other on the battlefield. Their entry onto the field is marked by the line βὰν δ' ἴμεναι πόλεμον δὲ θεοὶ <u>δίχα</u> θυμὸν ἔχοντες ("the gods went to battle having a <u>divided</u> *thumos*," 20.32), and their actual engagement in the fight with the words ὦρτο δ' Ἔρις κρατερὴ λαοσσόος ("dire Eris, who drives the *laos*, arose," 20.48); *eris* occurs twice more in the subsequent twenty lines in reference to the divine conflict.[113] The *dikha* formula precedes the first mention of *eris* by a good fifteen lines, so the

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[112] For the structural importance of these decision scenes, see Arend 1933: 106-115, esp. p. 110: "Wie immer wieder bei Homer Alternativen mit ἤ-ἤ vorkommen, so wird das Epos auch im großen immer wieder von der Entscheidung gespannt. Der Gang der Ereignisse wird nicht einfach erzählt, sondern als das Ergebnis solcher Spannungen dargestellt." Arend not only notes that decisions like those of Achilles and Penelope often occur at climactic narrative moments, but also relates such decisions to what Morrison calls "reversal passages" (cf. Morrison 1992: 69) as a means of indicating an alternative outcome to the story. In other words, such crisis points are a means of defining the limits of the traditional story. Another class of decision scenes identified by Arend tends to stand at the beginning of major episodes, and serves as a way of adumbrating the direction the subsequent story will follow: again, the decision has a structural function.

[113] 20.55, ἔριδα ῥήγνυντο βαρεῖαν, and 20.66, ἔριδι ξυνιόντων.

connection is not there directly felt; not so, however, when their conflict escalates in the

next book and the gods actually come to blows:

ἐν δ' ἄλλοισι θεοῖσιν ἔρις πέσε βεβριθυῖα
ἀργαλέη. δίχα δέ σφιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυμὸς ἄητο·

21.385-6

Heavy, painful *eris* fell among the other gods,
and the *thumos* in their *phrenes* blustered <u>in alternate directions</u>.

Even outside our *Iliad* the motif of the dichotomy of divine sentiment maintains a

connection with *eris*—but this connection seems to be marked as archetypally Iliadic.

Thus the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* introduces the Trojan War as follows, a passage

which follows immediately on the marriage of Helen:

ἣ τέκεν Ἑρμιόνην καλλίσφυρ[ο]ν ἐν μεγάροισιν
ἄελπτον. πάντες δὲ θεοὶ δίχα θυμὸν ἔθεντο
ἐξ ἔριδος· δὴ γὰρ τότε μήδετο θέσκελα ἔργα
Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης. †μεῖξαι κατ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν
τυρβάξας.† ἤδη δὲ γένος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
πολλὸν ἀϊστῶσαι σπεῦδε, πρ[ό]φασιν μὲν ὀλέσθαι
ψυχὰς ἡμιθέω[ν . . .

Hes. Fr. 204.94-100 MW[114]

And [Helen] bore Hermionê with lovely ankles in the halls,
against expectation. But all the gods were <u>divided</u> in their *thumos*
<u>from the *eris*</u>: for indeed Zeus who thunders on high was then devising
deeds of wonder, to send a cataclysm on the boundless earth (?),
and he was eager to annihilate the vast race
of mortal men—citing as pretext the destruction
of the *psukhai* of the demi-gods . . .

The divided *thumos*, however, is even more elementally an aspect of *eris*, quite apart

from any specific narrative context. I refer to the first of the *etêtuma* 'Truths'[115] Hesiod

relates to Persês:

οὐκ ἄρα μοῦνον ἔην Ἐρίδων γένος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν
εἰσὶ δύω· τὴν μέν κεν ἐπαινήσειε νοήσας,
ἡ δ' ἐπιμωμητή· διὰ δ' ἄνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχουσιν.

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[114] Τὸ ψυχὰς ἡμιθέω[ν] compare ψυχὰς "Αϊδι προΐαψεν / ἡρώων at *Il.* 1.3-4.

[115] As opposed to *alêtheia*, the 'truth' of poetic tradition, i.e. narrative: see Cole 1983.

Op. 11-13

> There is not a single kind of *eris*, but there are two
> on earth: the one you would approve when you understand,
> but the other is blameworthy; and they have <u>opposite</u> characters.

Eris is itself divided[116]—the very embodiment, we might say, of division, while

dichotomic division conversely expresses the essence of *eris*.

The general relevance of the *dikha* motif to the primarily political thematics of the

Iliad is evident from an offhand comment Nestor makes before embarking on his

miniature version of the *Nostoi*:

> ἔνθ' ἦ τοι εἷος μὲν ἐγὼ καὶ δῖος 'Οδυσσεὺς
> οὔτε ποτ' εἰν ἀγορῇ <u>δίχ' ἐβάζομεν</u>[117] οὔτ' ἐνὶ βουλῇ,
> ἀλλ' <u>ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε</u> νόῳ καὶ ἐπίφρονι βουλῇ
> φραζόμεθ' 'Αργείοισιν ὅπως ὄχ' ἄριστα γένοιτο.
> *Od.* 3.126-9

> During that time, glorious Odysseus and I
> never <u>spoke opposed utterances</u>, neither in the *agorê* nor in the *boulê*,
> but <u>having a single *thumos*</u> we advised the Argives with *noos*
> and salutary counsel how things would turn out best.

Nestor and Odysseus, the *Iliad*'s two primary specialists of socially cohesive speech (see

the next chapter), are distinguished precisely by their avoidance or prevention of

dichotomy; in marked contrast to those prone to *eris*, who customarily have δίχα θυμόν,

these two proponents of *ainos* have ἕνα. Nestor's comment, however, seems like a rather

rosied vision of the Iliadic world, which struggles continuously against the threat of

division; here, by contrast, Nestor emphasizes a unity that represents an exception to the

Iliadic rule. This transposition of the *Iliad*'s dissonance into harmony corresponds to a

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[116] Note the inflection of this division in terms of the complementarity of praise (*ainos*) and blame (*mômos*).

[117] In light of the previous note on the inflection of the difference of *dikha* in terms of praise / blame, cf. below, Ch. 4, n. 46, on the connection between the verb *bazô* and the socially cohesive usage of the genres of praise and blame. I single out there the fact that *bazô* can take as its object a substantive indicating blame speech.

general tendency of the *Odyssey*; we may recall also the homeostatic balance of complementary segments of society outlined by Alkinoos' economics at the beginning of Book 13. The same tendency emerges in the description of the internal balance of another ideal society only briefly examined by the *Odyssey*. From Eumaios' description of his original island home, a certain Suriê, we see that dichotomic division can in fact function as a harmonious balance (the context, obviously, serves to contrast this ideal with the state of affairs in post-lapsarian Ithaca): ἔνθα δύω πόλιες, δίχα δέ σφισι πάντα δέδασται ("There two cities, and <u>everything is divided</u> between them," 15.412). Now, this mention of division in two parts, following mention of 'two cities,' returns us to one of the texts with which I began this section, for it calls to mind immediately the images on the Shield of Achilles, and specifically the second of the two cities that are there in close iconographic proximity, as the two cities of Suriê are evidently in close geographical proximity: the besieging army considers resolving the conflict through precisely the same kind of division that worked so well for the subjects of Eumaios' father (ἄνδιχα πάντα δάσασθαι, 18.511). I pointed out above that the divided *boulê* that paralyzes the army on the Shield represents a kind of paradigm for the problems facing the Achaeans in the broader narrative. The question is, could the *Iliad*'s central problematic be resolved through a similar solution based on equitable division? That is, could the army figured by Hephaistos actually opt in favor of such a solution, thus opening the possibility, paradigmatically, to the Achaeans?

The answer has already been adumbrated, indirectly, by Leonard Muellner's analysis of the parallel situation that dominates the description of the first of the two cities on the Shield. The trial scene in the 'city at peace' deserves, even demands, to be

read alongside the 'city at war' because it presents essentially the same dilemma that confronts the besieging army, namely, a choice between accepting compensation, on the one hand, and relentlessly pursuing the destruction of the opponent, on the other.[118] (It is worth stressing that this choice is also the same as the one facing Achilles in Book 1—we have seen, however, that the poem cannot allow either the simple settling of differences or the definitive rejection of a solution, but must pursue a third option.) Muellner has shown that the exceptional syntax of the description of the trial indicates that the relative of the deceased man will *never* accept any compensation—and so, even as the scene remains permanently frozen in time, the litigants remain locked in a conflict without any apparent solution.[119] By the force of the analogy we could say that the besieging army likewise could never accept any settlement through compensation. But in light of the preceding analysis of the Iliadic thematics of division, we can go one step further. Within the *Iliad*, *dikha never* marks a positive, homeostatic balance of competing interests; it is designates a counter-consensual, that is to say untenable, situation. The relation between Nestor's recollection of the *Iliad* and the *Iliad* itself is not just the

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[118] There are, of course, differences between the two situations, which can be more or less effectively summed up if we characterize the trial as a matter of *poinê* (the trial is explicitly identified as such at 18.498) and the war as a matter of *apoina*. There are two relevant differences between *poinê* and *apoina*. *Poinê* 'bloodprice' is paid to the family of a deceased individual by one responsible for the death as compensation for what the family has lost. *Apoina* 'ransom' is paid, by contrast, by the family of a 'lost' individual to the one who has caused the loss in order to secure the return of the individual. (On the shield, the besiegers are demanding ransom in exchange for the lives of those in the city.) That is, *poinê* and *apoina* move in opposite directions. The second difference between these two forms of compensation is that *poinê* is exchanged within a society (since its social function is to allow a killer to remain within the community) while *apoina* is exchanged by members of different social groups (insofar as prisoners and ransom generally belong to conflicts between 'enemies'). So we can say that the trial concerns conflict *within* society—and so corresponds generally to the problematic of consensus among the Achaeans—while the war concerns conflict *between* societies—and so corresponds to the dynamics of the Trojan War as a whole. This is no small difference, because, simply put, consensus is not an option for resolving conflicts between groups; there is no long-term context that would guarantee 'delayed return' in the case of two groups that do not share a permanent bond.

[119] Muellner 1976: 106, which should be read with Nagy 1997.

relation between theme and variation (or vice versa), but the relation between fugue and counter-fugue, with one describing the inverse of the other. Equal division might be a possibility in the world of the *Odyssey*, but not in the *Iliad*, and so Troy must ultimately fall. Similarly, mere compensation will not suffice to settle the tensions within the Achaean army. The Greeks must find a resolution in a higher order of social reality—the order of consensus.

Blame and social cohesion: ὄνειδος and ἔχθιστος

I suggested above that the internal division experienced by Achilles in Book 1 represents a crisis and resolution analogous, on the level of the microcosm, to the larger crises and resolutions presented by the poem as a whole, a principle example of which is the scene of potential dissolution following Agamemnon's ill-fated *diapeira*. The peculiarity of Achilles' crisis is that, while it achieves a kind of resolution through the intervention of Athena, that resolution is in fact the continuation of dissonance, in the form of Achilles' *kholos* with Agamemnon. The last aspect of Book 1 to be considered in connection with the poem's larger thematics concerns the immediate frame for Achilles' dilemma. Having considered in this chapter a variety of modes of discord, some affective (*kholos*) and some concrete (*dikha*), this frame returns us to the modality of speech as a force that either promotes or undermines social cohesion—that is, the modality of *ainos* proper. The passages to be considered will again call for comparison with Book 2—and again we shall find that what is resolved in Book 2 remains an unresolved source of tension, and thus the mainspring for the subsequent development of the plot, in Book 1.

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In the course of his crisis and its quasi-resolution, Achilles' *eris*, a potentially

violent conflict, is transmuted into *kholos*, an anger which can be confined to words. In

fact verbal conflict is precisely the third option provided by Athena as a way out of the

dilemma when she enjoins Achilles:

ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε λῆγ᾽ ἔριδος, μηδὲ ξίφος ἕλκεο χειρί·
ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι ἔπεσιν μὲν ὀνείδισον ὡς ἔσεταί περ·
<div align="center">1.210-1</div>

But come, cease from *eris*, do put hand to sword:
rather, <u>vituperate him with words</u>, [telling him] how it will be.

As Nagy has demonstrated, *oneidos* is a technical term used by the medium of epic to

designate the genre of blame speech. Achilles follows exactly the course of action

outlined by the goddess, for his next words to Agamemnon deploy conventional insults

typical of this genre.[120] Moreover, as has often been noted, Achilles' words, and even the

sentiments he expresses, show a recognizable similarity to the words of the poem's

principle exponent of blame speech, Thersites, in Book 2.[121] Before we contemplate the

meaning of this superimposition of the best of the Achaeans on the one who is *aiskhistos*

'most base,' let us note that we have already been prepared for it by Agamemnon's words

in the speech in which he declares his intention to take Briseis, and so provokes Achilles'

internal crisis: ἔχθιστος δέ μοί ἐσσι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων ("you are most hateful to

me of the kings nourished by Zeus," 1.176). If Achilles is the embodiment of *philotês*,

these words amount to a forceful denial of Achilles' role in Achaean society parallel to

the denial implied by the taking away of his *geras* (insofar as the *geras* constitutes

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[120] Nagy 1999: 226.

[121] Ford 1992: 87.

recognition of one's role in society).[122] But they also signal that Achilles occupies a

position vis-à-vis Agamemnon parallel to the one Thersites occupies vis-à-vis Achilles

himself:

> ἔχθιστος δ' Ἀχιλῆϊ μάλιστ' ἦν ἠδ' Ὀδυσῆϊ·[123]
> τὼ γὰρ νεικείεσκε· τότ' αὖτ' Ἀγαμέμνονι δίῳ
> ὀξέα κεκλήγων λέγ' ὀνείδεα·
>
> 2.220-2

> He was <u>above all hateful</u> to Achilles and to Odysseus:
> for he was constantly directing *neikos* against them. But on that occasion
> he uttered reproaches against glorious Agamemnon, chattering shrilly.

Thus, Achilles' dilemma is framed by markers of the discourse of blame. To be more

precise, the dilemma is preceded by Agamemnon's declaration that the situation is like

one that elsewhere produces blame speech, and followed by the confirmation in actual

practice of that characterization.

The superlative of *ekhthros*, comparatively rare in the *Iliad* (it occurs a total of

four times), shows several layers of meaning, all of which are probably implicit in

Agamemnon's utterance. In Book 9 Agamemnon uses the term again, but in connection

with an inflexibility that he hopes Achilles will avoid:

> δμηθήτω· Ἀΐδης τοι ἀμείλιχος ἠδ' ἀδάμαστος,
> τοὔνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν <u>ἔχθιστος</u> ἀπάντων·
>
> 9.157-8

> Let him be subdued: Hades, surely, is relentless and implacable,
> wherefore he is <u>most hateful</u> to men of all the gods.

Reading this passage back into Book 1, we can sense some indication there that the

antagonism between Agamemnon and Achilles is caused by the latter's stubborn refusal

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[122] For the opposition of *philos* and *ekhthros*, see Nagy 1999: 52-3.

[123] See Ebert 1969: 172 for the importance of this line as a signal of the parallel status of Achilles and Odysseus as agents or embodiments of sociality; in the *Cypria* as in the *Iliad*, that status appears to have been defined by opposition with Thersites.

to submit. We find a more immediately comparable usage in Zeus' words to Arês (which

actually repeat an entire couplet from Agamemnon's speech):

ἔχθιστος δέ μοί ἐσσι θεῶν οἳ Ὄλυμπον ἔχουσιν·
αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε.
5.890-1 ~ 1.176-7

You are most hateful to me of the gods who hold Olympus:
for *eris*, wars, and battles are ever dear to you.

This expression of antagonism between the divine sovereign and the war-god—the

relationship between the two bears an obvious resemblance to that between Agamemnon

and Achilles—perhaps lends some force to Françoise Bader's interpretation of the quarrel

between the latter as a conflict of the first two Dumézilian functions.[124] But Thersites

remains the most directly relevant (and proximate) comparandum. In the context of

blame speech—and, again, blame speech is the immediate outcome of the scene in Book

1—*ekhthros* describes the position of the object of blame vis-à-vis the speaker, just as, in

the context of praise, *philos* describes the object of praise.[125] This is expressly the reason

why Thersites is *ekhthistos* to Achilles and Odysseus: τὼ γὰρ νεικείεσκε (2.221). But

notice that, in Book 2, Thersites is *ekhthistos because* he engages in blame speech, while

in Book 1 Agamemnon rushes to make use of this very loaded term—and only thereafter

is Achilles' speech marked as belonging specifically to the genre of blame.[126] It is as if

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[124] Bader 1980.

[125] Nagy 1999: 242-3.

[126] Prior to his internal crisis, Achilles' critical vocabulary has centered on *aidôs* 'shame' (ἀναιδείην, 1.149, and ἀναιδές, 1.158) and 'greed' (φιλοκτεανώτατε, 1.122, and κερδαλεόφρον, 1.149). Both of these belong to a much less loaded register: *kerdaleê*, for instance, can have a positive value (cf. 10.44), while *aidôs* is often appealed to in the context of rebukes intended to have a positive effect (cf. 5.787 ff., and the comments of Mackie 1996: 135: "*Aidôs* and *philia* are both qualities that can be considered collective, or cooperative, in that they depend upon, and contribute to, social order"). Neither approaches the purely negative force of Achilles' κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων in his later speech (1.225); calling one's addressee 'doglike' is a *topos* of blame poetry (ibid. 106, 153), and appears to be an Indo-European inheritance (Ward 1973: 142-3).

Achilles merely acts in accordance with the role that Agamemnon projects onto him: Thersites is hateful because he quarrels, but Achilles quarrels because he is hateful. Achilles' internal dilemma interposes itself between the naming of the relationship and the behavior that merits it: from this perspective, the dilemma appears as a suspense-building technique, a way of heightening the dramatic interest as we wonder whether Achilles really will pick up the glove that has been thrown down. And in the end Athena confirms that Achilles should for the moment play Thersites.

The *ekhthros*, as object of blame, is opposed to the *philos*, as object of praise; but blame is not therefore fundamentally opposed to the *philotês* that binds together society (or the *Männerbund*) as a whole. According to the Indo-European conceptual framework inherited by the Greeks, blame can serve the positive social function of establishing or strengthening the cohesion of the group.[127] Gregory Nagy has demonstrated that even within the poetics of archaic Greek blame poetry, *philotês* remains the ultimate value.[128] The social intention that motivates the institution of blame can be observed in the speeches of both Achilles and Thersites, and in fact emerges most clearly from the lines that form the most direction connection between them. Compare Achilles' rebuke

> δημοβόρος βασιλεὺς ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις·
> ἦ γὰρ ἂν ᾿Ατρεΐδη νῦν ὕστατα λωβήσαιο
> 1.231-2

> You are a king who devours his people—after all, you rule over worthless men;
> otherwise, son of Atreus, this would now be your last offense

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[127] See above, Ch. 2 p. 61. The *Iliad* recognizes the positive social function of blame: cf. e.g. 6.333 and 7.94 ff.

[128] Nagy 1999: 251: "Whether we view the audience of Archilochus as the immediate *philoi* or, teleologically, as the social order that helped preserve and propagate Archilochean *iamboi*, the point remains that such poetry is an affirmation of *philotês* in the community."

with the structurally analogous remark that closes Thersites' speech:

ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐκ Ἀχιλῆϊ χόλος φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ μεθήμων·
ἦ γὰρ ἂν Ἀτρεΐδη νῦν ὕστατα λωβήσαιο.
2.241-2

But Achilles, holding no *kholos* in his heart, lets this go:
otherwise, son of Atreus, this would now be your last offense.

We have here what may well be a standard trope of the genre of *oneidos*: both speakers

highlight the misdeeds of their specific object of blame by placing them in the context of

a larger system, claiming that the offender's malfeasance would be impossible were the

system as a whole operating properly. (This is clearly the implication of Thersites'

remark—if Achilles were not so 'lax,' Agamemnon would never have gotten away with

his latest abuse. I interpret Achilles' ἐπεὶ οὐτιδανοῖσιν ἀνάσσεις analogously: if the

Achaeans were worth their salt, Agamemnon would never be able to behave so

destructively.) This technique has the effect of making even the blame of some specific

object a generalized social critique, with the intention of improving not just the behavior

of individuals but the functioning of society as a whole.

Even the abuse of Thersites, then, reveals traces of a genuinely constructive social

impulse. But blame (the same could be said of praise) serves to promote social cohesion

only if it is justified, that is, if it is addressed to an adequate object.[129] Thersites' *neikos*

fails this test, not so much because Agamemnon is an inadequate object—he has certainly

merited all the abuses Thersites heaps on him—but because his generalized social

critique misses the mark, indeed even misrepresents social reality. For Achilles is

certainly not *methêmôn*, insofar as he is very much subject to *kholos*. Indeed, as we saw

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[129] Nagy 1999: 224-5, 254, etc.

in considering Achilles' dilemma as framed by the blame-speech motifs in Book 1, the possibility that Achilles might renounce his *kholos* represents one of two ways in which Achilles might vitiate the entire poetic tradition of which he is the hero. In claiming that Achilles has in fact done so, Thersites effectively promotes the negation of the poetic tradition: "these words of Thersites amount to an actual misrepresentation of epic traditions about Achilles. As a blamer of the *Iliad*, Thersites is deservedly described at II 220 as *ekhthistos* 'most hateful' to the prime hero of our epic."[130] Because of his misrepresentation of poetic and social reality, Thersites constitutes a threat to the *kosmos* of the *Iliad*—*kosmos* in the sense of both the internal social order represented by the poem and the order of the poetic tradition itself.[131] This threat must be silenced by Odysseus, who is, significantly, one of the *Iliad*'s principle exponents of *ainos* as socially cohesive speech.

The narrative frame of the poem describes the threat to order posed by Thersites when it introduces him as

ὃς ἔπεα φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἄκοσμά τε πολλά τε ᾔδη
μάψ, ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον, ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν . . .
2.213-4

one who knew many sayings without *kosmos* in his mind,
and used them rashly, not according to *kosmos*, to quarrel with the
basilêes.

Odysseus uses the same phrase when he commands Thersites to cease his subversive activities: ἴσχεο, μηδ᾽ ἔθελ᾽ οἶος ἐριζέμεναι βασιλεῦσιν ("restrain yourself, and do not

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[130] Ibid. 263.

[131] For the multiple senses of *kosmos*, see Ford 1992: 122-3, Mackie 1996: 18. Note that in rhapsodic diction *kosmeô* can mean both 'marshal' troops (e.g. 2.554) and 'arrange' a song (e.g. *HH* 7.29; cf. Ford 1992: 26).

undertake to quarrel alone with the *basilêes*," 2.247).[132] Now, the same language is

applied to Achilles' *oneidos* by Nestor, another specialist of *ainos* (see Chapter 4) who

intervenes, like Odysseus, in an attempt to restore order (in this case by enjoining better

behavior on Agamemnon as well):

> ἀλλὰ πίθεσθε καὶ ὕμμες, ἐπεὶ πείθεσθαι ἄμεινον·
> μήτε σὺ τόνδ' ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν ἀποαίρεο κούρην,
> ἀλλ' ἔα ὡς οἱ πρῶτα δόσαν γέρας υἷες Ἀχαιῶν·
> μήτε σὺ Πηλείδη 'θελ' ἐριζέμεναι βασιλῆϊ
> ἀντιβίην, ἐπεὶ οὔ ποθ' ὁμοίης ἔμμορε τιμῆς
> σκηπτοῦχος βασιλεύς, ᾧ τε Ζεὺς κῦδος ἔδωκεν.
>   1.274-9

> But both of you be persuaded as well, since it is better to be persuaded:
> though you are noble, do not take away this man's maiden,
> but let her stay with the one to whom the sons of the Achaeans first gave
>   her as prize;
> and you, son of Peleus, do not undertake to quarrel with the king
> in your hostility, since the scepter-bearing king to whom Zeus
> has granted *kudos* has no equal portion.

The implication of this parallel language and parallel intervention is that Achilles'

oneidos is, like that of Thersites, divisive rather than constructive; it does not serve the

proper function of blame. But certainly this is not because the object is inadequate, or

because Achilles misrepresents reality. If Achilles' blame is wrong, it is wrong for

structural reasons—because 'to quarrel with the king' is, in every instance, a sign that

something is wrong with the social system as a whole. And this is precisely how Nestor

formulates the problem: Achilles' blame is only one half of a systemic pathology, the

other side of which is Agamemnon's violation of the potlatch system that represents

Achaean social relations materially.[133]

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[132] This point is stressed by Mackie 1996: 153.

[133] It is important to note the correspondence between the pathology described by Nestor and Dumézil's description of the paradigm for the proper functioning of the system, according to which praise of the ruler is matched by the generous distribution he enacts or guarantees. Cf. Dumézil 1943: 40-1, 80-1, and esp. 56, which introduces the term 'potlatch.' Note that Nestor instructs Agamemnon to fulfill his proper social

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The rupture of *philotês* that is Achilles' withdrawal cannot, then, be described as *solely* a matter of the failure of cohesive speech. But I would emphasize that it is *principally* a matter of such a failure. That is the effect of framing Achilles' crucial dilemma with markers of the Thersites paradigm of blame speech. The counter-consensual *kholos* that drives Achilles' divisive use of blame is the solution to his dilemma offered by Athena. This *kholos* remains after the close of Book 1 and is the driving force behind the remainder of the epic—that is, while Thersites' *oneidos* denies the epic, threatens to erase it, Achilles' provides the epic with its *raison d'être* and in a sense creates it. As we shall see when we examine in detail Odysseus' intervention in Book 2, Thersites' divisive speech is successfully suppressed and replaced with constructive *epainos*. But if the socially cohesive speech of *(ep)ainos* is the poem's ultimate value, how then should it deal with the divisive and counter-consensual use of speech on which it depends for its very existence? This question awaits us in Chapter 5.

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function as guarantor of the potlatch at the beginning of Book 9 (Ἀτρεΐδη σὺ μὲν ἄρχε· σὺ γὰρ βασιλεύτατός ἐσσι· / δαίνυ δαῖτα γέρουσιν. ἔοικέ τοι, οὔ τοι ἀεικές, 9.69-70)—that is, as the first step in the attempt at reconciliation with Achilles.

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Chapter 4

Odysseus and Diomedes: On Complementarity

I have spent a considerable amount of time exploring the various forces that undermine consensus in the *Iliad*'s poetic world. The last chapter is likely to have given the reader the impression that Achaean society is fundamentally fragmented and always on the verge of dissolution. But of course the story of the sack of Troy is ultimately the tale of a triumphant collaborative effort. Before going on to consider the all-important question that concluded the last chapter, it is worth pausing to consider the positive, constructive forces that maintain the integrity of the Achaean community. We can begin by taking note of those characters who actually manage to achieve consensus with their utterances. Decisions enacted by *epainos* are comparatively few. In a few cases, proposals that receive *epainos* are voided by broader circumstances, so that—if we leave aside Olympus, where *epainos* is more often withheld than granted, and the exceptional *epainos* of the Trojans—there are only three cases in which a proposal actually enjoys the full efficiency of group consensus. These three instances of fully efficient *epainos* occur at significant moments in the plot, and they are distributed among speakers in a way that suggests, perhaps counter to our expectations, that it is not necessarily the most authoritative speaker who tends generally to realize consensus. Rather, the poem seems to recognize certain individuals as 'specialists' of consensus-building.

It will be useful to survey briefly all the passages which make direct reference to a

positive expression of *epainos* among the Greeks, including instances of *epainos* which

are subsequently rendered void (here indicated by an *):

2.335. Odysseus proposes that the Achaeans stay the course after
Agamemnon's 'test'

*3.461. The Achaeans approve Agamemnon's judgment on the outcome
of the duel

*4.380. In a tale narrated by Agamemnon, the Mycenaeans approve
Tydeus' request for soldiers

7.344. The Achaeans approve Nestor's proposal to bury the dead and
construct a defensive wall

9.710. The Achaeans approve Diomedes' proposal to rest for the night
and renew the battle in the morning

*23.539. The Achaeans approve Achilles' proposal to award second prize
in the chariot race to Eumelus

Were there any correlation between a speaker's prestige and his ability to obtain the

approval of an audience, we would naturally expect Agamemnon and Achilles to be the

preeminent recipients of *epainos*. However, while each succeeds on one occasion in

generating consensus, neither seems able to enjoy the full efficacy of *epainos*.[1] (The next

chapter explores the reasons why the consensus in favor of each of their proposals—a

consensus that *should* be efficient—is strangely vitiated by broader circumstances.) As

we shall see, this circumstance is connected to the fact that their quarrel defines the plot

of the *Iliad*. In the world of the poem, their *neikos* is the archetypal social division, the

very *fons et origo* of all disunity. In the poetic logic of the poem, neither of these two

should be able to achieve consensus so long as their fundamental difference persists; thus,

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[1] I leave it an open question whether the chariot race ultimately results in consensus.

though each superficially attains *epainos*, some deeper pathology prevents this *epainos* from bearing its proper fruit.

This leaves three 'specialists' of *epainos*, three individuals who are able to forge a consensus among the Achaeans for their proposals: Odysseus, Nestor, and Diomedes.[2] That Nestor should rank as such a specialist comes as no surprise. Since he is the consummate councilor, we should hope, if not expect, that his proposals, at least, would foster cohesion among the Greeks. Likewise for Odysseus: as the primary exponent of the proper exercise of kingship in Homeric tradition,[3] he too has a traditional association with social cohesion; furthermore, his traditional epithet *poluainos* indicates that he is a specialist in just the kind of socially-constructive utterances that are likely to be ratified by *epainos*. The case of Diomedes, however, calls for a bit more exploration. In certain ways he seems the very antitype of the wizened councilor Nestor: he must apologize for his youth and comparative inexperience when speaking before the kings (14.112), and Nestor himself, when criticizing a proposal of Diomedes, identifies him as *neos*, younger than all Nestor's sons (9.57-8). Why should Diomedes enjoy just as much success in the assembly as his older, wiser peers?

Diomedes' skill at speaking begins to make more sense when we understand him as part of a group of figures characterized by their function in the narrative and in the broader epic tradition. We should note, first of all, that the three instances of successful *epainos* share a certain modality that is defensive or preservative—that does not, in other

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[2] Littleton 1970: 243 briefly considers the possibility of an association of these three figures, along with Kalkhas, as representatives of the 'Mitraic' aspect of the first function of Dumézil's Indo-European ideology; but he finds this hypothesis untenable, and does not consider the deeper relations among the figures he cites.

[3] Martin 1984, esp. pp. 42 ff. (note the prominence in this discussion of Diomedes and Nestor as well).

words, seek action in a bold, new direction. In each case, the approved proposal seeks to shore up Achaean solidarity in the face of imminent dissolution or defeat. In two cases, this dissolution is explicit: Books 2 and 9 both unfold against the dreadful possibility, raised by Agamemnon himself, that the Achaean army might simply abandon the war. Nestor's proposal to construct the wall does not respond to an immediate threat, but it quickly emerges as part of the same thematic complex—thus, for instance, the wall's failure to hold back the Trojans prompts Agamemnon to propose retreat yet again in Book 14.[4] *Epainos*, therefore, seems fundamentally conservative, perhaps even reactionary: it maintains or restores the status quo, rather than exploring a new position. (Only the *epainos*—which ultimately fails because of divine involvement—for Agamemnon's judgment on the outcome of the duel in Book 3 aims to produce a radically new set of circumstances.)

The poem tends to associate Nestor, Odysseus, and Diomedes as exponents of this conservative solidarity; we find several signs of the traditional association of these three characters. For instance, in the passage from Book 14 alluded to above (14.27 ff.), Nestor finds Agamemnon in the company of Odysseus and Diomedes, and the four together seek to find some plan for saving the Achaeans from destruction. (More precisely, the three specialists of social cohesion seek to save the Achaeans from Agamemnon's self-destructive plan.) And at 8.93 ff., Diomedes seeks Odysseus' aid in saving Nestor from Hektor's onslaught.

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[4] Note too the observation of Nagy 1999: 48 on the way the wall—Nestor's *mêtis*—is alluded to in the Embassy of Book 9, where *epainos* and the effectiveness of Odysseus, Diomedes, and Nestor is very much at stake (see below).

Curiously, Diomedes calls on Odysseus for help, but Odysseus, evidently intentionally, does not respond (8.97-8). Far from signaling a rift in what I have suggested needs to be seen as a cohesive group, this detail marks instead, I suggest, a traditional pattern of complementarity creating a special bond between Diomedes and Odysseus in particular.[5] This complementarity can be expressed either by the coordinated action of the two as partners (the principal example in the *Iliad* is of course the Doloneia, but one should note also 11.310 ff., where the two act together to stave off the *loigos* of Hektor's offensive) or by a superficially competitive tension between the two in contexts where (implicitly) either one is capable of action (this is the way the complementarity is expressed in the passage from Book 8). Both tendencies have been noted as characterizing the relationship between Odysseus and Diomedes in the broader tradition of the epic cycle. Thus, in various accounts, they collaborate in the slayings of Palamedes, Poluxena, and Philomelas, and in the capture of the Palladium; on the other hand, the *Ilias Parva* has Diomedes bringing Philoktetes back to Troy, while other traditions credit this to Odysseus.[6] The case of Philoktetes deserves special comment, for his reintegration into the Achaean host is an act of social integration that is a *sine qua non* for the Achaean conquest of Troy. In other words, the story of Philoktetes is a myth of social solidarity centering on the same drive for cohesion I have argued is expressed by the dynamics of *epainos*. Tradition credits the reintegration of Philoktetes *either* to Odysseus *or* to Diomedes — two specialists of consensus.

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[5] Cf. Sinos 1980: 55 on Achilles and Patroklos, who express mutually exclusive aspects of a single character even as they are presented as interchangeable: "instead of being identical, they are really complementary."

[6] Fenik 1964: 12-3, with references. Note that Odysseus does play a role in the retrieval of Philoktetes in the *Ilias Parva*, but his action is confined to a different episode (the capture of Helenos); cf. below on the 'complementary' pattern of *Iliad* 9.

A similar pattern can be discerned in the case of the *Iliad*'s great opponent of

consensus, Thersites. This consummate dissident is introduced into the epic at the

moment that threatens most the integrity of the Achaean community, viz. the near

dissolution of the host following Agamemnon's *diapeira* in Book 2. Odysseus intervenes

to prevent the soldiers' flight; Thersites alone does not heed the call for order, but further

undermines the already precarious situation by launching a virulent critique of

Agamemnon's royal prerogatives (2.225 ff.). Odysseus responds by violently

suppressing the voice of dissidence—he beats Thersites into silence. This is hardly, we

should say, a display of the socially constructive use of speech. But that the silencing of

Thersites is conceived as a definitive step toward the restoration of order is shown by the

fact that Odysseus immediately delivers a speech that confirms the Achaeans'

commitment to the war—and receives *epainos*.[7] Thus the 'man of many *ainoi*' proves his

traditional credentials.

I draw attention to the fact that the core of Thersites' *neikos* is a critique of

Agamemnon's royal privileges, because this fact relates directly to Thersites' role outside

the *Iliad*—a role that is essential to an understanding of the nature of the threat he poses.

According to a story transmitted by Apollodorus (1.8.5-6), prior to his arrival at Troy,

Thersites had a career not just as a dissident, but as a proper revolutionary. Along with

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[7] Obviously, the case of Thersites has important implications for how we understand consensus in Homeric society. Homeric consensus is a consensus of the noble. The objections of base men like Thersites are forcefully repressed, not negotiated in the process of consensus building. Cf. the manner in which Odysseus treats men of the *dêmos* (also wielding, as against Thersites, the *skêptron*) as opposed to the *basilêes* at 2.198 ff., and note my comments above (Ch. 2 pp. 86-7) about the reestablishing of the "dynamics of *ainos*" in this scene.

the other sons of Agrios,[8] Thersites had staged a *coup d'état* that seized the royal power

of Calydon from the rightful ruler, Oineus. The plot was executed after the death of

Tydeus, thus, in the absence of the son who might protect his father's standing in the

community (note the similarity with the situation of Laertes in Ithaca).[9] The

reestablishment of civic harmony was left to the grandson, Diomedes, who, traveling in

secret from Argos, killed the sons of Agrios—all but Onkhêstos and Thersites, who fled

to Têlephos of Arkadia—and returned the royal power to Oineus' proper heir, his son-in-

law Andraimôn.[10] Thus, as Odysseus in Ithaca, Diomedes restores order and orderly

succession to a beleagured kingdom; and as Odysseus at Troy, Diomedes does so by

expelling the emblem of disorder, Thersites. Odysseus and Diomedes are linked together

by their common antagonism with Thersites, and by their common support for the

prerogatives of the rightful king.[11] We might therefore expect Diomedes to play some

role in the silencing of this most hateful man in Book 2, or at least to be listed among

those to whom Thersites is *ekhthistos* (2.220); but in fact, Diomedes is excluded entirely

from the scene.

Note that while Odysseus and Diomedes share credit for accomplishments of

questionable social benefit or ethical status (the theft of the Palladium, the killing of

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[8] Note the name of Thersites' father, who appears to be simply a personification of the asociality embodied by his son. Cf. my comments above, Ch. 3 p. 125: "*Agrios* designates what is fundamentally asocial, opposed to the basic principles of community, and, in fact, capable of dissolving the bonds of society."

[9] Cf. Edmunds 1990: 38 ff. (esp. pp. 38 and 41), who notes a number of connections between Diomedes' story and that of the Arkeisiads.

[10] Diomedes himself would seem to be ineligible for the kingship, either as a citizen of Argos, or because his father Tydeus was in fact an illegitimate son of Oineus (Apoll. 1.8.5-6). In the Catalogue of Ships, the Calydonian contingent is led by Thoas, son of Andraimôn, οὐ γὰρ ἔτ Οἰνῆος μεγαλήτορος υἱέες ἦσαν (2.641).

[11] Odysseus states those prerogatives unambiguously just before Thersites interrupts (2.205-6), and refers to them again in response to Thersites (2.255-6).

Palamedes), they appear to compete for credit in the case of those acts that contribute most to the integrity of the group (the retrieval of Philoktetes or the expulsion of Thersites). Similarly in the case of Nestor's rescue: the *Iliad* recognizes that one or the other must save the army's councilor, not both. For Elizabeth Block, this moment of Iliadic competition suggests an 'old rivalry' between the two.[12] I propose, rather, that the pattern of interaction suggests the kind of complementarity that obtains between gods and heroes who share a sanctuary, and that is often expressed as "antagonism."[13] That is not to say that the cooperation or 'rivalry' of Diomedes and Odysseus ought to be understood in a cultic context, but rather that, when benefits to the community are at stake (either in cult or in myth), the relation between a traditionally associated pair is more likely to be expressed as antagonism than as cooperation.

The complementarity of Diomedes and Odysseus, which makes of them either exclusive alternatives (antagonists) or cooperative counterparts, receives its most sustained development in the two books of the poem where the cohesion of the Achaean host is perhaps most at stake, Books 9 and 10. These books cover a period of time during which the integrity and safety of the army is explicitly in question: in Nestor's words, νὺξ δ' ἥδ' ἠὲ διαρραίσει στρατὸν ἠὲ σαώσει ("this night will either shatter the army completely or save it," 9.78). Ironically, these two books have at times themselves been seen as mutually exclusive alternatives.[14] This line of thinking has perhaps been fostered

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[12] Block 1985: 6n11.

[13] Nagy 1999 has developed the definitive formulation of the "ritual antagonism" between complementary god and hero.

[14] Cf. e.g. Klingner 1940: 339 (Book 10 proceeds as though Book 9 had never happened); Rabel 1991: 283 (with references): "the contents of [Book 10] . . . have most often been judged a blemish in the structure and an irrelevance to the plot of the *Iliad*." For a critique of the "critical dismissal" of Book 10, see Martin 2000. Similarly to my own argument, Rabel argues for a contrast between self-sufficiency and cooperation

by several textual indicators of the close connection between the two books, indicators that can have the appearance of being 'doublets,' and that therefore seem to suggest that one or the other episode is sufficient for the plot, but both together are redundant. For instance, in each book the tense atmosphere is established by a pronouncement by Nestor on the seriousness of the crisis: beside the line from Book 9 quoted above we can set 10.173-4, νῦν γὰρ δὴ πάντεσσιν ἐπὶ ξυροῦ ἵσταται ἀκμῆς / ἢ μάλα λυγρὸς ὄλεθρος Ἀχαιοῖς ἠὲ βιῶναι ("for now the affairs of all stand on the razor's edge: the Achaeans will either meet a painful destruction or be restored to life"). Similarly, each book describes the execution of a *mêtis* devised by Nestor.[15] These equivalent motifs, however, by no means mark the two books as being in any sense interchangeable. Rather, they are an indicator of continuity, but a continuity that is established by the exhaustive deployment of complementary themes rather than the pleonastic repetition of identical ones. We must read these two books side by side in order to appreciate the fullness with which the poem puts to the test its specialists of *ainos*—not just Odysseus and Diomedes, whose complementarity structures the development of this section of the poem, but Nestor as well.

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in Books 9 and 10; there are important differences between us, however, particularly as regards the nature of this self-sufficiency. It is not my intention to engage with the many Analytical arguments that have focused on these two books. Suffice it to say that, in my view, far from showing signs of compositional disunity, these two books are rather a sustained, balanced development of the two possible expressions of the traditional complementarity of Diomedes and Odysseus. Books 9 and 10 are codependent, and their existence, side by side, is a sign of the thoroughness with which the *Iliad* develops its inherited themes. Cf. Martin 2000.62 (who is discussing, however, the balanced relation between the night raid of Book 10 and the daytime battles of the rest of the *Iliad*): "To represent the entirety of heroic experience, the poem in fact *must* include both sides."

[15] 9.93 and 10.19; cf. also 9.423-6. The motif of Nestor's *mêtis* connects Books 9 and 10—particularly the former, in which *epainos* is especially at stake—with the *mêtis* of the wall, the only proposal made by Nestor that explicitly receives *epainos* (cf. 7.324 = 9.93).

The cohesiveness of these three figures as a group is just one of several factors

that give these books unity as a whole.[16] Diomedes, Nestor, and Odysseus are each

assigned an important, but separate, role in Book 9 (I will discuss the distribution of these

roles and their interrelation momentarily). For the moment, I note that, in addition to and

in contrast with their distinctly individual contributions to the common cause in Book 9,

they are also presented as working in concert, as a harmonious unit, in Book 10.[17]

Diomedes and Odysseus, obviously, are true partners, but their collaboration with Nestor

is also foregrounded by the text—not so much in the Doloneia proper, which highlights

the specific bond of the two younger men, but in the lead-up: after being approached by

Agamemnon, Nestor makes it clear that his first goal is to find Odysseus and Diomedes

(10.109). He proceeds immediately to their respective tents, and at each stop there is an

exchange between Nestor and the younger man that mirrors the one between

Agamemnon and Nestor (140-7; 159-76). Thus the narrative structure of the passage

emphasizes the parallelism of the three figures. The sequence of exchanges ends, in fact,

with Diomedes, who stresses his solidarity with Nestor by volunteering to take over for

him in summoning the remaining *basilées*—Diomedes literally substitutes for the older

man. The fundamental indivisibility of the three emerges more clearly, however, when

we grow sensitive to the fact that Book 10 as a whole focuses on the safe return of

dangerously isolated heroes to their social group—that is, on the theme of *nostos*.[18] As

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[16] Rabel 1991 argues that Books 9-11 together constitute a "triad." Of course, each of these books represents a compositional unity in itself.

[17] Rabel 1991: 287 draws attention also to the cooperation of Agamemnon and Menelaos in the early part of the book.

[18] Cf. 10.281 (Odysseus' prayer to Athena on setting out), and especially Athena's words to Diomedes at 10.509: νόστου δὴ μνῆσαι.

Douglas Frame has demonstrated on the basis of linguistic and comparative evidence,

Nestor is the embodiment of the intelligence that secures the "return to light and life" of

nostos.[19] If his age did not make him unsuitable for *ponoi*—a factor which Diomedes

himself acknowledges at 10.164-7[20]—Nestor would therefore be the ideal companion for

the night mission according to the criteria that Diomedes himself puts forward:

> τούτου γ' ἐσπομένοιο καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο
> ἄμφω νοστήσαιμεν. ἐπεὶ περίοιδε νοῆσαι.
> 10.246-7

> With this man as companion we would both return
> even from blazing fire, since he excels at knowing how to use his *noos*.

In fact, Nestor's very name expresses the same inherited root **nes-* (and the same

inherited themes) as the concepts of *noos* and *nostos* on which Diomedes lays such strong

emphasis.[21] That is to say, Diomedes might well have chosen the very man who

proposed the night mission to accompany him, had age allowed. Nestor, Diomedes, and

Odysseus are presented in Book 10 as possessing the same *nostos*-oriented qualities, and

they work in partnership, not in competition.

The relationship between these three men in Book 9 stands in marked contrast to

the noticeable overlap of their functions in Book 10. Their efforts are directed no less

toward the achievement of a common goal—namely, a solution to the difficulties in

which the Achaeans find themselves—but their specific actions and interests are

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[19] Frame 1978, Ch. 4 and *passim*.

[20] *Contra* LSJ s.v. II.2, *amêkhanos* at l.167 should doubtless be taken to refer to the incapacity of old age, rather than Nestor's 'relentlessness.' Regardless of how we interpret this word, however, Diomedes here asserts that Nestor should be relieved from hard duty.

[21] Frame 1978; see also Bader 1980: 50. Several men volunteer to accompany Diomedes, and while each ἤθελε, Nestor's son μάλα δ' ἤθελε (229). Note also αἰθομένοιο, which, I suggest, connects to the same traditional theme that motivates Odysseus' pseudonym *Aithôn* at *Od.* 19.183. Other expressions of this theme (connected in the *Od.* as here to *nostos*): *Od.* 5.490 (via *pur*), 18.343, 19.39, 20.25.

presented as being implicitly at odds, and at times even explicitly in conflict. At the start

of Book 9, Agamemnon, thoroughly demoralized and fearful of what the next day will

bring, proposes disengagement. The scene is sickeningly similar to Book

2—sickeningly, because, while Agamemnon had there proposed retreat as an ill-

conceived 'test' (one begins to suspect that the plan of retreat constitutes the sum total of

his store of strategic wisdom), he now does so in earnest.[22] In Book 2, as we have seen,

Odysseus intervened, and by attaining *epainos* he managed to restore order to the army.

He will intervene again under similar circumstances in Book 14 (83 ff.), and so we might

expect to hear his voice here as well. But instead it is Diomedes who interjects and

speaks out against Agamemnon's plan, offering substantially the same counter-proposal

as Odysseus had in Book 2 ('stay the course').[23] The substitution of Diomedes' voice for

Odysseus' thus reinforces the pattern of association between the two, but according to the

exclusive rather than cooperative mode of complementarity, Odysseus remains off stage

(for the time being).

Diomedes, as Odysseus, supports the status quo: he proposes no new plan which

might aid the Achaeans in their time of crisis, arguing merely that they should stay at

Troy since they "came with the god" (9.49). Unlike Odysseus, however, Diomedes does

not generate *epainos* with this proposal. Instead, he meets with a good example of the

'insufficiently sufficient' response marked by *epiakhô*: ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες

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[22] Jeanmaire 1939: 14 describes the opening of Book 9 as "une scène d'agora que certains details font apparaître comme un doublet de la grande scène politique qui occupe le début du deuxième chant." Cf. 14.75-6, where Agamemnon again proposes retreat—and again in the company of Nestor, Odysseus, and Diomedes. In this case, Odysseus vetoes the proposal while Diomedes proposes an alternative; the two thus act in concert without strictly overlapping.

[23] Note that in Books 2 and 9, Nestor adds supplemental advice immediately after Odysseus / Diomedes.

ἐπίαχον υἶες ’Αχαιῶν (9.50).[24] Thus received, Diomedes’ speech is sufficient to veto

Agamemnon’s proposal, but does not produce any immediate action.[25] Nestor must then

step in to offer a supplement to Diomedes’ argument—building, certainly, on the

foundations laid by Diomedes, but phrased in terms which verge on (polite) criticism:

> οὔ τίς τοι τὸν μῦθον ὀνόσσεται ὅσσοι ’Αχαιοί,
> οὐδὲ πάλιν ἐρέει· ἀτὰρ οὐ <u>τέλος</u> ἵκεο μύθων.
> ἦ μὲν καὶ νέος ἐσσί, ἐμὸς δέ κε καὶ πάϊς εἴης
> ὁπλότατος γενεῆφιν· ἀτὰρ πεπνυμένα βάζεις
> ’Αργείων βασιλῆας, ἐπεὶ κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες.
> ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἐγών, ὃς σεῖο γεραίτερος εὔχομαι εἶναι,
> ἐξείπω καὶ πάντα διίξομαι·
>
> 9.55-61

> No one of all the Achaeans will fault your *muthos*
> or change a word—but you have not come to the *telos* of *muthoi*.
> Indeed, you are still young; if you were my child, you would be
> the youngest by birth. Yet you utter sensible things [*pepnumena*]
> to the Argive *basilées*, since you have spoken in due measure.
> But nevertheless I, who claim to have more *geras* than you,
> will speak out and treat everything thoroughly.

Diomedes, Nestor claims, has not reached “the *telos* of *muthoi*.” Nestor’s criticism is

virtually a comment on or explanation of why Diomedes’ proposal—the same advice

which the Achaeans *epêinêsan* in Book 2—here falls short of *epainos*. In brief, the

situation calls for more than the minimum proposal of Diomedes; the present crisis

requires some action in addition to the simple conservative position. This criticism also

makes an interesting claim about the nature of utterances appropriate for *epainos*: it

implies that only those utterances—or rather, those discussions, since Nestor speaks of

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[24] Note that 9.50-1 = 7.403-4. In both cases, Diomedes’ speech falls short of *epainos*, and is supplemented by a more authoritative, and more efficient, speech (in Book 7, by Agamemnon).

[25] It is notable that, while the structure of Books 2 and 9 is the same, with Nestor supplementing the speeches of both Odysseus and Diomedes, the former receives *epainos* while the latter does not—that is, not until the end of the book. This difference derives from the fact that Book 9 describes a single, protracted struggle (which has as its ultimate goal the reintegration of Achilles) to establish social cohesion. *Epainos* must be deferred until this struggle reaches some kind of conclusion, however imperfect.

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plural *muthoi*, the implication being that Diomedes cannot have the 'last word' since more remains to be said—that are 'complete,' that have reached their *telos*, will be sufficient for *epainos*. If this is true, then no true consensus is possible for the Achaeans until this *telos* is reached; until then, the best they can hope for is an insufficient and provisional agreement.

In fact, the whole of Book 9 can be read as a search for this *telos*, a search that is conducted in several stages, each of which is supervised (individually) by one of the three specialists of social cohesion. The first stage is marked by Diomedes' speech in the general assembly, which prevents the dissolution of the army. Nestor's criticism of that speech initiates the second stage: he disbands the general assembly, sending the soldiers to their dinners,[26] and reconvenes the council of the *basilées* (or *gerontes*: 9.70) in Agamemnon's quarters.[27] Here he proposes the next stage: the Embassy to Achilles. His proposal is unanimously accepted and immediately put into action. But notice the way the text signals this reception—which is, after all, efficient, in the sense that it results in action:

ὣς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ἑαδότα μῦθον ἔειπεν.
9.173

Thus he spoke, and he uttered a *muthos* that pleased all.

I noted above that *handanô* is "definitively counter-consensual." How then do we account for its use here, where it looks for all the world as though a unanimous decision

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[26] At 7.370 and 380, the proposal of a meal and its execution mark the end of an *ineffective* deliberation, i.e. one in which new measures were proposed (measures which would have saved the Trojans), but no decision could be reached besides the status quo.

[27] See Sealey 1969: 260 for the Homeric *boulê gerontôn* as a possible reflection of the historical differentiation of *probouleusis* and assembly; on this question, cf. also Jeanmaire 1939: 16 and n.1. Rabel 1991: 285 evidently believes that both gatherings are limited to the councilors ("two councils of his chiefs"); that, however, deprives Nestor's speech of its logic, and ignores the articulation in terms of *boulê* and assembly that we observe also in Book 2.

has been reached, if we are to maintain the rule I have proposed? The subsequent

narrative of Book 9 will reveal two important considerations justifying this use of

handanô in place of the properly efficient *epaineô*. Firstly, we will learn at the end of the

book that, although Nestor's plan appears to have universal appeal, at least one Achaean

leader feels it is a bad idea. The second consideration has to do with the relation between

the *telos muthôn* and consensus implied by Nestor's previous speech in the assembly.

His proposal to the council is part of an ongoing struggle to reach that *telos*; and as the

protagonists of that struggle will themselves shortly acknowledge, the *telos* is not to be

achieved even in the sequel to the council meeting (and so, by inference, neither in the

council meeting itself). If reaching the *telos muthôn* is a precondition for consensus, then

epainos is not yet possible. All this is clear to us by virtue of our knowledge of later

developments (we can, of course, attribute the same knowledge to any ancient hearer or

reader with a basic competence in the tradition); for a hypothetical 'first reader'[28] of the

passage who is nevertheless familiar with the conventions of the poetry, ἐαδότα signals

that no true consensus, no true resolution, has yet been reached. More importantly, this

counter-consensual verb, which I have previously described as indicating, at best, the

mere coincidence of interests,[29] emphasizes that the group that is now desperately

reaching out to its alienated member remains for the time being painfully fragmented.

Odysseus — heretofore noticeably absent from the scene — dominates the third

stage in the journey toward an elusive *telos muthôn*. If Book 9 as a whole thematizes the

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[28] For the narratological distinction between a 'first reader' (one who reads a text for the first time) and a 'second reader' (one who re-reads a text), see Winkler 1985: 8-14. My qualification of familiarity with epic conventions — something we must presuppose of the 'implied reader' of the *Iliad* — suggests the limitations of this notion as applied to the traditional artistry of Homer.

[29] It is worth stressing a consideration I alluded to in the Introduction, namely, that consensus is not the same thing as 'unanimity,' and is in fact structurally far more complex.

Achaean struggle to forge consensus, the Embassy to Achilles is understandably its focus,

since Achilles' isolation from the Greek political community is the archetype for every

specific political problem (here, the determination of the best course of action in this

specific crisis). A successful Embassy—which would result in the reintegration of

Achilles—would obviously be the most satisfying *telos*, since it would represent a

definitive reunification of the fragmented social body. At this crucial moment, the third

specialist of *ainos*—Odysseus *poluainos*[30]—takes the lead (quite literally).[31] The

different rhetorical approaches[32] of Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax will, however,

ultimately fail to produce an *ainos* to which Achilles can consent. In fact, the repeated

and emphatic use in Book 9 of *anainomai*—which designates the negation of an *ainos*,[33] a

socially constructive utterance, as *epaineô* designates the confirmation of one—makes it

explicit that the failure of the Embassy (and by implication the conflict with Achilles as a

whole) is above all a failure of *ainos*.[34] *Anainomai* occurs a total of nine times in the

Iliad; four of these occurrences are in Book 9, and each of these four is thematically

significant.[35] First, in the council session that appoints the Embassy, Agamemnon admits

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[30] Odysseus is even addressed as such when he returns from his mission, as though in hopeful expectation that his specialization will have produced some results (9.673).

[31] For the forceful "self-assertion" of Odysseus at 9.192, see Nagy 1999: 50-1.

[32] The ancient commentators saw the four orators of the Embassy scene (including Achilles) as each exemplifying a different type of rhetoric: cf. scholion bT 9.622.

[33] Blanc 1995: 190 and 194; *anainomai* presupposes **ainomai*.

[34] Note Pindar's play on the contrast between *epaineô* and *anainomai* at *Pa.* 4.36.

[35] Of the five other instances, three have important thematic links to the failure of *ainos* in connection with Achilles. At 18.450 Thetis recalls how Achilles refused (ἡναίνετο) to reenter the war in return for the compensation offered by Agamemnon through the Embassy. At 11.647 Patroklos refuses (ἀναίνετο) a seat offered to him by Nestor. Since Nestor's speech (according to the ancient commentators, a continuation of the Embassy; cf. Eustathius 779, δευτέρᾳ πρεσβείᾳ οἰκειακῇ) will indirectly result in Patroklos' death, this instance continues the theme, first raised by Phoenix's speech in the Embassy, of the dangerous

his fault: ἀασάμην, οὐδ' αὐτός ἀναίνομαι ("I have erred, and not even I deny [negation

of *ainos*] it," 9.116). Thus, as he prepares to make an offer of reconciliation with

Achilles, he opens up rhetorically the possibility of establishing the social cohesion of

ainos by a cautious litotes; he, at least, is not unwilling to seek rapprochement. Phoenix

twice warns Achilles not to indulge in the kind of refusal signaled by *anainomai*, first in a

gnomic context with the parable of the *Litai*:

> ὅς μέν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διός ἄσσον ἰούσας.
> τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καί τ' ἔκλυον εὐχομένοιο·
> ὅς δέ κ' ἀνήνηται καί τε στερεῶς ἀποείπῃ.[36]
> λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιοῦσαι
> τῷ ἄτην ἄμ' ἔπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθείς ἀποτείσῃ.
>   9.508-12

He who respects the daughters of Zeus when they come near,
that one do they benefit and heed in his prayers;
but when someone denies *ainos* and stubbornly refuses,
then they approach Zeus son of Kronos and entreat him
to fix *atê* [on the one who refuses], so that he should suffer in return.

And again with the mythical example of Meleager's response to the *litai* of his mother

and sisters: ἐλλίσσονθ'· ὁ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀναίνετο ("they entreated him; but he refused

[denied *ainos*] the more," 9.585). But Phoenix has no more success than his colleagues.

Odysseus' summary of the Embassy's results on returning to Agamemnon's tent caps the

leitmotiv of *ainos* and responds, with classic ring-composition, to Agamemnon's initial

statement of the theme:

> κεῖνός γ' οὐκ ἐθέλει σβέσσαι χόλον. ἀλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον
> πιμπλάνεται μένεος, σὲ δ' ἀναίνεται ἠδὲ σὰ δῶρα.
>   9.678-9

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consequences of the refusal of gifts. At 18.500 ἀναίνετο designates the refusal of the litigant on the Shield
to accept *poinê* (on which see Muellner 1976: 101 ff.)—this negation of socially constructive *ainos* is the
definitive emblem for the failure of consensus among the Achaeans. The two remaining instances of
anainomai are 7.93 (of refusing to accept a challenge to duel; note the correlation between the roots *ain-*
and *dekh-*) and 23.204 (=11.647).

[36] Cf. Achilles' response to Odysseus' speech: χρή μὲν δή τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν (9.309).

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That man does not wish to extinguish his *kholos*, but he is ever more
filled with rage, and refuses [negation of *ainos*] you and your gifts.

Ainos fails in the Embassy, even under the guidance of the great master of *ainos*,
Odysseus himself. It fails to reincorporate Achilles into the social group—and it fails to
reveal a *telos muthôn*. Indeed, the mission to Achilles is effectively ended when Ajax
declares:

διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' 'Οδυσσεῦ
ἴομεν· οὐ γάρ μοι δοκέει μύθοιο τελευτὴ
τῇδέ γ' ὁδῷ κρανέεσθαι· ἀπαγγεῖλαι δὲ τάχιστα
χρὴ μῦθον Δαναοῖσι καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν περ ἐόντα . . .
9.625-27

Son of Laertes, descended from Zeus, Odysseus of many devices,
let us go; for it does not seem to me that the end of *muthoi*
will be accomplished by this route. We must as swiftly as possible
report to the Danaans this *muthos*, even though it is not good.

Since Achilles has refused to affirm any of the various *ainoi* proffered by his colleagues,
dialogue has failed as a means of reestablishing social integrity. In fact, as Odysseus
implies (ἔτι μᾶλλον), things have gotten even worse: with Phoenix left behind, the
Embassy itself, which meant to be an expression of Achaean solidarity, has disintegrated.
The Embassy has turned out to be a dead end, and in failing to produce any tangible
results, it has not led to a *telos muthôn*—not in any of the possible meanings of the
expression,[37] but above all not in the sense foremost in the minds of Nestor and
Agamemnon, viz. it has not revealed an actionable solution to the present crisis. But the
only immediately apparent alternative has been attempted, so deliberation has, in a sense,
reached a conclusion, unsatisfactory though it may be. Diomedes' minimal

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[37] The scholion T 9.625 proposes two possible interpretations for the phrase μύθοιο τελεύτη: τῆς
πρεσβείας. οἱ δὲ τῆς στάσεως. I.e. the *telos* referred to could be either a successful conclusion to the
Embassy, or to the quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles. Note that, as Eustathius 779 implies, the
Embassy as a whole does not lead to a definitive dead end: each appeal causes Achilles to soften his
position by degrees, so a possible end, while temporarily out of reach, certainly seems in sight.

proposal—simply to weather the storm and see what the morning brings—can no longer

be considered insufficient merely because it leaves other possibilities unspoken or

untried. And so, in the end, he does get the last word, and when he repeats his advice to

continue the fight, he at last attains *epainos* (9.710)—an *epainos* that brings Book 9 to an

unsatisfactory, but necessary and complete, conclusion.

Book 9 shows each of the *ainos*-specialists making his own particular

contribution to the search for a *telos muthôn*. Their actions are complementary, but not

harmonious. True, there are no explicit signs of discord between Nestor and Odysseus

(although the latter's surprising self-assertion at 9.223 may suggest that he is intervening

in a way not foreseen by the plan's architect). The signs of dissonance focus rather on

the two figures of Diomedes and Odysseus. The antagonism that was first expressed by

Nestor in a polite periphrasis comes explicitly to the fore when Diomedes responds to

Odysseus' report, declaring the whole endeavor, as planned by Nestor and executed by

Odysseus, to have been a mistake:

> Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγάμεμνον
> μὴ ὄφελες λίσσεσθαι ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα
> μυρία δῶρα διδούς· ὃ δ᾽ ἀγήνωρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλως·
> νῦν αὖ μιν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀγηνορίῃσιν ἐνῆκας.
> 9.697-700

> Son of Atreus, supreme lord of men, Agamemnon,
> you ought not to have entreated the blameless son of Peleus
> by offering countless gifts: he is high-minded even otherwise,
> but now you have sent him on to even greater heights of pride.

(Note that Diomedes picks up on Odysseus' assertion that things are now even worse:

πολὺ μᾶλλον.) In contrast to Book 10, where Odysseus and Diomedes work closely,

harmoniously together, here they are fundamentally at odds. Nevertheless, both elements

of this complementary pair are necessary in order ultimately to reach the *telos muthôn*: no

conclusive decision can be made until all available options are tried. (We can sense here an appreciation for the necessity of constructive disagreement to the healthy practice of consensus politics.) Diomedes' criticism, a final statement of his complementary antagonism with Odysseus, emphasizes that both aspects of the complementarity have been fully developed; the matter can now rest, and so it does, with the *epainos* of the community.

Having fully explored the exclusive mode of complementarity in Book 9, the poem, as I have said, moves on to develop the collaborative mode in Book 10. In addition to the complementarity of Diomedes and Odysseus, we can therefore speak as well of the complementarity of these two books taken as a unit: together, they express both possible manifestations, both modes, of a single relationship. Moreover, their complementarity involves not only contrasting manifestations of the relationship between the protagonists, but also contrasting themes. As I have pointed out, Book 9 focuses on the reconstruction of social solidarity by the establishment of a socially constructive utterance (*ainos*), while Book 10 focuses instead on the theme of *nostos*. I would like to point out that this thematic complementarity is also the very complementarity that defines the relationship between the *Iliad* (whose primary theme is the reestablishment of Achaean political integrity, above all through *ainos* / *epainos*) and the *Odyssey* (whose theme is the *nostos* of Odysseus). Books 9 and 10 belong together, *require* one another, in a more profound way than I think anyone has yet noticed.[38]

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[38] There are doubtless other ways of describing the complementarity of Books 9 and 10. For instance, while the former focuses on reestablishing order in the Achaean camp, the latter focuses on discovering the order of the Trojan camp (cf. 10.428 ff.). This opposition of internal and external is equivalent to the (complementary) opposition of the Cities at War and Peace on Achilles' Shield.

We find what looks like a self-conscious recognition of this thematic

complementarity at the start of the night mission. Diomedes has just selected Odysseus

as his companion, with direct acknowledgment that this selection, this partnership, is

based on the centrality of the key theme of *nostos* (νοστήσαιμεν, 10.247). To this

Odysseus responds by claiming that now is not the time to engage in the socially

constructive utterances of praise or blame:

> Τυδεΐδη, μήτ᾽ ἄρ με μάλ᾽ αἴνεε μήτε τι νείκει·
> εἰδόσι γάρ τοι ταῦτα μετ᾽ Ἀργείοις ἀγορεύεις.
> 10.249-50[39]
>
> Son of Tydeus, do not commend me overmuch nor find fault:
> for you speak these things among the Argives, who know as well as you.

In the first place, Odysseus' words emphasize the bond between himself and Diomedes,

their common language, so to speak, as two specialists of *ainos*. But they also serve to

bracket this language, to set it apart, for the duration of the night mission. In a curious

way, Diomedes and Odysseus work together to establish the distinctive thematics of

Book 10: Diomedes affirms the centrality of *nostos* and Odysseus disavows the

applicability of *ainos*.[40]

Understanding Odysseus and Diomedes as two paired specialists of *ainos* sheds

additional light on an earlier section of the poem, in which Agamemnon makes his most

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[39] I note that Odysseus' next words focus on astronomical observations. I suggest that the theme of star-reading is an integral part of the complex of *nostos* themes, so that Odysseus effectively makes a distinction between the thematics of praise / blame (i.e. socially active speech) and *nostos*. The claim that a speaker's audience 'already knows' is a conventional way of asserting that a particular illocutionary act is situationally inappropriate.

[40] The centrality of *nostos* in Book 10 perhaps allows us to explain a detail that has troubled critics, namely, the apparently "inauspicious" location—a 'clear place free of corpses' (10.199)—where the Achaeans hold their meeting at the beginning of the book. In order to account for this anomalous detail, Mackie 1996: 25n.30 must have recourse to the Analysts' argument of inauthenticity. This detail becomes meaningful, however—and an effective contrast with the assembly of Book 9—if we consider Frame's demonstration that the *nostos* theme concerns, fundamentally, a return from death to life (Frame 1978; note esp. p. 40). Book 10 is, in a sense, a *nekuia*, a journey among the dead, like that of the *Odyssey*.

sustained attempt to foster order and unity among the Achaeans—the mustering of the

troops in Book 4. This scene shows Agamemnon using both praise- and blame-speech to

establish cohesion in his army. As has been noted before, both praise and blame can have

a "positive social function,"[41] that is, used correctly, both can help to reinforce social

order. But considering that Diomedes and Odysseus are themselves embodiments of this

positive social function, it seems odd, to say the least, that they are the only ones singled

out by Agamemnon for blame (*neikos*).[42] Agamemnon bestows praise on Idomeneus, the

Ajaxes, and finally Nestor—whom, significantly, he encounters in the very act of

enjoining order on his horsemen, that is, of exercising his own social specialty[43]—but

with Odysseus and Diomedes (each, interestingly, presented as part of a pair, the former

with Menestheus and the latter with Sthenelos) he suddenly switches to blame.

Determining whether Agamemnon is here meant to be seen as an extraordinarily gifted

leader, who is able to use every means at his disposal to achieve his strategic goals, or, in

an ironic light, as an extraordinarily bad one, who does not realize that he is picking

quarrels with the men who contribute most to the *esprit de corps*,[44] is ultimately less

important than our recognition of the fundamental issue: viz., that blame is socially

positive when correctly applied, and negative when misapplied. It is therefore necessary

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[41] Nagy 1999: 287 (§10n.6), 309, etc.

[42] νείκεσσεν at 4.336 and 368 marks Agamemnon's words in both cases as blame-speech.

[43] In the first place, by fostering order, and in the second—but no less significantly—by managing horsemanship. Keeping chariots in line is a key symbol of order (*kosmos*) in the *Iliad*; this theme is the essence of the story of Asios (which I intend to explore in a separate essay), who is himself a foil for Hektor. It is therefore not coincidental that the chief exponent of *ainos* is also the principal expert on the handling of horses (cf. Bader 1980: 16 and n.20, with references).

[44] For the former view, see Walsh (forthcoming): 148-9. If we consider what Diomedes and Odysseus themselves have to say, it would seem that blame is correctly applied in one case and incorrectly in the other.

to find some touchstone with which to distinguish good blame from bad blame, the constructive from the solvent. And what better test could the *Iliad* apply for the social solvency of an utterance than the very representatives of socially constructive speech?

Diomedes and Odysseus provide the touchstone, and their duality, their complementarity, allows them to reveal both the good and the bad aspects of Agamemnon's use of blame-speech.[45] That is one way, at least, of explaining their very different reactions. Odysseus' explosive response is that Agamemnon's *neikos* is utterly inappropriate. Literally, he asserts that the king has "uttered words empty as the wind" (ἀνεμώλια βάζεις, 4.355)—the phrase belongs to a system of formulas that (as a rule in the *Iliad*, and generally in the *Odyssey*) express an evaluation (usually negative) of the validity of an illocutionary act.[46] He asserts, in other words, that Agamemnon's use of the genre of *neikos* is situationally invalid.[47] Agamemnon promptly corrects the generic content of his speech by foreswearing *neikos*. In essence, he admits that the genre would

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[45] Walsh (forthcoming): 160n.31 notes the way "the Diomedes and Odysseus sections respond to each other."

[46] Note especially ἄρτια βάζειν in Odysseus' critique of Agamemnon's proposal to retreat (14.92—cf. in a closely related context *Od.* 8.240) and πεπνυμένα βάζεις, Nestor's positive evaluation of Diomedes' proposal, but in a context which is overall critical (9.58). The only other occurrence of the verb *bazô* in the *Iliad* is 16.207, where it is used without a qualified substantive to mean simply formal speech in an assembly (cf. *Od.* 3.127 and 11.511). I would single out two other significant instances of the verb in the *Odyssey*. First, note that it can take as its object a generic term for blame-speech: ὀνείδεα βάζεις, 17.461 (observe the same correlation between *bazô* and blame-speech at Hes. *Op.* 186). Note also the formula μεταμώνια βάζεις (18.332 = 392), where *metamônios* is semantically parallel (at least in the ancient understanding: cf. LSJ s.v.) to *anemôlios*. This formula, I suggest, explains Agamemnon's answer to Odysseus: τὰ δὲ πάντα θεοὶ μεταμώνια θεῖεν (*Il.* 4.363). By a kind of formulaic cross-reference, Agamemnon acknowledges (and implicitly accepts) Odysseus' critique.

[47] In Austin's terms, he identifies Agamemnon's *neikos* as a "Misapplication" (Austin 1975: 34: "The particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked"). In responding to Agamemnon, Odysseus speaks of himself as Τηλεμάχοιο φίλον πατέρα προμάχοισι μιγέντα (4.354). I note this emphasis on his participation in a cohesive network of social forces along two axes simultaneously: 'horizontally,' as a soldier on the front lines, and 'vertically,' as father of Telemakhos. Of course, this rare teknonymy is also a method of avoiding the prohibition against mentioning one's own name (see Muellner 1976: 74n.9).

indeed be incorrectly applied in this situation—which, he confesses, is one of true cohesion:

οὔτε σε <u>νεικείω</u> περιώσιον οὔτε κελεύω·
οἶδα[48] γὰρ ὥς τοι θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν
<u>ἤπια</u>[49] δήνεα οἶδε· τὰ γὰρ φρονέεις ἅ τ' ἐγώ περ.
4.359-61

I do not <u>blame</u> you to excess, nor do I command:
for I know that the *thumos* in your dear chest knows
counsels that are in accord [with mine]; for you think even as I myself.

Agamemnon's use of the word *êpios* is telling. This same word is used by Zeus to signal his 'reconciliation' with Athena in Book 22; as we will see in Chapter 5 (pp. 229-30), *êpioi* enjoy a state of cohesion that is virtually a precondition for consensus; in any case, it is antithetical to the situation that produces *neikos*. Agamemnon thus declares that it would be strictly impossible for him to blame Odysseus in earnest; Odysseus' critique compels him to convert his invalid *neikos* (again, his speech is marked as such by the narrator) into an assertion of solidarity.

In the case of Odysseus, then, the test applied by the narrative appears to reveal Agamemnon's *neikos* to be invalid, misapplied—thus potentially disruptive—and therefore in need of correction in the form of a reassertion of social unity. In the case of Diomedes, the test yields opposite results. At any rate, Diomedes' reaction is certainly

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[48] Cf. above, n. 39, on the conventional use of *oida* to assert (here, acknowledge) that a given illocutionary act is situationally inappropriate.

[49] As Edmunds 1990 has shown, the meaning and usage of *nêpios* and *êpios* are interdependent. Now, in connection with my comments above on the expression ἀνεμώλια βάζεις, I note the existence of another *bazô* formula, νήπια βάζεις (*Od.* 4.32). That is to say, the diction of this passage (*anemôlia, neike(i)ô, êpios, metamônia*) is drawn from a strictly circumscribed lexicon that relates to the socially constructive (or destructive) use of language. The inclusion of *êpios* in this lexicon, which also implies a kind of syntax, prompts me to wonder why we do not have any attestations of a formula **êpia baz-*. I hope to pursue this question on another occasion; for now, I note that this hypothetical formula would be metrically and semantically equivalent to the attested *artia baz-*.

the opposite of Odysseus': while the latter had responded angrily (ὑπόδρα ἰδών,[50] 4.349), the former is shamed (αἰδεσθείς, 4.402) into silence.[51] *His* anger (ὑπόδρα ἰδών, 4.411) is in fact reserved for his comrade Sthenelos, who goes one step further than Odysseus in declaring Agamemnon's words to be, not a misuse of generic conventions, but outright falsehoods (ψεῦδε', 4.404). Diomedes, for his part, feels that Agamemnon's utterance, regardless of its truth, *is* situationally appropriate, since the concrete results it is designed to produce are adequate to Agamemnon's social position (415-6). In other words, Diomedes affirms the social function of blame, which he judges to be correctly applied in the present instance. Interestingly, he voices this affirmation not to Agamemnon, but to Sthenelos; he remains 'silent' vis-à-vis the king. It is well worth considering this silence in relation to the masterful rhetoric of Agamemnon, who has constructed his rebuke so that no verbal response is possible (perhaps he has learned something about the power of criticism from his encounter with Odysseus). Agamemnon bases his *neikos* on a story about Diomedes' father, Tydeus. This story narrates Tydeus' excellence both in the socially constructive use of speech (Tydeus receives *epainos* at Mycenae for his proposal to mount an assault on Thebes) and in combat (having bested the Thebans in *athloi*,[52] he single-handedly liquidates an ambush party of 50 disgruntled Cadmeians). Diomedes, Agamemnon claims, is worse than his father in battle—ἀγορῇ δέ τ' ἀμείνω (4.400). In point of fact, neither of Agamemnon's assertions has yet been

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[50] See Walsh (forthcoming): 149-50 for this phrase as an expression of Homeric *kholos*.

[51] *Aidôs* is characteristic of the attitudes of younger men toward their elders (Ferrari 1990: 190-4). This reaction is therefore appropriate to Diomedes, whose youth is often stressed.

[52] The story is a multiform for Odysseus among the Phaeacians: in *Od.* 8 Odysseus, like Tydeus, does not fear to compete in *athloi*, even though he is an isolated *xenos*. This story of Tydeus thus reveals the hostile undertones of *Od.* 8.

borne out by the narrative of the *Iliad* (although the latter part of his remark may well refer to Diomedes' general reputation as a specialist of *ainos*). The bind for Diomedes is that, if he should now counter Agamemnon's *neikos* by asserting, as Odysseus, that it is an abusive, socially disruptive use of speech—that is, by positioning himself as arbiter of what is socially constructive—he will only prove that aspect in which he is "better than his father." (Note that, while Tydeus does attain *epainos*, that *epainos* is invalidated by Zeus [4.381]; he therefore fails to achieve lasting consensus in the same way as Agamemnon in Book 3.) By implication, he would also prove that he is "worse than his father" in other respects. Diomedes has no choice but to respond not in word but in deed. And so, even as Diomedes suggests to Sthenelos, Agamemnon's utterance does prove to be efficient, for it produces its desired effect: the very next book opens with the beginning of Diomedes' *aristeia*. Diomedes thus proves his worth in battle, and only subsequently, in Book 9, proves that he also surpasses his father in his ability to achieve *epainos*.[53]

I have made the case that Diomedes' success at attaining *epainos*, which may strike us as unexpected, makes more sense if we understand his position in a set of 'specialists' of *ainos*, that is, of social cohesion as established by the proper performance of speech acts. I have made this case purely through empirical observation of the complementarity defining the relationships between Diomedes, Odysseus, and

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[53] Diomedes in fact cites Agamemnon's *neikos* as a kind of justification for his first proposal in Book 9: ἀλκὴν μέν μοι πρῶτον ὀνείδισας ἐν Δαναοῖσι, 9.34. Note that this assertion (πρῶτον) is not strictly true, *unless* we consider Agamemnon's *neikos* of Odysseus to be invalid. Once again we find a declaration of what is 'known' as a way of criticizing an illocutionary act (9.35-6). Diomedes' phrase μαχήσομαι . . . ἀγορῇ (32-3) is an ironic reference to Agamemnon's χέρεια μάχη. ἀγορῇ δέ τ' ἀμείνω (4.400). Here in Book 9, Diomedes at last proves that he has surpassed his father in *both* respects. Note, finally, that Diomedes also cites Tydeus at 14.113 ff., in the context of a counter-proposal to Agamemnon's plan of retreat. I will suggest shortly that Diomedes' connection to his father makes him appropriate as a specialist of *ainos*; the story of the *epainos* for Tydeus at Mycenae is an important part of this connection.

Nestor—above all between the first two. These observations have incorporated

Diomedes into an intelligible framework, but they do not suffice as an explanation for

why Diomedes, and not some other, should occupy this position. In answering the

question with which I began this discussion, I take my cue from the connection I have

just noted between Diomedes and his father. In both scenes where Diomedes intervenes

in the decision-making process, his paternity is explicitly thematized.[54] Ancestry, of

course, is important for all Homeric heroes (Achilles' connection with Peleus is central to

the thematics of the *Iliad*[55]), and it is an important component of the Diomedes character

in particular, figuring prominently, for example, in the episode with Glaukos (6.215 ff.).

But the fact that this paternal connection is explicitly evoked by Diomedes (twice) at the

moment of pronouncing an *ainos* suggests that it may have some special relevance in

contexts where social cohesion is at stake. Indeed, as I noted above, when Odysseus

refutes Agamemnon's *neikos* by declaring that he will do his part to engage the

Trojans—an expression of solidarity with the army—he employs a rare teknonymy to

emphasize simultaneously his 'vertical' connection to his descendants (4.354).[56]

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[54] Cf. previous note. I suggest that in Book 9 Diomedes may intend a jab at Agamemnon by alluding to the story of Tydeus told by Agamemnon in Book 4. He refers to Agamemnon's ships, αἵ τοι ἕποντο Μυκήνηθεν μάλα πολλαί (9.44): Tydeus sought troops from Mycenae, but did not receive them; Agamemnon brings such troops without even having to seek *epainos* (they follow because he is their king)—and yet he is contemplating abandoning the war. But regardless of whether this is an intentional allusion, the question of Diomedes' relation to his father is raised by Diomedes' recollection of Agamemnon's *neikos*.

[55] In point of fact, the father-son relationship is central to Homeric epic in general. Achilles and Peleus represent the same essential theme (the separation of father and son) as Telemakhos and Odysseus. Palmer 1963: 79 is crucial: "there is no difficulty about Πηλεύς since this contains merely the Aeolic form of the first component corresponding to Attic τηλε-, so that it can be classified within the given morphological framework as the shortened form characterized by –εύς of a compound name such as Q^wηλέμαχος."

[56] Cf. above, n. 47. Notice the same teknonymy—the technique seems peculiar to Odysseus—at the moment he reestablishes consensus among the Achaeans by silencing Thersites (μηδ' ἔτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατήρ κεκλημένος εἴην, 2.260). Here, the device is *not* motivated by the prohibition against mentioning one's own name, since Odysseus does so in the previous line.

Likewise, in Book 10, as the complementarity of the three *ainos*-specialists is being

marshaled to shore up Achaean solidarity, Agamemnon cites Nestor's ancestral

connection to the younger soldiers as the key to his ability to ensure the solidity of their

defenses:

κείνῳ γάρ κε μάλιστα πιθοίατο· τοῖο γὰρ υἱὸς
σημαίνει φυλάκεσσι . . .

10.56-7

They will be especially sure to obey him, for his son
has command of the guards . . .

All this suggests that people who enjoy strong 'vertical' bonds within their

families—who act successfully to ensure the continuity of generations—may also be

particularly adept at strengthening the 'horizontal' bonds within a synchronic

community.[57]

In fact, when we ask ourselves what the diverse figures of Nestor, Odysseus, and

Diomedes—the wizened councilor, the wily trickster, and the bold youth—all have in

common, surely the first (if not the only) answer that suggests itself is that these three

heroes, in contrast to the vast majority of their peers, participate in a generally positive

succession of generations. At the very least we can say that these are the three Homeric

heroes whose stories place particular emphasis on the process or fact of succession itself.

And though it may be going too far to say that this succession is in every case

unproblematic—Tydeus died early enough that Diomedes cannot even remember him

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[57] Note also Diomedes' interest in preserving hereditary succession in the Thersites story discussed above
(plainly, in the case of royal succession, there is a direct connection between the vertical bonds of the
family and the horizontal bonds of the community); and the fact that Odysseus transmits the arms of
Achilles to Neoptolemos in the *Ilias Parva*. The clearest statement of the interdependence of vertical and
horizontal cohesion is Hes. *Op.* 182-3: οὐδὲ πατὴρ παίδεσσιν ὁμοίιος οὐδέ τι παῖδες. / οὐδὲ ξεῖνος
ξεινοδόκῳ καὶ ἑταῖρος ἑταίρῳ. Hesiod's iron race must work as hard to forge consensus as to harvest
agricultural products.

(6.222; but note that this memory gap does not affect the generational continuity

emphasized by Diomedes)—it is always indisputably positive. The success of the

Epigonoi is one of the great emblems of filial fulfillment in archaic Greek culture.[58]

Nestor—whose lifetime unites three generations—is the very embodiment of

generational integrity.[59] Similarly, the *Odyssey* expresses the final reunification of the

family—correlated poetically with Telemakhos' final accession to full adulthood—by

presenting the three generations of Arkeisiads side by side.[60] Each of our three specialists

of social cohesion is also connected in a positive way to those who come before and after

him.

Notice, however, that each occupies a different position on the generational

continuum. Facing the families of the Suitors with his father and son, Odysseus stands

squarely in the middle of the age spectrum. Nestor, for his part, is the consummate father

figure, while Diomedes is the ideal son.[61] Now, as *Odyssey* 24 shows, Odysseus can be

presented either as father or as son, but the *Odyssey* as a whole and Homeric tradition

generally focuses on the former aspect.[62] This orientation aligns him with Nestor—and

puts him, to a certain extent, at odds with Diomedes, who falls together instead with

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[58] Put to notable use in Pindar's *Pythian* 8.

[59] Cf. Thomas 1989: 124 ff.: in classical Athens, three generations represented a 'complete' genealogy; the figure is perhaps determined by the span of "'living memory'" (129).

[60] This image of three generations standing side by side in the battle line (cf. 24.515) presents the same combination of 'vertical' and 'horizontal' connectivity as Odysseus' response to Agamemnon (*Il.* 4.354), noted above. Recall that the first step on Telemakhos' road to adulthood is to establish a connection with Nestor—and Nestor's son.

[61] Cf. the comments of Rabel 1991: 288 on the dialogue between Nestor and Diomedes in Book 10: "Nestor and Diomedes banter almost playfully in the style of parent and recalcitrant child . . ."

[62] Note that Aristophanes and Aristarchus fixed the end of the *Odyssey* at 23.296 (cf. Eustathius 1948, and the scholia ad loc.), thus excluding the most pronounced presentation of Odysseus as son.

Telemakhos. In fact, Susan Edmunds documents a number of connections between

Diomedes and Telemakhos, both sons of absent fathers who struggle to come into their

own.[63] The relationship between sons and fathers is ideally characterized by cooperation,

but it is often fraught with tension, even antagonism—as is vividly shown by

Telemakhos' double, Telegonus.[64] That is to say, the father-son relationship is a premier

example of the kind of complementarity that we have seen to define the relationship

between Odysseus and Diomedes. The alternating antagonism and partnership of these

two heroes can therefore be explained by their relative positions on the generational

continuum. The same factor—viz. connection to one's ancestors /

descendants—accounts not only for the specialization of Nestor, Odysseus, and

Diomedes in the social cohesion of *ainos*, but also for the peculiarly complementary

relationship which bonds Diomedes and Odysseus in particular.

One final word remains to be said on this connection between *ainos* and

generational continuity. Three Greek heroes, as I have pointed out, exhibit an affinity for

both. On the Trojan side, we find obvious father-figures (Priam, perhaps Hektor) and

sons (above all Hektor), but when it comes to Laomedon's line, certainly the poem places

the strongest emphasis on its imminent termination—the failure of continuity. If we ask

ourselves who on the Trojan side could stand as a representative of the truly positive,

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[63] Edmunds 1990: 38 ff.

[64] The cyclic *Nostoi* related how Telegonos, after killing Odysseus, married Penelope, while Telemakhos married Kirkê (fr. IX Allen). This story, with all its tension, is alluded to in the *Odyssey* by the suggestion that Telemakhos might string the bow and 'win' Penelope for himself (21.114-7). A few lines later we find the motif of the climactic 'fourth attempt,' and the indication (via a "reversal" passage) that Telemakhos *will* in fact string the bow: Nagy 1999: 143-4 ties this motif to ritual antagonism in the case of Achilles / Patroklos and Apollo.

flourishing continuity of generations, we must turn instead to the one Trojan figure whose

lineage is projected beyond the end of the *Iliad*.[65] This is the descendant of Dardanos,

ὃν Κρονίδης περὶ πάντων φίλατο παίδων
οἳ ἕθεν ἐξεγένοντο γυναικῶν τε θνητάων.
ἤδη γὰρ Πριάμου γενεὴν ἔχθηρε Κρονίων·
νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείαο βίη Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει
καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται.
20.304-8

> whom the son of Kronos has come to cherish above all the children
> born from his unions with mortal women.
> For already has Kronos' son conceived a hatred for the line of Priam,
> and now Aeneas will rule over the Trojans,
> and the children of his children, who will come hereafter.

(Note that this passage contrasts the continuity of Aeneas' line with the termination of

Priam's.) Now, Aeneas' connection with the type of social cohesion embodied by the

figures of Diomedes, Odysseus, and Nestor goes far beyond his family ties. In the first

place, he too is a master of the art of speaking: he seems uniquely able to go head-to-head

with the greatest performer of *muthoi* on the Achaean side, Achilles.[66] More importantly,

his very name signifies the mode of *ainos*: *Aineias* is in fact derived from *ainê*, an Ionic

biform of *ainos*.[67] He is not merely a specialist of *ainos*—he is its personification. He

represents, therefore, a potential talisman of cohesion for the Trojans, like Odysseus and

his colleagues—or like Achilles himself. His Achillean dispute with Priam (referred to at

13.460) and his removal from the scene after his encounter with Achilles in Book 20 are

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[65] Cf. Nagy 1999: 269.

[66] For Aeneas' verbal duel with Achilles, see Nagy 1999: 270-4, and cf. my comments below, Ch. 5 p. 253. For Achilles as master performer, see Martin 1989: Ch. 4.

[67] Meister 1921: 156-7; Nagy 1999: 274. *Aineias* is to *ainê* as *Augeias* (as at *Il.* 11.701) is to *augê*. Ionic *ainê* is attested in Herodotus; Crusius (*RE* s.v. *ainos* 10) glosses the Herodotean ἐν αἴνῃ εἶναι as "im Gerede sein." For the possibility that Vergil plays on a perceived connection between Aeneas' name and *ainos* (in which case we should consider the possibility that such a connection figured in Hellenistic Homer criticism), see Foster 1996.

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symptomatic of the Trojans' general lack of the kind of unity that represents triumph for

the Greeks.

Chapter 5

Consensus and the Constitution of Tradition

I have more than once had occasion to point out that the *Iliad* tends to avoid naming *(ep)ainos* in any context relating to Achilles or to the 'monumental theme' of his quarrel with Agamemnon—despite the fact that this quarrel is quintessentially a matter of the failure of *ainos*, that is, of socially constructive speech. Nowhere is this lack more acutely felt than in Book 19, which describes the formal end of Achilles' wrath. Prompted by his mother, Achilles now 'renounces his *mênis*' and rejoins the warrior *Männerbund*. These two are actually conceived by Thetis as aspects of the same movement:

> ἀλλὰ σύ γ' εἰς ἀγορὴν καλέσας ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς
> <u>μῆνιν ἀποειπὼν</u> Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαῶν
> αἶψα μάλ' <u>ἐς πόλεμον θωρήσσεο</u>.[1] δύσεο δ' ἀλκήν.
> 19.34-6

> But now call summon the Achaean heroes to the *agorê*,
> <u>foreswear your *mênis*</u> for Agamemnon shepherd of the people,
> quickly <u>arm for battle</u> and gird yourself with valor.

The subsequent assembly provides a juridical conclusion to the dispute, complete with oath and sacrifice (comparable, I suggest, to the prayer and sacrifice that conclude the episode of Apollo's *mênis* in Book 1).[2] Given that this marks both the end to a quarrel

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[1] Note that *thôrêssô* means both 'arm oneself' (in the middle, as here) and 'call to arms,' i.e. 'assemble the *Männerbund*' (in the active, as at 16.155, Μυρμιδόνας δ' ἄρ' ἐποιχόμενος θώρηξεν Ἀχιλλεὺς).

[2] In addition to the juridical solemnity of the oath and the persistent emphasis on publicity, which is an essential component of any juridical act in an oral society (cf. Pringsheim 1950: 18-9), note that Agamemnon calls for explicitly legal recognition of his formal reconciliation: Πηλείδη μὲν ἐγὼν ἐνδείξομαι· αὐτὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι / σύνθεσθ' Ἀργεῖοι. μῦθόν τ' εὖ γνῶτε ἕκαστος (19.83-4; for the legal force of *gignôskô*, see above, Ch. 3 n. 22).

formerly characterized by the negation of *ainos* and Achilles' return to the battlefield, hence the restoration of the *philotês* of warrior society, we should expect to find some recognition in terms of *(ep)ainos* that Achaean society has been, in effect, reconstituted. However, despite the fact that Book 19 is indeed marked as a climactically (re)constructive moment, signs persist that Achilles' reintegration is less than complete; and *epainos* is still deferred.

That this assembly represents a climactic moment in the social life of the Achaeans cannot be mistaken, for the text depicts it as a singular event, without parallel in the prior history of the war: even those who had on all previous occasions remained by the ships—the *kubernêtai* 'steersmen' and the *tamiai* 'stewards'[3]—assemble in the *agorê* in response to Achilles' summons. The phraseology of that summons likewise indicates its significance as an act that (re)constitutes the *Männerbund*. Thetis had instructed Achilles to 'call the Achaean *hêrôes*' (εἰς ἀγορὴν καλέσας ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς, 19.34); Homeric diction regularly uses *kaleô* in the context of summoning an assembly.[4] But when the poem narrates the act itself, the phraseology changes: ὦρσεν δ' ἥρωας Ἀχαιούς ("he stirred the Achaean heroes," 19.41). One can guess at the meaningfulness of this change simply by observing the fact that, in virtually every other instance in the *Iliad* (and the instances are not few), ὦρσε(ν) takes as its subject a god.[5] This fact makes

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[3] The conceit relies on an exaggerated distinction between the literal and symbolic meanings of *kubernêtês* and *tamiês*. The text pretends that these are merely support personnel whose previous absence from the *agorê* is due to the fact that they are inessential to the day-to-day functioning of the army. On a symbolic level, however, both *kubernêtês* and *tamiês* represent good governance and social order, and on this level their former absence follows from the fact that true order has thus far been wanting; their participation on this occasion means that order is to be re-established.

[4] E.g. 2.55, 9.11.

[5] Of 32 occurrences in Prendergast's concordance (Prendergast 1971), only two have a human as subject. One of these exceptions is clearly relevant to Achilles' act in Book 19, and seems determined by the

Agamemnon's formal request to Achilles to reenter the battle—ἀλλ' ὄρσεο πόλεμόνδε, καὶ ἄλλους ὄρνυθι λαούς ("stir yourself for battle, and <u>stir</u> the other <u>laoi</u>," 19.139)—all the more striking. These words are already endowed with considerable prominence by virtue of the fact, noted by commentators, that they are the first words Agamemnon addresses directly to Achilles in his lengthy speech.[6] More, they are the first words that Agamemnon addresses to Achilles *since the breakdown of* ainos *in Book 1.* At this climactic moment at which Agamemnon first reaches out to Achilles verbally, we find the collocation of *ornûmi* and *laos* (exceedingly rare in a poem which makes frequent use of both terms[7]); it is precisely this collocation that endows the phraseology of assembly with special significance. As Mühlestein has noted, the Homeric ὄρνυθι λαούς represents a traditional syntagm of considerable antiquity, which is expressed also in the Mycenaean personal name *e-ti-ra-wo = Erti-lawos*, the exact equivalent of Homeric *Laertes*.[8] Laertes is, in a way, the key to the social significance of Book 19: Odysseus' father is the *Odyssey*'s representative of sociality, and it is by virtue of *his* reintegration

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mythical capability of the withdrawn hero to 'rouse' the host: αὐτὰρ 'Αχαιούς / ὦρσε Μενοιτιάδεω Πατροκλῆος λάσιον κῆρ (16.553-4; note that the epithet *lasios* is used also of Achilles at 1.189, and is otherwise applied only to the Trojan ally Pulaimenês, who is unceremoniously eliminated from the action at 5.576, in the Catalogue [2.851]). The other example of ὦρσε(ν) with a human subject is 13.362 ('Ιδομενεὺς Τρώεσσι μετάλμενος ἐν φόβον ὦρσεν)—note, however, that here the hero does not 'rouse' his own troops, but 'stirs' fear in his enemy.

[6] Cf. Edwards 1991 ad 19.76-84, 78-84, 83.

[7] Ajax uses the same formula in urging Teukros, after his bowstring has broken, to enter the mêlée (μάρναό τε Τρώεσσι καὶ ἄλλους ὄρνυθι λαούς, 15.475). The only other remotely comparable—but still significantly distinct—formulation is at 2.450-2.

[8] Mühlestein 1987: 24; see also von Kamptz 1982: 77. Equivalent, but with *o*-ablaut, is 'Ορσίλαος (as at Plut. *Mor.* 825b; cf. García-Ramón 1992: 240). The Homeric text attests a parallel compound 'Ορσ(τ)ίλοχος (5.542, 546, etc.), as well as Θερσίλοχος (17.216, 21.209), which is a close semantic match. In light of the syntactic and syntagmatic correspondence of 'Ορσί-/-τί- and Θερσί-, I note 19.37, μένος πολυθαρσές ἐνῆκε, which describes the 'mentality' Thetis inspires in Achilles just before he calls the assembly—a mentality which therefore seems requisite for such an action. Note as well the role of Thersites in the overall process of establishing order in the assembly in Book 2. (For a different interpretation of the semantics of Θερσί- in Book 2, see Nagy 1999: 260.)

into the social structure that community is finally reconstituted on Ithaca.[9] (Odysseus'

reintegration accomplishes only the reestablishment of order within the *oikos*; thus the

necessity for Book 24.) We should note, however, that the community at stake is not

'civil' society but the warrior's *Männerbund*: as can be demonstrated on the basis of the

Linear B texts, the *laos*, as opposed to the *dêmos*, is precisely the warrior class

corresponding to the second function of the Dumézilian model.[10] Thus the ultimate locus

of Odyssean reintegration is not an assembly but the battle line, and the climactic

moment Laertes' spear cast.[11]

Nevertheless, in spite of several signs that the assembly of Book 19 represents the

definitive rehabilitation of the Achaean social body,[12] there are as many or more that

suggest to the contrary some lingering discord.[13] Of these, I single out two—first and

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[9] Note that, as in the *Iliad*, the embodiment of sociality is characterized throughout the narrative proper precisely by his asociality (cf. *Od.* 11.187-8).

[10] Lejeune 2001: 227-8 (originally published in 1965).

[11] *Od.* 24.517 ff. Note that when Athena puts a stop to the battle, there is only one *laos*: κατὰ δ' ἔσχεθε λαὸν ἅπαντα (24.530). Contrast this with the division—indicated by *handanô*—that marks the (unresolved) assembly, from which *half* (or slightly more) of the Ithacans embark on an expedition against Odysseus: ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἀνήϊξαν μεγάλῳ ἀλαλητῷ / ἡμίσεων πλείους· τοὶ δ' ἀθρόοι αὐτόθι μίμνον· / οὐ γάρ σφιν ἅδε μῦθος ἐνὶ φρεσίν. ἀλλ' Εὐπείθει / πείθοντ'· (24.463-6).

[12] In addition to those signs described above, I note the phraseology that describes the gathering: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντες ἀολλίσθησαν Ἀχαιοί (19.54). This phrase bears an obvious resemblance to πάντες ἐπευφήμησαν Ἀχαιοί, and moreover fits the 'efficient' metrical pattern I identified in Chapter 1 (see above, p. 36). More important than metrical or phonological similarities, however, is the use of the Aeolicism ἀολλίσθησαν. This verb (which appears 4 times in the *Iliad*) is very strictly localized in a single position in the hexameter—the same position as the related adjective *aollees*. This suggests that use of the verb is subject to very rigid traditional restrictions. I noted above (Ch. 1, p. 52) that, in the cognate diction of Alcaeus, *aollees* is correlated with *epaineô*. Taken together, these metrical and phraseological patterns suggest that πάντες ἀολλίσθησαν Ἀχαιοί carries traditional connotations of social coordination and harmony.

[13] I note, without developing an analysis, the often-commented on emphasis given to the fact that Agamemnon does not deliver his conciliatory speech from the customary position of public declaration (οὐδ' ἐν μέσσοισιν ἀναστάς, 19.77; see Edwards 1991 for a survey of critical assessments). We know from the work of Detienne 1996: 91-102 how essential the *meson* is to the constitution of community; not until Book 23 is the proper force of the community's central space recuperated. It is also worth noting

foremost, the lack of any reference to *(ep)ainos* in the context either of the speeches of the two men seeking to reestablish community through speech or of the reactions of the group that witnesses the reconciliation. Of course, the utterances of Achilles and Agamemnon are addressed primarily to each other and not to the group, so there seems to be little call for *epainos*. All the same, the only reception formula we find in the scene draws attention to the absence of *epainos* by virtue of its divergence from the system I have outlined and by its own distinctive function within the poem. Despite the fact that Achilles' formal renunciation of *mênis* has important consequences for the community as a whole, the witnesses to his illocution do not respond with any active display; we are told only of their internal reaction:

ὣς ἔφαθ'. οἳ δ' ἐχάρησαν ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
μῆνιν ἀπειπόντος μεγαθύμου Πηλεΐωνος.
19.74-5

Thus he spoke, and the well-greaved Achaeans <u>felt *kharis*</u>
at the great-hearted son of Peleus' foreswearing of *mênis*.

This reception formula occurs on only one other occasion in the *Iliad*, comparison with which is instructive. In Book 3, Menelaos agrees to the duel proposed by Alexander and stipulates that sacrifices should be brought by both sides to sollemnify the pact, at which the assembled soldiers experience a similar *kharis*:

ὣς ἔφαθ'. οἳ δ' ἐχάρησαν Ἀχαιοί τε Τρῶές τε
ἐλπόμενοι παύσασθαι ὀϊζυροῦ πολέμοιο.
3.111-2

Thus he spoke, and the Achaeans and Trojans felt *kharis*
in the expectation of relief from woeful war.

Achilles' ambivalence toward the gifts that *should* restore the proper functioning of the potlatch (19.147-8); again, the full restoration of the distributive system is accomplished only in Book 23.

In both instances we are dealing with a response to an utterance that seems to offer the possibility of an end to a destructive conflict. In Book 3, however—where the response *is* efficient, insofar as it indicates an agreement that results in action—the impression of an avoidance of *epainos* is even stronger. The very efficiency of the response means that pragmatically the situation admits, even calls for, *epainos*. But notice that we have here perhaps the poem's single instance of unity of sentiment among Trojans and Achaeans (who are elsewhere unified only by their common enmity); as I pointed out in Chapter 1, *epainos* is, as a rule, limited to the Achaeans (and the gods). When we return shortly to the way the agreement setting the terms of the duel plays out in the transition from Book 3 to Book 4, after the apparent victory of Menelaos, we will see that the poem explicitly raises the question of whether *epainos*—the efficacy of which, by virtue of the social dynamics outlined in Chapter 2, is coextensive with the group that defines it—actually could have an effect that carries across the boundary between groups. In the light of this questioning of the possibility of an inter-societal consensus, οἳ δ' ἐχάρησαν 'Αχαιοί τε Τρῶές τε can only seem like a place-holder for an *epainos* that the episode as a whole problematizes (and ultimately finds wanting).[14] On the basis of the *khairô* formula's usage in Book 3, I suggest that in Book 19, where it similarly expresses the reaction of a group whose unity is still in question, this formula likewise takes the place of an *epainos* about which the poem remains skeptical.

The deferral of *epainos* goes hand in hand with the second major sign that the Achaean social order has not yet been fully restored, namely, Achilles' refusal to

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[14] The situation is made more complex by the fact that Hektor's original formulation of the agreement had met with silence (ὣς ἔφαθ'. οἱ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἀκὴν ἐγένοντο σιωπῇ, 3.95). This is a signal that, although the proposal results in action in the short term, in the long term the agreement will fail.

participate in the meal on which Odysseus insists as a conclusion to the assembly and

prelude to battle.[15] Odysseus argues that the army should take their *deipnon*, their

morning or midday meal, before entering battle (19.171); otherwise they risk being

overcome by hunger. Achilles counters that the urgency of the situation does not allow

time for feasting, and that the Achaeans can enjoy a *dorpon*, an evening meal, after they

have exacted revenge (19.208). The issue at stake is not just practical or strategic, but

has a symbolic value as well. As Mackie has shown, the *deipnon* characteristically

concludes the 'proper' assemblies of the Achaeans, which normally take place in the

morning, while the Trojans typically end their *evening* gatherings with a *dorpon*.[16] In

Book 2, a *deipnon* follows Odysseus' reestablishment of *epainos* in the assembly (cf.

2.381), after which the Greeks muster for battle. We may presume that this paradigm lies

in the background of Book 19—it is as though Odysseus is attempting to repeat his

earlier success, perhaps this time integrating the Myrmidons into the Catalogue of

Ships[17]—but the lead-up to battle diverges in two crucial respects from the model of

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[15] Cf. Seaford 1994: 159-60. Although Achilles apparently participates in a communal meal at 23.48, Seaford points out that the text also suggests that Achilles does not actually end his fast until his meal with Priam (I do not follow this author, however, in seeing this 'inconsistency' as a trace of multiple 'versions'). I find it significant that the poem does not present the formulaic scene of the preparation of a meal proper (as opposed to the sacrifice described at 23.29-34) until 24.621 ff.

[16] Mackie 1996: 24. These differences in timing and ritual are the two principal practices of Trojan assembly that seem to Mackie "abnormal, unorthodox, or possibly just less political in nature than those endorsed by the Achaeans" (23). At 130, Mackie notes that in the *Iliad* only the Achaeans conduct a *dais*, which is a premier symbol of social order as expressed by the equal division of sacrificial portions. The dysfunctional nature of an evening assembly is stressed by Nestor in his miniature *Nostoi*: τὼ δὲ καλεσσαμένω ἀγορὴν ἐς πάντας ᾿Αχαιούς. / μάψ. ἀτὰρ οὐ κατὰ κόσμον. ἐς ἠέλιον καταδύντα (*Od.* 3.137-8).

[17] The Myrmidons' entry in the Catalogue is displaced to 16.168, when they finally muster for battle. This displacement of diegetic elements that, in a sense, demand reintegration is identical to the displacement of episodes in the *Odyssey*, where the reintegration, in the collaborative narrative of Penelope and Odysseus (23.302 ff.), of what the poem recounts in a very disjointed fashion marks the final reunion of the lovers. We seem to be dealing with a general technique of Homeric epos that allows the poetry to mark reintegration in terms of the units of its own discourse. Note, however, that the *Iliad* never gives us a unified Catalogue.

Book 2, viz. the absence of *epainos* and of a description of the sacrificial feast as we see

it at 2.421 ff. Such descriptions provide a sense of resolution at other key moments in the

poem, above all at the conclusion of the episode of Apollo's *mênis* (1.458 ff.).[18] If that

episode provides a microcosmic model for the process of crisis resolution (see above, Ch.

3 pp. 93-4), the absence of such a description here should indicate that the process

remains in some sense incomplete. Although Achilles ultimately relents and allows the

Achaeans their *deipnon*, the poem emphasizes that he himself abstains, even against the

litai of his comrades, as though he has no recollection of the parable related by his

mentor Phoenix in Book 9.[19] The fact that the *deipnon* is not described is a pointed

reminder that this meal fails to integrate fully the community, as such meals should.[20]

Moreover, the fact that Achilles advocates an evening meal instead of the *deipnon* aligns

him with the non-socializing practice of the Trojans and indicates that the embodiment of

sociality still retains some residual volatility.

I suggested at the end of Chapter 3 that the *Iliad* faces a certain difficulty when it

comes to the quarrel that defines its plot. The plot of the poem is in a sense threatened by

epainos, the poem's ultimate value, since the reestablishment of consensus would

effectively bring an end to the tensions driving the narrative. This judgment emerged

solely from consideration of Achilles' dilemma in Book 1, which is resolved on one

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[18] Cf. Rabel 1988.479. Note also the sacrificial feast hosted by Agamemnon at the conclusion of the duel between Hektor and Ajax (7.314 ff.). As Nagy 1999: 28 emphasizes, this duel figures or substitutes for the combat between Hektor and Achilles.

[19] Or perhaps he *has* learned something, for now, instead of refusing *litai*, he counters with a *litê* of his own (19.305).

[20] Notice that Odysseus' first words to Achilles in the Embassy focus on the *daïs*—Odysseus recognizes that without a feast Achilles cannot be truly reintegrated.

plane, but only by the continuation of a static discord that propels the rest of the poem. In

Book 19—in the very speech that formally puts an end to his *mênis*—Achilles himself

confirms what we had merely inferred from the possibilities raised at the beginning of the

poem:

'Ατρεΐδη ἦ ἄρ τι τόδ' ἀμφοτέροισιν ἄρειον
ἔπλετο σοὶ καὶ ἐμοί, ὅ τε νῶΐ περ ἀχνυμένω κῆρ
θυμοβόρῳ ἔριδι μενεήναμεν εἵνεκα κούρης·
τὴν ὄφελ' ἐν νήεσσι κατακτάμεν "Αρτεμις ἰῷ
ἤματι τῷ ὅτ' ἐγὼν ἑλόμην Λυρνησσὸν ὀλέσσας·
τώ κ' οὐ τόσσοι 'Αχαιοὶ ὀδὰξ ἕλον ἄσπετον οὖδας
δυσμενέων ὑπὸ χερσὶν ἐμεῦ ἀπομηνίσαντος.
"Εκτορι μὲν καὶ Τρωσὶ τὸ κέρδιον·[21] <u>αὐτὰρ 'Αχαιοὺς</u>
<u>δηρὸν ἐμῆς καὶ σῆς ἔριδος μνήσεσθαι ὀίω.</u>

19.56-64

Son of Atreus, in what respect was it better for us two,
you and me, that we, grieved at heart,
raged with *thumos*-devouring *eris* over a girl?
Would that Artemis killed her in the ships with an arrow
on the day when I seized her after destroying Lurnêssos.
Then not so many Achaeans would have perished unspeakably
beneath the enemy's hands while I had *mênis*.
This was the better for Hektor and the Trojans; <u>but the Achaeans</u>
<u>will long recall our *eris*</u>, I expect.

That is, Achilles locates the value, questionable as it is, of his quarrel with Agamemnon

in the fact that it has provided the material for a poetic tradition, as though

acknowledging that without his *mênis* there would be no *Iliad*.[22] This brief metapoetic

reflection occurs at the precise moment that Achilles puts aside his *mênis*—but the *Iliad*

has not yet ended. If the problematic relation between *epainos* and the quarrel of

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[21] There is a certain ominous irony in this definition of the quarrel as *kerdion* for Hektor. *Kerdion* most
often occurs in counter-factual statements of what *would have been* better, in contrast with a present state
of disadvantage or disaster. (Interestingly, the hypothetical alternative is often agreement with advice that
was offered in the past—e.g. 5.201, 7.352.) Hektor himself will reflect on the tragedy of his own situation
in precisely these terms at 22.103, when he realizes that his imminent demise would have been prevented
had he followed Pouludamas' advice (cf. also 22.108). We will see shortly the crucial role that a unique
Trojan *epainos* plays in Hektor's downfall. It should already be clear, however, that to speak of Achilles'
wrath as *kerdion* for Hektor carries an ironic foreboding.

[22] For the poetic connotations of *mimnêskô*, cf. e.g. Nagy 1999: 304 (§4n.3).

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Achilles explains in general terms why the poem avoids naming *epainos* in connection with the 'monumental theme,' the fact that over five books remain to be narrated perhaps offers some suggestion of why *epainos* must be deferred even when the quarrel is, officially, ended. If *epainos* functions, in the *Iliad*'s poetics, as the ultimate resolution of tensions, it cannot occur prematurely, that is, prior to the end of the poem.

Such a formulation, however, would imply a negative relation between *epainos* and the plot of the poem: *epainos* would, on this view, represent the end of the poem, i.e. the negation of continued narration. But in fact Iliadic poetics assign to *epainos*, except in the case of Achilles, a fundamentally positive relation to the traditional plot of the poem—*epainos* is actually necessary to keep the poem going. This discrepancy between the situation of Achilles and the general operating principles of the *Iliad*'s poetic world suggests that there is more to the story, that the avoidance of *epainos* in relation to Achilles derives from deeper concerns than merely the desire to avoid a premature end to the tale. I will return to those concerns at the end of this chapter. Our first task is to explore the poetic function of *epainos*—that is, its value as a positive reinforcement of the poetic tradition.

After being evoked but held at bay by the phraseology of the assembly in Book 1, *epainos* makes its first explicit appearance in response to Odysseus' speech in the *diapeira*, Book 2's drama of dissolution and reintegration, an episode that has already emerged as paradigmatic. I have just now suggested that the pattern set by Book 2 lies in the background of Book 19; but earlier (Ch. 3, pp. 156 ff.) I stressed Book 2's function as a foil for the crisis that immediately precedes it, the *neikos* between Achilles and Agamemnon in Book 1. In both episodes Agamemnon expresses an intention that is

explicitly at odds with the social bonds that unite his army: in Book 1 he declares his

suspension of the social contract of potlatch, and in Book 2 he simply dismisses the host

(an act which would render void the contract entered into by Helen's suitors[23]; on a more

superficial level, we can note that in both cases the speech that provokes the crisis

releases a soldier or soldiers from their obligation to fight [cf. 1.179-80]). Of course,

Agamemnon's speech in Book 2 does not express a true intention, but represents rather

his attempt to 'test' the troops; by asserting that it is his customary right to do so (ἡ θέμις

ἐστί, 2.73), Agamemnon implies that such 'testing' is a normal, if not expected, act of

generalship. I do not wish to pursue the question of whether Agamemnon's strategy is

sound,[24] but I do note that his proposal creates a certain political paradox since, if the

troops assent, they will maintain agreement with their leader at the cost of disbanding the

Greek army, that is, of social disintegration; and if they dissent, they may well remain,

but they remain as an acephalous body, having mutinied against the commands of their

general. In this situation, a true consensus—an agreement that reaffirms the social

structure—is impossible. In any case, as Agamemnon's speech in Book 1 provoked

internal division in his addressee Achilles, so his test in Book 2 has an immediately

disintegrating, even atomizing, effect on his audience, an effect that can be observed in

the phraseology of reception: ὡς φάτο. τοῖσι δὲ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε / πᾶσι..

. ("thus he spoke, and he stirred the *thumos* of all in their chests," 2.142-3). Line 142 is a

modification of a formula that elsewhere *always* refers to the reaction of an individual to

a request or command, viz. ὡς φάτο. τῷ δ' ἄρα θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε ("thus he

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[23] For the contract, see Hes. Fr. 204.78-84 MW (I use the term 'contract' with an eye to the word σπονδῇ, l. 80). Note also the phrase ἀολλέας ὁρμηθῆνα[ι] (l. 83), and cf. above, n. 12.

[24] Eustathius (173), at least, found Agamemnon's behavior to be exemplary generalship.

spoke, and he stirred the *thumos* in his chest"; also relevant to Book 2 is the fact that this formula always results in the affected individual's departure for some new destination).[25] To the extent that the formula indicates an individualized response, we are justified in speaking of the audience as 'atomized': each soldier experiences a particular, not a general, impulse to flee. The phraseology thus expresses succinctly and concretely the disintegration of the social body caused by Agamemnon's rash words.

The paradox posed by Agamemnon's test bears a formal similarity to Achilles' dilemma: each balances two equally unacceptable alternatives. And in each case Athena must intervene to restore some semblance of order in the face of the imminent dissolution of the Achaean social body. (Achilles' murderous impulse is as real a threat to the cohesion of the host as the possibility that the soldiers might flee.) In Book 1, of course, her intervention produces only a quasi-resolution. In Book 2 matters proceed along a path that corresponds more closely to the ideal. Athena first locates Odysseus and employs this specialist of *ainos* as her agent in reestablishing physical order among the army. After the latter has confronted and silenced, in Thersites, the last atomized (μοῦνος, 2.212) voice of counter-consensual division, she then stands by him as he delivers a speech reaffirming the Achaeans' commitment to the war. It is worth stressing the close collaboration between Athena—who takes the form of a *kêrux*—and her human protégé, a collaboration that makes the roles of speaker and herald seem less hierarchically distinct and more like aspects of the same function:

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[25] Cf. 3.395, 4.208, 11.804, etc. The provocation of Aeneas at 13.468 is an ironic use of the conventional request for the hero to 'come' to someone's aid. One can sense the individualizing nature of *thumon orin-* in descriptions of reactions to boasts on the battlefield, e.g. ὣς ἔφατ'. 'Αργείοισι δ' ἄχος γένετ' εὐξαμένοιο· / Αἴαντι δὲ μάλιστα δαΐφρονι θυμὸν ὄρινε (14.458-9; cf. 13.417-8, 14.486-7). The phrase has the same individualizing force as *handanô*; thus the πᾶσι of 2.143 is analogous to τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ἑαδότα μῦθον at 9.173, which is, like Book 2, an example of an imperfect consensual situation (for reasons I outlined in the previous chapter).

ἀνὰ δ' ὃ πτολίπορθος Ὀδυσσεὺς
ἔστη σκῆπτρον ἔχων· παρὰ δὲ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη
εἰδομένη κήρυκι σιωπᾶν λαὸν ἀνώγει,
ὡς ἅμα θ' οἳ πρῶτοί τε καὶ ὕστατοι υἷες Ἀχαιῶν
μῦθον ἀκούσειαν καὶ ἐπιφρασσαίατο βουλήν·
2.279-82

Odysseus sacker of cities stood up
holding the *skêptron*; and beside him grey-eyed Athena
like to a *kêrux* bid the *laos* to be silent,
so that the first and last sons of the Achaeans as a whole
could hear the *muthos* and mark the *boulê*.

This passage emphasizes that the *kêrux* is essential to the very possibility of the speech

act; for this reason I argued above (Chapter 2) that the *kêrux* has as important a role in the

establishment of *ainos* as the *basilêes*.[26] Athena is playing no merely supporting role, but

taking direct action to restore order. And that action produces the desired effect. When

Odysseus at last formulates a proposal that is truly constructive, in a way that

Agamemnon's was not, he succeeds in reconstituting the consensus that alone maintains

the Achaean social group:

ἀλλ' ἄγε μίμνετε πάντες ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοὶ
αὐτοῦ εἰς ὅ κεν ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο ἕλωμεν.
ὣς ἔφατ'. Ἀργεῖοι δὲ μέγ' ἴαχον, ἀμφὶ δὲ νῆες
σμερδαλέον κονάβησαν ἀϋσάντων ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν,
μῦθον ἐπαινήσαντες Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο·
2.331-5

"But come, all you well-greaved Achaeans, steadfastly remain
here until we take the great city of Priam."
Thus he spoke, and the Argives shouted greatly, and round about the ships
resounded terribly with the cries of the Achaeans,
who expressed *epainos* for the *muthos* of godlike Odysseus.

With the establishment of *epainos* the main question is settled; Nestor's speech, which

follows Odysseus', already looks past the present crisis to the next stage in Book 2's

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[26] Bader 1989: 19 and Martin 1989: 41n.91 note that Greek *kêrux* is cognate with Indic *kârú-* 'he who praises, poet.' The etymology of *kêrux* therefore suggests a connection with the same inherited institutions of socially constructive praise / blame to which I have traiced *(ep)ainos*.

exploration of Achaean social order, the *krisis* of the Catalogue (κρῖν' ἄνδρας κατὰ

φῦλα ["divide the men into troops"], 2.362).[27] The consensus achieved by Odysseus /

Athena signals the reunification of the army and the resolution of their dilemma,

analogous to the reintegration of Achilles' divided heart brought about by Athena in

Book 1. *Epainos* appears as the ideal form of such a resolution, insofar as it leaves no

obvious residue of dissonance (except for the absence of the Myrmidons from the

Catalogue, which is, however, taken for granted); Achilles may achieve a kind of

intrapersonal consensus, but at the cost of installing a semi-permanent discord at the

group level.

The situations of books 1 and 2 are not merely formally comparable; they are

functionally equivalent as well, and it is in this respect that we begin to sense the

connection between *epainos* and the poetic tradition. As Morrison has noted, the

decision faced by Achilles is only one example of a range of techniques Homeric poetry

employs to raise (and dispel) the possibility of an alternative or non-traditional

development of the plot; the most common of these techniques is the "reversal statement"

of the type 'and then X would have happened, had not . . .'[28] In Book 1, the fact that we

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[27] Nestor's explanation of the function of such a *krisis* suggests that it is the *krisis*—and not the ill-conceived plan of a disingenuous proposal to retreat—that corresponds to the king's traditional prerogative to test his troops: εἰ δέ κεν ὡς ἔρξῃς καί τοι πείθωνται 'Αχαιοί. / γνώσῃ ἔπειθ' ὅς θ' ἡγεμόνων κακὸς ὅς τέ νυ λαῶν / ἠδ' ὅς κ' ἐσθλὸς ἔῃσι· (2.364-6). Note that Agamemnon identifies as *themis* only the practice of testing the troops, and not the specific plan he pursues (cf. 2.73-5).

[28] Morrison 1992: 69; for bibliography on "reversal passages" see Morrison 1997: 285, nn. 25 and 26. Lang 1989: 7 suggests that Achilles' dilemma is equivalent to a such a counter-factual formulation, and that the formulation of the alternative as a choice is motivated by poetic concerns: "a statement by the poet that he would have killed Agamemnon if Athena had not stopped him would deny Achilles the freedom of choice that is so important for all his later actions." I agree with this assessment, but I believe that Achilles' 'free will' has more to do with the importance attached to his mythical role than with a purely poetic desire for compelling characterization. I have made note of Achilles' super-human agency above, in the context of his virtually unique ability to 'rouse the *laoi*' (pp. 198-9). Note also his ability to summon the winds at 23.192 ff. (the motif recalls Aulis)—*only here* does Iris convey a message on behalf of a human, suggesting that Achilles has an authority and agency comparable to those of Zeus himself. (Book

are dealing with a situation that threatens to vitiate the traditional plot of the *Iliad* can be

inferred from the terms of Achilles' dilemma.[29] The same could be said of the choice

implicitly posed to the army in Book 2, but in this case the poem formulates the situation

in terms of a "reversal statement" and makes explicit the threat to tradition:

> ἔνθά κεν Ἀργείοισιν ὑπέρμορα νόστος ἐτύχθη
> εἰ μὴ Ἀθηναίην Ἥρη πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·
>
> 2.155-6
>
> Then would the Argives have happened upon a *nostos* contrary to destiny,
> if Hera had not addressed a *muthos* to Athena.

"Within the conventions of epic composition, an incident that is untraditional would be

ὑπέρ μοῖραν 'beyond destiny.'"[30] A *nostos* at this point would undermine not only the

tradition of the *Iliad* in particular, but the tradition of the Troy tales in general.[31] Since

the possibility of this counter-traditional *nostos* arises from the disintegration of the

Achaean social body,[32] the only way to restore the plot to its traditional course is by

reassembling that body, that is, by reestablishing the social structures of consensus. In

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23 also has the only Iliadic attestations of the formula ἔνθ' αὖτ' ἄλλ' ἐνόησε [Il. 140, 193]; I plan to
outline on another occasion the importance of this formula in the *Odyssey* as an articulation of Athena's
ability to orchestrate the plot.)

[29] Cf. the precisely analogous dilemma—which even adopts some of the phraseology of *Iliad* 1—that
confronts Odysseus in Poluphêmos' cave. Here it is explicitly a matter of an action that would sabotage the
plot of the poem, and the threat of such sabotage is marked by a "reversal" statement: τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ
βούλευσα κατὰ μεγαλήτορα θυμὸν / ἆσσον ἰών, ξίφος ὀξὺ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ, / οὐτάμεναι
πρὸς στῆθος, ὅθι φρένες ἧπαρ ἔχουσι. / χείρ' ἐπιμασσάμενος· ἕτερος δέ με θυμὸς ἔρυκεν. / αὐτοῦ
γάρ κε καὶ ἄμμες ἀπωλόμεθ' αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον ... Note also the 'schizophrenia' of Odysseus' 'other
thumos,' and cf. below on Zeus.

[30] Nagy 1999: 40, with references; cf. Morrison 1997: 284.

[31] This passage comes close to formulating a generic opposition between *nostos*-tales and siege-tales.
Aside from determining the relation between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, this opposition is also thematized
by Homeric epos, particularly in the latter.

[32] Ironically, the dissolution of the group appears to have been a traditional component of the cyclic
Nostoi—cf. *Od.* 3.153-7, in Nestor's version of the tale, and Proclus' summary (p. 108 Allen).

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this way, Athena's restoration of *epainos* is as essential to the maintenance of the plot of the poem as was the perpetuation of Achilles' *kholos* in Book 1.

Reinhardt remarks that the possibility that the Greeks might leave Troy without accomplishing the ultimate goal of the Troy tradition—the sack of the city—represents a recurring anxiety in the *Iliad*.[33] *Epainos* remains the medium in which that anxiety is expressed and negotiated throughout the early books of the poem, which show an almost obsessive fascination with the object of Reinhardt's "Gefahr." For Morrison, the crises of Books 1 and 2 are part of a series that extends at least as far as the treaty proposed at the end of Book 3.[34] The treaty, especially as it plays out in the articulation of books 3 and 4, is the next episode that brings the force of *epainos* to bear on the tensions related to the confirmation of tradition. As I pointed out above, there is already a certain evocation of the thematics of consensus in the joint response of Achaeans and Trojans to the initial proposal of a negotiated settlement. The poem strengthens the impression of a unique moment of concord uniting the two sides by means of a remarkable adjustment to one of its familiar devices, namely the formulation of an anonymous 'man in the street' utterance introduced by an iterative or subjunctive form of *eipô* indicating what 'someone would have said.' At the very moment that Trojans and Greeks sollemnify the oath that

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[33] Reinhardt 1961: 107: "Die Gefahr der Heimkehr unverrichteter Sache ist ein in der Ilias immer wiederkehrendes Begleitmotiv."

[34] Morrison 1992: 69: "The inevitability of the Greeks' success is repeatedly challenged. In book 1, Achilles nearly slays Agamemnon; in book 2, the Greeks almost return home; in book 3, the proposed duel leads to the possibility of a negotiated settlement." Morrison 1997: 275 argues that the Homeric medium poses the question of possible alternatives on three different levels: the "heroic" (choices faced by characters), the "poetic" (or metapoetic, i.e. instances where the question is posed by the narrator), and the "divine." The first two are evident in Books 1 and 2, respectively. Book 3 will lead into a premier example of the operation of the divine level in Book 4.

defines the terms of the duel, the poem makes a very rare attribution of an utterance *to members of both sides*:

... ἠδ’ εὔχοντο θεοῖς αἰειγενέτῃσιν·
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε·
Ζεῦ κύδιστε μέγιστε καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι
ὁππότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια πημήνειαν
ὧδέ σφ’ ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὡς ὅδε οἶνος
αὐτῶν καὶ τεκέων. ἄλοχοι δ’ ἄλλοισι δαμεῖεν.
3.296-301

... and they prayed to the immortal gods.
And thus <u>Achaeans and Trojans</u> were speaking:
"Highest and most supreme Zues, and you other immortal gods:
whichever side should first contravene the oath with an act of hostility,
so may the brains of themselves and their children flow on the ground
as this wine, and may their wives by subjugated by others.

This device is repeated twice more, the last time, significantly, early in Book 4, when the efficacy of the oath is still in question. Trojans and Achaeans alike gape at the *teras* of the shooting star as Athena streaks to earth:

θάμβος δ’ ἔχεν εἰσορόωντας
Τρῶάς θ’ ἱπποδάμους καὶ ἐϋκνήμιδας Ἀχαιούς·
ὧδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν ἰδὼν ἐς πλησίον ἄλλον·
ἦ ῥ’ αὖτις πόλεμός τε κακὸς καὶ φύλοπις αἰνὴ
ἔσσεται. ἦ φιλότητα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισι τίθησι
Ζεύς, ὅς τ’ ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται.
ὡς ἄρα τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε.
4.79-85

Wonder held them as they looked on,
<u>both horse-taming Trojans and well-greaved Achaeans.</u>
And thus one was saying, looking to another near him:
"Either there will again be foul war and dread slaughter,
or else Zeus is working *philotês* between the two sides,
Zeus who is the stewared of war for men."
Thus <u>spoke any number of Achaeans and Trojans</u>.

This common utterance of Achaeans and Trojans appropriately balances the two alternatives raised by the possibility of a peace agreement, i.e. war or peace. Those same two alternatives are considered in relation to each other by the poem's *only other instance* of an imagined utterance uniting both sides, an instance which demonstrates that the

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device carries unambiguous implications of Trojan-Greek concord. Hektor concludes his

duel with Ajax in Book 7—a duel that substitutes for the miscarried duel of Book 3—by

instituting a less comprehensive form of the settlement that might have been

accomplished in Book 4[35]:

> δῶρα δ' ἄγ' ἀλλήλοισι περικλυτὰ δώομεν ἄμφω,
> ὄφρά τις ὧδ' εἴπησιν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε·
> ἠμὲν ἐμαρνάσθην ἔριδος πέρι θυμοβόροιο,
> ἠδ' αὖτ' ἐν φιλότητι διέτμαγεν ἀρθμήσαντε.
>   7.299-302

Come, let us each give distinguished gifts to the other,
so that <u>anyone of Achaeans and Trojans might say</u>:
"They fought in *thumos*-devouring *eris*,
but thereafter they parted in *philotês*, having forged a bond."

Here, the common utterance of Greeks and Trojans marks a 'peace' settlement that is

actually effective; moreover, since Hektor and Ajax both expect to meet each other again

in battle (cf. 7.291), the corporate speech of Achaeans and Trojans together is the only

persistent sign of their *philotês*—in fact, the very form of that *philotês*, which will not

produce any other social effects. We can see, then, that the repeated construction of an

utterance common to Greeks and Trojans in books 3 and 4 marks a unique moment of

nascent concord that raises the question of whether its social efficacy will extend beyond

the realm of speech.[36]

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[35] The exchange of gifts is analogous to the exchange that would have concluded the war according to the terms formulated by Hektor himself at 3.93.

[36] I have emphasized how 'remarkable' this device is. I note that the manuscript tradition suggests that ancient editors were somewhat uncomfortable with the idea of an utterance common to both Greeks and Trojans. The only case where the tradition attests Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε without any sign of ambivalence is 4.85. Allen's reading of 3.297 is a correction for the true confusion of the manuscripts, the key to which is ἰδὼν ἀχαιῶν τρώωντε in V[32]. 3.319 is omitted by one of the papyri. Several manuscripts give χαλκοχιτώνων at the end of 7.300. As often in the case of a poetic medium that uses variation from the norm to indicate significance, the anxieties of editors correspond to marked moments of high poetic value. Martin 1989: 33 has shown that the poem employs a similar device to mark its movement toward a conclusion: toward the end of the poem, the *epea pteroenta* formula, which normally applies to speech "between those sharing a social bond," describes also exchanges between enemies. As with the use of τις

That is to say, the situation in Books 3 and 4 raises the question of the social efficacy of speech—the question, in other words, of *(ep)ainos*. Again, the question is, specifically, whether the efficiency of *epainos*—the force of which is by definition coextensive with the social group, insofar as *epainos* both emerges from and affirms the structure of the group—can extend between groups. (In modern terms, it is a question of the existence of an international law.) I argued above that the *kharis* with which Greeks and Trojans respond to, and thus ratify, the terms of the treaty both evokes the efficiency of *epainos* and keeps it at bay, precisely because it involves the problematic social status of an inter-societal accord. After thus posing the question of such an *epainos*, the poem brings matters to a head at the end of Book 3 by explicitly naming the *epainos* whose cross-cultural efficiency is being tested. The duel between Menelaos and Alexander ends—not without some ambiguity, but clearly in favor of the former—whereon Agamemnon addresses to the assembled armies his interpretation of the legal consequences:

κέκλυτέ μευ <u>Τρῶες καὶ Δάρδανοι ἠδ' ἐπίκουροι·</u>
νίκη μὲν δὴ φαίνετ' ἀρηϊφίλου Μενελάου.
ὑμεῖς δ' Ἀργείην Ἑλένην καὶ κτήμαθ' ἅμ' αὐτῇ
ἔκδοτε. καὶ τιμὴν ἀποτινέμεν ἥν τιν' ἔοικεν.
ἥ τε καὶ ἐσσομένοισι μετ' ἀνθρώποισι πέληται.
ὣς ἔφατ' Ἀτρεΐδης. <u>ἐπὶ δ' ἥνεον ἄλλοι Ἀχαιοί.</u>
                                                    3.456-61

"Hear me, <u>Trojans, Dardanians, and allies</u>:
the victory of Menealaos dear to Ares is in evidence:
surrender Argive Helen and with her the property,
and render as penalty the honor that is fitting,
which will persist even among men of later generations."
Thus spoke the son of Atreus, <u>and the other Achaeans expressed *ainos* in
        response</u>.

εἴπεσκεν, "what seems like a violation of formulaic conventions is actually a creative extension of the usual meaning of the phrase."

Representing the Achaeans, Agamemnon addresses his words to the Trojans—he solicits

a common response encompassing both sides. Surrounded as this passage is by several

striking examples of the convergence in speech of the Achaean and Trojan points of

view, we might expect this invitation to a common *epainos* here, if nowhere else, to be

accepted. In the event, Agamemnon does receive *epainos*—but, consistently with the

bounded nature of the social infrastructure that produces consensus, this *epainos* is

restricted to the Achaeans. The question of the efficiency of *epainos* nevertheless

remains open. We must remember that, as a rule, *epainos* is *always* efficient. According

to the norms of Homeric discourse, the last line of Book 3 implies that Agamemnon's

performative has been or will be transformed into an efficacious speech act.

At this point—specifically, with the first line of Book 4—the scene shifts abruptly

to Olympus, where a divine council-cum-symposium is in session. (This technique of

juxtaposing two contrasting assemblies in order to highlight the play of consensus is a

recurrent feature of Iliadic architecture; we will see below how it organizes the climactic

instance of *epainos* in Books 18 and 19.) The shift is a masterfully effective cliff-hanger.

As the tension produced by the unilateral ratification of a bilateral accord hangs in the air,

the poem defers resolution while the Olympians themselves take up the issue. Zeus

opens the discussion by essentially adopting Agamemnon's point of view—he endorses

the latter's judgment on the outcome of the duel, and proposes the same settlement to the

gods:

> ἀλλ' ἤτοι νίκη μὲν ἀρηϊφίλου Μενελάου·
> ἡμεῖς δὲ φραζώμεθ' ὅπως ἔσται τάδε ἔργα,
> ἤ ῥ' αὖτις πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ φύλοπιν αἰνὴν
> ὄρσομεν. ἦ φιλότητα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι βάλωμεν.
> εἰ δ' αὖ πως τόδε πᾶσι φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ γένοιτο,
> ἤτοι μὲν οἰκέοιτο πόλις Πριάμοιο ἄνακτος,
> αὖτις δ' Ἀργείην Ἑλένην Μενέλαος ἄγοιτο.

> The victory goes to Menelaos dear to Ares.
> But let us consider how these matters will be:
> will we again stir four war and dread slaughter,
> or should we establish *philotês* between them?
> If, somehow, this should be dear and sweet to all,
> let the city of lord Priam live on,
> and Menelaos take back Argive Helen.

That is, Zeus proposes allowing the consensus of the Achaeans to be actualized, in accordance with Homeric norms, even though his proposal contradicts his own *boulê* (which is how *Iliad* 1.5 refers to the poem's sequence of events). The significance of this scene has nothing to do with the question of whether or not Zeus' proposal meets Searle's "sincerity condition,"[37] i.e. whether or not he seriously wishes to consider the possibility of a peaceful settlement. By characterizing his speech as an 'attempt' to provoke Hera (ἐπειρᾶτο Κρονίδης ἐρεθιζέμεν Ἥρην, 4.5), the poem does indeed suggest that Zeus speaks insincerely: scholars have long recognized that this characterization creates a direct, verbal link between Zeus' words in the divine council and Agamemnon's *diapeira* in the assembly of Book 2[38]; like Agamemnon, then, Zeus may be proposing, with the ulterior purpose of confirming his *boulê*, something that runs counter to his own intention. But this possible (and ultimately unknowable) parallel of intention does not impinge upon the central parallel of circumstance or function: both speakers put forward proposals that run counter to the overall 'intention' of the plot to the extent that they raise the possibility of an early, untraditional end to the war. In both cases, the subsequent narrative serves the necessary function of reaffirming the traditional sequence of events

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[37] Searle 1969: 60, Searle 1976: 4.

[38] Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 1920: 298. Cf. πειρήσομαι at 2.73.

by establishing the commitment of the relevant social group (the Greek army in Book 2, and the divine community in the series of episodes beginning with Book 4) to the 'fated' outcome of the story. The only difference is that, for the Achaeans in Book 2, this reaffirmation follows immediately on the 'test,' while, as we will see, it appears to remain in question throughout most of the poem among the gods.

Leaving aside, then, the false problem of intentionality, we may turn our attention to the functional aspects of Zeus' proposal, which has the effect of pointing up a mechanical contradiction, so to speak, produced by the *epainos* of the Achaeans, a conflict between rules of two different orders. *Epainos should be* efficient—but in this case it cannot be without subverting the most general requirement of the Trojan tale. In other words, following the internal norms of Homeric poetry in this instance means violating the overarching norm of Homeric tradition, i.e. the traditional outcome of the story, conventionally designated as the 'Will of Zeus.'[39] The poem has, in effect, engineered an internal conflict of its own conventions that recalls the mutually impossible alternatives faced by Achilles in Book 1.[40] Though Zeus seems—superficially at least—at ease with the paradoxical situation, not so the divine community as a whole: we have already observed the counter-consensual *kholos* that divides their assembly on partisan lines (Ch. 3, pp. 122 ff.).[41] It is nevertheless worth restating Hera's definitive formulation of the rift opened by Zeus' proposal, for her words make clear that an alteration of the traditional plot of the poem will necessarily involve a negotiation of

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[39] Cf. e.g. Nagy 1999: 81, 98, 219-20, etc.

[40] The comparison is worth considering, for in both cases the outcome of the conflict is the *continuation* of tensions.

[41] For the communication between intra- and interpersonal division, see above, Ch. 3 p. 146.

epainos: ἔρδ᾽· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι ("do as you like, but we other gods will not all express *epainos* for you," 4.29).

Taplin has recently formulated what I take to be the standard interpretation of the significance of Zeus' proposal and the sanction that Hera applies (with success):

> Zeus *could* have his own way on everything; he could even annul something long-fated, even perhaps his own *boulê*. But the repercussions would be so disagreeable that it would not be worth it . . . 'Go on, do it,' other gods cry when Zeus contemplates going back on something that was settled. . . . 'but we other gods will not all applaud you' . . . Clearly this threatens something far worse than merely witholding praise.[42]

This interpretation presents Zeus' acquiescence as the result of a cost-benefit analysis that finds the price of unilateralism to exceed whatever personal profit he might derive, as though Zeus were some bourgeois entrepreneur or parliamentary power-broker—and it assumes that Zeus could nevertheless act in defiance of the group will. But it ignores the fact that, wherever consensus is acknowledged as the governing principle, *epainos* constitutes the sole efficient cause for action; action is not possible without the consent of the group. (Thus in Book 23 Antilokhos' dissent prevents the proposed distribution of prizes.) Moreover, in those cases where an autocrat attempts to act outside the framework of consensus he invariably fails to enforce his will: Agamemnon cannot keep Khrusêis (Book 1), nor can Zeus prevent the gods from aiding their human protégés (Book 8). Focusing on the hypothetical autonomy of Zeus—which is only, in fact, conjured as a rhetorical foil by Hera, not acknowledged as a real possibility—obscures

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[42] Taplin 1992: 132. By suggesting that Hera's threat indicates "something far worse than merely witholding praise," Taplin does not mean that *epaineô* means anything more than 'praise,' but that Hera is insinuating the possibility of subsequent retribution. Cf. Morrison 1997: 288: "The consequences [of Zeus' acting against the group will]? Not that Zeus would violate the dictates of destiny, not that the vault of heaven would come crashing down, but that none of the gods would approve." In a footnote, Morrison speculates that Zeus fears a challenge to his sovereignty by the other gods, "who in an extreme case might physically fetter him" (n.31).

the true import of this passage, which is the establishment not of Zeus' freedom of action but, on the contrary, of the rigid control set on action by the consensus of the group. The point here is *fixity*, not the possibility of variation.

As in Book 2, *epainos*—or, more precisely (and the difference is significant), the *withholding* of *epainos*—works to preserve the traditional outcome of the story. The gods opt to enforce the global norm of the Trojan teleology rather than the merely 'syntactical' norm implied by the *epainos* of the Achaeans (which was in any case already 'ungrammatical' by virtue of being situated in an inter-societal context). And just as in Book 2 (or, indeed, Book 1), Athena is the agent of enforcement.[43] Her actions following Zeus' *diapeira*, however, are the negative image of those she performed after Agamemnon's, a transformation that is a consequence of the double articulation of consensus in this scene, with the human sphere directly opposed to the divine. So Athena seeks out not a Greek specialist of cohesion but a Trojan specialist of discord, namely, Pandaros. Pandaros' qualification for this role emerges from the description of his bow: αὐτίκ' ἐσύλα τόξον ἐΰξοον ἰξάλου αἰγὸς / ἀγρίου ("at once he took out his bow, well-worked from [the horn of] a spry wild goat," 4.105-6). The enjambment of *agrios* emphasizes the fundamentally antisocial purpose to which Pandaros puts his bow, as the instrument that will dissolve the treaty.[44] *Epainos* is equally a control on the violation of

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[43] Cf. Reinhardt 1961: 71.

[44] For the implications of *agrios*, see above, Ch. 3 pp. 124-5; note that the word constructs a kind of metonymic connection between Pandaros and Athena, who experiences a *kholos agrios* during the divine council (4.23). The antisocial nature of Pandaros' act receives emphasis again at 7.351-2, where Antênôr cites the violation of the treaty in the context of a Trojan assembly that is marked by the failure or absence of consensus (cf. below, p. 196). Indeed, if Antênôr is right, Pandaros' act may be an ultimate cause of the destruction of Trojan society.

tradition here as before, but that control, deployed on the divine level, now imposes

discord in the human sphere in place of order.[45]

And for that matter, what kind of order does it impose even on Olympus? We

surely witness a negotiation of *epainos*, but just because Zeus acts in such a way that

consent is not withheld, does that therefore mean that consensus is established? Not in

Flaig's view: if we can speak of consensus here at all, it must be as an 'imperfect'

manifestation that falls far short of the 'ideal.'[46] Flaig points out the 'affective

dissonance' that remains between Zeus and Hera's party; the most explicit sign of this

dissonance is Zeus' declaration that he has conceded "willingly but with an unwilling

thumos" (ἑκὼν. ἀέκοντί γε θυμῷ, 4.43).[47] We can make sense of Zeus'

schizophrenia—the division between himself and his *thumos*—if we recall that

circumstances have pitted the internal norms of poetic syntax against the global norm of

the traditional plot. To the extent that the *Iliad* is coextensive with Zeus' will—and

again, this is an equivalence formulated in the proem (1.5)—such a conflict finds a

natural expression in Zeus' 'psychology.'

Zeus exhibits an internal division altogether analogous to that of Achilles in Book

1, and as in the case of Achilles, this internal conflict will leave an unresolved residuum

to carry over into subsequent episodes. To put things in Freudian terms, Zeus may

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[45] I note that the *epipôlêsis* of Book 4—which essentially doubles for the Catalogue, but in the new, less harmonious key imposed by the divine intervention—reveals an analogous story in which the divine apparatus undermines a human consensus (4.380-1); interestingly, this story concerns the competing epic tradition of the Theban cycle, which more than once serves as a foil for Iliadic tradition. Cf. Hes. *Op.* 162-5 and Nagy 1999: 161.

[46] Cf. above, Ch. 3 p. 126, where I quote Flaig 1994: 25: "Doch die Götter erreichen diesen Konsens nicht auf 'idealem' Wege, und daher ist er zunächst auch kein vollendeter."

[47] Ibid.

manage for a time to repress his schizoid anxieties, but the repressed returns and is

doomed to repeat until it comes to some resolution. With the entry of Patroklos into

battle, the poem moves into its final, most portentous phase, the sequence of inevitable

killings that will lead ultimately to the deaths of Hektor and, just beyond the *Iliad*'s

horizon, Achilles himself. The pressure of this inevitability brings Zeus' anxieties again

to the surface, first at the moment that his son Sarpêdôn faces off against Patroklos. As

in Book 4, where Zeus expressed his fondness for the city in which his altar never lacked

an 'equal *dais*,' the poem again suggests that Zeus' dilemma derives from a personal

connection; but the conflict itself—the schism that divides Zeus against himself—is now

foregrounded, so that, rather than arising from the outcome of debate, it constitutes the

very ground for debate:

> ὤ μοι ἐγών, ὅ τέ μοι Σαρπηδόνα φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν
> μοῖρ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλοιο Μενοιτιάδαο δαμῆναι.
> <u>διχθὰ δέ μοι κραδίη</u> μέμονε φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντι,
> ἤ μιν ζωὸν ἐόντα μάχης ἄπο δακρυοέσσης
> θείω ἀναρπάξας Λυκίης ἐν πίονι δήμῳ,
> ἤ ἤδη ὑπὸ χερσὶ Μενοιτιάδαο δαμάσσω.
> <div align="right">16.433-8</div>

> Ah alas, that my Sarpêdôn, dearest of men,
> is fated to fall beneath Patroklos son of Menoitios.
> <u>My heart is divided in two</u> as I consider in my mind what I should do—
> whether I should snatch him, while he is still alive, from the tearful battle
> and set him down in the rich *dêmos* of Lycia,
> or if I should indeed lay him low beneath the hands of Menoitios' son.

The prominence of division—that is, the absence of consensus within the mind of Zeus,

indicated by a derivative of *dikha*, the Iliadic semantics of which I discussed in Chapter

3—signals that no progress has been made; the scene is rather a continuation of the

tensions that first appeared in relation to the fate of Troy in Book 4.[48] There, Zeus'

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[48] The only superficial difference is that, while Zeus had previously considered a deviation from the most general dictates of fate and thus only implicitly an amendment to his *boulê* for the course of the *Iliad*, he

apparently indifferent consideration of competing alternatives provoked the counter-consensual *kholos* of Athena and Hera; here, Zeus appears to have internalized the division among the gods within his own *kradiê* 'heart.' External division persists nonetheless, for Hera interjects a variation on the same words she had used to express her opposition to the proposed change in Book 4 (Athena receives no mention in this scene):

αἰνότατε Κρονίδη ποῖον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες.
ἄνδρα θνητὸν ἐόντα πάλαι πεπρωμένον αἴση
ἂψ ἐθέλεις θανάτοιο δυσηχέος ἐξαναλῦσαι:
ἔρδ᾽· ἀτὰρ οὔ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.
                                                16.440-3

Dread son of Kronos, what a *muthos* you have uttered!
Do you wish to release from ill-sounding death
a man, mortal and long fated by destiny [for death]?
Do as you like, but we other gods will not all express *epainos* for you.

Hera makes clear that Zeus' saving Sarpêdôn would not merely contravene his own stated intentions, but also violate fate (which has severe consequences for the *Iliad* and beyond, since the deaths of Sarpêdôn, Patroklos, Hektor, and ultimately Achilles are all causally linked). Moreover, she strengthens her claim that such an act would make consensus impossible by pointing out its impact on the functioning of the divine community: this singular exception would compromise the privileges of those many Trojan heroes who likewise boast divine parentage, and thus provoke the anger (*kotos*) of other gods on behalf of the sons who do not benefit from such favor.[49] The *kotos*

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now contemplates an explicit contradiction of his own authoritative pronouncement on the plot of the poem—for as recently as the last book he had dictated the death of Sarpêdôn as part of the sequence of events he would impose even against the will of the other gods (15.67).

[49] 16.448-9: πολλοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμοιο μάχονται / υἱέες ἀθανάτων, τοῖσιν κότον αἰνὸν ἐνήσεις. *Pace* Walsh (forthcoming): 38, who translates, "Many are the sons of the immortals in battle about the great city of Priam, against whom you will incite terrible *kótos*" (emphasis mine; original emphasis removed), the antecedent of τοῖσιν is ἀθανάτων, not υἱέες. We should be guided by the syntax of *enhiêmi* (as at 16.449); Walsh bases his interpretation on the syntax of *tithêmi*. Moreover, Hera does not mean to say that Zeus will generate anger against humans—on the contrary, Hera is emphasizing the positive bonds between gods and humans—but that he will generate anger *against himself*.

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envisioned by Hera functions as a sanction or control that ensures the maintenance of a

consensus-based system (or at least prevents its outright violation), analogously to the

kholos deployed by Poseidon in Book 15 (see above, Ch. 3 pp. 113-4).[50]

As in Book 4, Zeus yields: the threat of withholding *epainos* effectively

constrains him to preserve the traditional outlines of the Troy story. Once again,

however, an 'affective dissonance' sounds the final note of the scene, in the form of the

rain of blood Zeus lets fall in honor of his son (16.459-61)—a highly poeticized sign of

the deep regret with which he concedes to the will of the group. The dissonance

reemerges rather quickly this time—or rather, the scene repeats itself, but this time with

decidedly more harmonious results. Not surprisingly, it recurs at the climactic moment

of the poem, the 'race' between Achilles and Hektor for the great 'prize' of Hektor's

life.[51] As the two speed across the plain, Zeus raises again essentially the same question

he has posed twice before:

> ὢ πόποι ἦ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ τεῖχος
> ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι· . . .
>   .   .   .

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[50] As I understand the semantics of *kholos* and related words (see above, Ch. 3 n. 36), the context of 16.449 does not allow the use of the word *kholos*, which always indicates anger *over loss or damage*—in this case, the gods will be angered by the unequal distribution of privileges. *Kotos* can be understood in this context as equivalent to *kholos*, but adjusted for this difference. The difference that I suggest determines the alternation here is not incompatible with the other semantic differences outlined by the exhaustive study of Walsh (forthcoming).

[51] The scene shifts immediately from the simile of the athletic contest to the divine council by means of a transitional phrase (θεοὶ δ' ἐς πάντες ὁρῶντο, 22.166) that assimilates the gods to the spectators of such a contest (cf. the use of *eishoraô* at 23.448, 464). Note that the transition to Olympus in Book 16 emphasized the *individual* reaction of Zeus (τοὺς δὲ ἰδὼν ἐλέησε Κρόνου πάϊς ἀγκυλομήτεω, 16.431), while this transition emphasizes precisely the collective identity of the gods, expressed by their collective attendance at an athletic *agôn*. This difference resonates with the way the funeral games of Book 23 work to reestablish the collective social structure of Achaean society. Moreover, considering that the prizes for the chariot race will provide the last occasion for the Achaean negotiation of *epainos*, it is interesting to observe that Book 22—the last Olympian negotiation of *epainos*—also, in essence, concerns the awarding of a 'prize.'

ἀλλ' ἄγετε φράζεσθε θεοὶ καὶ μητιάασθε
ἠέ μιν ἐκ θανάτοιο σαώσομεν, ἦέ μιν ἤδη
Πηλεΐδῃ Ἀχιλῆϊ δαμάσσομεν ἐσθλὸν ἐόντα.

<div align="right">22.168-9, 174-6</div>

Alas, indeed I see with my eyes a man who is dear
being pursued about the wall. . . .

.   .   .

But come, you gods, consider and take thought
whether we shall save him from death, or lay him low,
noble as he is, beneath Peleus' son Achilles.

It is worth emphasizing that the precise structural and phraseological parallels between this scene and the two previously considered establish an equivalence between Hektor, Sarpêdôn, and Troy, by virtue of which we understand that the sparing of either warrior would mean not only the disruption of the plot of the *Iliad*, but also the sparing of Troy herself, that is, the disruption of the Troy saga as a whole.[52] The debate over Hektor's fate does, however, differ in several important respects from the two that precede. In the first place, Zeus gives no sign of any internal conflict aside from merely posing the question; in other words, there are no lexical or thematic markers of division. In fact, the language of discord and dissent is entirely absent from the episode, even from the (brief) debate that follows Zeus' proposal. Finally, and more significantly, the one who voices an objection is not Hera (of whom we find no mention now) but Athena, whose concise and comparatively polite remarks—she utters exactly and only the four lines I quoted above from Book 16, including the now familiar warning about *epainos*, but without the lengthy threats and caveats we encounter in the earlier books—bespeak a far different attitude than the *kholos agrios* that gripped her in Book 4. Most striking of all is the

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[52] Morrison 1997: 287 recognizes an 'echo' only between the scenes in books 16 and 22, although there are just as many connections to Book 4 (the motif of sacrifice, for instance, connects Troy with Hektor).

tenderness of Zeus' reply and the total lack of ambivalence as he disavows any desire to be at odds with his daughter:

θάρσει Τριτογένεια φίλον τέκος· οὔ νύ τι θυμῷ
πρόφρονι μυθέομαι, ἐθέλω δέ τοι ἤπιος εἶναι·
ἔρξον ὅπη δή τοι νόος ἔπλετο, μὴ δ' ἔτ' ἐρώει.
22.183-5

Have courage, Tritogeneia, my dear child: I have not now
uttered this in earnest, and I wish to be in accord with you.
Act in accordance with your *noos*, and do not hesitate longer.

Zeus' words declaring that he is not 'in earnest' and that he wishes to be *êpios* to his daughter are familiar from Book 8[53]; but while they there concealed a rift that the subsequent narrative exposed, here they explicitly (we shall see how explicitly in a moment) close the rift that has driven the threefold repetition of the scene. At last Zeus is one of purpose with the representative of the opposition. He even appears to hand over to Athena control of events (that is, of the plot of the poem) by enjoining her to act in accordance with her own *noos*, whereon she descends to earth, as before, to enforce the sequence of events dictated by fate (that is, tradition).

But 'appears' is the operative word in this formulation: is Zeus actually relinquishing his authoritative control over events, or is he merely acknowledging that his will and Athena's *noos* are essentially one and the same? We may usefully consider the relation between Athena and Zeus in the broader epic tradition. The *Iliad* itself suggests that the ultimate teleology of the Troy story—that is, events outside of the "Will of Zeus" narrowly defined as the plot of the *Iliad*—ultimately fall under the auspices of Athena. Thus Zeus' summary of events after the death of Hektor, i.e. after the end of the poem:

ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἄν τοι ἔπειτα παλίωξιν παρὰ νηῶν

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[53] See above, Ch. 1 p. 24 and Ch. 3 p. 127.

αἰὲν ἐγὼ τεύχοιμι διαμπερὲς εἰς ὅ κ' Ἀχαιοὶ
Ἴλιον αἰπὺ ἕλοιεν Ἀθηναίης διὰ βουλάς.
<div align="right">15.68-70[54]</div>

Then from that moment I will bring about a continuous pursuit
back from the ships, all the way until the Achaeans
take lofty Ilion through the *boulai* of Athena.

Note that the predominance of Athena's *boulai* does not preclude the complementary action of Zeus (τεύχοιμι). Moreover, as Murnaghan has shown, the *noos* of Athena functions as a double for the Will of Zeus insofar as it controls the other epic of Homeric tradition, the *Odyssey*.[55] Zeus takes a strangely hands-off approach in this poem of Athena's design—but he is by no means absent, as though Athena's direction were something that operated independently of her father. In fact, the *Odyssey* achieves its ultimate resolution through a scene that recalls the debate between Athena and Zeus in *Iliad* 22—and even employs some of the language of the debate over Troy in Book 4. As violence is about to break out on Ithaca, Athena consults Zeus as to how the story should proceed:

ὦ πάτερ ἡμέτερε Κρονίδη, ὕπατε κρειόντων.
εἰπέ μοι εἰρομένῃ· τί νύ τοι νόος ἔνδοθι κεύθει;
ἢ προτέρω πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ φύλοπιν αἰνὴν
τεύξεις, ἢ φιλότητα μετ' ἀμφοτέροισι τίθησθα;
τὴν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς·
τέκνον ἐμόν, τί με ταῦτα διείρεαι ἠδὲ μεταλλᾷς;
οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτον μὲν ἐβούλευσας νόον αὐτή,
ὡς ἦ τοι κείνους Ὀδυσεὺς ἀποτείσεται ἐλθών;
ἔρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις· ἐρέω δέ τοι ὡς ἐπέοικεν.
<div align="right">24.473-81[56]</div>

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[54] *Contra* Morrison 1997: 277n9, I understand Athena's *boulai* to apply not just to the device of the wooden horse, but to the events leading to the sack of Troy as a whole. Athena is credited as the governing intelligence of at least two non-Iliadic traditions, the *Nostoi* (see Allen 1975: 108.16) and the *Odyssey* (see below). Note that *Od.* 8.81-2 speaks of the Trojan teleology in terms that, read alongside *Il.* 15.70, make the *boulai* of Zeus and Athena interchangeable: κυλίνδετο πήματος ἀρχή / Τρωσί τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς.

[55] Murnaghan 1995: 1995.

[56] Note that this passage reverses the pattern of the *Iliad* and attributes *noos* to Zeus and *boulê* to Athena. I infer that, in the context of divine control of the story, to *bouleuein* is to 'emplot' the narrative.

"Son of Kronos, our father, highest of the powers,
answer my inquiry: what now does your *noos* conceal?
Will you extend further foul war and dread slaughter,
or are you working *philotês* between the two sides?"
Answering her, cloud gathering Zeus said:
"My child, why do you inquire of me and ask these things?
For did not you yourself contrive this *noos*,
how Odysseus would exact retribution on them on his return?
Do whatever you like; but I will tell you what seems fit."

Taken together with *Iliad* 4, this passage effectively bookends Homeric tradition as a whole: while the option of continued war was once necessary in order to allow the epic to continue, the option of peace is now necessary to allow the epic to end. The difference is that while *Iliad* 4—in which Hera, not Athena, fills the role of Zeus' interlocutor—continued tensions on both the human and divine levels, this passage puts them to rest. In both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, then, Zeus' endorsement of Athena's *noos* functions as a resolution of tension—more precisely, as a reunification of divine intention. That unity of intention is emphasized in both *Iliad* 22 and *Odyssey* 24 by the formulaic notice that, in endorsing Athena's action, Zeus ὄτρυνε πάρος μεμαυῖαν Ἀθήνην ("he bid Athena, who was already so minded").[57] That is, Zeus' command is identical to the intention Athena has already conceived. The two are manifestly of one mind—one *noos*, we might say, in the sense of the divine intention that controls the plot.

We could just as easily say that Zeus himself is at last of one mind. We have seen before how individual psychology can express the psychology of the group, and vice versa (above, Ch. 3 pp. 146-7). Nowhere is this tendency more visible than on Olympus: when there is discord among the gods, Zeus himself experiences conflict; in *Iliad* 22 that

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[57] *Il.* 22.186 = *Od.* 24.487. The formula occurs also at *Il.* 4.73 and 19.349, both cases in which Athena intervenes in a way that is, in some sense, crucial to the maintenance of the plot.

internal conflict disappears even as the tensions among the group are resolved. From a certain point of view, Zeus internalizes or embodies the collective will of the group.[58] And if Athena's *noos* doubles for the Will of Zeus in the epic tradition as a whole, then Zeus' reconciliation with his daughter is just as much a mending of the rift that has divided his mind against itself in previous versions of the scene. In fact, one lexical feature of this scene indicates that we are dealing with a literal reintegration, the reverse of the division signaled in Book 16 by *dikhtha*: Zeus' stated desire to be *êpios* with Athena. The research of Susan Edmunds has demonstrated that the Homeric semantics of this word bear out a linguistic connection with Latin *apiscor, aptus*, etc., and that *êpios* therefore means, etymologically, something approximating 'connecting.'[59] The connection of those who are *êpios* to each other is preeminently a matter of being 'of one mind'; thus Agamemnon emphasizes the virtual identity of his attitudes and opinions with those of Odysseus:

διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη πολυμήχαν' 'Οδυσσεῦ
οὔτέ σε νεικείω περιώσιον οὔτε κελεύω·
οἶδα γὰρ ὥς τοι θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν
ἤπια δήνεα οἶδε· τὰ γὰρ φρονέεις ἅ τ' ἐγώ περ.

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[58] To this internalization of group dynamics I would compare the Herodotean idiom *tên gnômên pleiston einai*, as at 1.120.4, 5.126.1, and 7.220.2. Cf. the comments of Stein 1889 on this last passage: "Bei zweifelhafter Sache teilt sich der überlegende Verstand gleichsam in zwei oder mehr Parteien, von denen eine zuletzt die *pars maior* oder *maxima* wird, was, auf das überlegende Subjekt selber angewandt, diese nur bei H. gelesene Redensart veranlaßte." I would point out, however, that this idiom is used of an individual 'Subjekt' only in very special circumstances: a king, upon considering the opinions of his advisors (1.120.19), and the author himself, after considering various accounts of an event (7.220.5). (At 5.126.2-3, the idiom is used, in what we might expect is its 'natural' context, of the majority opinion of a council.) In other words, this projection of a group dynamic onto an individual subjectivity is restricted to those special individuals who have the ability to represent (in the literary and political senses) the opinions of others.

[59] Edmunds 1990, esp. p. 24. Note her insightful comment on Zeus' use of the term *êpios* in Books 8 and 22: "Since his wise subjects know, as Athene does, what is allotted, the *êpios* king satisfies their sense of what is right. A consensus is reached and there is social harmony" (15).

> Son of Laertes, descended from Zeus, Odysseus of many devices,
> I do not blame you to excess, nor do I command:
> for I know that the *thumos* in your dear chest knows
> counsels that are in accord [with mine]; for you think even as I myself.

It is not without significance for our understanding of Book 23 that this declaration of

êpiotês involves as well a disavowal of divisive *neikos*. In fact, the quarrel that defines

the *Iliad* itself can be described as a lack of such a connection between the two parties to

that quarrel, Achilles and Agamemnon. When he describes the plight of the Greeks in

Book 16, Achilles refers to his alienation as a failure of *êpiotês*:

> οὐ γὰρ ἐμῆς κόρυθος λεύσσουσι μέτωπον
> ἐγγύθι λαμπομένης· τάχα κεν φεύγοντες ἐναύλους
> πλήσειαν νεκύων, εἴ μοι κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων
> ἤπια εἰδείη· νῦν δὲ στρατὸν ἀμφιμάχονται.
> 16.70-3[61]

> For [the Trojans] do not see the visor of my helmet
> shining near at hand; quickly would they fill the trenches
> with corpses in their flight, if lord Agamemnon's mind were
> in accord with my own. But now they beset the host.

If Achilles' reincorporation into the *Männerbund* in Book 19 signals the partial or

complete restoration of *êpiotês* among the Achaean leaders, then Zeus' reconnection with

Athena, his alter ego, parallels developments in Greek society; if not, it institutes at the

divine level something that has been sorely missed by the Greeks throughout the poem.

At the very least we can say that Zeus' declaration indicates the fusion of what has been,

until now, fragmented.

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[60] The sentiment recalls Nestor's description of a similarly harmonious relationship with Odysseus at *Od.* 3.127-29, where their unity of mind is designated by the negation of *dikha*: οὔτε ποτ᾽ εἰν ἀγορῇ δίχα βάζομεν οὔτ᾽ ἐνὶ βουλῇ. / ἀλλ᾽ ἕνα θυμὸν ἔχοντε νόῳ καὶ ἐπίφρονι βουλῇ / φραζόμεθ᾽. . . .

[61] Cf. the parallel assertion of Agamemnon at 2.379-80, by virtue of which we can see that being *êpios* means unity of *boulê*: εἰ δέ ποτ᾽ ἔς γε μίαν βουλεύσομεν. οὐκέτ᾽ ἔπειτα / Τρωσὶν ἀνάβλησις κακοῦ ἔσσεται. οὐδ᾽ ἐβαιόν.

The sudden and seemingly painless resolution of a long-standing discord naturally

prompts one to ask what has changed in the interim; this question will ultimately return

us to the crucial books that intervene between 16 and 22, including the quasi-resolution

of Book 19 with which we began. But before revisiting that section of the poem it is

necessary to formulate two important observations that emerge from this examination of

the divine negotiation of *epainos*. The first is that, while *epainos* on the human plane

concerns a variety of tactical and political decisions (e.g. the construction of the Achaean

wall at 7.344) that may or may not have an effect on the outcome of the story, divine

epainos always concerns a proposed alteration either to the plot of the *Iliad* as dictated by

Zeus or to the Trojan tradition as a whole. Through the metapoetic lens of Olympian

society,[62] the poem presents with special clarity the importance of *epainos* to the

maintenance of epic tradition. But we must temper this first observation with a second.

Epainos in the human sphere can reveal a fundamentally positive relation to the poetic

tradition, as in the case of the consensus Odysseus achieves in Book 2, which prevents an

untraditional *nostos* by confirming the Achaeans' intention to sack Troy. In the divine

sphere, however, we cannot speak of a properly positive connection. The requirement

that no action be undertaken without the approval of the gods as a whole functions as a

basically conservative principle that merely prevents change, and thus confirms tradition

only indirectly. Perhaps more to the point, while Book 2's paradigmatic instance of

constructive consensus presents straightforwardly a proposition and the *epainos* that

brings it into effect, the Olympian debates never portray *epainos* in its efficient

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[62] I refer to the "metalinguistic doctrine" in Homer that distinguishes the 'language of men' from the "aesthetically marked" 'language of gods'—that is, "ordinary language" from "poetic language" (Watkins 1995: 181-2; see also Bader 1989). If the gods speak the language of poetry, in their councils they debate the poetic tradition.

aspect—that is to say, they never show us the moment at which *epainos* is expressed, only the moment at which it is expressly withheld. Even in Book 22, when virtually every trace of dissonance appears to be resolved, we can only infer the existence of a divine consensus on the basis of contextual cues, despite the fact that it would be relatively easy to represent, for instance, Zeus reformulating a proposal that could be unambiguously ratified by a line such as *ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἳ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνησαν θεοὶ ἄλλοι. In other words, we find at the divine level a deferral of *epainos*—an avoidance of stating the ultimate reestablishment of consensus—analogous to the apparent avoidance of this term I have already noted in Book 19. This parallel aversion to the direct statment of what has emerged as the *Iliad*'s ultimate value can only strike us as remarkable.

Both of these observations—the connection between the *epainos* of the group and the affirmation of the epic tradition, on the one hand, and the paradoxical deferral of explicit *epainos*, on the other—apply equally well to the last instances of *epaineô* in the *Iliad*, in the debate over the awarding of prizes in the chariot race of Book 23, which deserve some attention simply for being the poem's final statement on the theme. The contests of the funeral games are a kind of third lens, in addition to the 'every day' conflicts between the human protagonists and the conflicts among the gods, through which the poem refracts its thematic material. The chariot race has an especially dense layering of connections to the main plot[63]; I will only touch on the fraction of these that

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[63] The chariot race is the strongest illustration of the general rule that paradigmatic narratives—what Alden 2000 calls 'paranarratives'—never have a single, strictly allegorical meaning. It is, for instance, impossible to determine which competitor 'represents' Achilles, who is like Antilokhos insofar as the latter objects to the alteration of a predetermined system of distribution, but also resembles Eumêlos in an important way: Eumêlos *should* win the race, for he is singled out as "the best" both by Achilles (ὤριστος, 23.536) and by the Catalogue (which identifies his horses as μέγ᾽ ἄρισται [2.763], after those of Achilles [770]). Achilles is similarly the *aristos* one who will be prevented from crossing the 'finish line' of the Trojan cycle, i.e. the sack of Troy.

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bear on the basic theme of *epainos*. I begin with the second of the observations I have

just formulated, namely the avoidance of the definitive expression of consensus. I recall

lines I have already had occasion to cite more than once, which are in fact the very last

occurrence of the word *epaineô* in the *Iliad*:

ὣς ἔφαθ᾽, οἳ δ᾽ ἄρα πάντες ἐπῄνεον ὡς ἐκέλευε,
καί νύ κέ οἱ πόρεν ἵππον, ἐπῄνησαν γὰρ Ἀχαιοί . . .

23.539-40

Thus he spoke, and they were all expressing *epainos* for his command.
And now he would have bestowed the horse, for the Achaeans had
expressed *epainos* . . .

My primary interest in these lines has lain precisely in the fact that *epainos is not*

established—that Antilokhos is able to forestall *epainos* by making an objection—for this

fact supplied the basis for my inference that the activity designated by *epaineô* must be

universal (above, Chapter 3 n. 67). Equally worthy of notice, however, is something I

have not heretofore stressed, namely that despite the considerable emphasis these lines

place on the disruption of *epainos*, the poem never states whether Achilles is able to

establish a consensus with his ultimate, revised distribution of prizes. There is an

important suggestion that such is the case, analogous to Zeus' declaration of *êpiotês* in

Book 22, but no explicit reference to the most definitive marker of social cohesion. The

suggestion, admittedly, comes very close. Antilokhos lays the groundwork in his

response to Achilles' proposal: he argues that, since he will not willingly give up the

prize mare, Achilles should find in his private stock of goods some substitute prize to

award to Eumêlos, ἵνα σ᾽ αἰνήσωσιν Ἀχαιοί ("so that the Achaeans will commend you,"

23.552). That is, Antilokhos uses the general mode of *ainos*, of socially constructive

speech, to index the satisfactory solution. Menelaos, it seems, does not find this solution

so satisfactory; he has no words of praise for Achilles (although it should be noted that

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neither does he address any criticism to him), but rather indicts Antilokhos with a

complaint of his own, which focuses on the events of the race. Nevertheless, when all

plaintiffs have at last been satisfied we do find an indication that Achilles' revised

distribution has achieved a limited rehabilitation of socially constructive speech. The

scene concludes with Achilles' awarding of the outstanding prize to Nestor, so that this

once accomplished athlete, now sidelined by age, will have something by which to

remember the occasion. Nestor reciprocates with a lengthy speech recognizing Achilles'

circumspection and thanking him for the gift—a speech that the narrative explicitly

identifies as an *ainos* (ἐπεὶ πάντ' αἶνον ἐπέκλυε Νηλεΐδαο ["when he heard the *ainos* of

the son of Neleus in its entirety"], 23.652).[64] Antilokhos' prediction has turned out to be

correct: the amended allocation of prizes has indeed produced *ainos* for Achilles. But I

emphasize that, in the prediction and in the event, this socially constructive speech

remains the act of individuals; it remains, that is, *ainos* and does not attain the fully

integrative aspect of *epainos*. We may hypothesize that Nestor's pronouncement could

be affirmed by the *epainos* of the group—but confirmation of this hypothesis remains

beyond the scope of the narrative. The poem comes no closer than Nestor's *ainos* to

suggesting the possibility of a globally cohesive consensus.

I draw attention to the fact that the (implied) reestablishment of social cohesion

hinges on the cooperation or mutual confirmation of father and son: the synergy of Nestor

and Antilokhos (which is an overarching theme of the chariot race) will ultimately prove

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[64] As Nagy and others have pointed out (Nagy 1999: 235, Pucci 1977: 76n.3), in Homeric poetry an *ainos* is always reciprocated with a gift, and this reciprocal pattern corresponds entirely to the ideology of epinician praise poetry (where the poet's *ainos* reciprocates his patron's *xenia*). In Book 23 we see very explicitly how this ideology—that is, the inherited Indo-European ideology of reciprocity between poet and patron (cf. Watkins 1995, Ch. 5)—ultimately serves the purpose of establishing social cohesion.

relevant to the second aspect of *epainos* in this passage, namely, the interconnection

between the disruption and reconstitution of consensus on the one hand and the

questioning and confirmation of poetic tradition on the other. When Menelaos lodges his

complaint against Antilokhos—the episode's second threat to the successful

establishment of a cohesive group—he introduces his grievances by remarking that

Antilokhos' 'foul play' contrasts with the character he had previously been thought to

have: Ἀντίλοχε, πρόσθεν πεπνύμενε, ποῖον ἔρεξας ("Antilokhos, prudent

[*pepnumenos*] in times past, what have you done?," 23.570). This remark is a

formalization of the language Menelaos had used when he cried 'foul' during the race

itself:

> Ἀντίλοχ' οὔ τις σεῖο βροτῶν ὀλοώτερος ἄλλος·
> ἔρρ', ἐπεὶ οὔ σ' ἔτυμόν γε φάμεν πεπνῦσθαι Ἀχαιοί.
> $$23.439\text{-}40$$
>
> Antilokhos, there is no man more reckless than you:
> go on, since it is not true what we Achaeans say, that you are *pepnumenos*.

The later comment is a 'formalization' in two senses: in the first place, Menelaos is now

litigating, through a formal apparatus, the charge he had made in the heat of the race; in

the second, he now converts a comparatively rare verbal form of *pepnumai* into the

familiar participial form in which the word functions as a fixed epithet for more than one

Homeric hero (most recognizably Telemakhos, to whom Antilokhos bears a certain

resemblance in this episode). Notice, however, that while the narrative frame makes

frequent use of the epithet *pepnumenos*, the word hardly ever makes its way into the

direct speech of the characters. Menelaos' critique of the general usage of the

Achaeans—who, he claims, regularly refer to Antilokhos as *pepnumenos*—thus carries

the suggestion of an uncanny awareness of the conventions of epic diction: a character

within the epic momentarily steps outside the world of strict mimesis to comment on the diegetic frame that normally contains the world of heroic action. In this way, Menelaos' charge against Antilokhos—that he cheated during the race—amounts to a criticism of the epic tradition, for, so he claims, Antilokhos' recklessness constitutes proof that his epithet is *ouk etumon*, i.e. that it doesn't correspond to reality.[65] Menelaos' dispute, in other words, calls into question the very fabric of the epic, which the oath he desires threatens to rend entirely: since Antilokhos cannot swear that his maneuver was unintentional (cf. 23.585), he seems likely to be forced to acknowledge that he consciously employed a dangerous tactic, thus opening himself up to the charge of lacking the sensibility implied by *pepnumenos*—and exposing the error of a tradition that applies that epithet to him. That is, according to *Menelaos'* definition of the term; ironically, however, Menelaos' critique reveals that he himself is 'mistaken' insofar as he misunderstands the conventions of epic diction. In actuality, reckless behavior is not at all the kind of criterion that could test the accuracy of the epithet: as Dale has demonstrated with convincing statistical evidence, "*pepnumenos* manifestly implies proficiency in speech," i.e. it relates above all to verbal phenomena.[66] As a result, Antilokhos has the opportunity to vindicate his claim to the epithet even without taking the oath, by demonstrating his verbal proficiency. And this is exactly what he does in the masterful speech with which he replies to Menelaos, a speech that employs artful rhetoric to reaffirm at one and the same time Menelaos' higher status and his own (implicitly

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[65] For the difference between *etumos / etêtumos* and *alêthês* as indicators of the 'truth' of a traditional utterance, see Cole 1983.

[66] Dale 1982: 208, with n.11; cf. Heath 2001: 134n.11. It is precisely with respect to his "proficiency in speech" that Antilokhos will ultimately justify his claim to the epithet.

justified) claim to the prize mare (see above, Ch. 3 p. 104). The poem itself

acknowledges this as a definitive demonstration of the fact that Antilokhos can 'truly' be

called *pepnumenos*, for it introduces his speech with the line: τὸν δ' αὖτ' ᾿Αντίλοχος

πεπνύμενος ἀντίον ηὖδα ("prudent [*pepnumenos*] Antilokhos answered him," 23.586).

Thus the voice of the narrator confirms what Menelaos had called into question, and the

constructive speech that settles the dispute—that restores cohesion among the

competitors—constitutes simultaneously a confirmation of the fabric of epic tradition.

We observe the same convergence of social and poetic aspects of cohesion in Nestor's

role in the episode. As we have seen, his *ainos* concludes the scene and is as close as the

poem comes to naming the restoration of consensus. His artfully constructed speech is

also a last reminder of the legitimacy of Antilokhos' claim to *pepnumenos*: as Heath has

shown, the quality of being *pepnumenos* tends to run in families[67]; the tendency is

especially evident among the Nêleidai, for in the *Odyssey* both Nestor and Peisistratos

receive the epithet.[68]

The *Iliad*'s final, microscopic exploration of *epainos* confirms what we have seen

to be true of the larger negotiation of consensus among both Achaeans and Olympians:

on the one hand, the restoration of social cohesion provides the necessary confirmation of

a poetic tradition whose integrity is called into question by moments of discord; on the

other hand, the poem noticeably avoids identifying restored cohesion as a definitive

reconstitution of *epainos*. These two principles seem to pull in opposite directions, one

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[67] Heath 2001: 153-4.

[68] Cf. *Od.* 3.20 and 52. With respect to Nestor's *ainos* in Book 23, it is worth noting that Antilokhos himself later delivers an *ainos* to Achilles (and receives compensation, as his father: 23.795-6), which confirms his inheritance of verbal proficiency.

toward and one away from the ideal form of consensus. This curious *coincidentia oppositorum* will prove significant when we return to the earlier books to determine what new circumstances allow the reintegration of the divine community in Book 22. For the moment, however, I wish to round out this discussion of Book 23 by way of a short diversion.

I am aware that my interpretation of Menelaos' critique might seem like an unlikely overreading that attributes rather too much self-consciousness to what are, after all, but two brief remarks, especially since there is no positive evidence outside Book 23 that *pepnumenos* would be perceived as an epithet proper to Antilokhos. For that reason, and because my argument for a connection between *epainos* and poetic tradition gains much from the recognition of the 'metapoetic' force of these lines, I think I may appropriately note that there is, to my knowledge, one other instance in which a character of Homeric epic deploys a critique of the language of epic[69]—and that instance reveals some rather remarkable correspondences of theme with the episode of the chariot race. In an admonishing tale in Book 7, Nestor recalls a champion he once faced, and gives a brief history of that champion's armor:

τοῖσι δ' Ἐρευθαλίων πρόμος ἵστατο ἰσόθεος φὼς
τεύχε' ἔχων ὤμοισιν Ἀρηϊθόοιο ἄνακτος
δίου Ἀρηϊθόου. τὸν ἐπίκλησιν κορυνήτην
ἄνδρες κίκλησκον καλλίζωνοί τε γυναῖκες
οὕνεκ' ἄρ' οὐ τόξοισι μαχέσκετο δουρί τε μακρῷ,
ἀλλὰ σιδηρείῃ κορύνῃ ῥήγνυσκε φάλαγγας.
τὸν Λυκόοργος ἔπεφνε δόλῳ, οὔ τι κράτεΐ γε,
στεινωπῷ ἐν ὁδῷ ὅθ' ἄρ' οὐ κορύνη οἱ ὄλεθρον

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[69] Of course, it is not uncommon for characters to demonstrate an awareness of poetic traditions as such: cf. Edmunds 1990: 78 on the "hyperpoetic" quality of Aeneas' speech in *Il*. 20, or Achilles' evident awareness of poetic tradition in Book 19, noted above (p. 205). What is exceptional is 1) for this awareness to take the form of a critique, of an exposure of real or potential fault lines (Aeneas 'praises' epic and 'parades' "some of its more artful elements [Edmunds 1990, ibid.]), and 2) for it to focus on the mechanical or stylistic features of epic (specifically, its most distinctive stylistic feature, the use of fixed epithets) rather than the mere fact of epic as such.

χραῖσμε σιδηρείη· πρὶν γὰρ Λυκόοργος ὑποφθὰς
δουρὶ μέσον περόνησεν, ὃ δ' ὕπτιος οὔδει ἐρείσθη·
τεύχεα δ' ἐξενάριξε, τά οἱ πόρε χάλκεος Ἄρης.
καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ἔπειτα φόρει μετὰ μῶλον Ἄρηος·
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ Λυκόοργος ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐγήρα,
δῶκε δ' Ἐρευθαλίωνι φίλῳ θεράποντι φορῆναι·
<div align="right">7.136-49</div>

Ereuthaliôn, a godlike man, came forward as their champion,
bearing on his shoulders the arms of lord Arêithoos,
glorious Arêithoos, whom mean and beautiful-girdled women
called by the epithet 'mace-bearer' [korunêtês],
because he never fought with bow or long spear,
but he used to break through battle lines with his iron mace.
Lukoorgos slew him by deceit [dolos], not at all by physical strength,
in a narrow way where his iron mace was of no use
in warding off destruction. For Lukoorgos managed first to pierce him
through the middle with a spear, and he was stretched on the ground on his
    back.
And [Lukoorgos] stripped the arms that brazen Ares had given him.
And these arms he himself then carried into Ares' tumult;
but when Lukoorgos grew old in his halls,
he gave them to his dear therapôn Ereuthaliôn to carry.

Nagy notes that in line 138 "the poetry itself is actually referring to an epithet as an epithet."[70] More: as soon as Nestor has established the epithet *korunêtês* as normative, he immediately subverts the norm by exposing a moment at which the epithet is inapplicable, or, as we might say, 'untrue.' Arêithoos is anything but a *korunêtês* when he loses his life (and his arms, including, presumably, the mace that gives him his name) to Lukoorgos. This does not amount to a full-fledged criticism of epic diction along the lines of Menelaos' complaint—the manner of Arêithoos' defeat confirms his essence as 'mace-man' as well as if he had had room to wield his characteristic weapon—but it is critical of epic diction insofar as it exposes a feature of epic style that has troubled critics ancient and modern, viz. the occasional discrepancy between the meaning of a fixed

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[70] Nagy 1999: 329 (§11n1).

epithet and the narrative context in which it is deployed.[71] Curiously, the situation that

strips Arêithoos of his epithet (and the weapon from which it derives) has two important

points of connection with the circumstances of the crisis of epic referentiality identified

by Menelaos. In the first place, it takes place "on a narrow path"—the same phrase

describes the place at which Antilokhos succeeds in passing his competitor (στεινωπῷ

ἐν ὁδῷ, 23.416; cf. 23.427). Secondly, it is a premier example of *dolos*, just as the

reckless driving of which Menelaos accuses his opponent (23.585).[72] I do not wish to

guess whether or not some particular meaning motivates this strangely consistent

association of themes[73]; we may have to do merely with one of those mysterious, virtually

inexplicable bonds that typify the phenomenon of multiformity in oral tradition and that

maintain the contiguity of elements in the most diverse circumstances—what Lord called

the "tension of essences."[74] But I emphasize that such a "tension of essences" can

confidently be considered a sign of deep traditionality. The lesson to draw from the

correspondence between Nestor's tale and the chariot race, then, is that, although it rarely

seeks to expose the potential faults of its material, Homeric poetry is familiar with the

possibility of mounting a critique of its fabric; it has even developed a traditional context

in which to do so.

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[71] See Parry 1987: 120 ff.

[72] To 7.142 (δόλῳ. οὔ τι κράτεΐ γε) cf. κέρδεσιν. οὔ τι τάχει γε in 23.515.

[73] For instance, one might be tempted to infer that these passages represent *dolos* as a force that subverts the norms of heroic tradition.

[74] Lord 2000: 97.

I return now to the main question, that of the manner in which the *Iliad* represents a cohesion, both social and poetic, about which it seems, to say the least, ambivalent. The last third of the poem, which begins roughly with the death of Patroklos, witnesses a major change of overall social dynamics. While Achaean society, no less than its Olympian superstructure, was previously torn by internal division, both Greeks (in Book 19) and gods (in Book 22) now show a remarkable ability to restore their broken communities. But, as we have seen, the rehabilitation seems in each case to be less than fully complete, since we never find the definitive formulation of cohesion the poem's thematics of consensus conditions us to expect, viz. a description of the *epainos* of the community. Let us refrain just a little longer from questioning the source of this reluctance to portray the realization of the poem's ultimate value and take the deferral of *epainos* as a given—the logical hypothesis that will allow the argument to advance. Assuming, then, that for some reason the poem *cannot* attribute a decisive *epainos* to the Greeks or their divine counterparts, the question then becomes, where can we look to find the kind of resolution the poem seems to demand? Given the poem's tripartite social division—which we saw in Chapter 1 to be clearly articulated in terms of the system of reception formulas that endows the verb *epaineô* with its special value—we are prompted, naturally but paradoxically, to look eastward, to Troy. And we need not look hard, for it is relatively easy to perceive that the poem's climactic instance of *epainos*—the moment of social cohesion that definitively and ineluctably confirms the traditional course of events—unifies not Greeks, not gods, but—Trojans.

That the ultimate moment of *epainos* should be displaced, so to speak, to the Trojans should strike us as remarkable, and as an indicator of the intensity with which the

poem recoils from portraying true consensus among the Achaeans. For if anything the

Trojans are characterized by a profound heterogeneity, a deep social and linguistic divide

that would seem to make even the idea of the construction of social cohesion through

speech an impossibility at Troy. (We may justifiably wonder what Trojan *ainos* could

generate a universal response, given that the Trojans have no common language.[75]) In

fact, representations of a divisive Trojan political process are deployed throughout the

Iliad as foils for the relative solidarity demonstrated by Greek deliberations: as Mackie

has shown, the poem employs a consistent strategy of pairing to match each Achaean

assembly with a Trojan gathering, as a rule with an emphasis on the 'irregularities' that

make these gatherings "less political" than their Greek counterparts.[76] (The only

assembly, aside from the funeral games, that escapes Mackie's attention is the one that

closes Book 3; as we saw above, precisely the same strategy pairs this Greek *and* Trojan

gathering with a matching divine council, likewise with emphasis on the different ways

epainos is negotiated in each.) We find a perfect example of this technique in the

transition in Book 7 from the Achaean *boulê*, in which the *basilêes* ratify Nestor's

proposal for the construction of the wall, to the Trojan *agorê*[77]:

ὡς ἔφαθ'. οἳ δ' ἄρα πάντες ἐπήνησαν βασιλῆες.
Τρώων αὖτ' ἀγορὴ γένετ' Ἰλίου ἐν πόλει ἄκρῃ
δεινὴ τετρηχυῖα, παρὰ Πριάμοιο θύρῃσι·
7.344-6

Thus he spoke, and all the *basilêes* expressed *ainos* in response.
But now the Trojans held an *agorê* on the acropolis of Ilion,

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[75] 4.437-8: οὐ γὰρ πάντων ἦεν ὁμὸς θρόος οὐδ' ἴα γῆρυς. / ἀλλὰ γλῶσσα μέμικτο, πολύκλητοι δ' ἔσαν ἄνδρες.

[76] Mackie 1996: 21 ff. Her conclusion on p. 133 is that "The Achaeans . . . exhibit a more collective and politically more developed decision-making process than the Trojans."

[77] Mackie's table actually obscures the force of the contrast, since she neglects the *boulê* and considers only the full Greek assembly that happens later in the book, even though this takes place on the following day.

one angry and full of discord, beside Priam's palace doors.

Not only is the Trojan assembly "angry and full of discord" (trans. Butler) in contrast with the harmony implicit in ἐπήνησαν; the narrative of that assembly portrays a rather blunt conflict between irreconcilable proposals—Alexander outright refuses to consider Antênôr's suggestion (ἀντικρὺ δ' ἀπόφημι ["I tell you straight out, I refuse"], 7.362[78])—and furthermore lacks any indicators of audience response, as though the social dynamics of reception were totally non-functional among the Trojans.

This pattern is suddenly and sharply reversed in the pairing that accounts for the climactic Achaean assembly of Book 19, the Trojan counterpart to which Mackie identifies as the battlefield *agorê* Hektor convenes at the close of fighting the day before (18.245 ff.).[79] Not that this *agorê* is any less 'irregular' than other Trojan gatherings: for instance, as Mackie notes, the troops do not adopt the seated position that typifies orderly proceedings, but emphatically remain standing (ὀρθῶν δ' ἑσταότων ἀγορὴ γένετ' ["they held an *agorê* while standing upright"], 18.246).[80] Nevertheless, while *epainos* is conspicuous by its absence in Book 19 (see above), the corresponding Trojan assembly exceptionally concludes with the ratification of a proposal through a version of the efficient *epaineô* formula—thus suggesting, superficially at least, that the Trojans achieve

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[78] *Pace* LSJ s.v. I (which qualifies, "in this sense only Ep."), Autenrieth s.v., and doubtless other of the lexica, I cannot accept that *apophêmi* does not have here the negative force it carries in classical usage. (The prefix *apo-* negates, as in *apênês*, on which see Ch. 3; cf. Blanc 1985.260.) Note that its only other Homeric occurrences are 9.422 and 649, where Achilles enjoins the Embassy to take back his *negative* response: ἀγγελίην ἀπόφασθε. I propose translating this phrase, "report my answer (of 'no')," and Alexander's remark, "openly I say 'no.'"

[79] The pattern we observe in books 18 and 19 is set by the sequence of assemblies in 8 (Hektor convenes a battlefield assembly at the close of fighting, and presents the same strategy he argues for in 18) and 9 (the nighttime assembly that sends and receives the Embassy). Note that this pattern has the effect of linking together the Embassy with the assembly that finally reintegrates Achilles.

[80] Mackie 1996: 24. Does the 'irregular' *seated* position of Agamemnon at 19.77 perhaps respond to this detail?

the kind of cohesion that is implied but deferred in the case of the Greeks. This is the *only* instance in the *Iliad* in which the phraseology of consensus is applied to the Trojans.

But given the general pattern of pathological dissonance set by the other Trojan assemblies, we should not be surprised to find that this unique Trojan *epainos* does not, as it should, contribute to the health of the social organism, but is rather malign—indeed, on a certain view, the germ of Troy's ultimate destruction. In fact, a set of correspondences with the obviously dysfunctional assembly of Book 7 (which contrasts with a properly cohesive instance of Achaean consensus) signals that the Trojans' new-found solidarity focuses on precisely the wrong object. The issue under consideration in the *agorê*, which has been hastily convened to consider the strategic implications of Achilles' sudden epiphany,[81] is whether the army should retreat under cover of night to the safety of Troy's walls, or whether they should camp on the plain and attempt another assault on the ships in the morning. Pouludamas opens the debate by advocating the conservative, defensive tactic; by introducing him as *pepnumenos*, the poem assimilates him to Antênôr, who had proposed a similarly conservative, and doubtless sensible, position in Book 7.[82] Hektor counters with the alternative strategy of aggression, and he does so in decidedly aggressive terms that recall the language with which Alexander

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[81] I use the term 'epiphany' with an eye to 18.247-8, Ἀχιλλεὺς / ἐξεφάνη.

[82] 18.249 (τοῖσι δὲ Πουλυδάμας πεπνυμένος ἦρχ' ἀγορεύειν) ~ 7.347 (τοῖσιν δ' Ἀντήνωρ πεπνυμένος ἦρχ' ἀγορεύειν). Antênôr makes essentially the same proposal as the peace settlement offered by Agamemnon at the end of Book 3—which very nearly resulted in a consensus which would have ended the war. Note that Antênôr is the only one among the Trojans who 'looks forward and back' (18.250)—that is, he has precisely the contextualizing perspective necessary for constructing consensus (cf. above, Ch. 3 pp. 100-1). It is conceivable that the designation *pepnumenos*, in addition to indicating skill in constructive speaking generally, makes a more direct connection between Antênôr and *epainos*, if we read this passage against the dispute over Antilokhos' epithet in Book 23.

summarily refused to consider Antênôr's advice[83]; as a result, Hektor is portrayed as an obstructionist similarly opposed to consensus-building.[84] Not only does the inflexible disposition he shares with his brother leave him deaf to the salutary advice of others. More, Hektor actively works to disable the social mechanisms that would produce decisions based on group will, by silencing Pouludamas *and by preventing the collective expression of approval*:

νήπιε μηκέτι ταῦτα νοήματα φαῖν' ἐνὶ δήμῳ·
οὐ γάρ τις Τρώων ἐπιπείσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἐάσω.
18.295-6

Nêpios, do not make these thoughts evident among the *dêmos* any more; no Trojan will be persuaded—for I will not allow it.

Hektor recognizes the social dynamics expressed by the syntax of *epi-*, but he recognizes them as a threat to his own point of view, and he takes immediate steps to render them non-functional. This must be considered as a counter-consensual move *par excellence*.

Nevertheless, despite all these flaws, despite even the conscious efforts of Hektor himself to block the channels of collective decision-making, the Trojans succeed in expressing their cohesive consent—for Hektor's plan. In the event, it is not Pouludamas who is thereby shown to be *nêpios* (that is, 'disconnected,' the opposite of being *êpios*[85]), but the Trojans themselves:

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[83] Cf. Hektor's Πουλυδάμα σὺ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἐμοὶ φίλα ταῦτ' ἀγορεύεις (18.285) with the identical words of Alexander at 7.357. (As in the example cited in the previous note, only the proper name changes.)

[84] One component of Hektor's proposal—his directive that those Trojans concerned about their property should distribute it among the *laoi*, since it is 'better for them to enjoy it than the Achaeans'—can actually be understood as a rebuttal of the distributive settlement proposed by Antênôr in Book 7. In Book 18, this directive makes sense only in terms of an anxiety that the Achaeans might take the city on the following day; in the context of the general options confronting the Trojans throughout the poem—either to compensate the Greeks or to be destroyed—Hektor's command is, in a sense, a denial of the former possibility and an expression of the Trojans' commitment to 'fight to the end.'

[85] Edmunds 1990.

ὡς Ἕκτωρ ἀγόρευ', ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν
νήπιοι· ἐκ γάρ σφεων φρένας εἵλετο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.
Ἕκτορι μὲν γὰρ ἐπήνησαν κακὰ μητιόωντι,
Πουλυδάμαντι δ' ἄρ' οὔ τις ὃς ἐσθλὴν φράζετο βουλήν.
18.311-13

Thus Hektor spoke, and the Trojans shouted in response,
nêpioi: for Pallas Athena took away their senses.
For they expressed *epainos* for Hektor, who was counseling ill,
but no one [approved] Pouludamas, who had advised a good *boulê*.

Given the fundamental connection between *êpiotês* and the cohesion of a properly

integrated society (see above), this consensus of *nêpioi* must strike us as problematic,

even contradictory. The contradiction, evidently, can only be resolved by divine

intervention, notably that of Athena, who 'took away their *phrenes*.'[86] Moreover, even

the syntax of *epainos* takes an irregular form, suggesting that problems lurk beneath the

surface of a superficially successful gathering. As a rule, *epaineô* is used absolutely in

Homer, on one occasion only taking an accusative object designating the utterance

(2.335); its normal usage emphasizes the absolute quality of the action as a total social

phenomenon that extends throughout society and is, in principle, free of restriction

temporal or otherwise. Here, however, we find the verb construed, exceptionally, with a

dative object indicating the speaker; the construction, I suggest, ominously foreshadows

the limitations that constrict this flawed consensus. For even when *epaineô* takes as its

object an utterance, the consensus that transforms the utterance into a total speech act

may, in a sense, outlive the speaker. But the solidarity centered on Hektor is doomed in

advance to become meaningless and to dissolve in the very near future, once Hektor is

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[86] The narrator's justification for the approval of the Trojans ironically recalls the explanation Alexander
offered in Book 7 for what he perceived as the impossible proposal of Antênôr: ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα θεοὶ
φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί (7.360). But it should also be read in connection with the similar divine
intervention that brings into effect the 'foolish' pact of Glaukos and Diomedes (ἔνθ' αὖτε Γλαύκῳ
Κρονίδης φρένας ἐξέλετο Ζεύς, 6.234).

removed from the scene. The bond that unites Trojan society proves ultimately to be a cult of personality that cannot survive the death of its hero.

In fact, the greatest irony of this Trojan consensus is that it ratifies nothing if not its own demise. For Hektor's final words in the assembly—the words that evoke the inexorable efficiency of *epainos*—are precisely those that will require him to face his own death in Book 22:

> οὔ μιν ἔγωγε
> φεύξομαι ἐκ πολέμοιο δυσηχέος, ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἄντην
> στήσομαι, ἤ κε φέρῃσι μέγα κράτος, ἤ κε φεροίμην.
> ξυνὸς Ἐνυάλιος, καί τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα.
> ὣς Ἕκτωρ ἀγόρευ' . . .

> 18.306-10

> "I will not flee before him,
> away from ill-sounding battle, but indeed I will stand
> and face him, whether he should take the victory, or I.
> Enualios is our common right, and he slays the slayer."
> Thus Hektor spoke . . .

If Hektor had truly managed to disable the mechanisms of consensus, as he threatened against Pouludamas, he might have also saved himself, for his utterance would have been received with something less than the full efficiency of *epainos*, and therefore might have gone unfulfilled. But thanks to the intervention of Athena, Hektor's speech is transformed into a true speech act; according to the rules of the *Iliad*'s poetic world, reality must conform. Hektor binds himself to face Achilles—he acknowledges as much at 22.99 ff.—and in this way the efficiency of Trojan *epainos* ensures the destruction of its very object.

At the same time, of course, the efficiency of the Trojans' *epainos* guarantees the course of the rest of the poem. That is the significance of Athena's involvement: here, as elsewhere, she intervenes at a moment at which the traditional plot of the poem is called

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into question in order to ensure that events unfold according to fate. She confirms tradition. The poem is not as explicit about the possible consequences of the Trojan debate as it is on other occasions: we find no mention of the possibility that something might happen 'contrary to destiny,' no "reversal passage" delineating the boundaries of tradition. But this moment nevertheless threatens to undermine the subsequent plot of the poem, indeed, even the ultimate fate of Troy, as the ancient commentators recognized.[87] More poetically meaningful, however, than critical recognition is the effect within the poem of this confirmation of the inevitability of Hektor's confrontation with Achilles. The scene shifts immediately from the Trojan *agorê* to the Achaean camp, where Achilles places his 'man-slaying' hands on the corpse of Patroklos. As though the Trojan *epainos* had resolved not a strategic dilemma but rather the most central dichotomy of the *Iliad*—Achilles' *dikhthadiai kêres* (9.411), either to die at Troy or to live a long life without *kleos*—Achilles' words mark the first time he accepts his fate without internal conflict:

ἄμφω γὰρ πέπρωται ὁμοίην γαῖαν ἐρεῦσαι
αὐτοῦ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ, ἐπεὶ οὐδ' ἐμὲ νοστήσαντα
δέξεται ἐν μεγάροισι γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεὺς
οὐδὲ Θέτις μήτηρ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ γαῖα καθέξει.
νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν Πάτροκλε σεῦ ὕστερος εἶμ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν,
οὔ σε πρὶν κτεριῶ πρίν γ' Ἕκτορος ἐνθάδ' ἐνεῖκαι
τεύχεα καὶ κεφαλὴν μεγαθύμου σοῖο φονῆος·
18.329-35

For we are both fated to stain red the same earth
here in Troy, since neither will the aged horseman Peleus
receive me on my return to his halls,
nor Thetis my mother, but the earth will hold me here.
But now, Patroklos, since I go under the ground later than you,

[87] Cf. these two representative comments from the bT scholia ad 18.312-3: [1] πιθανὴ ἡ οἰκονομία· εἰ γὰρ ἔφυγον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ταῦτα τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐγένετο, τειχήρεις οἱ Τρῶες καὶ πολιορκία· καὶ οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Ἕκτωρ ἀπώλετο, κωλυόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν δημογερόντων προελθεῖν . . .; [2] πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὅλην ποίησιν οἰκονομικῶς διέθετο ταῦτα ὁ ποιητής· πεισθέντων γὰρ τῷ Πολυδάμαντι τῶν Τρώων ἐξαγώνιον ἂν κατέστη τὸ λοιπὸν μέρος τῆς Ἰλιάδος.

> I will not complete your funeral rights until I bring here
> the arms of Hektor, and the head of your killer, great of *thumos*.

His acceptance is at the same time a summary of the events immediately to follow—Achilles displays a Zeus-like ability to dictate the plot of the poem.[88]

With the question of how the plot of the poem will unfold effectively settled—by Trojan consensus—there is, in a sense, no need for *epainos* in the Achaean assembly of Book 19. Achilles can summon the *Männerbund* and proceed into battle, fully conscious now of how events will proceed. The function of *epainos*—at least, its poetic function as confirmation of tradition—is fulfilled in the Trojan sphere: Book 18's double for the climactic Greek assembly of the following book is the closest the *Iliad* will come to identifying an ultimate moment of consensus. By thus displacing *epainos* from the Greeks to the Trojans, and correspondingly representing the resolution of Achilles' great dilemma as something that transpires in the enemy camp, the poem finds relief from the burden of having to portray something from which it mysteriously shrinks, viz. the total restoration of social cohesion among the Achaeans.

The *Iliad* applies a similar technique of displacement to the related problem of representing the reestablishment of cohesion among the gods. We should recall that, even at the moment that Achilles rejoins warrior society, the divine community is far from being integrated. The conflicting loyalties that divide the Olympians have by no means been resolved—they have only been in a compulsory stasis, ever since Zeus put an end to Poseidon's subversive intervention in Book 15. In fact, Zeus had then made it clear that he would not allow those divided loyalties to express themselves until *after* Achilles had rejoined the *Männerbund*:

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[88] To 18.335, cf. the use of πρὶν . . . πρὶν in Zeus' statement of his Will at 15.72-4.

τὸ πρὶν δ' οὔτ' ἄρ' ἐγὼ παύω χόλον οὔτέ τιν' ἄλλον
ἀθανάτων Δαναοῖσιν ἀμυνέμεν ἐνθάδ' ἐάσω
πρίν γε τὸ Πηλείδαο τελευτηθῆναι ἐέλδωρ . . .
<div align="center">15.72-4</div>

I will not put an end to my *kholos* <u>nor allow</u>
<u>any other god to aid the Danaans</u>
until the wish of Peleus' son is accomplished . . .

For the gods, at least, the settlement of differences among the Greeks is no resolution, but rather a case of 'peace breaking out,' as is readily apparent from the divine assembly that follows the climactic Greek gathering of Book 19. As Achilles had summoned even the least (but most fundamental) members of the host to the *agorê*, so Zeus (through Themis) gathers even the most marginal divinities (who, as natural powers, are also in a sense the most elemental).[89] This assembly, however, does not have as its goal the clarification of group will or the marshaling of collective support for a single *boulê*; Zeus' *boulê* (20.20) is now, on the contrary, almost the denial of any unified plan, for he directs the gods to pursue each his or her own *noos*:

ἔρχεσθ' ὄφρ' ἂν ἵκησθε μετὰ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιούς.
ἀμφοτέροισι δ' ἀρήγεθ' ὅπη νόος ἐστὶν ἑκάστου.
<div align="center">20.24-5</div>

Go until you are among the Trojans and Achaeans,
bring aid to both sides, each in accordance with his own *noos*.

Nevertheless, we should not think that this florescence of tension, of contradictory wills, is anything but the necessary precursor to the ultimate reconstitution of community: Book 2's paradigmatic instance of consensus building illustrates well the principle that a system must reach its breaking point before it can be put back together.

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[89] 20.7-9: οὔτε τις οὖν ποταμῶν ἀπέην, νόσφ' Ὠκεανοῖο, / οὔτ' ἄρα νυμφάων, αἵ τ' ἄλσεα καλὰ νέμονται / καὶ πηγὰς ποταμῶν καὶ πίσεα ποιήεντα. To the extent that fluvial geography provides a framework for the identification and organization of local poetic traditions (see the very important comment of Ford 1992: 80 on Hesiod's catalogue of rivers [*Th.* 337-70]: "Here the appeal is not to the Muses but to epichoric traditions, which cannot be included in a Panhellenic river catalog"), this assembly also crystallizes the tension between local and Panhellenic dynamics.

Peace breaks out on all fronts at once: when Achilles leads the Greeks against the Trojans the gods too enter the field, and for the first time take up positions directly opposite one another.[90] The direct effect of their involvement is the engineering of a confrontation between Achilles and Aeneas,[91] which encounter seems designed as much to define the lines of opposition among the gods as to match and test representative human antagonists. Aeneas' initial approach prompts Hera to seek the support of her customary allies, Athena and Poseidon (20.114-5)—in this way the narrative uses the occasion to redefine one last time the poem's most easily identifiable bloc. Hera argues that the trio should either turn Aeneas to flight immediately, or else ensure that Achilles easily vanquishes him, so that the latter understands clearly that the gods are in his favor. Strangely, Poseidon—who previously, we recall, was the only one to take up Hera's invitation to intervene—now advocates a policy of provisional non-involvement. The three then seat themselves as spectators, as do their counterparts Apollo and Ares opposite them. With the imminent duel thus marked as a crucial confrontation of conflicting divine interests, the moment of resolution is delayed while the human actors take center stage.

The great tension of this encounter derives from the fact that both actors are, we might say, playing the same role. I suggested at the end of the last chapter that Aeneas represents precisely the kind of cohesion that is the focal point of Achilles' story—that he is, in other words, an embodiment of sociality just like Achilles. Indeed, Nagy has shown how the *Iliad*, in the duel of Book 20 and earlier in the poem, presents Aeneas as a virtual

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[90] Cf. 20.67-74. The conflict between Athena and Ares in Book 5 is not direct, but mediated by Diomedes.

[91] Cf. 20.79, Αἰνείαν δ' ἰθὺς λαοσσόος ὦρσεν Ἀπόλλων.

double for Achilles: Aeneas is the only other character to have *mênis*, a reciprocal *mênis* with the king that derives from his lack of *timê* (13.461) and a *geras* (20.182).[92] The only difference between the two heroes' stories is that Aeneas will live beyond the Trojan war, while Achilles' life (and story) will end at Troy (cf. 20.304-8). This difference is actually thematized in the episode we are considering[93]; in fact, it is this difference that gives a parallel emphasized by Aeneas himself its particular poignancy. In comparing himself to Achilles, Aeneas does not focus on social dynamics but on birth: as he points out, both heroes are sons of goddesses. This fact—evidently more noteworthy to Aeneas than any comparison of social circumstances or affective states—endows their encounter with truly epic significance, for it means that, no matter who wins the duel, the son of a goddess must die: τῶν δὴ νῦν ἕτεροί γε φίλον παῖδα κλαύσονται / σήμερον ("the parents of one or the other of us will today lament their dear child," 20.210-1). The deaths of two goddesses' sons (one of whom is Achilles) make up the climactic events of the poem that follows the *Iliad* in the epic cycle, the *Aithiopis*. When we consider the emotive power that is assigned to those events in Homeric tradition itself (cf. the description of Achilles' funeral in the *Odyssey*'s second *nekuia*, 24.37 ff.), we can easily understand the magnitude of the interest this episode claims from both its external audience and its internal one—that is, the gods whose loyalties are being tested.

Aeneas clearly expects that either he or Achilles will perish; at the narrative level, the expectation is that one or the other figure of cohesion will be destroyed. In other words, the episode posits the mutual incompatibility of Trojan and Greek sociality, or the

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[92] Nagy 1999: 265-7.

[93] Ibid. 267-8.

impossibility of a sociality that could accomodate both sides. Conceptually, then, the situation explores the same problem that was raised by the near truce at the end of Book 3, namely, the determination of the extent to which cohesion is possible across group boundaries.[94] The earlier reflections on this issue were conducted in terms of *epainos*, of socially constructive speech; it is not inappropriate to approach Book 20 in the same terms, especially in light of the connection I have pointed out between *epainos* and poetic tradition. Nagy's analysis of the scene hinges on the observation that the exchange of *neikea* that precedes actual physical combat constitutes precisely a hostile opposition of (implied) variant traditions: each of the heroes has epic material he can range against his opponent.[95] From this perspective, the conflict between figures of cohesion is exactly the conflict of cohesiveness between opposed poetic traditions, one of which seems to exclude the possibility of the other. There is no consensus that could confirm the truth of both traditions, given their mutual exclusivity. Indeed, Aeneas himself perceives the counterposing of these opposed poetic motifs as a mode of speech that defies consensus:

ἀλλὰ τί ἢ ἔριδας καὶ νείκεα νῶϊν ἀνάγκη
νεικεῖν ἀλλήλοισιν ἐναντίον ὥς τε γυναῖκας,
αἵ τε <u>χολωσάμεναι</u> ἔριδος πέρι θυμοβόροιο
νεικεῦσ᾽ ἀλλήλῃσι μέσην ἐς ἄγυιαν ἰοῦσαι
<u>πόλλ᾽ ἐτεά τε καὶ οὐκί· χόλος</u> δέ τε καὶ τὰ κελεύει.
                                        20.251-5

But what is the need for us to hurl at each other
erides and *neikea*, like women
who, <u>having conceived *kholos*</u>, make *neikos* with each other
in *thumos*-devouring *eris*, going to the middle of the road
and uttering <u>many things that are true, and many that are not</u>—<u>*kholos*</u>
      ordains even this.

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[94] The same question constitutes the focus of the important encounter between Diomedes and Glaukos in Book 6, an encounter which is not unrelated to the problems considered by this thesis. I have elected, however, to set this episode aside, since a full appreciation of it would require a sociology of exchange as developed as the sociology of speech I have undertaken here.

[95] Nagy 1999: 265-74.

The juxtaposition of contrary utterances imbued with counter-consensual *kholos* to such an extent that a clear distinction between true and false is no longer possible could never lead to any kind of resolution.

Aeneas hopes to resolve the conflict at a different level, not of speech but of action. But even on this plane the hoped-for resolution is obstructed by a conflict of poetic norms, by contradictory demands for cohesion at distinct poetic levels. The situation is again precisely comparable to the problematic of books 3 and 4, where we observed a contradiction between the internal norm of thematic 'syntax' and the global norm of broader tradition. Nagy has pointed out that the narrative of the duel breaks down at the precise point that the 'grammar' of epic combat prescribes victory for Aeneas, an outcome that obviously cannot be permitted by the larger demands of the narrative. The *Iliad* even presumes to rewrite that grammar (by suggesting that Achilles' armor would have warded off what, as a rule, should have been a fatal blow) before rescuing the disaster-bound narrative by sending in Poseidon as a literal *deus ex machina*.[96] He takes up the mission that Athena had performed in Book 4 and that is customarily hers throughout the poem—that is, he undertakes to return the narrative to an acceptable course.

Poseidon's solution is to save the life of Aeneas by removing him from the battle—he thus fulfills the wishful divine impulse that Zeus had expressed in Book 16, and will express again in 22 (and that Aphrodite likewise fulfilled in the case of Alexander in Book 3). In this way, the poem is spared the painful task of deciding which goddess' son should meet his end. Now, it is the surprising fact that *Poseidon* acts on an

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[96] Nagy 1999: 274.

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impulse that is elsewhere attributed to Zeus that explains the importance of this scene to the process of restoring cohesion among the Olympians. I recall that the duel had begun with Poseidon's assertion that the gods should avoid direct involvement for the time being, but also an unambiguous declaration of his intent to intervene *on behalf of Achilles* if necessary (20.134 ff.). This intent was one of what the poem explicit describes as the competing *boulai* of the gods.[97] Now, however, he intervenes with an eye not to his own *boulê*, but to the requirements of fate:

ὢ πόποι ἦ μοι ἄχος μεγαλήτορος Αἰνείαο,
ὃς τάχα Πηλείωνι δαμεὶς Ἄϊδος δὲ κάτεισι
πειθόμενος μύθοισιν Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο,
νήπιος, οὐδέ τί οἱ χραισμήσει λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον.
ἀλλὰ τί ἢ νῦν οὗτος ἀναίτιος ἄλγεα πάσχει
μὰψ ἕνεκ' ἀλλοτρίων ἀχέων, κεχαρισμένα δ' αἰεὶ
δῶρα θεοῖσι δίδωσι τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν·
ἀλλ' ἄγεθ' ἡμεῖς πέρ μιν ὑπὲκ θανάτου ἀγάγωμεν,
μή πως καὶ Κρονίδης κεχολώσεται, αἴ κεν Ἀχιλλεὺς
τόνδε κατακτείνῃ· μόριμον δέ οἵ ἐστ' ἀλέασθαι . . .
<div align="right">20.293-302</div>

Alas, I feel *akhos* for great-hearted Aeneas,
who soon, subdued by the son of Peleus, will descend to Hades,
all because he obeyed the *muthoi* of lord Apollo,
the *nêpios*, nor will anything suffice to prevent dire destruction.
But why does this man, without fault, suffer pains
without reason, because of another's *akhea*, though he always
gives welcome gifts to the gods who hold wide heaven?
But come, let us take him out of death's way,
lest somehow the son of Kronos too should feel *kholos*, if Achilles
slays this man: it is allotted to him to escape . . .

It is as though Poseidon speaks with, or for, the voice of Zeus. Not only do his words overtly echo those of his brother on comparable occasions[98]; he also envisions the requirements of fate as the will of Zeus, and expresses the intention to avoid provoking

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[97] 20.153-4: ὣς οἵ μέν ῥ' ἑκάτερθε καθείατο μητιόωντες / βουλάς.

[98] For instance, Poseidon cites Aeneas' sacrifices, which is the same argument Zeus had offered in favor of saving both Troy and Hektor.

kholos by acting in accord with this will. Poseidon, the recalcitrant dissident, not only avoids taking a counter-consensual position—he actually acts in the interest of the will he had hitherto opposed.[99] There could be no more evident sign of cohesion. Moreover, it is worth noting that Poseidon's saving of Aeneas amounts also to an assertion that the cohesiveness of the 'Aeneas' tradition is *not* fundamentally at odds with the cohesiveness of the 'Achilles' tradition. The key is to understand that Achilles' story, as crystallized and expressed in his name, is the story of '*akhos* for the *laos*.'[100] This is precisely the story referred to by Poseidon when he states that there is no need for Aeneas to suffer 'on accout of another's *akhea*.' In other words, Aeneas may live on in his own tradition without disturbing the tradition of the *Iliad* in progress.

In order to fully appreciate the way the Aeneas figure, as presented in the *Iliad*, represents the continuity or preservation of cohesion in spite of the threat posed by competing claims, it is necessary to remind ourselves of what *his* name means. As I pointed out at the end of the last chapter, *Aineias* is a derivative of *ainê*, an Ionic biform of *ainos*: Aeneas is the 'man of *ainos*.' If Achilles' story is the story of *akhos*, Aeneas' is the story of the cohesiveness of utterances. And it is by preserving this principle of cohesion that the gods restore *ainos* to the Olympian sphere. Admittedly, 'peace breaks out' with even greater violence in the next book, when the *theomakhia* begins in earnest. But the Olympian theater of war also stages a signal act of collaboration among the gods,

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[99] My argument about the poetic motivation for Poseidon's intervention is not in conflict with the argument about the timing of events put forward by Nagy 1999: 268; I view this as a case of the so-called 'double determination' of a thematically significant event. I do, however, disagree with Nagy's assertion that "the rescue by Poseidon puts the act *above* taking sides" (ibid.; emphasis original). For me, the significance of the act lies precisely in Poseidon's crossing from one side to the other.

[100] This etymology of Ἀχιλλεύς was proposed by Palmer 1963 79; cf. Sinos 1980: 9, and now Nagy 2004: 131-7.

perhaps the single instance where we witness the manifestation of a true divine consensus. When Achilles, in his struggle with Skamandros, is moved to such depths of despair that he expresses the wish to have been killed by Hektor—he wishes, in other words, that the very foundation of the epic be overturned—Poseidon and Athena appear to him in order to strengthen his resolve (and perhaps to re-harmonize the poem's protagonist with his tradition). Their intervention on this occasion is explicitly presented as a moment of cooperation between the opposition and the establishment:

Πηλείδη μήτ' ἄρ τι λίην τρέε μήτέ τι τάρβει·
τοίω γάρ τοι νῶϊ θεῶν ἐπιτάρροθω εἰμὲν
Ζηνὸς ἐπαινήσαντος ἐγὼ καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη·
$$21.288\text{-}290$$

Son of Peleus, do not tremble overmuch, nor feel an ounce of fear:
for you have as helpers no less than we two gods,
Pallas Athena and I, and Zeus has expressed epainos.

This cooperation is the result and expression of the social cohesion of epainos. Significantly, this is the single instance in the poem where epaineô is construed with a singular subject. This is not, however, a violation of the rule that epainos is always collective, for Zeus, as we have seen, functions as a kind of projection or embodiment of the gods taken as a group.[101] Rather, the unusual syntax is an indication that the cohesion of the divine community has at last been reestablished, for Zeus can stand as a singular, not a divided, subject.

This epainos, of course, is presented as a fait accompli. Neither here nor in Book 22 do we witness the actual moment at which consensus is reestablished. But at last we understand what change in Olympian dynamics has removed all trace of discord by the

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[101] Cf above, p. 229. To the Iliadic representation of Zeus as singular subject of epainos (which is of course an act of reception, even here), one should compare the Hesiodic representation of Zeus as an 'audience of one' for the Muses' performance (Th. 37, 51).

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time the divine council convenes to consider the fate of Hektor. The encounter between

Achilles and Aeneas is the crucible in which the divergent elements of Olympian society

are fused. The name of Aeneas is as close as the *Iliad* comes to naming the restoration of

consensus among the gods (as the *ainoi* of Nestor and Antilokhos in Book 23 are as close

as the poem comes to naming the newly integrative *epainos* of the Greeks.) We should

take note of the fact that the catalyst of this fusion belongs not to the Greek sphere but to

the Trojan. The embodiment of *ainos* that restores functionality to the divine social

structure is, contrary to our expectation, not a Greek at all: just as in the case of the

exceptional consensus of Book 18, the rehabilitation of *epainos* is displaced onto the

Trojans.

The solution to the question I posed at the end of Chapter 3 and again in this

chapter—namely, how does the *Iliad* represent a rehabilitation of consensus that it defers

or just simply avoids in the context of its main sociological interest, the Greek

community (and the divine superstructure that mirrors it)—now becomes clear. The

answer is: by displacing it to Troy. But what about the question of that deferral (which I

have myself consciously deferred until the end of my discussion)? How do we account

for the poem's strange reluctance to attribute a definitive *epainos* to the community that

wants it most, and with which, we assume, the poem stands in greatest sympathy? Surely

the problem cannot be explained away by the hypothesis I suggested earlier, that *epainos*

must be deferred in order for the poem to continue insofar as the 'monumental theme' is

coextensive with the duration of Achilles' *neikos*—after all, the narrative continues for

804 verses after the close of Book 23's systematic restoration of the Achaean social

system.[102] What then motivates the *Iliad*'s abhorrence for what my entire poetic analysis

has suggested to be a necessity?

The answer to this question has, I think, already been intimated by my comments

on the reasons why the duel between Achilles and Aeneas focuses such intense interest

both for characters within the epic and for the external audience. The emotional power of

the conflict between two sons of goddesses derives from the story that lies in the

immediate background of the *Iliad*, that is, so to speak, just barely visible on the

horizon—the story of the *Aithiopis*, the story of Achilles' death. This terrible horizon is

an object of fascination for the *Iliad* (thus the many reflections and refractions of the

Aithiopis that neoanalysis has so usefully brought to light[103]), but also an object from

which the poem continuously tries to avert its gaze. It is the trauma of the death of the

Achilles figure that elevates the duel of Book 20 to a position of such crucial importance,

making of Aeneas the focus of the problematics of cohesion, and that propels Poseidon to

discover the much longed-for solution of preserving cohesion by saving the life of the

embodiment of sociality.

The story of Achilles' death: when we look to the structure and thematic content

of the *Aithiopis* (our knowledge of which derives virtually entirely from Proclus'

summary [pp. 105-6 Allen]), we recognize that this poem was defined by the dynamics of

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[102] It is instructive to compare the analogous structure of the *Odyssey*, which has seemed to many to include an 'extra' final book.

[103] "Neoanalysis is a critical approach to the *Iliad* which takes into account the stories and themes of the epic cycle as sources of or as background for the Homeric poem" (Clark 1986: 379). For critical summaries of the main connections between the *Iliad* and the *Aithiopis* pointed out by neoanalysts, see Fenik 1968: 229-240, Clark 1986: 380 and Seaford 1994: 154 ff. I must emphasize that when I speak of the *Iliad*'s awareness of the *Aithiopis*, I mean an awareness of the tradition that ultimately produced the text known in antiquity as the *Aithiopis*, not an awareness of the text itself (cf. Kullmann 1977: 542; Nagy 1999 *passim*). This is only one of several ways in which my position departs from the general tenor of neoanalysis.

social cohesion as much or more so than the *Iliad*—and certainly more so than any other poem in the Trojan cycle. The narrative begins with a conflict between Achilles and his literal double, Penthesileia, whose name also means '*penthos / akhos* for the *laos*.'[104] In this case, however, the stories of these parallel heroes seem fundamentally at odds or fatefully intertwined: there can be no question of exempting one from 'the *akhea* of others,' and Achilles kills his antagonist. This unresolvable conflict of parallel poetic themes leads immediately to the breakdown of social cohesion among the Greeks, as manifested, in the first place, by the failure of verbal cohesion: Thersites, the archetypal figure of discord, mounts an *oneidos* against Achilles that attributes to the latter not an antagonism with Penthesileia, but an erotic attraction (τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ Πενθεσιλείᾳ λεγόμενον ἔρωτα ["the alleged *erôs* for Penthesileia"], Allen 105.26-7). Thersites' divisive utterance amounts, in a way, to a dangerous conflict of poetic worldviews, for he has so to speak rewritten epic heroics as lyric erotics. In this way, he threatens not only to undermine the Achaean social structure, but to undermine the very generic conventions of their epic world. The poetic conflict is again irreconcilable, and Achilles kills Thersites. As before, however, the killing only galvanizes dissonance: καὶ ἐκ τούτου στάσις γίνεται τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς περὶ τοῦ Θερσίτου φόνου ("and from this *stasis* arises among the Achaeans over the murder of Thersites," Allen 105.27-8). This *stasis* provides the reason for Achilles' withdrawal, as he must seek purification on Lesbos.[105] The

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[104] Nagy 1999: 69-70; in the system of Homeric phraseology, *penthos* is a double for *akhos*.

[105] *Contra* Seaford 1994: 155n.47 (cf. 158), it seems to me clear that Achilles' withdrawal in the *Aithiopis* was due to the *miasma* of murder, and not to Thetis' prophecy (which Achilles ignores in the *Iliad*). Two arguments support my position. In the first place, *miasma* is an appropriate parallel for *mênis*: Apollo's *mênis* results in a plague, and elsewhere in Greek tradition plague is a possible consequence of the pollution of murder (I think of the plague that opens Soph. *O.T.*). Secondly, if we suppose that Achilles' withdrawal was caused by the pollution, then Odysseus occupies the same position in both traditions as

heterogeneity of pollution can only be removed by the Achaeans' specialist of cohesion, Odysseus, who thus bears responsibility, here too, for finally exorcising the dissonance caused by Thersites (καθαίρεται τοῦ φόνου ὑπ' 'Οδυσσέως ["he is purified of the murder by Odysseus"], Allen 106.1). From this point on Achilles' reintegration proceeds along lines strictly analogous to the last third of the *Iliad*: Memnon, son of Dawn, kills Antilokhos; Achilles, advised of his own imminent demise, reenters the battle to kill Memnon. But the *Aithiopis* adds as well the final element of this sequence, which the *Iliad* omits, namely the death of Achilles—the climactic event of the Trojan cycle.

Many of the events that punctuate the *Aithiopis'* drama of social dissolution and reintegration are refracted by the *Iliad*. And from the *Iliad* we can see that it was precisely the death and burial of Achilles that produced the ultimate reestablishment of social solidarity for the Achaean *laos* (at least until their ultimate dissolution in the *Nostoi*). Like the *Iliad*, the *Aithiopis* ended with a dramatic presentation of *thrênoi* for the central hero.[106] The social function of those *thrênoi* is reflected by the social function the *Iliad* attributes to the final sequence of laments for Hektor. As we have seen throughout this study, the key to understanding the social function of any performative in Homeric poetics is to observe the way the poetry marks its reception. The social dynamics of the three laments for Hektor—of Andromakhê, Hekabê, and Helen,

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restorer of social integrity. There is no comparable act of reintegration if Achilles withdrew in the *Aithiopis* simply out of reluctance to meet his fated end.

[106] Here again I take issue with Seaford 1994: 177 (whose emphasis, however, is on the reconciliation with Priam): "The ending of the *Iliad* . . . has no counterpart in the *Memnonis*." We should take note of the fact that the *Aithiopis* included also, immediately following the funeral, the quarrel over the arms of Achilles. Thus the final integrative events of the poem "may have expressed the unity of the Greeks, but if so, then they contrasted not with what preceded them, as in the *Iliad*, but with what followed" (Seaford 1994: 162).

respectively—and the process by which they ultimately restore the solidarity of the

Trojan community are clearly demarcated by the reception each lament receives:

Andromakhê:

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίουσ', ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες
24.746

Thus she spoke, lamenting, and the women cried out in response

Hekabê:

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίουσα, γόον δ' ἀλίαστον ὄρινε
24.760

Thus she spoke, lamenting, and she stirred unceasing lamentation

Helen:

ὣς ἔφατο κλαίουσ', ἐπὶ δ' ἔστενε δῆμος ἀπείρων
24.776

Thus she spoke, lamenting, and the boundless dêmos cried in response

It is fascinating to observe that this sequence of responses actually recapitulates the

global sequence of dissolution and reintegration that characterizes the poem as a whole,

as well as self-contained episodes such as Book 2. The reception that greets

Andromakhê's lament implies a certain limited cohesion, the cohesion of one single

segment of Trojan society—but the very restriction of this cohesion draws attention to the

boundaries that segment the Trojan community.[107] Hekabê's lament, curiously, provokes

a fundamentally atomized, disintegrated response (see above, pp. 207-8, on the semantics

of orinô). But the Trojan community—the dêmos as a whole, without limitation

(ἀπείρων)—is at last and definitively reconstituted by the response to Helen's

performance.

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[107] Even outside Book 24, lamentation serves the function of delineating segments of society. Cf. the responses to Achilles' lament at 19.338 (ὣς ἔφατο κλαίων, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γέροντες) and to Priam's at 22.429 (ὣς ἔφατο κλαίων, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο πολῖται). On the integrative function of lamentation and funeral ritual, see Seaford 1994: 163 and 173.

I submit that precisely the same socially integrative force was attributed to the funeral of Achilles in the *Aithiopis*. In the *Iliad*, however, that integrative force is displaced to the Trojans.[108] In fact, as we have seen, all the dynamics of reintegration are displaced onto the Trojans—as are all the anxieties about the death of the hero. I stress that it is entirely possible to interpret the divine anxiety over the deaths of Sarpêdôn and Hektor as a *displaced* anxiety over the death of Achilles, since the repeated warnings about the fate of Achilles link all these deaths together in a causal chain. There is even a direct textual suggestion of such a pattern of displacement. When the poem explains the depth of feeling that prompts Zeus to rain drops of blood in honor of his son Sarpêdôn, it does so in language identical to the explanation offered for Thetis' deep sorrow for her own son. Compare

πᾶιδα φίλον τιμῶν, τόν οἱ Πάτροκλος ἔμελλε
φθίσειν ἐν Τροίη ἐριβώλακι, τηλόθι πάτρης
16.460-1

honoring his dear son, who at the hands of Patroklos was about
to perish in Troy of fertile soil, far from his fatherland

to

κλᾶιε μόρον ο͂υ παιδὸς ἀμύμονος, ὅς οἱ ἔμελλε
φθίσεσθ' ἐν Τροίη ἐριβώλακι, τηλόθι πάτρης.
24.85-6

She was lamenting the fate of her blameless son, who was about
to perish in Troy of fertile soil, far from his fatherland.

In the same way, one could understand the saving of Aeneas—the Trojan Achilles—as a kind of wish-fulfillment fantasy, by means of which the poem is able to project onto the Trojan sphere the avoidance of the disaster it knows to loom over the Greeks.

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[108] Notice that, again, the catalyst of a community's fusion is an *outsider*: Helen is a displacement within a displacement.

I suggest that this strategy of displacement, which is ultimately a coping strategy that allows the *Iliad* to deal with the great trauma lurking in the epic subconscious, provides the reason why the *Iliad* can never show the reestablishment of social cohesion, of *epainos*, among the Greeks. In the *Aithiopis*, the reestablishment of that cohesion is identical with the death and burial of Achilles. To envision the total reconstitution of consensus among the Greeks is also to envision the loss of their dearest hero. And this is a scene from which the *Iliad* must, ultimately, avert its gaze.

Conclusion

I set out to provide a reading of the *Iliad* that would elucidate the way in which a certain mode of political interaction, one characterized by the cooperative integration of all members of the community, is crucial to the poem's structure and thematics. That goal has, I think, been met by the interpretation I put forward in the last chapter. I do not claim that my analysis of *epainos* in the *Iliad* has exhausted the possibilities of interpretation. The framework I have constructed could fruitfully be applied to many other passages in the Homeric corpus, especially in the *Odyssey*, for I have only suggested some ways in which my reading could be extended to that poem. Nevertheless, that reading is coherent and self-sufficient; my case for a 'poetics of consent' in the *Iliad* here rests.

In my Introduction, however, I declared my intent not merely to describe the poetic texture of the poem, but also to suggest the ways in which the poem reveals or projects a much deeper interconnection between the 'politics of reception' and the 'poetics of consent.' That interconnection has already begun to emerge from the interpretation undertaken in Chapter 5, for we have seen that consensus is not just a poetic theme of crucial importance to the plot of the *Iliad*; in fact, the *Iliad* represents consensus as the political process that forms the plot itself. That is, it represents itself as the end result of an extended process of negotiation in which the global support of the group (principally the gods) is repeatedly tested. By way of concluding my discussion, I wish to reflect briefly on some of the possible implications of the distinctly self-reflexive

twist in the Iliadic treatment of *epainos*. The reader will forgive me if the comments that follow are necessarily more speculative than what has preceded.

I begin by noting, following Flaig, that there is something of a discrepancy between the *Iliad*'s representation of consensus as a political necessity and the realities of Greek political culture considered in its most general aspect, at least from the rise of the *polis* on.[1] Greeks of various city-states were undoubtedly aware of the general principles of consensus and the advantages those principles could potentially offer in the negotiation of competing interests; otherwise we would not find those principles so prominently put on display in the most authoritative poetic creation of Greek culture. Nevertheless, even the most distanced observer must admit that "an elite ethic that encourages rivalry and places the highest value on the preservation of personal honor and superiority leaves little room" for the operation of the mechanisms of consensus, which often requires individuals to subordinate personal preference to group will (or at least to coordinate the former with the latter).[2] This discrepancy will seem irreducible so long as we suppose that the Greek political experience—that is, the experience of engaging in the public life of the *polis*—was in fact the basis for the *Iliad*'s representation of consensus. The awkwardness of this clash between real-life politics and Iliadic poetics justifies our asking ourselves whether there is not some other possible vector for the introduction of the thematics of consensus into the *Iliad*. In other words, was there some other field or context, aside from the civic life of the *polis*, where the Greeks who received and

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[1] Cf. Flaig 1994: 30-1.

[2] Ibid. 30: "Ein Adelsethos, das zu rivalitärem Verhalten anhielt und die eigene Ehrwahrung und Überlegenheit obenan stellte, ließ der Entstehung der 'Disposition des Nachgebens' wenig Spielraum." For Flaig, this 'disposition to concede'—which I have described as the 'subordination' of interests—is an essential prerequisite for the practice of consensus politics.

transmitted the *Iliad* might have gained familiarity with the principles of consensus—and might have been convinced of their necessity in some respect?

I suggest that the seed-bed for the *Iliad*'s vision of consensus was not the practice of politics proper, but rather the set of para-political phenomena, tied to the development and negotiation of ties *between* city-states, that have come collectively to be known as Panhellenism.[3] A principal feature of this broad cultural movement, which saw the genesis of a variety of cultural forms and practices that transcended local difference and contributed to the creation of a more broadly 'Greek' identity, was the institution of Panhellenic religious festivals; these festivals were a prime locus for the performance and diffusion of the Homeric poems—indeed, in the view of many, it was performance in Panhellenic contexts that endowed the Homeric poems with their unique form and status.[4] Whether one considers institutions, ritual practice, or poetry, the tendency toward Panhellenism was distinguished by the screening out of local difference in favor of what is acceptable to the widest possible range of local audiences (in the case of the progressive diffusion of culture) or to the largest number of representatives of local communities (in the case of the 'instantaneous' distribution of culture, as at a festival at which Greeks from diverse communities are gathered). Participants in a Panhellenizing transaction were asked to look beyond local difference in favor of what appeals most broadly to the Greek community as a whole. That is to say, the general movement of

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[3] For a brief introduction to Panhellenism broadly conceived, see Nagy 1999: 7-9. An important part of the concept's foundation is Snodgrass' analysis of archaeological evidence for the increasing interconnection of Greek populations in the eight century (Snodgrass 1971, esp. 419 ff.).

[4] See Nagy 1990: 23; Bakker 1997: 31n.41.

Panhellenism represents a cultural dynamic that was precisely analogous to the political dynamic of consensus.

We can understand the diffusion and transmission of Homeric epic as a decision process. Our Homeric text is the end product of a series of re-performances, in which the selection of material for each successive performance was based on the reactions of audiences at previous performances. The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* are ultimately the result of a poetic 'decision' made collectively by generations of performers and audiences, each of whom participated, on the occasion of any given performance, in a decisive act of reception. These many agents of reception were certainly aware of the differences between the treatment of themes in Panhellenic epos and in their own local traditions—this tension between local and global interests is what gives the comparison of Panhellenism with political consensus its heuristic value. As a bearer of local tradition asked to approve an expression of cultural synthesis, an elite Greek in attendance at a Panhellenic festival featuring the performance of epic poetry would be participating in a cultural process for all intents and purposes identical to the politics of consensus. One thinks of the 'approval' garnered by Homer himself at the funeral games of Amphidamas, the stylized representation of a Panhellenic festival we find in the *Certamen*:

θαυμάσαντες δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τὸν "Ομηρον οἱ "Ελληνες ἐπῄνουν,[5]
ὡς παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γεγονότων τῶν ἐπῶν, καὶ ἐκέλευον διδόναι
τὴν νίκην. ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸν 'Ησίοδον ἐστεφάνωσεν . . .
ll. 205-8 Allen

At that, struck with wonder, the Hellenes expressed *epainos* for Homer, seeing as his verses exceeded what the context demanded, and they bid [the judges] to award him the victory. But the king gave the crown to Hesiod . . .

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[5] Note the way in which this prosaic use of *epaineô* conforms to the rules of Homeric discourse grammar: the imperfect of *epaineô* is the tense of 'exception,' of the non-fulfillment of the norm (above, Ch. 1 pp. 34-5).

The assembled Hellenes universally approve the poetry of Homer.[6] Interestingly, the

king Panêdês decides, after the fashion of Agamemnon, to pursue his own personal

preference (notwithstanding the Panhellenic overtones of his name). Does this decision

undercut the Panhellenic status of Homer? Not at all: the point of the story is precisely

that Homer *is* approved by the Panhellenic community (the *Hellênês*), which is here

contrasted with the narrow point of view of local tradition—Panêdês and his fellow

judges are explicitly identified as representatives of the local community of Khalkis,[7] in

contrast to the contestants and attendees at the games, who come from abroad. The story

expresses the certainty that, after all, it is the collective will of the group that matters, and

not the preference of any single individual.

The advantage of grounding the *Iliad*'s poetics of consensus in the cultural field

of Panhellenism, especially as experienced at large religious festivals featuring poetic

agônes, is not only that it provides a much more realistic source for the unambiguously

positive view of consensus dynamics we find in the Homeric poems. Linking in this way

Iliadic thematics with the institutional framework that structured the development of the

Iliad itself also provides an explanation for what is left unaccounted for in Flaig's view of

the poem as a "politische Reflexion in atheoretischer Form," namely, the reason why the

poem should so insistently connect *epainos* with the confirmation of epic tradition. If

Iliadic *epainos* is the expression of a cultural rather than political phenomenon, the reason

becomes clear: the poetic inflection of *epainos* accurately reflects the historical

experience that motivated the Homeric development of this theme. The *Iliad* sees

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[6] Cf. ll. 176-7: οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες πάντες τὸν Ὅμηρον ἐκέλευον στεφανοῦν...

[7] Ll. 68-9: τοῦ δὲ ἀγῶνος ἄλλοι τέ τινες τῶν ἐπισήμων Χαλκιδέων ἐκαθέζοντο κριταὶ καὶ μετ' αὐτῶν Πανήδης, ἀδελφὸς ὢν τοῦ τετελευτηκότος.

epainos as fundamental to the constitution of its own tradition precisely because it is, in a

very real sense, the product of *epainos*, of the consensus of the Panhellenic audiences

comprised by its history of reception.

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